Eyeballing the NSA 044

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  1. Eyeballing the NSA 044
  2.    
  3.    
  4.  “Defeat adversary cyber-security practices
  5. in order to acquire the SIGINT data we need
  6. from anyone, anytime, anywhere.”
  7.  
  8.   - NSA ; SIGINT Strategy 2012 - 2016
  9.  
  10.  
  11. ¤ A Look at the Inner Workings of NSA’s XKEYSCORE ::
  12.  
  13. http://cryptome.org/2015/07/nsa-xks-more-intercept-15-0701.7z
  14. http://cryptome.org/2015/07/nsa-xks-four-revised-intercept-15-0702.7z
  15. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/07/01/nsas-google-worlds-private-communications/
  16. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/07/02/look-under-hood-xkeyscore/
  17. _______________________________________
  18. ¤ NSA German Spying via WikiLeaks ::
  19.  
  20. https://wikileaks.org/nsa-germany/
  21. https://wikileaks.org/nsa-germany/intercepts/WikiLeaks_US_Bugs_Franco-German_EU_Financial_Crisis_Treaty.pdf
  22. https://wikileaks.org/nsa-germany/intercepts/WikiLeaks_Merkel_Bugged_Pondering_Greece_Crisis.pdf
  23. https://wikileaks.org/nsa-germany/intercepts/WikiLeaks_US_Bugs_Germany_Plotting_BRICS_Bailout_for_Greece.pdf
  24.  
  25. ¤ Attack on Press Freedom: SPIEGEL Targeted by NSA ::
  26.  
  27.  Revelations from WikiLeaks published this week show
  28. how boundlessly and comprehensively American intelligence
  29. services spied on the German government. It has now
  30. emerged that the US also conducted surveillance against
  31. Der SPIEGEL.
  32.  
  33. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-nsa-and-american-spies-targeted-spiegel-a-1042023.html
  34. _______________________________________
  35. ¤ NSA Brazil Spying via WikiLeaks ::
  36.  
  37. https://wikileaks.org/nsa-brazil/
  38. http://cryptome.org/2015/07/wl-nsa-brazil-01.jpg
  39. http://cryptome.org/2015/07/wl-nsa-brazil-02.jpg
  40. _______________________________________
  41. ¤ NSA French Spying via WikiLeaks ::
  42.  
  43. https://wikileaks.org/nsa-france/
  44. http://www.cryptome.org/2015/06/NSA-French-Spying-WikiLeaks-15-0623.pdf
  45. http://www.cryptome.org/2015/06/NSA-French-Spying-WikiLeaks-15-0629.pdf
  46. http://www.cryptome.org/2015/06/NSA-French-Spying-WikiLeaks-15-0629-2.pdf
  47. _______________________________________
  48. ¤ NSA Eyeballed NY Times During Bush Regime ::
  49.  
  50. http://cryptome.org/2015/06/nsa-nyt-warrantless-wiretap.pdf
  51. _______________________________________
  52. ¤ NSA Sifts Americans' Internet Traffic to Hunt Hackers ::
  53.  
  54. http://cryptome.org/2015/06/cyber-spy-nyt-15-0604.pdf
  55. http://www.propublica.org/article/new-snowden-documents-reveal-secret-memos-expanding-spying
  56. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/05/us/hunting-for-hackers-nsa-secretly-expands-internet-spying-at-us-border.html
  57. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/06/04/nsa-hackers-nyt-warrantless-surveillance/
  58. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  59. ¤ NSA Officials Privately Criticize “Collect It All” Surveillance ::
  60.  
  61.  AS MEMBERS OF CONGRESS struggle to agree on which surveillance
  62. programs to re-authorize before the Patriot Act expires, they
  63. might consider the unusual advice of an intelligence analyst
  64. at the National Security Agency who warned about the danger
  65. of collecting too much data. Imagine, the analyst wrote in
  66. a leaked document, that you are standing in a shopping aisle
  67. trying to decide between jam, jelly or fruit spread, which
  68. size, sugar-free or not, generic or Smucker’s. It can be
  69. paralyzing. ... ...
  70.  
  71. “We are drowning in information. And yet we know nothing.”
  72.  
  73.  – NSA (via SID Today) Intelligence Analyst
  74.  
  75. http://cryptome.org/2015/05/nsa-sid-today-intercept-15-0527.pdf
  76. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/05/28/nsa-officials-privately-criticize-collect-it-all-surveillance/
  77. http://www.infowars.com/current-nsa-officials-admit-agency-is-drowning-in-too-much-info/
  78. _______________________________________
  79. ¤ Joint NSA-BND Operation Eikonal Cable Tapping ::
  80.  
  81. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2015/05/new-details-about-joint-nsa-bnd.html
  82. _______________________________________
  83. ¤ NSA Planned to Hijack Google App Store to Hack Smartphones ::
  84.  
  85. http://cryptome.org/2015/05/5-eyes-cellspy-cbc-intercept-15-0521.pdf
  86. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2083944/uc-web-report-final-for-dc.pdf
  87. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/05/21/nsa-five-eyes-google-samsung-app-stores-spyware/
  88. http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/spy-agencies-target-mobile-phones-app-stores-to-implant-spyware-1.3076546
  89. _______________________________________
  90. ¤ NSA MEDINT Medical Spying (Bin Laden Intercept) ::
  91.  
  92. http://cryptome.org/2015/05/nsa-medint-intercept-15-0521.pdf
  93. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/05/21/nsa-plan-find-osama-bin-laden-infiltrating-medical-supply-chain/
  94.  
  95. ¤ NSA Bin Laden Intercept (NATO / JTAC / Black Budget) ::
  96.  
  97. http://cryptome.org/2015/05/nsa-sid-nato-intercept-15-0515.pdf
  98. http://cryptome.org/2015/05/jtac-attack-intercept-15-0515.pdf
  99. http://cryptome.org/2015/05/bin-laden-raid-intercept-15-0518.pdf
  100. http://cryptome.org/2015/05/nctc-terrorism-figures-intercept-15-0518.pdf
  101. _______________________________________
  102. ¤ ICWATCH: This Database Gathers the Resumes of 27,000
  103. Intelligence Workers ::
  104.  
  105. https://github.com/TransparencyToolkit/ICWATCH-Data
  106. https://transparencytoolkit.org/project/icwatch/
  107. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/08/25/icreach-nsa-cia-secret-google-crisscross-proton/
  108. https://motherboard.vice.com/read/this-database-gathers-the-resumes-of-27000-intelligence-workers
  109.  
  110. mirrored: #!gQ8EgbxZ!2hgGLnsfEK-Nss4nUImGL5nDr3QqxUhpqZZNd6TJL3o
  111. _______________________________________
  112. ¤ US Government Designated Prominent Al Jazeera Journalist
  113. as “Member of Al Qaeda” ::
  114.  
  115.  The document cites Zaidan as an example to demonstrate the
  116. powers of SKYNET, a program that analyzes location and
  117. communication data (or “metadata”) from bulk call records
  118. in order to detect suspicious patterns.
  119.  
  120.  In the Terminator movies, SKYNET is a self-aware military
  121. computer system that launches a nuclear war to exterminate
  122. the human race, and then systematically kills the survivors.
  123.  
  124.  According to the presentation, the NSA uses its version of
  125. SKYNET to identify people that it believes move like couriers
  126. used by Al Qaeda’s senior leadership. The program assessed
  127. Zaidan as a likely match, which raises troubling questions
  128. about the US government’s method of identifying terrorist
  129. targets based on metadata.
  130.  
  131.  It appears, however, that Zaidan had already been identified
  132. as an Al Qaeda member before he showed up on SKYNET’s radar.
  133. That he was already assigned a watch list number would seem
  134. to indicate that the government had a prior intelligence
  135. file on him. The Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment,
  136. or TIDE, is a US government database of over one million
  137. names suspected of a connection to terrorism, which is
  138. shared across the US intelligence community.
  139.  
  140. The presentation contains no evidence to explain the designation.
  141.  
  142. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/05/08/u-s-government-designated-prominent-al-jazeera-journalist-al-qaeda-member-put-watch-list/
  143.  
  144. ¤ NSA SKYNET Cloud Analytics-Courier Detection ::
  145.  
  146. http://cryptome.org/2015/05/nsa-skynet-intercept-15-0507.pdf
  147. _______________________________________
  148. ¤ How the NSA Converts Spoken Words Into Searchable Text ::
  149.  
  150.  Most people realize that emails and other digital communications
  151. they once considered private can now become part of their
  152. permanent record.
  153.  
  154.  But even as they increasingly use apps that understand what
  155. they say, most people don’t realize that the words they speak
  156. are not so private anymore, either.
  157.  
  158.  Top-secret documents from the archive of former NSA contractor
  159. Edward Snowden show the National Security Agency can now
  160. automatically recognize the content within phone calls by
  161. creating rough transcripts and phonetic representations that
  162. can be easily searched and stored.
  163.  
  164.  The documents show NSA analysts celebrating the development
  165. of what they called “Google for Voice” nearly a decade ago.
  166.  
  167. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/05/05/nsa-speech-recognition-snowden-searchable-text/
  168.  
  169.  ... the real solution is end-to-end encryption, preferably of
  170. the unbreakable kind.  https://whispersystems.org/
  171.  
  172. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/05/08/keep-nsa-computers-turning-phone-conversations-searchable-text/
  173.  
  174. ¤ NSA Converts Spoken Words Into Searchable Text Documents ::
  175.  
  176. http://cryptome.org/2015/05/nsa-black-budget-sid-rt10-wg-language-intercept-15-0504.pdf
  177. _______________________________________
  178. ¤ Declassified Report Shows Doubts About Value of NSA
  179. Warrantless Spying ::
  180.  
  181.  The secrecy surrounding the National Security Agency’s
  182. post-9/11 warrantless surveillance and bulk data collection
  183. program hampered its effectiveness, and many members of the
  184. intelligence community later struggled to identify any
  185. specific terrorist attacks it thwarted, a newly declassified
  186. document shows.
  187.  
  188.  The document is a lengthy report on a once secret NSA
  189. program code-named Stellarwind. The report was a joint
  190. project in 2009 by inspectors general for five intelligence
  191. and law enforcement agencies, and it was withheld from the
  192. public at the time, although a short, unclassified version
  193. was made public. The government released a redacted version
  194. of the full report to The New York Times on Friday evening
  195. in response to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit.
  196.  
  197. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/25/us/politics/value-of-nsa-warrantless-spying-is-doubted-in-declassified-reports.htm
  198.  
  199. ¤ NSA Stellar Wind OIG Analysis ::
  200.  
  201. http://cryptome.org/2015/04/nsa-stellar-wind-oig-nyt-15-0424.pdf
  202. _______________________________________
  203. ¤ NSA Torus Receivers of 35 Satellite Signals ::
  204.  
  205.  At three satellite facilities, in Britain, Cyprus and New Zealand,
  206. there's a special antenna that allows NSA's partner agencies a
  207. significant increase in their capability to collect satellite
  208. communications.
  209.  
  210.  This antenna is called Torus, and while conventional parabolic
  211. dish antennas can only view one satellite at a time, one single
  212. Torus antenna is able to receive the signals from up to 35
  213. communications satellites.
  214.  
  215.  These rare and expensive Torus antennas are used by some television
  216. networks, but a close look at photos of the Five Eyes satellite
  217. stations has now revealed the locations where Torus antennas are
  218. also used for gathering signals intelligence.
  219.  
  220. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2015/04/torus-antenna-to-significantly-increase.html
  221. _______________________________________
  222. ¤ CSEC Cyberwarfare Toolbox Revealed ::
  223.  
  224.  Top-secret documents obtained by the CBC show Canada’s
  225. electronic spy agency has developed a vast arsenal of
  226. cyberwarfare tools alongside its US and British counterparts
  227. to hack into computers and phones in many parts of the
  228. world, including in friendly trade countries like Mexico
  229. and hotspots like the Middle East. ... ...
  230.  
  231.  The CSE toolbox includes the ability to redirect someone
  232. to a fake website, create unrest by pretending to be
  233. another government or hacker, and siphon classified
  234. information out of computer networks, according to experts
  235. who viewed the documents. ... ...
  236.  
  237.  But the latest top-secret documents released to CBC News
  238. and The Intercept illustrate the development of a large
  239. stockpile of Canadian cyber-spy capabilities that go beyond
  240. hacking for intelligence, including:
  241.  
  242. • destroying infrastructure, which could include electricity,
  243. transportation or banking systems;
  244.  
  245. • creating unrest by using false-flags — ie. making a target
  246. think another country conducted the operation;
  247.  
  248. • disrupting online traffic by such techniques as deleting
  249. emails, freezing internet connections, blocking websites and
  250. redirecting wire money transfers.
  251.  
  252. http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/communication-security-establishment-s-cyberwarfare-toolbox-revealed-1.3002978
  253. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/03/23/canada-cse-hacking-cyberwar-secret-arsenal
  254.  
  255. ¤ CSEC Cyber Threats / Cyberwarfare Toolbox ::
  256.  
  257. http://cryptome.org/2015/03/csec-cyber-threats-cbc-15-0320.pdf
  258. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  259. ¤ NSA Releases William Friedman Papers ::
  260.  
  261. http://cryptome.org/2015/03/nsa-friedman-15-0323.pdf
  262. _______________________________________
  263. ¤ The CIA Campaign to Steal Apple’s Secrets ::
  264.  
  265. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/03/10/ispy-cia-campaign-steal-apples-secrets/
  266. http://www.infowars.com/new-snowden-documents-cia-has-spent-10-years-hacking-iphones-ipads/
  267.  
  268. ¤ NSA-CIA Apple DPA Cryptanalysis ::
  269.  
  270. http://cryptome.org/2015/03/nsa-apple-dpa-intercept-15-0309.zip
  271. _______________________________________
  272. ¤ Leaked Snowden Files Show Most of GCSB’s Targets Are NOT
  273. Security Threats to New Zealand (UPDATED SEVERAL TIMES) ::
  274.  
  275.  New Zealand’s electronic surveillance agency, the GCSB, has
  276. dramatically expanded its spying operations during the years
  277. of John Key's National Government and is automatically funnelling
  278. vast amounts of intelligence to the US National Security Agency,
  279. top-secret documents reveal.
  280.  
  281.  Since 2009, the Government Communications Security Bureau
  282. intelligence base at Waihopai has moved to “full-take collection”,
  283. indiscriminately intercepting Asia-Pacific communications and
  284. providing them en masse to the NSA through the controversial
  285. NSA intelligence system XKeyscore, which is used to monitor
  286. emails and internet browsing habits. ... ...
  287.  
  288.  New Zealand is selling out its close relations with the Pacific
  289. nations to be close with the United States, author Nicky Hager
  290. has said.
  291.  
  292.  Hager, in conjunction with the New Zealand Herald and the
  293. Intercept news site, revealed today how New Zealand’s spies
  294. are targeting the entire email, phone and social media
  295. communications of the country’s closest, friendliest and
  296. most vulnerable neighbours.
  297.  
  298.  This morning, Hager told Radio New Zealand that the documents
  299. revealed even more countries which New Zealand was spying on,
  300. and more information would come.
  301.  
  302.  “The Five Eyes countries led by the US are literally trying
  303. to spy on every country in the world ... and what we’re going
  304. to be hearing about in the next few days is New Zealand in all
  305. kinds of very surprising ways playing a role in that,” he said.
  306.  
  307. http://cryptome.org/2015/03/gcsb-xkeyscore-nz-herald-15-0305.pdf
  308. http://cryptome.org/2015/03/gcsb-xkeyscore-nz-herald-15-0306.pdf
  309. http://cryptome.org/2015/03/gcsb-xkeyscore-nz-star-times-15-0308.pdf
  310. http://cryptome.org/2015/03/nsa-nz-nz-herald-15-0310.pdf
  311. http://cryptome.org/2015/03/gcsb-solomons-nz-herald-15-0314.pdf
  312. http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11411759
  313. http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11411730
  314. http://media.nzherald.co.nz/webcontent/document/pdf/201513/WTO%20document.pdf
  315. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/03/04/new-zealand-gcsb-surveillance-waihopai-xkeyscore/
  316. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/15/new-zealand-gcsb-speargun-mass-surveillance/
  317. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/03/07/new-zealand-ironsand-waihopai-nsa-gcsb/
  318. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/03/22/new-zealand-gcsb-spying-wto-director-general/
  319. http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/67082905/snowden-files-inside-waihopais-domes
  320. https://leaksource.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/gcsb-asia-pacific-spying-five-eyes-nsa-xkeyscore.pdf
  321. https://leaksource.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/gcsb-provide-nsa-nz-data.pdf
  322. https://leaksource.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/gcsb-xks-ironsand-access-multiple-choice-test-check-box.pdf
  323. https://leaksource.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/gcsb-asd-nzsis-asis-south-pacific-spying-high-priority.pdf
  324. http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/national/267923/gcsb-in-mass-collection-of-pacific-data-ferguson
  325. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-31741564
  326. _______________________________________
  327. ¤ How NSA-GCHQ Stole the Keys to the Encryption Castle ::
  328.  
  329.  AMERICAN AND BRITISH spies hacked into the internal computer network
  330. of the largest manufacturer of SIM cards in the world, stealing
  331. encryption keys used to protect the privacy of cellphone communications
  332. across the globe, according to top-secret documents provided to The
  333. Intercept by National Security Agency whistleblower Edward Snowden.
  334.  
  335.  The hack was perpetrated by a joint unit consisting of operatives
  336. from the NSA and its British counterpart Government Communications
  337. Headquarters, or GCHQ. The breach, detailed in a secret 2010 GCHQ
  338. document, gave the surveillance agencies the potential to secretly
  339. monitor a large portion of the world’s cellular communications,
  340. including both voice and data.
  341.  
  342. http://cryptome.org/2015/02/gchq-pcs-harvesting-intercept-15-0219.pdf
  343. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/02/19/great-sim-heist/
  344. http://www.democracynow.org/2015/2/20/nsa_british_gchq_hacked_sim_card
  345. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/02/20/gemalto-heist-shocks-europe/
  346.  
  347. ¤ Gemalto Government National Mobile ID Schemes / Partners ::
  348.  
  349. http://cryptome.org/2015/02/gemalto-gov-national-mobile-id.pdf
  350.  
  351. http://cryptome.org/2015/02/gemalto-partner-list.htm
  352.  
  353. ¤ Gemalto Responds After SIM Encryption Key Heist Exposed ::
  354.  
  355. http://www.gemalto.com/press/Pages/Information-regarding-a-report-mentioning-a-hacking-of-SIM-card-encryption-keys.aspx
  356.  
  357. http://www.infowars.com/sim-card-producer-denies-any-real-risk-from-nsa-hacking-its-encryption-keys/
  358.  
  359. ¤ White House Responds After SIM Encryption Key Heist Exposed ::
  360.  
  361. MIRROR #1 http://postimg.org/image/yj37iju33/
  362.  
  363. MIRROR #2 https://pbs.twimg.com/media/B-U0B20CIAASRpq.png
  364. _______________________________________
  365. ¤ NSA’s “Equation Group” Firmware-imbedded Malware Found ::
  366.  
  367.  NSA stores secret imbedded malware inside the firmware of
  368. harddrives and USB(s).
  369.  
  370.  Malware can be used as a beacon once plugged into an air-gapped
  371. system and data can be accessed remotely while OFFLINE.
  372.  
  373.  Kaspersky’s reconstructions of the spying programs show that
  374. they could work in disk drives sold by more than a dozen
  375. companies, comprising essentially the entire market. They
  376. include Western Digital Corp, Seagate Technology Plc, Toshiba
  377. Corp, IBM, Micron Technology Inc and Samsung Electronics Co Ltd.
  378.  
  379.  Western Digital, Seagate and Micron said they had no knowledge
  380. of these spying programs. Toshiba and Samsung declined to comment.
  381. IBM did not respond to requests for comment.
  382.  
  383. http://cryptome.org/2015/02/nsa-equation-group.pdf
  384. http://www.stuff.co.nz/technology/digital-living/66279485/nsa-hiding-equation-spy-program-on-hard-drives
  385. https://news.yahoo.com/russian-researchers-expose-breakthrough-u-spying-program-194217480--sector.html
  386. http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/02/how-omnipotent-hackers-tied-to-the-nsa-hid-for-14-years-and-were-found-at-last/
  387. _______________________________________
  388. ¤ NY Times’ David Carr Snowden Interview Hours Before Death ::
  389.  
  390. http://timestalks.com/laura-poitras-glenn-greenwald-edward-snowden.html
  391.  
  392. http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/David-Carr-died-New-York-Times-Snowden/2015/02/13/id/624700/
  393. _______________________________________
  394. ¤ NSA Claims Iran Learned from Western Cyberattacks ::
  395.  
  396. http://cryptome.org/2015/02/iran-gchq-intercept-15-0210.pdf
  397.  
  398. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/02/10/nsa-iran-developing-sophisticated-cyber-attacks-learning-attacks/
  399. _______________________________________
  400. ¤ White House Spy “Reform” - Increase Spying! Flaunt It! ::
  401.  
  402. An in-you’re-face attitude is now considered “reform.”
  403.  
  404. http://cryptome.org/2015/02/ic-ppd-28-15-0203.zip
  405.  
  406. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/01/29/one-year-major-report-nsa-still-collecting-bulk-domestic-data-still-clueless-much-good-surveillance/
  407. _______________________________________
  408. ¤ Hypocrisy of Youtube’s CitizenFour Censorship ::
  409.  
  410. http://piratetimes.net/new-snowden-documentary-censored-online/
  411.  
  412. ¤ Citizenfour Snowden Documentary (7-Zipped MP4) ::
  413.  
  414. http://cryptome.org/Citizenfour.7z
  415.  
  416. ¤ Citizenfour Snowden Documentary HD (7-Zip MP4) ::
  417.  
  418. http://cryptome.org/Citizenfour-HD.7z
  419.  
  420. ¤ Citizenfour Screengrabs, 87 PDFs in 13 Files ::
  421.  
  422. http://cryptome.org/2015/01/Citizenfour-Screengrabs-pdfs.7z
  423.  
  424. ¤ Citizenfour Screengrabs, 87 JPGs in 13 Folders ::
  425.  
  426. http://cryptome.org/2015/01/Citizenfour-Screengrabs.7z
  427. _______________________________________
  428. ¤ Western Spy Agencies Secretly Rely on Hackers for Intel ::
  429.  
  430. http://cryptome.org/2015/02/gchq-lovely-horse-intercept-15-0204.pdf
  431.  
  432. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/02/04/demonize-prosecute-hackers-nsa-gchq-rely-intel-expertise/
  433. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  434. ¤ CSEC Eyeballs File Sharing Host User Data ::
  435.  
  436. http://torrentfreak.com/canadian-government-spies-on-millions-of-file-sharers-150128/
  437. http://www.cbc.ca/news/cse-tracks-millions-of-downloads-daily-snowden-documents-1.2930120
  438. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/01/28/canada-cse-levitation-mass-surveillance
  439. http://motherboard.vice.com/read/how-canadian-spies-infiltrated-the-internets-core-to-watch-what-you-do-online?
  440.  
  441. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  442. ¤ NSA MORECOWBELL HTTP GET Attacking ::
  443.  
  444. http://cryptome.org/2015/01/nsa-morecowbell.htm
  445. http://cryptome.org/2015/01/MORECOWBELL.pdf
  446. http://cryptome.org/2015/01/MORECOWBELL-Analysis-Grothoff-etal.pdf
  447. http://cryptome.org/2015/01/Wertheim-NSA-and-Encryption-NotiAMS-Feb15.pdf
  448. http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/visuel/2015/01/24/cowbells-nouvelles-revelations-sur-les-pratiques-de-la-nsa_4561547_3234.html
  449. _______________________________________
  450. ¤ Compilation of Snowden Documents - January 30, 2015 ::
  451.  
  452. https://github.com/nsa-observer/documents/archive/master.zip
  453.  
  454. https://github.com/nsa-observer/documents/tree/master/files/pdf
  455. _______________________________________
  456. ¤ How GCHQ Prepares Interception of Phone Calls From Satellites ::
  457.  
  458. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2015/01/how-gchq-prepares-for-interception-of.html
  459. _______________________________________
  460. ¤ NSA Documents Expose NSA’s Digital Arms Race for Cyber Warfare ::
  461.  
  462.  The NSA’s mass surveillance is just the beginning. Documents from
  463. Edward Snowden show that the intelligence agency is arming America
  464. for future digital wars -- a struggle for control of the Internet
  465. that is already well underway.
  466.  
  467.  Normally, internship applicants need to have polished resumes,
  468. with volunteer work on social projects considered a plus. But at
  469. Politerain, the job posting calls for candidates with significantly
  470. different skill sets. We are, the ad says, “looking for interns who
  471. want to break things.”
  472.  
  473.  Politerain is not a project associated with a conventional company.
  474. It is run by a US government intelligence organization, the National
  475. Security Agency (NSA). More precisely, it’s operated by the NSA’s
  476. digital snipers with Tailored Access Operations (TAO), the department
  477. responsible for breaking into computers.
  478.  
  479.  Potential interns are also told that research into third party
  480. computers might include plans to “remotely degrade or destroy
  481. opponent computers, routers, servers and network enabled devices
  482. by attacking the hardware.” Using a program called Passionatepolka,
  483. for example, they may be asked to “remotely brick network cards."
  484. With programs like Berserkr they would implant “persistent backdoors”
  485. and “parasitic drivers.” Using another piece of software called
  486. Barnfire, they would “erase the BIOS on a brand of servers that
  487. act as a backbone to many rival governments.”
  488.  
  489.  An intern’s tasks might also include remotely destroying the
  490. functionality of hard drives. Ultimately, the goal of the internship
  491. program was “developing an attacker’s mindset.”
  492.  
  493.  The internship listing is eight years old, but the attacker’s mindset
  494. has since become a kind of doctrine for the NSA’s data spies. And the
  495. intelligence service isn’t just trying to achieve mass surveillance
  496. of Internet communication, either. The digital spies of the Five Eyes
  497. alliance -- comprised of the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia
  498. and New Zealand -- want more.
  499.  
  500. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/new-snowden-docs-indicate-scope-of-nsa-preparations-for-cyber-battle-a-1013409.html
  501.  
  502. ¤ Der Spiegel Releases NSA’s Plans for Cyber Warfare ::
  503.  
  504. http://cryptome.org/2015/01/spiegel-15-0117.7z
  505. _______________________________________
  506. ¤ Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA’s War on Internet Security ::
  507.  
  508.  US and British intelligence agencies undertake every effort imaginable
  509. to crack all types of encrypted Internet communication. The cloud, it
  510. seems, is full of holes. The good news: New Snowden documents show that
  511. some forms of encryption still cause problems for the NSA. ... ...
  512.  
  513.  As one document from the Snowden archive shows, the NSA had been
  514. unsuccessful in attempts to decrypt several communications protocols,
  515. at least as of 2012. An NSA presentation for a conference that took
  516. place that year lists the encryption programs the Americans failed to
  517. crack. In the process, the NSA cryptologists divided their targets
  518. into five levels corresponding to the degree of the difficulty of the
  519. attack and the outcome, ranging from “trivial” to “catastrophic.”
  520.  
  521.  Monitoring a document’s path through the Internet is classified as
  522. “trivial.” Recording Facebook chats is considered a “minor” task,
  523. while the level of difficulty involved in decrypting emails sent
  524. through Moscow-based Internet service provider mail.ru is considered
  525. “moderate.” Still, all three of those classifications don’t appear to
  526. pose any significant problems for the NSA.
  527.  
  528.  Things first become troublesome at the fourth level. The presentation
  529. states that the NSA encounters “major” problems in its attempts to
  530. decrypt messages sent through heavily encrypted email service providers
  531. like Zoho or in monitoring users of the Tor network, which was
  532. developed for surfing the web anonymously. Tor, otherwise known as
  533. The Onion Router, is free and open source software that allows users
  534. to surf the web through a network of more than 6,000 linked volunteer
  535. computers. The software automatically encrypts data in a way that
  536. ensures that no single computer in the network has all of a user’s
  537. information. For surveillance experts, it becomes very difficult to
  538. trace the whereabouts of a person who visits a particular website or
  539. to attack a specific person while they are using Tor to surf the Web.
  540.  
  541.  The NSA also has “major” problems with Truecrypt, a program for
  542. encrypting files on computers. Truecrypt’s developers stopped their
  543. work on the program last May, prompting speculation about pressures
  544. from government agencies. A protocol called Off-the-Record (OTR) for
  545. encrypting instant messaging in an end-to-end encryption process also
  546. seems to cause the NSA major problems. Both are programs whose source
  547. code can be viewed, modified, shared and used by anyone. Experts agree
  548. it is far more difficult for intelligence agencies to manipulate open
  549. source software programs than many of the closed systems developed by
  550. companies like Apple and Microsoft. Since anyone can view free and
  551. open source software, it becomes difficult to insert secret back doors
  552. without it being noticed. Transcripts of intercepted chats using OTR
  553. encryption handed over to the intelligence agency by a partner in
  554. Prism -- an NSA program that accesses data from at least nine American
  555. internet companies such as Google, Facebook and Apple -- show that
  556. the NSA’s efforts appear to have been thwarted in these cases: “No
  557. decrypt available for this OTR message.” This shows that OTR at least
  558. sometimes makes communications impossible to read for the NSA.
  559.  
  560.  Things become “catastrophic” for the NSA at level five - when, for
  561. example, a subject uses a combination of Tor, another anonymization
  562. service, the instant messaging system CSpace and a system for Internet
  563. telephony (voice over IP) called ZRTP. This type of combination results
  564. in a “near-total loss/lack of insight to target communications, presence,”
  565. the NSA document states.
  566.  
  567.  ZRTP, which is used to securely encrypt conversations and text chats
  568. on mobile phones, is used in free and open source programs like RedPhone
  569. and Signal. “It’s satisfying to know that the NSA considers encrypted
  570. communication from our apps to be truly opaque,” says RedPhone developer
  571. Moxie Marlinspike.
  572.  
  573. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html
  574.  
  575. ¤ NSA Attacks on VPN, SSL, TLS, SSH, Tor ::
  576.  
  577. http://cryptome.org/2014/12/nsa-spiegel-14-1228.rar
  578. _______________________________________
  579. ¤ Operation Socialist ; How GCHQ Spies Hacked Belgium’s Largest Telco ::
  580.  
  581. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/12/13/belgacom-hack-gchq-inside-story/
  582.  
  583. ¤ GCHQ Belgacom Telecom Hacking (ZIP) ::
  584.  
  585.  Slides show Canada’s intelligence agency, CSEC, was involved in helping
  586. GCHQ intercept Belgacom communications. It also proves 3rd party cookies
  587. are very much instrumental in being used to exploit information about IPs.
  588.  
  589. http://cryptome.org/2014/12/gchq-belgacom-intercept-14-1213.zip
  590. _______________________________________
  591. ¤ Keith Alexander’s Anti-spy Patent Leaked ::
  592.  
  593. http://cryptome.org/2014/12/nsa-alexander-patent-14-1125.pdf
  594.  
  595. ¤ Keith Alexander Now Works To Secure Banking Networks ::
  596.  
  597. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-20/ex-nsa-chief-pitches-advice-on-cyber-threats-to-the-banks.html
  598. _______________________________________
  599. ¤ Operation AURORAGOLD: How the NSA Hacks Cellphone Networks Worldwide ::
  600.  
  601.  Codenamed AURORAGOLD, the covert operation has monitored the content of
  602. messages sent and received by more than 1,200 email accounts associated
  603. with major cellphone network operators, intercepting confidential company
  604. planning papers that help the NSA hack into phone networks.
  605.  
  606.  One high-profile surveillance target is the GSM Association, an influential
  607. UK-headquartered trade group that works closely with large US-based firms
  608. including Microsoft, Facebook, AT&T, and Cisco, and is currently being
  609. funded by the US government to develop privacy-enhancing technologies.
  610.  
  611.  Karsten Nohl, a leading cellphone security expert and cryptographer who
  612. was consulted by The Intercept about details contained in the AURORAGOLD
  613. documents, said that the broad scope of information swept up in the operation
  614. appears aimed at ensuring virtually every cellphone network in the world is
  615. NSA accessible.
  616.  
  617. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/12/04/nsa-auroragold-hack-cellphones/
  618.  
  619. ¤ NSA Operation AURORAGOLD Slides ::
  620.  
  621. http://cryptome.org/2014/12/nsa-aurora-gold-intercept-14-1203.pdf
  622.  
  623. ¤ NSA OPULANT PUP Circumventing Strong Cryptography ::
  624.  
  625.  Last year, the Washington Post reported that the NSA had already managed
  626. to break the most commonly used cellphone encryption algorithm in the world,
  627. known as A5/1. But the information collected under AURORAGOLD allows the
  628. agency to focus on circumventing newer and stronger versions of A5 cellphone
  629. encryption, such as A5/3.
  630.  
  631. http://cryptome.org/2014/12/nsa-opulant-pup-intercept-14-1203.pdf
  632. _______________________________________
  633. ¤ Germany’s Intelligence Agency, the BND, Spies On Civilians Too ::
  634.  
  635.  German MPs examining the surveillance activities the US National
  636. Security Agency have found a legal loophole that allows the Berlin’s
  637. foreign intelligence agency to spy on its own citizens.
  638.  
  639.  The agency, known by its German acronym BND, is not usually allowed
  640. to intercept communications made by Germans or German companies, but a
  641. former BND lawyer told parliament this week that citizens working abroad
  642. for foreign companies were not protected.
  643.  
  644.  The German government confirmed on Saturday that work-related calls
  645. or emails were attributed to the employer. As a result, if the employer
  646. is foreign, the BND could legally intercept them.
  647.  
  648.  Angela Merkel pretends to be outraged about industrial espionage by
  649. the NSA while condoning illegal surveillance itself.
  650.  
  651. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/29/german-loophole-allows-bnd-agency-spy-own-people
  652. http://www.infowars.com/like-the-nsa-and-gchq-germanys-foreign-intelligence-agency-uses-a-legal-loophole-to-spy-on-its-own-citizens/
  653. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20141202/09513729296/like-nsa-gchq-germanys-foreign-intelligence-agency-uses-legal-loophole-to-spy-its-own-citizens.shtml
  654. _______________________________________
  655. ¤ How Vodafone-Subsidiary Telecom Aided GCHQ’s Spying Efforts ::
  656.  
  657.  Previously unpublished documents show how the UK telecom firm Cable
  658. & Wireless, acquired by Vodafone in 2012, played a key role in
  659. establishing one of the Government Communications Headquarters’
  660. (GCHQ) most controversial surveillance programs.
  661.  
  662.  A joint investigation by NDR, WDR, Süddeutsche Zeitung and Channel 4
  663. based on documents leaked by whistleblower Edward Snowden, reveals
  664. that Cable & Wireless actively shaped and provided the most data to
  665. GCHQ mass surveillance programs, and received millions of pounds in
  666. compensation. The documents also suggest that Cable & Wireless
  667. assisted GCHQ in breaking into a competitor’s network.
  668.  
  669.  In response to these allegations, Vodafone said that an internal
  670. investigation found no evidence of unlawful conduct, but the company
  671. would not deny it happened.
  672.  
  673. http://www.channel4.com/news/spy-cable-revealed-how-telecoms-firm-worked-with-gchq
  674. http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/snowden-vodafone-101.html
  675. http://www1.wdr.de/daserste/monitor/videos/videovodafonederlangearmdesbritischengeheimdienstes100.html
  676. http://international.sueddeutsche.de/post/103543418200/snowden-leaks-how-vodafone-subsidiary-cable
  677.  
  678. ¤ GCHQ’s Vodafone Cable Master List ::
  679.  
  680. https://netzpolitik.org/2014/cable-master-list-wir-spiegeln-die-snowden-dokumente-ueber-angezapfte-glasfasern-auch-von-vodafone/
  681.  
  682. ¤ GCHQ Vodafone Gerontic Cables & Slides ::
  683.  
  684. http://cryptome.org/2014/11/vodafone-gchq-slides.pdf
  685. http://cryptome.org/2014/11/vodafone-gchq-netzpolitik-slides-14-1125.pdf
  686. http://cryptome.org/2014/11/vodafone-gchq-netzpolitik-cables-14-1125.pdf
  687.  
  688. ¤ GCHQ Vodafone Gerontic Cables & Slides ZIPPED ::
  689.  
  690. http://cryptome.org/2014/11/Gerontic_GCHQ_SZ.zip
  691.  
  692. ¤ INCENSER: How NSA and GCHQ Are Tapping Internet Cables ::
  693.  
  694. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fi/2014/11/incenser-or-how-nsa-and-gchq-are.html
  695. _______________________________________
  696. ¤ Microsoft SkyDrive (aka OneDrive) Gateway Into NSA PRISM ::
  697.  
  698. http://cryptome.org/2014/11/ms-onedrive-nsa-prism.htm
  699.  
  700.  NOTE: Anything uploaded to “the cloud” is going to be available
  701. for the government to snoop through, the new Apple iphone gadgets
  702. automatically upload all users’ personal files into “the cloud”
  703. and yes, looks like Microsoft is also doing it as well.
  704.  
  705.  You might want to avoid using these new systems, go back to using
  706. older desktop computers which are rather easy to fortify. As for
  707. phones, you can buy an old jitterbug phone - it’s a basic cellphone
  708. without all the other crap included - just plain oldschool, mofos!
  709. And add one more thing - a “Blockit Pocket.” ;)
  710. _______________________________________
  711. ¤ German Investigation of the Cooperation Between NSA-BND Part 1 ::
  712.  
  713. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/11/german-investigation-of-cooperation.html
  714. _______________________________________
  715. ¤ UK Lawyers Spied by GCHQ Spies ::
  716.  
  717. http://cryptome.org/2014/11/uk-lawyers-spies-intercept-14-1106.pdf
  718.  
  719. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/11/06/uk-surveillance-of-lawyers-journalists-gchq/
  720. _______________________________________
  721. ¤ The German Operation Eikonal Part of NSA’s RAMPART-A Program ::
  722.  
  723.  Just over a week ago, the regional German paper Süddeutsche Zeitung
  724. and the regional broadcasters NDR and WDR came with a story saying that
  725. between 2004 and 2008, the German foreign intelligence service BND had
  726. tapped into the Frankfurt internet exchange DE-CIX and shared the
  727. intercepted data with the NSA. As not all communications of German
  728. citizens could be filtered out, this is considered a violation of the
  729. constitution.
  730.  
  731.  Here we will give a summary of what is currently known about this BND
  732. operation and we will combine this with information from earlier reports.
  733. This will show that it was most likely part of the RAMPART-A program of
  734. the NSA, which includes similar interception efforts by foreign partner
  735. agencies. Finally, we will look at where exactly the BND interception
  736. might have taken place.
  737.  
  738. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/10/the-german-operation-eikonal-as-part-of.html
  739. ---------------------------------------
  740. ¤ How Secret Partners Expand NSA’s Surveillance Dragnet ::
  741.  
  742. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/06/18/nsa-surveillance-secret-cable-partners-revealed-rampart-a/
  743. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140619/08062627624/nsa-working-with-denmark-germany-to-access-three-terabits-data-per-second-overseas-cables.shtml
  744. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-uses-33-countries-to-intercept-web-traffic-snowden-files/
  745. http://gigaom.com/2014/06/20/governments-let-nsa-tap-cables-on-their-territory-latest-snowden-revelations-show/
  746.  
  747. ¤ Foreign Partner Access to Black Budget FY 2013 ::
  748.  
  749. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200866/foreignpartneraccessbudgetfy2013-redacted.pdf
  750.  
  751. ¤ Overview Presenting the RAMPART-A Spy Program ::
  752.  
  753. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200860/odd-s3-overviewnov2011-v1-0-redacted-information.pdf
  754.  
  755. ¤ Three RAMPART-A Slides ::
  756.  
  757. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200865/uodds2overview-v1-1-redacted-information-dk.pdf
  758.  
  759. ¤ Black Budget FY 2013 / RAMPART-A Slides (Mirror) ::
  760.  
  761. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-intercept-14-0618.pdf
  762.  
  763. ¤ Update ; Intercept Releases More RAMPART-A Slides ::
  764.  
  765. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-information-intercept-14-0619.pdf
  766. _______________________________________
  767. ¤ Core Secrets: NSA Saboteurs in China and Germany
  768.  
  769.  The National Security Agency has had agents in China, Germany,
  770. and South Korea working on programs that use “physical subversion”
  771. to infiltrate and compromise networks and devices, according to
  772. documents obtained by The Intercept.
  773.  
  774.  The documents, leaked by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden, also
  775. indicate that the agency has used “under cover” operatives to gain
  776. access to sensitive data and systems in the global communications
  777. industry, and that these secret agents may have even dealt with
  778. American firms. The documents describe a range of clandestine field
  779. activities that are among the agency’s “core secrets” when it comes
  780. to computer network attacks, details of which are apparently shared
  781. with only a small number of officials outside the NSA.
  782.  
  783.  “It’s something that many people have been wondering about for a
  784. long time,” said Chris Soghoian, principal technologist for the
  785. American Civil Liberties Union, after reviewing the documents.
  786. “I’ve had conversations with executives at tech companies about
  787. this precise thing. How do you know the NSA is not sending people
  788. into your data centers?”
  789.  
  790.  Previous disclosures about the NSA’s corporate partnerships have
  791. focused largely on US companies providing the agency with vast amounts
  792. of customer data, including phone records and email traffic. But
  793. documents published today by The Intercept suggest that even as the
  794. agency uses secret operatives to penetrate them, companies have also
  795. cooperated more broadly to undermine the physical infrastructure of
  796. the internet than has been previously confirmed.
  797.  
  798.  In addition to so-called “close access” operations, the NSA’s “core
  799. secrets” include the fact that the agency works with US and foreign
  800. companies to weaken their encryption systems; the fact that the NSA
  801. spends “hundreds of millions of dollars” on technology to defeat
  802. commercial encryption; and the fact that the agency works with US
  803. and foreign companies to penetrate computer networks, possibly without
  804. the knowledge of the host countries. Many of the NSA’s core secrets
  805. concern its relationships to domestic and foreign corporations.
  806.  
  807.  Some of the documents in this article appear in a new documentary,
  808. CITIZENFOUR, which tells the story of the Snowden disclosures and is
  809. directed by Intercept co-founder Laura Poitras. The documents describe
  810. a panoply of programs classified with the rare designation of
  811. “Exceptionally Compartmented Information,” or ECI, which are only
  812. disclosed to a “very select” number of government officials.
  813.  
  814. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/10/10/core-secrets/
  815.  
  816. ¤ Top Secret Special Source Operations Classification Guides ::
  817.  
  818. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-whipgenie-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  819.  
  820. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-tarex-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  821.  
  822. ¤ Operation Sentry Eagle (Parts 1 & 2) ::
  823.  
  824. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-sentry-eagle-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  825.  
  826. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-sentry-eagle-2-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  827.  
  828. ¤ NSA Exceptionally Controlled Information ::
  829.  
  830. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-eci-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  831.  
  832. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-eci-pawleys-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  833.  
  834. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-eci-compartments-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  835.  
  836. ¤ NSA National Initiative Task Security (Parts 1 & 2) ::
  837.  
  838. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-nit-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  839.  
  840. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-nit-2-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  841.  
  842. ¤ NSA Computer Network Exploitation ::
  843.  
  844. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-cne-declass-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  845.  
  846. ¤ Following 10 NSA Releases (8.5MB | ZIP) ::
  847.  
  848. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-releases-the-intercept-14-1010.zip
  849. _______________________________________
  850. ¤ Retired NSA Technical Director Explains NSA Slides ::
  851.  
  852. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/www.alexaobrien.com/secondsight/wb/binney.html
  853.  
  854. ¤ Retired NSA Technical Director Explains NSA Slides (ZIP) ::
  855.  
  856. Includes the report and the slides.
  857.  
  858. http://fileb.ag/i627vr7a6bkx
  859. _______________________________________
  860. ¤ ACLU’s FOIA Documents Shed Light on One of the NSA’s Most
  861. Powerful Tools (Other Agencies and Legal Loopholes) ::
  862.  
  863. https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/new-documents-shed-light-one-nsas-most-powerful-tools
  864.  
  865. ¤ Overview of (Other) Signals Intelligence Authorities ::
  866.  
  867. https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/eo12333/NSA/Overview%20of%20Signals%20Intelligence%20Authorities.pdf
  868.  
  869. ¤ DoD-DIA’s 16 Legal Loopholes to Spy On US Persons ::
  870.  
  871. https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/eo12333/DIA/DoD%20HUMINT%20Legal%20Workshop%20Fundamentals%20of%20HUMINT%20Targeting.pdf
  872.  
  873. ¤ Intelligence Law Handbook Defense HUMINT Service ::
  874.  
  875. https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/eo12333/DIA/Intelligence%20Law%20Handbook%20Defense%20HUMINT%20Service.pdf
  876. _______________________________________
  877. ¤ NSA Spies on UN in Vienna ::
  878.  
  879. http://fm4.orf.at/stories/1746596/
  880. http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/28666/intelligence/nsa-spying-un-vienna.html
  881. http://www.techworm.net/2014/09/erich-mochel-leaks-photos-nsa-spying-united-nations.html
  882. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  883. ¤ How Covert Agents Infiltrate the Internet to Manipulate, Deceive,
  884. and Destroy Reputations ::
  885.  
  886. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/02/24/jtrig-manipulation/
  887.  
  888. http://www.infowars.com/cointelrpo-revisited-greenwald-exposes-nsa-agenda-to-destroy-journalists/
  889.  
  890.  One of the many pressing stories that remains to be told from the
  891. Snowden archive is how western intelligence agencies are attempting
  892. to manipulate and control online discourse with extreme tactics of
  893. deception and reputation-destruction. It’s time to tell a chunk of
  894. that story, complete with the relevant documents.
  895.  
  896.  Over the last several weeks, I worked with NBC News to publish a
  897. series of articles about “dirty trick” tactics used by GCHQ’s previously
  898. secret unit, JTRIG (Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group). These
  899. were based on four classified GCHQ documents presented to the NSA
  900. and the other three partners in the English-speaking “Five Eyes”
  901. alliance. Today, we at the Intercept are publishing another new
  902. JTRIG document, in full, entitled “The Art of Deception: Training
  903. for Online Covert Operations.”
  904.  
  905. ¤ GCHQ ; The Art of Deception: Training for Online Covert Operations ::
  906.  
  907. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/document/2014/02/24/art-deception-training-new-generation-online-covert-operations/
  908.  
  909. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1021430/the-art-of-deception-training-for-a-new.pdf
  910. ---------------------------------------
  911. ¤ Hacking Online Polls and Other Ways British Spies
  912. Seek to Control the Internet ::
  913.  
  914.  The secretive British spy agency GCHQ has developed
  915. covert tools to seed the internet with false information,
  916. including the ability to manipulate the results of online
  917. polls, artificially inflate pageview counts on web sites,
  918. “amplify” sanctioned messages on YouTube, and censor video
  919. content judged to be “extremist.” The capabilities, detailed
  920. in documents provided by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden,
  921. even include an old standby for pre-adolescent prank callers
  922. everywhere: A way to connect two unsuspecting phone users
  923. together in a call.
  924.  
  925.  The tools were created by GCHQ’s Joint Threat Research
  926. Intelligence Group (JTRIG), and constitute some of the most
  927. startling methods of propaganda and internet deception
  928. contained within the Snowden archive. Previously disclosed
  929. documents have detailed JTRIG’s use of “fake victim blog
  930. posts,” “false flag operations,” “honey traps” and
  931. psychological manipulation to target online activists,
  932. monitor visitors to WikiLeaks, and spy on YouTube and
  933. Facebook users.
  934.  
  935. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/14/manipulating-online-polls-ways-british-spies-seek-control-internet/
  936.  
  937. http://www.infowars.com/what-exactly-are-the-spy-agencies-actually-doing-with-their-bag-of-dirty-tricks/
  938.  
  939. ¤ GCHQ’s JTRIG Tools and Techniques ::
  940.  
  941. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-jtrigall-intercept-14-0714.pdf
  942. ---------------------------------------
  943. ¤ More Details on GCHQ Propaganda/Deception Tactics ::
  944.  
  945. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/04/04/cuban-twitter-scam-social-media-tool-disseminating-government-propaganda/
  946.  
  947.  This week, the Associated Press exposed a secret
  948. program run by the US Agency for International
  949. Development to create “a Twitter-like Cuban
  950. communications network” run through “secret shell
  951. companies” in order to create the false appearance
  952. of being a privately owned operation. Unbeknownst
  953. to the service’s Cuban users was the fact that
  954. “American contractors were gathering their private
  955. data in the hope that it might be used for political
  956. purposes”–specifically, to manipulate those users
  957. in order to foment dissent in Cuba and subvert its
  958. government. According to top-secret documents
  959. published today by The Intercept, this sort of
  960. operation is frequently discussed at western
  961. intelligence agencies, which have plotted ways to
  962. covertly use social media for “propaganda,” “deception,”
  963. “mass messaging,” and “pushing stories.” ...
  964.  
  965. ¤ GCHQ Full Spectrum Cyber Effects ::
  966.  
  967. “Destroy Deny Degrade Disrupt Deceive Protect”
  968.  
  969. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/gchq-full-spectrum-cyber.pdf
  970.  
  971.  ... The annual SIGDEV conference, according to one
  972. NSA document published today by The Intercept, “enables
  973. unprecedented visibility of SIGINT Development activities
  974. from across the Extended Enterprise, Second Party and US
  975. Intelligence communities.” The 2009 Conference, held at
  976. Fort Meade, included “eighty-six representatives from
  977. the wider US Intelligence Community, covering agencies
  978. as diverse as CIA (a record 50 participants), the Air
  979. Force Research Laboratory and the National Air and
  980. Space Intelligence Center.”
  981.  
  982.  Defenders of surveillance agencies have often insinuated
  983. that such proposals are nothing more than pipe dreams
  984. and wishful thinking on the part of intelligence agents.
  985. But these documents are not merely proposals or hypothetical
  986. scenarios. As described by the NSA document published
  987. today, the purpose of SIGDEV presentations is “to
  988. synchronize discovery efforts, share breakthroughs,
  989. and swap knowledge on the art of analysis.”
  990.  
  991.  For instance: One of the programs described by the newly
  992. released GCHQ document is dubbed “Royal Concierge,” under
  993. which the British agency intercepts email confirmations
  994. of hotel reservations to enable it to subject hotel
  995. guests to electronic monitoring. It also contemplates
  996. how to “influence the hotel choice” of travelers and
  997. to determine whether they stay at “SIGINT friendly”
  998. hotels. The document asks: “Can we influence the hotel
  999. choice? Can we cancel their visit?” ...
  1000.  
  1001. ¤ NSA 5 Eyes 2009 SIGDEV Conference ::
  1002.  
  1003. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-5-eyes-2009-sigdev.pdf
  1004. ---------------------------------------
  1005. ¤ GCHQ Trolls, Spies and Deceives Online Users ::
  1006.  
  1007. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-online-deception.pdf
  1008.  
  1009. ¤ GCHQ Disruption Operations ::
  1010.  
  1011. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-disruption.pdf
  1012.  
  1013. ¤ GCHQ Spreads Propaganda to Discredit Critics ::
  1014.  
  1015.  The documents from the GCHQ (the British equivalent
  1016. of the NSA), titled “The Art of Deception: Training
  1017. for Online Covert Operations,” were given to the
  1018. NSA and leaked by Snowden. They reveal that the
  1019. GCHQ is involved, through a unit known as JTRIG
  1020. (Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group), in
  1021. “the monitoring of YouTube and Blogger, the
  1022. targeting of Anonymous with the very same DDoS
  1023. attacks they accuse “hacktivists” of using, the
  1024. use of honey traps (luring people into compromising
  1025. situations using sex) and destructive viruses.”
  1026.  
  1027.  The goals of the JTRIG program are “(1) to inject
  1028. all sorts of false material onto the internet in
  1029. order to destroy the reputation of its targets;
  1030. and (2) to use social sciences and other techniques
  1031. to manipulate online discourse and activism to
  1032. generate outcomes it considers desirable.”
  1033.  
  1034. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/02/24/jtrig-manipulation/
  1035. http://www.examiner.com/article/government-infiltrating-websites-to-deny-disrupt-degrade-deceive
  1036. http://rt.com/news/five-eyes-online-manipulation-deception-564/
  1037. ---------------------------------------
  1038. ¤ GCHQ Attacked Anonymous in 2012 ::
  1039.  
  1040. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-anonymous.pdf
  1041.  
  1042. http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/snowden_anonymous_nbc_document.pdf
  1043.  
  1044. ¤ GCHQ Cyber Attack Operations ::
  1045.  
  1046. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-cyber-attack.pdf
  1047.  
  1048. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1015553/snowden-cyber-offensive1-nbc-document.pdf
  1049.  
  1050. ¤ GCHQ Full-Spectrum Cyber Effects ::
  1051.  
  1052. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-cyber-effects.pdf
  1053.  
  1054. ¤ GCHQ Spies Attacked Anonymous IRC Chats ::
  1055.  
  1056. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/war-anonymous-british-spies-attacked-hackers-snowden-docs-show-n21361
  1057. http://www.zdnet.com/uk-used-denial-of-service-against-anonymous-7000025993/
  1058. http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2014-02/05/gchq-ddos-attack-anonymous
  1059.  
  1060. ¤ British Spies Used Porn and Dirty Tricks to
  1061. Lure Targets to Honeypots ::
  1062.  
  1063. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/snowden-docs-british-spies-used-sex-dirty-tricks-n23091
  1064. ---------------------------------------
  1065. ¤ NSA & GCHQ Spies on Wikileaks, TPB Visitors ::
  1066.  
  1067. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/18/snowden-docs-reveal-covert-surveillance-and-pressure-tactics-aimed-at-wikileaks-and-its-supporters/
  1068. http://wikileaks.org/NSA-and-GCHQ-spying-on-WikiLeaks.html
  1069. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/02/surveillance-and-pressure-wikileaks-readers
  1070. http://torrentcrazy.com/news/nsa-authorized-monitoring-of-pirate-bay-and-proxy-users
  1071.  
  1072. ¤ NSA-GCHQ Discovery SIGINT Targeting ::
  1073.  
  1074. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-gchq-discovery.pdf
  1075.  
  1076. ¤ Youtube Targets by SQUEAKYDOLPHIN Presentation ::
  1077.  
  1078. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-squeakydolphin-videos.htm
  1079.  
  1080. ¤ GCHQ Psychology SIGDEV ::
  1081.  
  1082. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-psychology.pdf
  1083. ---------------------------------------
  1084. ▲ Reddit Censors All Stories Above ::
  1085.  
  1086. http://www.infowars.com/reddit-censors-big-story-about-government-manipulation-and-disruption-of-the-internet/
  1087. _______________________________________
  1088. ¤ Unraveling NSA’s TURBULENCE Programs ::
  1089.  
  1090. https://robert.sesek.com/2014/9/unraveling_nsa_s_turbulence_programs.html
  1091. _______________________________________
  1092. ¤ New Zealand’s Prime Minister Isn’t Telling the Truth About
  1093. Mass Surveillance ::
  1094.  
  1095. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/15/snowden-new-zealand-surveillance/
  1096.  
  1097. ¤ New Zealand Launched Mass Surveillance Project While Publicly
  1098. Denying It ::
  1099.  
  1100. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/15/new-zealand-gcsb-speargun-mass-surveillance/
  1101.  
  1102. ¤ Snowden and Greenwald Reveal Prime Minister John Key Lied About
  1103. Kiwi Mass Surveillance, Key Calls Greenwald “A Loser” ::
  1104.  
  1105. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140915/06175828518/snowden-greenwald-reveal-pm-john-key-lied-about-kiwi-mass-surveillance-key-hits-back-calling-greenwald-loser.shtml
  1106.  
  1107. ¤ New Zealand Prime Minister Releases GCSB Spy Documents ::
  1108.  
  1109. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/gcsb-nz-pm-nz-herald-14-0916.zip
  1110.  
  1111. ¤ NSA Visit by New Zealand Spy PM Ferguson ::
  1112.  
  1113. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-nz-ferguson-visit-the-intercept-14-0915.pdf
  1114.  
  1115. ¤ The Questions for New Zealand on Mass Surveillance ::
  1116.  
  1117. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/15/questions-new-zealand-mass-surveillance/
  1118. _______________________________________
  1119. ▼ NSA Spooks Deny The Evidence (Provided Below) Exists ::
  1120.  
  1121.  Did the NSA forget Ed Snowden contacted NBC and released
  1122. the evidence contacting authorities regarding his concerns?
  1123.  
  1124. https://news.vice.com/article/the-nsa-has-revealed-new-details-about-its-exhaustive-search-of-edward-snowdens-emails
  1125.  
  1126. ▲ FLASHBACK! Snowden Strikes Back at NSA, Emails NBC News ::
  1127.  
  1128.  Fugitive Edward Snowden on Friday challenged the
  1129. NSA’s insistence that it has no evidence he tried
  1130. to raise concerns about the agency’s surveillance
  1131. activity before he began leaking government documents
  1132. to reporters, calling the response a “clearly tailored
  1133. and incomplete leak ... for a political advantage.”
  1134.  
  1135.  “The NSA’s new discovery of written contact between
  1136. me and its lawyers -- after more than a year of denying
  1137. any such contact existed - raises serious concerns,”
  1138. Snowden said in an email Friday to NBC News. “It
  1139. reveals as false the NSA’s claim to Barton Gellman
  1140. of the Washington Post in December of last year, that
  1141. ‘after extensive investigation, including interviews
  1142. with his former NSA supervisors and co-workers, we
  1143. have not found any evidence to support Mr. Snowden’s
  1144. contention that he brought these matters to anyone’s
  1145. attention.’”
  1146.  
  1147.  Snowden’s email followed Thursday’s release by the US
  1148. Office of the Director of Intelligence of an email
  1149. exchange between Snowden and the NSA’s Office of the
  1150. General Counsel. The Washington Post received and
  1151. published a similar response from Snowden on Thursday.
  1152.  
  1153. http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/edward-snowden-interview/snowden-strikes-back-nsa-emails-nbc-news-n118821
  1154.  
  1155. ▲ NSA Oversight Training, OVSC1800 Minimization Training,
  1156. NSA OGC Snowden Emails on OVSC1800 Course ::
  1157.  
  1158. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-oversight.pdf
  1159. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ovsc1800.pdf
  1160. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ogc-snowden.pdf
  1161. ---------------------------------------
  1162. ¤ NBC Interviews Edward Snowden (Full) ::
  1163.  
  1164. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yNhMXyAdjp8
  1165.  
  1166. Mirror here » http://upstore.net/62ocku
  1167. _______________________________________
  1168. ¤ NSA-GCHQ Breached Deutsche Telekom and Other German Firms ::
  1169.  
  1170.  According to top-secret documents from the NSA and the British
  1171. agency GCHQ, the intelligence agencies are seeking to map the entire
  1172. Internet, including end-user devices. In pursuing that goal, they
  1173. have broken into networks belonging to Deutsche Telekom.
  1174.  
  1175. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/snowden-documents-indicate-nsa-has-breached-deutsche-telekom-a-991503.html
  1176.  
  1177. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/14/nsa-stellar/
  1178.  
  1179. ¤ GCHQ Satellite Teleport Knowledge ::
  1180.  
  1181. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/gchq-stellar-der-spiegel-14-0914.pdf
  1182.  
  1183. ¤ NSA Treasure Map New Release ::
  1184.  
  1185. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-treasure-map-new-der-spiegel-14-0914.pdf
  1186.  
  1187. ¤ NSA Treasure Map Slides ::
  1188.  
  1189. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-treasure-map-der-spiegel-14-0914.pdf
  1190.  
  1191. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1301057/tm-m-402.pdf
  1192. _______________________________________
  1193. ¤ NSA Economic Espionage Benefits American Corporations ::
  1194.  
  1195. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/05/us-governments-plans-use-economic-espionage-benefit-american-corporations/
  1196.  
  1197. ¤ Masterspy Quadrennial Report 2009 (Spy For US Corporations) ::
  1198.  
  1199. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/dni-qicr-2009-the-intercept-14-0905.pdf
  1200.  
  1201. ▲ UPDATE: Obama Rubber Stamps Economic Espionage, Mass Spying ::
  1202.  
  1203. http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/despite-obama-s-pledge-to-curb-it-nsa-mass-surveillance-wins-rubber-stamp-20140913
  1204. _______________________________________
  1205. ¤ Bush-era Justification For Warrantless Wiretapping ::
  1206.  
  1207. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/legal-memos-released-on-bush-era-justification-for-warrantless-wiretapping/2014/09/05/91b86c52-356d-11e4-9e92-0899b306bbea_story.html
  1208. http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/World/2014/Sep-06/269796-bush-era-memos-president-can-wiretap-americans-at-all-times.ashx
  1209. http://mic.com/articles/98116/just-released-bush-administration-memos-explain-deeply-disturbing-government-spying
  1210.  
  1211. ¤ NSA STELLAR WIND Assessed by DoJ 2004 (REDACTED) ::
  1212.  
  1213. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-olc-stellar-wind-wapo-14-0906.pdf
  1214.  
  1215. ¤ NSA STELLAR WIND Assessed by DoJ 2004 (UNREDACTED) ::
  1216.  
  1217. Above DOJ assessment released by WaPo compared to ACLU document.
  1218.  
  1219. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-olc-stellar-wind-annotated.pdf
  1220.  
  1221. ¤ NSA’s STELLAR WIND PROGRAM (DECLASSIFIED 2013) ::
  1222.  
  1223. RAGTIME was the codename for Stellar Wind.
  1224.  
  1225. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  1226.  
  1227. ¤ NSA STELLARWIND Classification Marking ::
  1228.  
  1229. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/09/about-stellarwind-and-another.html
  1230. _______________________________________
  1231. ¤ DNI Releases 47 FISC Yahoo Documents ::
  1232.  
  1233. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/dni-fisc-yahoo-14-0911.zip
  1234. _______________________________________
  1235. KILLCEN ; Eyeballing Snowden’s Info
  1236.  
  1237.  Includes all news reports, videos, images, slides and
  1238. documents from and related to Snowden’s leaks so far,
  1239. up to September 5th of 2014. I’m still collecting any
  1240. information that comes out and will provide an updated
  1241. archive twice per year.
  1242.  
  1243.  Due to the enormous size of this current archive, the
  1244. archive has been split concurrent to the names of each
  1245. file and directory in alphabetical order to facilitate
  1246. the size limit while uploading to the file hosts below.
  1247.  
  1248.  After decompression, the first folder is titled “Eyeballing_
  1249. Snowden_Info_Folder_01” and the second is titled “Eyeballing_
  1250. Snowden_Info_Folder_02” , both holding a total of 1,668 files
  1251. (1.37GB) after being decompressed and consolidated.
  1252.  
  1253.  This was stored on an old OFFLINE system, without any
  1254. WiFi card or modem attached so the archive is safe from
  1255. being modified, exploited or stolen.
  1256.  
  1257. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_01.zip
  1258. (589 files | ZIP | 686MB)
  1259.  
  1260. http://fileb.ag/ojvlj5rqihw2
  1261. http://bitshare.com/files/pigqc2bo/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_01.zip.html
  1262. http://fpsbay.com/download/64709X14099602822363X347361/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_01.zip
  1263.  
  1264. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_02.zip
  1265. (1,079 files | ZIP | 476MB)
  1266.  
  1267. http://fileb.ag/xqtrujp8jcey
  1268. http://bitshare.com/files/ztfcjdwg/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_02.zip.html
  1269. http://fpsbay.com/download/64711X14099654782364X347381/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_02.zip
  1270. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  1271. ¤ NSA ; Ask Zelda (Redacted) ::
  1272.  
  1273. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ask-zelda.pdf
  1274.  
  1275. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/07/nsa-advice-columnist-seriously/
  1276.  
  1277. ¤ NSA ; Ask Zelda (Full, DECLASSIFIED) ::
  1278.  
  1279. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-ask-zelda-14-0828.pdf
  1280. _______________________________________
  1281. ¤ NSA’s Foreign Partnerships ::
  1282.  
  1283. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/09/nsas-foreign-partnerships.html
  1284. _______________________________________
  1285. ¤ Two-Faced Friendship: Turkey Is Partner and Target for NSA ::
  1286.  
  1287. http://www.spiegel.de/international/documents-show-nsa-and-gchq-spied-on-partner-turkey-a-989011.html
  1288.  
  1289. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/08/31/nsaturkeyspiegel/
  1290.  
  1291. ¤ NSA-GCHQ Eyeball Turkey (Original Links) ::
  1292.  
  1293. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34650.pdf
  1294. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34651.pdf
  1295. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34652.pdf
  1296. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34653.pdf
  1297. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34654.pdf
  1298. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34655.pdf
  1299. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34656.pdf
  1300. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34657.pdf
  1301. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34658.pdf
  1302. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34659.pdf
  1303. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34660.pdf
  1304. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34661.pdf
  1305. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34662.pdf
  1306.  
  1307. ¤ NSA-GCHQ Eyeball Turkey (Mirrored) ::
  1308.  
  1309. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-gchq-spy-turkey-der-spiegel-14-0831.pdf
  1310. _______________________________________
  1311. ¤ How the NSA Built Its Own Secret Google ::
  1312.  
  1313. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/08/25/icreach-nsa-cia-secret-google-crisscross-proton
  1314.  
  1315. ¤ NSA ICREACH Slides ::
  1316.  
  1317. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-icreach.pdf
  1318. _______________________________________
  1319. ¤ NSA-GCHQ-CSEC HACIENDA Program for Internet Colonization ::
  1320.  
  1321. http://www.heise.de/ct/artikel/NSA-GCHQ-The-HACIENDA-Program-for-Internet-Colonization-2292681.html
  1322.  
  1323. ¤ NSA-GCHQ-CSEC HACIENDA Slides (ZIP) ::
  1324.  
  1325. http://www.xup.to/dl,62909734/HACIENDA_Slides.zip/
  1326.  
  1327. ¤ NSA-GCHQ-CSEC HACIENDA Slides (PDF) ::
  1328.  
  1329. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-gchq-csec-hacienda-heise-14-0816.pdf
  1330. _______________________________________
  1331. ¤ Now US Corporations Admit They Profit From Spying ::
  1332.  
  1333. Beat them at their own game - lie.
  1334.  
  1335. http://www.forbes.com/sites/quickerbettertech/2014/08/18/the-other-sharing-economy-thats-about-to-change-the-world/
  1336.  
  1337. ¤ Money And Power - The Real Reason For The NSA Spying On Everyone ::
  1338.  
  1339. Put out false information. Flood them with false data.
  1340.  
  1341. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140819/17104028259/money-power-real-reason-nsa-spying-everyone.shtml
  1342. _______________________________________
  1343. ¤ Newly Declassified Documents Regarding the “Now-Discontinued” (?)
  1344. NSA Bulk Electronic Communications Metadata Pursuant to Section 402
  1345. of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ::
  1346.  
  1347. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  1348. _______________________________________
  1349. ¤ GCHQ Covert Mobile Phone Security Tactics ::
  1350.  
  1351. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/gchq-covert-mobiles-the-intercept-14-0812.pdf
  1352.  
  1353. ¤ Compare GCHQ Security Tactics to Jihadist Tactics ::
  1354.  
  1355. https://prod01-cdn03.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/sites/1/2014/08/GCHQ-Jihadist-handbook.gif
  1356. _______________________________________
  1357. ¤ Barack Obama’s Secret “Terrorist-Tracking” System ::
  1358.  
  1359.  Nearly half of the people on the US government’s widely shared
  1360. database of terrorist suspects are not connected to any known
  1361. terrorist group, according to classified government documents
  1362. obtained by The Intercept.
  1363.  
  1364. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/08/05/watch-commander/
  1365.  
  1366. ¤ NCTC Directorate of Terrorist Identities ::
  1367.  
  1368. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nctc-dti-the-intercept.pdf
  1369.  
  1370. ¤ Secret Government Rulebook For Labeling You a Terrorist ::
  1371.  
  1372.  The Obama administration has quietly approved a substantial
  1373. expansion of the terrorist watchlist system, authorizing a
  1374. secret process that requires neither “concrete facts” nor
  1375. “irrefutable evidence” to designate an American or foreigner
  1376. as a terrorist, according to a key government document obtained
  1377. by The Intercept.
  1378.  
  1379. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nctc-watchlist-intercept-14-0723.pdf
  1380. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/07/23/blacklisted/
  1381. http://www.infowars.com/leaked-document-facts-and-evidence-not-considered-when-adding-americans-to-terror-lists/
  1382. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140723/14232027979/intercept-reveals-us-governments-guidebook-declaring-your-terrorist-putting-you-no-fly-list.shtml
  1383. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140723/14321427980/revealed-what-kind-extra-scrutiny-government-gives-to-folks-terrorist-watchlist.shtml
  1384.  
  1385. NOBODY notes
  1386.  
  1387.  Sounds much like the (now defunct) COINTELPRO operation the
  1388. FBI once was launched to target, blacklist and harrass US
  1389. civil rights activists and whistleblowers back in the day -
  1390. only these “dirty tricks” are now fully digitalized.
  1391.  
  1392. ¤ Executive Order 12333: They Do Spy on Americans ::
  1393.  
  1394.  John Tye is but the latest surveillance whistleblower,
  1395. though he took pains to distinguish himself from Snowden
  1396. and his approach to dissent. “Before I left the State
  1397. Department, I filed a complaint with the department’s
  1398. inspector general, arguing that the current system of
  1399. collection and storage of communications by US persons
  1400. under Executive Order 12333 violates the Fourth Amendment,
  1401. which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures,”
  1402. Tye explained. “I have also brought my complaint to the
  1403. House and Senate intelligence committees and to the
  1404. inspector general of the NSA.”
  1405.  
  1406.  These steps — which many say Snowden should’ve taken —
  1407. produced no changes to the objectionable NSA spying and
  1408. wouldn’t be garnering attention at all if not for
  1409. Snowden’s leaks.
  1410.  
  1411. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/meet-executive-order-12333-the-reagan-rule-that-lets-the-nsa-spy-on-americans/2014/07/18/93d2ac22-0b93-11e4-b8e5-d0de80767fc2_story.html
  1412.  
  1413. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/07/a-new-surveillance-whistleblower-emerges/374722/
  1414. _______________________________________
  1415. ¤ Cash, Weapons, Surveillance - The US is a Key Party to Every
  1416. Israeli Attack ::
  1417.  
  1418.  The US government has long lavished overwhelming aid on Israel,
  1419. providing cash, weapons and surveillance technology that play a
  1420. crucial role in Israel’s attacks on its neighbors. But top secret
  1421. documents provided by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden shed
  1422. substantial new light on how the US and its partners directly
  1423. enable Israel’s military assaults – such as the one on Gaza.
  1424.  
  1425. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/08/04/cash-weapons-surveillance/
  1426.  
  1427. ¤ ISNU-NSA Spying Pact (1999 & 2013) ::
  1428.  
  1429. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/israel-us-1999-the-intercept.pdf
  1430.  
  1431. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-israel-2013-the-intercept.pdf
  1432.  
  1433. ¤ US Empire Pays Israel $500,000 in 2004 ::
  1434.  
  1435. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-israel-500k-2004.pdf
  1436.  
  1437. ¤ (RELATED) Terrorism in the Israeli Attack on Gaza ::
  1438.  
  1439. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/29/terrorism-israelgaza-context/
  1440. http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2014/08/04/374016/us-directly-enables-israeli-attacks-on-gaza/
  1441. http://rt.com/news/177716-us-israel-funding-aggression/
  1442.  
  1443. ¤ (RELATED) Gaza Natural Gas - Why Israel Kills for It ::
  1444.  
  1445. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/gaza-natural-gas.zip
  1446. _______________________________________
  1447. ¤ USA-Saudi Arabia Spy Partnership ::
  1448.  
  1449. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-saudi-arabia-intercept-14-0725.pdf
  1450.  
  1451. ¤ NSA’s New Partner in Spying ; Saudi Arabia’s Brutal State Police ::
  1452.  
  1453.  The National Security Agency last year significantly expanded
  1454. its cooperative relationship with the Saudi Ministry of Interior,
  1455. one of the world’s most repressive and abusive government agencies.
  1456. An April 2013 top secret memo provided by NSA whistleblower Edward
  1457. Snowden details the agency’s plans “to provide direct analytic and
  1458. technical support” to the Saudis on “internal security” matters.
  1459.  
  1460.  The Saudi Ministry of Interior—referred to in the document as MOI
  1461. — has been condemned for years as one of the most brutal human rights
  1462. violators in the world. In 2013, the U.S. State Department reported
  1463. that “Ministry of Interior officials sometimes subjected prisoners
  1464. and detainees to torture and other physical abuse,” specifically
  1465. mentioning a 2011 episode in which MOI agents allegedly “poured an
  1466. antiseptic cleaning liquid down [the] throat” of one human rights
  1467. activist. The report also notes the MOI’s use of invasive surveillance
  1468. targeted at political and religious dissidents.
  1469.  
  1470.  But as the State Department publicly catalogued those very abuses,
  1471. the NSA worked to provide increased surveillance assistance to the
  1472. ministry that perpetrated them. The move is part of the Obama
  1473. Administration’s increasingly close ties with the Saudi regime;
  1474. beyond the new cooperation with the MOI, the memo describes “a
  1475. period of rejuvenation” for the NSA’s relationship with the Saudi
  1476. Ministry of Defense.
  1477.  
  1478.  In general, US support for the Saudi regime is long-standing. One
  1479. secret 2007 NSA memo lists Saudi Arabia as one of four countries
  1480. where the US “has [an] interest in regime continuity.”
  1481.  
  1482. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/25/nsas-new-partner-spying-saudi-arabias-brutal-state-police/
  1483. _______________________________________
  1484. ¤ Senate Bill Spy Funding FY 2015 ::
  1485.  
  1486. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/spy-funding-fy2015.pdf
  1487. _______________________________________
  1488. ¤ NSA Spying Costs to US Businesses ::
  1489.  
  1490. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-naf-spy-costs.pdf
  1491.  
  1492. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-29/tech-companies-reel-as-nsa-spying-mars-image-for-clients.html
  1493. _______________________________________
  1494. ¤ Insider - Intelligence Agencies Are Running Governments ::
  1495.  
  1496.  Alex Jones talks with NSA whistleblower William Binney about the
  1497. growing corruption and power of the NSA and how they abuse their
  1498. power behind the scenes to pull strings.
  1499.  
  1500. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DERMBOJBDCk
  1501.  
  1502. http://www.infowars.com/insider-says-intelligence-agencies-are-running-the-government/
  1503. _______________________________________
  1504. ¤ NSA/FISA Spying Timeline ::
  1505.  
  1506.  1978 FISA ; 1981 EO 12333, 1982 DoD Reg 5240.1-R,
  1507. 1993 USSID SP0018 ; 2001 USA Patriot Act, 2002 FISC
  1508. “Raw Take” Share Motion ; 2003 SP002 ; 2004 PR/TT FISA ;
  1509. 2004 NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 ; 2006 BR FISA ; 2006 RAS Memo ;
  1510. 2007 PAA (expired) ; 2008 FAA ; 2008 SP002 (Revised) ;
  1511. 2008 EO 12333 (Revised) ; 2008 RAS Memo (Revised) ;
  1512. 2009 NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Revised).
  1513.  
  1514. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spy-timeline.pdf
  1515.  
  1516. ▲ FISA Surveillance Leaks ::
  1517.  
  1518. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-targeting.pdf
  1519. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  1520. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-certification.pdf
  1521.  
  1522. ▲ Executive Order 12333 (Default 1981) ::
  1523.  
  1524. http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html
  1525.  
  1526. ▲ DoD Regulation 5240.1-R (1982) ::
  1527.  
  1528.  Guidance to DoD components in implementing EO 12333
  1529. and general rules pursuant to FISA.
  1530.  
  1531. http://cryptome.org/dod5240-1-r.htm
  1532.  
  1533. ▲ USSID SP0018 (2003) ::
  1534.  
  1535. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDFinal%20USSID%20SP0018.pdf
  1536.  
  1537. ▲ FISA ; Pen Register and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) ::
  1538.  
  1539.  Opinion of the FISC granting the government application
  1540. seeking the collection of bulk electronic communications
  1541. metadata pursuant to Section 402 of FISA, the Pen Register
  1542. and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) provision.
  1543.  
  1544. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-13-1118/CLEANEDPRTT%201.pdf
  1545.  
  1546. ▲ Bulk Collection Programs Under PATRIOT ACT ::
  1547.  
  1548. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/obama-releases-13-0731.pdf
  1549.  
  1550. ▲ NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Default 2004) ::
  1551.  
  1552. http://cryptome.org/nsa-css-1-23.pdf
  1553.  
  1554. ▲ NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Revised 2009) ::
  1555.  
  1556. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-css-policy-1-23-nyt-14-0727.pdf
  1557.  
  1558. ▲ Executive Order 12333 (Revised 2008) ::
  1559.  
  1560. http://cryptome.org/eo12333-amend.htm
  1561.  
  1562. NSA’s FOIA Release » http://cryptome.org/nsa-eo12333.pdf
  1563.  
  1564. ▲ NSA ; FISA/PAA/FAA Classification Guide ::
  1565.  
  1566. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-fisa-faa-class.pdf
  1567.  
  1568. ▲ NSA Attorney General Dissemination Procedures ::
  1569.  
  1570. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ag-dissemination.pdf
  1571. _______________________________________
  1572. ¤ NSA SIGINT Records Disposition Schedule ::
  1573.  
  1574. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-sigint-rds.pdf
  1575.  
  1576. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/records_management/index.shtml
  1577. _______________________________________
  1578. ¤ The NSA Said Edward Snowden Had No Access to Surveillance
  1579. Intercepts, They Lied ::
  1580.  
  1581.  The contents of the surveillance files — almost half of which
  1582. contained information from US citizens or residents — “tell
  1583. stories of love and heartbreak, illicit sexual liaisons,
  1584. mental-health crises, political and religious conversions,
  1585. financial anxieties and disappointed hopes.”
  1586.  
  1587. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/07/a-devastating-leak-for-edward-snowdens-critics/373991/
  1588. http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2014/07/nsa-said-edward-snowden-had-no-access-surveillance-intercepts-they-lied
  1589. http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/snowden-undermines-presidential-panel-s-defense-of-nsa-spying-20140708
  1590.  
  1591. ¤ Meet the Muslim-American Leaders the FBI and NSA Have
  1592. Been Spying On ::
  1593.  
  1594.  The National Security Agency and FBI have covertly
  1595. monitored the emails of prominent Muslim-Americans—including
  1596. a political candidate and several civil rights activists,
  1597. academics, and lawyers—under secretive procedures intended
  1598. to target terrorists and foreign spies.
  1599.  
  1600.  According to documents provided by NSA whistleblower
  1601. Edward Snowden, the list of Americans monitored by their
  1602. own government includes:
  1603.  
  1604.  • Faisal Gill, a longtime Republican Party operative and
  1605. one-time candidate for public office who held a top-secret
  1606. security clearance and served in the Department of Homeland
  1607. Security under President George W. Bush;
  1608.  
  1609.  • Asim Ghafoor, a prominent attorney who has represented
  1610. clients in terrorism-related cases;
  1611.  
  1612.  • Hooshang Amirahmadi, an Iranian-American professor of
  1613. international relations at Rutgers University;
  1614.  
  1615.  • Agha Saeed, a former political science professor at
  1616. California State University who champions Muslim civil
  1617. liberties and Palestinian rights;
  1618.  
  1619.  • Nihad Awad, the executive director of the Council on
  1620. American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the largest Muslim civil
  1621. rights organization in the country.
  1622.  
  1623. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/07/09/under-surveillance/
  1624. http://www.infowars.com/fbi-directly-spying-on-prominent-muslim-american-politicians-lawyers-and-civil-rights-activists/
  1625. http://electrospaces.blogspot.ca/2014/07/document-shows-that-it-was-not-nsa-but.html
  1626.  
  1627. ¤ NSA FISA Accounts and Emails ::
  1628.  
  1629. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-fisa-accounts.pdf
  1630.  
  1631. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-emails.pdf
  1632.  
  1633. ¤ Those Not Targeted Far Outnumber Foreigners Who Are ::
  1634.  
  1635. NSA targeted domestic communications as well as foreign.
  1636.  
  1637. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-nsa-intercepted-data-those-not-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-who-are/2014/07/05/8139adf8-045a-11e4-8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html
  1638.  
  1639. ▼ NSA OKs Domestic Spying for Suspected Criminals ::
  1640.                               ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  1641.  “The FBI is also permitted to disseminate US person
  1642. information that reasonably appears to be evidence of a
  1643. crime to law enforcement authorities.”
  1644.  
  1645. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/pclob-14-0702.pdf
  1646.  
  1647. ▲ US Government Denies Spying US Persons ::
  1648.  
  1649. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/dni-doj-14-0709.pdf
  1650.  
  1651. NOBODY responds
  1652.  
  1653.  Compare the new DoJ memo (dni-doj-14-0709.pdf)
  1654. with the one during 2007, before any of the NSA
  1655. documents were ever leaked (doj-nsa-memo.pdf)
  1656.  
  1657. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/doj-nsa-memo.pdf
  1658.  
  1659.  Now compare the arrogance of the political class
  1660. back in 2004 up till today.
  1661.  
  1662. http://www.infowars.com/congress-insisted-they-be-kept-in-the-dark-on-nsa-spying/
  1663.  
  1664.  Notice their lack of oversight during the Bush regime
  1665. now stuck in continuum under the Obama regime?
  1666.  
  1667. http://www.infowars.com/senate-committee-passes-cisa-cybersecurity-bill-that-could-broaden-nsa-powers/
  1668.  
  1669.  Just like those in the “Department of Justice” they
  1670. never learn from their mistakes, they are stuck in a
  1671. state of blissful ignorance, they lie and when the truth
  1672. comes out (as it often does), then they deny it happened.
  1673.  
  1674. ¤ Some New Thoughts on the Snowden Cache ::
  1675.  
  1676. http://members.efn.org/~paulmd/SomeNewThoughtsontheSnowdenCache.html
  1677.  
  1678.  “So, apparently the Snowden cache contains quite a large number
  1679. of intercepted communications, not just technical documents,
  1680. PowerPoint slides, and memos. This opens up a whole can of worms,
  1681. and some new possibilities for the cache.
  1682.  
  1683.  Worms first: several journalists have access to an incredibly
  1684. sensitive cache of personal information. According to some NSA
  1685. defenders: Snowden has committed a horrible privacy violation
  1686. of thousands of innocent Americans. This is a big problem, but
  1687. it requires some mental gymnastics not to recognize that if
  1688. Snowden had violated the privacy of innocents by giving this
  1689. information to journalists, so had the NSA by storing it in the
  1690. first place.  Realistically, it’s not one or the other, it’s
  1691. both. Now that we know what it contains, the long term storage
  1692. of that portion cache by journalists becomes very problematic.
  1693. On one hand: it’s evidence, on the other, it’s private information
  1694. on many thousands of people.
  1695.  
  1696.  While there are some problems, there are also new possibilities.
  1697. First, it could be a boon for defendants, and those facing legal
  1698. jeopardy, to confront the evidence against them, to receive a
  1699. genuinely fair trial. This is doubly important for drug cases,
  1700. particularly those with DEA involvement, because of the highly
  1701. questionably practice of Parallel Reconstruction, wherein
  1702. classified evidence is laundered, and is reconstructed using
  1703. traditional methods. In effect: perjury. Second, it is prima
  1704. facie evidence to use in lawsuits against the NSA, proof that
  1705. a plaintiff had been spied on. Third, one of the wilder stories:
  1706. Snowden to Reveal the Secrets of Arab Dictators, really can
  1707. happen now. The US government’s dealings with brutal regimes
  1708. are newsworthy, so are the dealings of those regimes against
  1709. their own people.
  1710.  
  1711.  One of the things that makes Cablegate so powerful, and
  1712. simultaneously controversial, is the ability of ordinary
  1713. citizens to query it, and learn what the government had kept
  1714. hidden. In at least one case, it allowed a rendition victim
  1715. to seek justice. I am not suggesting leaking it out in full,
  1716. but ways of allowing ordinary citizens the ability to get
  1717. their own communications, and broadening access, should be
  1718. considered. Contrary to the opinions of those who described
  1719. the Post’s story as a dud, it’s the first page of the next
  1720. chapter of the Snowden Saga, with wide-reaching, and
  1721. unpredictable consequences.”
  1722.  
  1723. By Paul Dietrich, Jul 8, 2014
  1724. _______________________________________
  1725. ¤ Networks vs. Hierarchies: Which Will Win? ::
  1726.  
  1727. http://libertyblitzkrieg.com/2014/06/22/networks-vs-hierarchies-which-will-win-niall-furguson-weighs-in/
  1728. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  1729. ¤ Ultimate Goal of the NSA ; Total Population Control ::
  1730.  
  1731.  At least 80% of all audio calls, not just metadata, are
  1732. recorded and stored in the US, says whistleblower William
  1733. Binney – that’s a “totalitarian mentality.”
  1734.  
  1735. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/11/the-ultimate-goal-of-the-nsa-is-total-population-control
  1736. _______________________________________
  1737. ¤ NSA Hacks TOR in Germany, Calls Users Extremists ::
  1738.  
  1739. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-tor-de.htm
  1740.  
  1741.  It is one of the most sensitive secrets of the NSA,
  1742. the engine of the global monitoring machine: the source
  1743. code of the XKeyscore program, the most comprehensive
  1744. Ausspähprogramm of US foreign intelligence.
  1745.  
  1746.  NDR and WDR have excerpts of the source code. Parts of
  1747. the collection infrastructure ie, so-called software rules
  1748. that define the intelligence, what or who they want to
  1749. investigate.
  1750.  
  1751.  There are only a few numbers and characters to string
  1752. together the programmer. But when the program executes
  1753. XKeyscore these rules, get people and their data in their
  1754. sights. The connections from computers to the Internet
  1755. are identified and stored in a database type. The users
  1756. are quasi marked. It is the dragnet of the 21st century.
  1757.  
  1758. http://download.media.tagesschau.de/video/2014/0703/TV-20140703-0546-2401.webl.webm
  1759.  
  1760. MP4 Video Format » http://fileb.ag/u12my0tpvr8y
  1761.  
  1762. ¤ XKeyscore Targets Tor ::
  1763.  
  1764. http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/xkeyscorerules100.txt
  1765.  
  1766. ¤ NSA Targets the Privacy-conscious Using Tor ::
  1767.  
  1768. http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/nsa230_page-1.html
  1769. ---------------------------------------
  1770. ¤ NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Tor, etc. ::
  1771.  
  1772. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-tor-slides.pdf
  1773.  
  1774. ¤ NSA & GCHQ Counter-Tor Slides ::
  1775.  
  1776.  “Use cookies to identify Tor users when they are not
  1777. using Tor.”
  1778.  
  1779. “Investigate Evercookie persistence.”
  1780.  
  1781. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-stinks.pdf
  1782.  
  1783. ¤ Cookies Threaten Tor User Anonymity ::
  1784.  
  1785.  “Just because you’re using Tor doesn’t mean that your
  1786. browser isn’t storing cookies,” said Jeremiah Grossman,
  1787. a colleague of Hansen’s who also specializes in browser
  1788. vulnerabilities.
  1789.  
  1790.  As Grossman described the procedure to CNET, the NSA is
  1791. aware of Tor’s entry and exit nodes because of its Internet
  1792. wide surveillance.
  1793.  
  1794.  “The very feature that makes Tor a powerful anonymity
  1795. service, and the fact that all Tor users look alike on the
  1796. Internet, makes it easy to differentiate Tor users from
  1797. other Web users,” he wrote.
  1798.  
  1799.  “The NSA then cookies that ad, so that every time you go
  1800. to a site, the cookie identifies you. Even though your IP
  1801. address changed [because of Tor], the cookies gave you away,”
  1802. he said.
  1803.  
  1804. http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57606178-83/nsa-tracks-google-ads-to-find-tor-users/
  1805.  
  1806. ¤ GCHQ ; MULLENIZE Operation to Tag and Identify Packet
  1807. Traffic From Machines ::
  1808.  
  1809.  “Working together, CT and CNE have devised a method to carry
  1810. out large-scale ‘staining’ as a means to identify individual
  1811. machines linked to that IP address. ... ...
  1812.  
  1813.  User Agent Staining is a technique that involves writing a
  1814. unique marker (or stain) onto a target machine. Each stain
  1815. is visible in passively collected SIGINT and is stamped into
  1816. every packet, which enables all the events from that stained
  1817. machine to be brought back together to recreate a browsing
  1818. session.”
  1819.  
  1820. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/gchq-mullenize.pdf
  1821.  
  1822. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/801762/mullenize-28redacted-29.pdf
  1823.  
  1824. ¤ Packet Staining ::
  1825.  
  1826. http://prezi.com/p5et9yawg2c6/ip-packet-staining/
  1827. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-00
  1828. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-01
  1829. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/packet-stain/packet-staining.htm
  1830.  
  1831. ¤ NSA Peeling Back the Layers of Tor ::
  1832.  
  1833. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-egotisticalgiraffe.pdf
  1834. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/egotistical-giraffe-nsa-tor-document
  1835. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity
  1836. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption
  1837.  
  1838. ¤ NSA ; Tor Source Code Vulnerabilities ::
  1839.  
  1840.  “We have seen several targets using Tor. Our goal was to
  1841. analyze Tor source code and determine any vulnerabilities
  1842. in the system. We set up an internal Tor network to analyze
  1843. Tor traffic, in the hopes of discovering ways to passively
  1844. identify it. We also worked to create a custom Tor client
  1845. which allows the user finer control.” ... ...
  1846.  
  1847.  “This accomplishes several things. Most basically, the Tor
  1848. servers, many of which are listed on publicly advertised
  1849. directory servers, are chosen to act as a series of proxies.
  1850. This may seem to be excessively complex, as a single proxy
  1851. server can be used to hide one’s location, but a single-hop
  1852. proxy is vulnerable in two ways. First, by analyzing the
  1853. pattern of the traffic going to and from the proxy server,
  1854. it is possible to deduce which clients are making which requests.
  1855. Second, if an attacker owns the proxy server, then it certainly
  1856. knows who is asking for what, and anonymization is ruined. By
  1857. using multiple hops, Tor is much more resistant to both of
  1858. these attacks. Traffic analysis becomes extraordinarily
  1859. difficult, as it must be coordinated across several machines,
  1860. and an attacker must own all the hops along the circuit in
  1861. order to trace requests back to the originating client.”
  1862.  
  1863. ... ...
  1864.  
  1865.  “In our time in the lab, we found that running an nmap on a
  1866. node that is offering a hidden service will turn up the port
  1867. that the hidden service is using to deal with incoming
  1868. connections. It can then be directly connected to, outside
  1869. of Tor.”
  1870.  
  1871. ... ...
  1872.  
  1873.  “We would have to try to connect to each of the ports we see
  1874. open on a machine to determine if there is a hidden service
  1875. being run. We would not even know which protocol the hidden
  1876. service is running. It may be an HTTP server, an FTP server,
  1877. an SMTP server, etc. The only thing we know is that the protocol
  1878. must run over TCP. It is not enough to attempt to connect once
  1879. to each port, using an HTTP GET request. Several protocols must
  1880. be tried.”
  1881.  
  1882. ... ...
  1883.  
  1884.  “It may also be useful to study Tor directory servers in more
  1885. detail. Our work focused solely on the client, but many attacks
  1886. would be much easier with access to more Tor servers. The
  1887. directory servers ultimately control which Tor servers are
  1888. used by clients. We have found that a server can put itself on
  1889. a directory server multiple times; all it takes is the server
  1890. running several Tor processes, each having a different nickname,
  1891. open port, fingerprint, and LOG FILE. This only requires different
  1892. configuration files for the different processes, which are easy
  1893. to set up. That machine will handle a disproportionate amount of
  1894. traffic, since it is listed several times. This increases the
  1895. density of friendly servers in the cloud without increasing the
  1896. number of servers we have set up. Unfortunately, each listing
  1897. has the same IP address, which would be very noticeable to anyone
  1898. who inspecting the directories.”
  1899.  
  1900. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor.pdf
  1901. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/802061/ces-summer-2006-tor-paper-28redacted-29-1.pdf
  1902. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/secret-nsa-documents-show-campaign-against-tor-encrypted-network/2013/10/04/610f08b6-2d05-11e3-8ade-a1f23cda135e_story.html
  1903.  
  1904. ¤ NSA ; Types of IAT ::
  1905.  
  1906. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-iat-tor.pdf
  1907.  
  1908. ¤ NSA Link Removed by Guardian ::
  1909.  
  1910. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-link-removed.htm
  1911.  
  1912. ¤ Tor Media Reports Disinformative (?) ::
  1913.  
  1914.  “This document doesn’t give much insight into capabilities
  1915. the IC has developed against Tor. It’s apparently quite common
  1916. to run multiple research teams (either known or unknown to
  1917. each other) against a single target, and a few summer
  1918. students with a dozen lab machines is a pretty small
  1919. investment. I’d expect there are other programs with more
  1920. sophisticated attacks, especially now 7 years later.”
  1921.  
  1922. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-disinfo.htm
  1923. _______________________________________
  1924. ¤ UPDATE ; German CIA Agent Arrested ::
  1925.  
  1926. http://cryptocomb.org/?p=869
  1927.  
  1928. ¤ UPDATE ; Der Spiegel Exposed Spy Scandle Between US-Germany, ;
  1929. Angela Merkel Plans to Scrap No-spy Agreement with US-Britain ::
  1930.  
  1931.  A new surveillance scandal is threatening to unsettle US-German
  1932. relations after it emerged that an employee of Germany’s
  1933. intelligence agency has been arrested under suspicion of acting
  1934. as a double agent for the US.
  1935.  
  1936.  According to several reports in the German media, a 31-year-old
  1937. member of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) administration
  1938. department in Pullach was on Wednesday arrested by the country’s
  1939. federal prosecutor, originally under suspicion of passing on
  1940. information to Russian intelligence services. ... ...
  1941.  
  1942.  The plan is in response to the scandal resulting from last
  1943. week’s arrest of a 31-year-old BND “double agent” who spent
  1944. at least two years selling top-secret German intelligence
  1945. documents to his US spymasters in return for cash payments
  1946. of €10,000 (£7,940) per document. ...
  1947.  
  1948.  The double agent is reported to have simply emailed Berlin’s
  1949. American embassy and asked whether officials were interested
  1950. in “co-operation”. He subsequently downloaded at least 300
  1951. secret documents on to USB sticks that he handed to his
  1952. American spymasters at secret location in Austria.
  1953.  
  1954.  He was caught by German counter-espionage agents only after
  1955. he was found offering similar BND documents to Berlin’s Russian
  1956. embassy. The Germans had considered it “impossible” that one
  1957. of their own intelligence men could be working as a “double agent”
  1958. for the Americans.
  1959.  
  1960. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-to-spy-on-us-for-first-time-since-1945-after-double-agentscandal-9590645.html
  1961. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/07/nsa-chancellor-double-agent-german-us-relations
  1962. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/04/germany-arrest-bnd-spying-allegations-double-agent-us
  1963. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/11/world/europe/germany-expels-top-us-intelligence-officer.html?_r=0
  1964.  
  1965. ¤ Der Spiegel Releases NSA-BND Spy Documents ::
  1966.  
  1967. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-spiegel-snowden-14-0618.pdf
  1968.  
  1969. http://www.spiegel.de/international/the-germany-file-of-edward-snowden-documents-available-for-download-a-975917.html
  1970.  
  1971. ¤ NSA-BND_Spy_Documents_2014.zip (Mirror) ::
  1972.  
  1973. http://filedump.org/files/epVgbFV91403117533.html
  1974.  
  1975. ¤ Der Spiegel Release on German SIGADs ::
  1976.  
  1977. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-spiegel-german-sigads.pdf
  1978.  
  1979. ¤ Inside the New NSA-BND Revelations ::
  1980.  
  1981. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/new-snowden-revelations-on-nsa-spying-in-germany-a-975441.html
  1982.  
  1983. http://www.dw.de/new-leaks-show-germanys-collusion-with-nsa/a-17726141
  1984.  
  1985. ¤ NSA and BND Spying Telecommunications ::
  1986.  
  1987. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-german-spying.pdf
  1988.  
  1989. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-der-spiegel-14-0616.pdf
  1990.  
  1991. ¤ Germany Cooperates Closely with NSA ::
  1992.  
  1993. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-reveals-cooperation-between-nsa-and-german-bnd-a-909954.html
  1994.  
  1995. ¤ Key Partners ; Secret Links Between BND and NSA ::
  1996.  
  1997. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-intelligence-worked-closely-with-nsa-on-data-surveillance-a-912355.html
  1998.  
  1999. ▲ FLASHBACK ; Angela Merkel Compares NSA to Stasi ::
  2000.  
  2001.  In an angry exchange with Barack Obama, Angela Merkel
  2002. has compared the snooping practices of the US with those
  2003. of the Stasi, the ubiquitous and all-powerful secret
  2004. police of the communist dictatorship in East Germany,
  2005. where she grew up.
  2006.  
  2007. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/merkel-compares-nsa-stasi-obama
  2008. _______________________________________
  2009. ¤ NSA FORNSAT Intercept in 2002 and Economic Motives ::
  2010.  
  2011. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/07/the-national-security-agency-in-2002.html
  2012. _______________________________________
  2013. ¤ Look Out for Falling Redactions ::
  2014.  
  2015. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-falling-redactions.pdf
  2016. _______________________________________
  2017. ¤ Dump of BOUNDLESSINFORMANT IP Data ::
  2018.  
  2019. https://gist.github.com/9b/de3f0510cccbd5dbfdf0
  2020. _______________________________________
  2021. ¤ NSA Playset ; Tailored Access for Hackers ::
  2022.  
  2023. http://www.nsaplayset.org/
  2024. _______________________________________
  2025. ¤ How Secret Partners Expand NSA’s Surveillance Dragnet ::
  2026.  
  2027. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/06/18/nsa-surveillance-secret-cable-partners-revealed-rampart-a/
  2028. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140619/08062627624/nsa-working-with-denmark-germany-to-access-three-terabits-data-per-second-overseas-cables.shtml
  2029. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-uses-33-countries-to-intercept-web-traffic-snowden-files/
  2030. http://gigaom.com/2014/06/20/governments-let-nsa-tap-cables-on-their-territory-latest-snowden-revelations-show/
  2031.  
  2032. ¤ Foreign Partner Access to Black Budget FY 2013 ::
  2033.  
  2034. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200866/foreignpartneraccessbudgetfy2013-redacted.pdf
  2035.  
  2036. ¤ Overview Presenting the RAMPART-A Spy Program ::
  2037.  
  2038. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200860/odd-s3-overviewnov2011-v1-0-redacted-information.pdf
  2039.  
  2040. ¤ Three RAMPART-A Slides ::
  2041.  
  2042. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200865/uodds2overview-v1-1-redacted-information-dk.pdf
  2043.  
  2044. ¤ Black Budget FY 2013 / RAMPART-A Slides (Mirror) ::
  2045.  
  2046. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-intercept-14-0618.pdf
  2047.  
  2048. ¤ Update ; Intercept Releases More RAMPART-A Slides ::
  2049.  
  2050. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-information-intercept-14-0619.pdf
  2051. _______________________________________
  2052.  Keith Alexander’s talking points for strategic meeting
  2053. between the NSA and the Danish Defense Intelligence
  2054. Service (DDIS).
  2055.  
  2056. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200859/diropeningremarksguidancefordp1-v1-1-v1-0.pdf
  2057. _______________________________________
  2058. ¤ FISA Court Rules to Retain Spy Data Past 5 Years ::
  2059.  
  2060. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/fisc-br14-01-14-0410.pdf
  2061.  
  2062. ¤ NSA Admits They Keep All Spy Data Past 5 Years ::
  2063.  
  2064. http://dailycaller.com/2014/06/10/nsa-our-systems-are-too-complex-to-stop-deleting-evidence/
  2065. _______________________________________
  2066. ¤ Head of GCHQ Very Pissed Off Over Media Coverage ::
  2067.  
  2068. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet-security/10910212/Head-of-GCHQ-launches-thinly-veiled-attack-on-The-Guardian.html
  2069. _______________________________________
  2070. ¤ GCHQ Forced to Reveal Secret Policy for Mass Spying
  2071. of Residents’ Facebook and Google Use ::
  2072.  
  2073. https://www.privacyinternational.org/press-releases/uk-intelligence-forced-to-reveal-secret-policy-for-mass-surveillance-of-residents
  2074. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/17/business/international/british-spy-agencies-said-to-assert-broad-power-to-intercept-web-traffic.html?_r=0
  2075. http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/E/EU_BRITAIN_ONLINE_SURVEILLANCE
  2076.  
  2077.  Britain’s top counter-terrorism official has been forced
  2078. to reveal a secret Government policy justifying the mass
  2079. surveillance of every Facebook, Twitter, Youtube and Google
  2080. user in the UK.
  2081.  
  2082. https://www.privacyinternational.org/sites/privacyinternational.org/files/downloads/press-releases/witness_st_of_charles_blandford_farr.pdf
  2083.  
  2084. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/gchq-farr-pi.pdf (mirror)
  2085. _______________________________________
  2086. ¤ THIS IS HOW THE US GOVERNMENT TREATS WHISTLEBLOWERS ;
  2087. CIA Rendition Jet Was Waiting in Europe to Blackbag Snowden ::
  2088.  
  2089. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/06/13/cia_rendition_jet_was_waiting_in_europe_to_snatch_snowden/
  2090. ---------------------------------------
  2091. ¤ Leak Spy Documents @ The Intercept Dropbox ::
  2092.  
  2093. http://y6xjgkgwj47us5ca.onion/
  2094. _______________________________________
  2095. ¤ PRISM FOIA Request Highly Censored ::
  2096.  
  2097. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-prism-foia-email.pdf
  2098. _______________________________________
  2099. ¤ DEA-NSA SANDKEY Voice Intercepts ::
  2100.  
  2101. http://cryptomeorg.siteprotect.net/dea-nsa-sandkey.pdf
  2102.  
  2103. Mirrored » http://fileb.ag/pmu6ugcxsxq1
  2104. _______________________________________
  2105. ¤ How Governments Around The World Responded To
  2106. Snowden’s Revelations ::
  2107.  
  2108. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140612/03532827554/how-have-governments-around-world-responded-to-snowdens-revelations.shtml
  2109. _______________________________________
  2110. ¤ GCHQ’s Beyond Top Secret Middle Eastern Spy Base ::
  2111.  
  2112. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/06/03/revealed_beyond_top_secret_british_intelligence_middleeast_internet_spy_base/
  2113.  
  2114. ¤ GCHQ’s Middle Eastern Spy Base Eyeball ::
  2115.  
  2116. http://cryptome.org/2014-info/gchq-seeb/gchq-seeb.htm
  2117. _______________________________________
  2118. ¤ UK Teleco Admits Governments Used Secret Cables
  2119. to Tap Phones ::
  2120.  
  2121. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet-security/10880208/Vodafone-governments-use-secret-cables-to-tap-phones.html
  2122. _______________________________________
  2123. ¤ Some Numbers About NSA’s Data Collection ::
  2124.  
  2125. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com.br/2014/06/some-numbers-about-nsas-data-collection.html
  2126. _______________________________________
  2127. ¤ NSA Whistleblower Russel Tice Reveals NSA Has
  2128. Documents “Above Top Secret” and Many Are Burned
  2129. After Covert Operations, Routinely ::
  2130.  
  2131.  “Think of it this way. Remember I told you about the
  2132. NSA doing everything they could to make sure that the
  2133. information from 40 years ago – from spying on Frank
  2134. Church and Lord knows how many other Congressman that
  2135. they were spying on – was hidden?
  2136.  
  2137.  Now do you think they’re going to put that information
  2138. into Powerpoint slides that are easy to explain to
  2139. everybody what they’re doing?
  2140.  
  2141.  They would not even put their own NSA designators on
  2142. the reports [so that no one would know that] it came
  2143. from the NSA. They made the reports look like they were
  2144. Humint (human intelligence) reports. They did it to
  2145. hide the fact that they were NSA and they were doing
  2146. the collection. That’s 40 years ago. [The NSA and other
  2147. agencies are still doing "parallel construction",
  2148. "laundering" information to hide the fact that the
  2149. information is actually from mass NSA surveillance.]
  2150.  
  2151.  Now, what NSA is doing right now is that they’re taking
  2152. the information and they’re putting it in a much higher
  2153. security level. It’s called “ECI” – Exceptionally Controlled
  2154. Information – and it’s called the black program … which I
  2155. was a specialist in, by the way.
  2156.  
  2157.  I specialized in black world – DOD and IC (Intelligence
  2158. Community) – programs, operations and missions … in “VRKs”,
  2159. “ECIs”, and “SAPs”, “STOs”. SAP equals Special Access
  2160. Program. It’s highly unlikely Mr. Snowden had any access
  2161. to these. STO equals Special Technical Operations It’s
  2162. highly unlikely Mr. Snowden had any access to these.
  2163.  
  2164.  Now in that world – the ECI/VRK world – everything in that
  2165. system is classified at a higher level and it has its own
  2166. computer systems that house it. It’s totally separate than
  2167. the system which Mr. Snowden was privy to, which was called
  2168. the “JWICS”: Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications
  2169. System. The JWICS system is what everybody at NSA has access
  2170. to. Mr Snowden had Sys Admin [systems administrator] authority
  2171. for the JWICS.
  2172.  
  2173.  And you still have to have TS/SCI clearance [i.e. Top Secret/
  2174. Sensitive Compartmented Information - also known as “code word”
  2175. - clearance] to get on the JWICS. But the ECI/VRK systems are
  2176. much higher[levels of special compartmentalized clearance]
  2177. than the JWICS. And you have to be in the black world to get
  2178. that [clearance].
  2179.  
  2180.  ECI = Exceptionally Controlled Information. I do not believe
  2181. Mr. Snowden had any access to these ECI controlled networks).
  2182. VRK = Very Restricted Knowledge. I do not believe Mr. Snowden
  2183. had any access to these VRK controlled networks.
  2184.  
  2185.  These programs typically have, at the least, a requirement of
  2186. 100 year or until death, ’till the person first being “read in”
  2187. [i.e. sworn to secrecy as part of access to the higher
  2188. classification program] can talk about them. [As an interesting
  2189. sidenote, the Washington Times reported in 2006 that – when Tice
  2190. offered to testify to Congress about this illegal spying – he
  2191. was informed by the NSA that the Senate and House intelligence
  2192. committees were not cleared to hear such information.]
  2193.  
  2194.  It’s very compartmentalized and – even with stuff that they had
  2195. – you might have something at NSA, that there’s literally 40
  2196. people at NSA that know that it’s going on in the entire agency.
  2197.  
  2198.  When the stuff came out in the New York Times [the first big
  2199. spying story, which broke in 2005] – and I was a source of
  2200. information for the New York Times – that’s when President Bush
  2201. made up that nonsense about the “terrorist surveillance program.”
  2202. By the way, that never existed. That was made up.
  2203.  
  2204.  There was no such thing beforehand. It was made up … to try
  2205. to placate the American people.
  2206.  
  2207.  The NSA IG (Inspector General) – who was not cleared for this –
  2208. all of a sudden is told he has to do an investigation on this;
  2209. something he has no information or knowledge of.
  2210.  
  2211.  So what they did, is they took a few documents and they
  2212. downgraded [he classification level of the documents] – just
  2213. a few – and gave them to them to placate this basic whitewash
  2214. investigation.”
  2215.  
  2216. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/tice-shoot-snowden.pdf
  2217. http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2014/06/original-nsa-whistleblower-snowden-
  2218. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-whistleblower-snowden-never-had-access-to-the-juiciest-documents/
  2219. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=az-YWMNWQuU
  2220. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GJS7F-mShpI
  2221. _______________________________________
  2222. ¤ NSA MYSTIC SIGAD Reporting Tabulation ::
  2223.  
  2224. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-sigad-reporting.pdf
  2225.  
  2226. ¤ NSA SOMALGET Spy Programme ::
  2227.  
  2228. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1164088/somalget.pdf
  2229.  
  2230. ¤ SOMALGET SSO Dictionary Excerpt ::
  2231.  
  2232. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1164086/sso-dictionary-excerpt.pdf
  2233.  
  2234. ¤ MYSTIC/SOMALGET Spy Documents ::
  2235.  
  2236. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-intercept-14-0519.pdf
  2237.  
  2238. ¤ Toward the Identity of “Country X” in MYSTIC ::
  2239.  
  2240. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-mystic-identity.pdf
  2241.  
  2242. ¤ Wikileaks Releases Identity of “Country X” ::
  2243.  
  2244. http://wikileaks.org/WikiLeaks-statement-on-the-mass.html
  2245.  
  2246. http://www.infowars.com/country-x-wikileaks-reveals-nsa-recording-nearly-all-phone-calls-in-afghanistan/
  2247.  
  2248. ¤ Google Idea’s Director Jared Cohen Was Tasked With
  2249. Getting Afghan Telcos to Move Towers to US Bases ::
  2250.  
  2251. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09KABUL2020_a.html
  2252.  
  2253. ¤ Data Pirates of the Caribbean ; The NSA Is
  2254. Recording Every Cell Phone Call in the Bahamas ::
  2255.  
  2256. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/05/19/data-pirates-caribbean-nsa-recording-every-cell-phone-call-bahamas/
  2257.  
  2258. ¤ UPDATE ; The Bahamas Wants to Know Why the NSA is
  2259. Recording Its Phone Calls ::
  2260.  
  2261. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/05/20/bahamas-wants-know-nsa-recording-phone-calls/
  2262. _______________________________________
  2263. ¤ NSA Collecting Millions of Faces From Web Images ::
  2264.  
  2265.  The FBI, DHS, state and local law enforcement
  2266. agencies are now also using the same facial
  2267. recognition systems as the NSA. Other biometric
  2268. identification systems are being developed as well.
  2269. A panopticon for endless spying in the police state.
  2270.  
  2271. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/01/us/nsa-collecting-millions-of-faces-from-web-images.html
  2272.  
  2273. http://rt.com/usa/162868-nsa-snowden-social-facial/
  2274.  
  2275. ¤ NSA Identity Spying ::
  2276.  
  2277. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-identity-spy.pdf
  2278. _______________________________________
  2279. ¤ 10 Things (Most People) Didn’t Know Before Snowden ::
  2280.  
  2281. 1. Everything you do online can be monitored.
  2282. 2. What you do offline can be monitored!
  2283. 3. They are collecting your phone records, too.
  2284. 4. In some countries, it is not just metadata.
  2285. 5. Or ordinary citizens for that matter.
  2286. 6. The NSA engages in industrial espionage.
  2287. 7. The NSA is also hacking the global financial system.
  2288. 8. The NSA is also hacking into online video games.
  2289. 9. The NSA uses pornography to honeytrap targets.
  2290. 10. The NSA dragnet is collecting facial images.
  2291.  
  2292. http://rt.com/usa/163700-year-whistleblower-before-snowden/
  2293.  
  2294. And a few more to think about,
  2295.  
  2296. 11. The NSA has access to crypto-breaking supercomputers.
  2297. 12. The NSA spied on human rights activists, organizations.
  2298. 13. Google does in fact have personal relations in the NSA.
  2299. 14. All electronic products are manufactured with backdoors.
  2300. 15. NSA tampers with electronics being shipped by mail.
  2301. _______________________________________
  2302. ▼ Snowden Strikes Back at NSA, Emails NBC News ::
  2303.  
  2304.  Fugitive Edward Snowden on Friday challenged the
  2305. NSA’s insistence that it has no evidence he tried
  2306. to raise concerns about the agency’s surveillance
  2307. activity before he began leaking government documents
  2308. to reporters, calling the response a “clearly tailored
  2309. and incomplete leak ... for a political advantage.”
  2310.  
  2311.  “The NSA’s new discovery of written contact between
  2312. me and its lawyers -- after more than a year of denying
  2313. any such contact existed - raises serious concerns,”
  2314. Snowden said in an email Friday to NBC News. “It
  2315. reveals as false the NSA’s claim to Barton Gellman
  2316. of the Washington Post in December of last year, that
  2317. ‘after extensive investigation, including interviews
  2318. with his former NSA supervisors and co-workers, we
  2319. have not found any evidence to support Mr. Snowden’s
  2320. contention that he brought these matters to anyone’s
  2321. attention.’”
  2322.  
  2323.  Snowden’s email followed Thursday’s release by the US
  2324. Office of the Director of Intelligence of an email
  2325. exchange between Snowden and the NSA’s Office of the
  2326. General Counsel. The Washington Post received and
  2327. published a similar response from Snowden on Thursday.
  2328.  
  2329. http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/edward-snowden-interview/snowden-strikes-back-nsa-emails-nbc-news-n118821
  2330.  
  2331. ▲ NSA Oversight Training, OVSC1800 Minimization Training,
  2332. NSA OGC Snowden Emails on OVSC1800 Course ::
  2333.  
  2334. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-oversight.pdf
  2335. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ovsc1800.pdf
  2336. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ogc-snowden.pdf
  2337. ---------------------------------------
  2338. ¤ NBC Interviews Edward Snowden (Full) ::
  2339.  
  2340. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yNhMXyAdjp8
  2341.  
  2342. Mirror here » http://upstore.net/62ocku
  2343. _______________________________________
  2344. ¤ What Does GCHQ Know About Our Devices We Don’t? ::
  2345.  
  2346. https://www.privacyinternational.org/blog/what-does-gchq-know-about-our-devices-that-we-dont
  2347.  
  2348. ¤ A Hint? ; “Flashdrive Cache Paths” (Repost) ::
  2349.  
  2350. http://paste.security-portal.cz/view/b30bffb6
  2351. _______________________________________
  2352. ¤ Onionshare App Lets the Next Snowden Send Big Files
  2353. Securely and Anonymously ::
  2354.  
  2355.  OnionShare lets you securely and anonymously
  2356. share a file of any size with someone. It works
  2357. by starting a web server, making it accessible
  2358. as a Tor hidden service, and generating an
  2359. unguessable URL to access and download the file.
  2360. It doesn’t require setting up a server on the
  2361. internet somewhere or using a third party
  2362. filesharing service. You host the file on your
  2363. own computer and use a Tor hidden service to
  2364. make it temporarily accessible over the internet.
  2365. The other user just needs to use Tor Browser to
  2366. download the file from you.
  2367.  
  2368. https://github.com/micahflee/onionshare
  2369. http://www.wired.com/2014/05/onionshare/
  2370.  
  2371. ¤ Mirrored Onionshare App w/ Report (ZIP) ::
  2372.  
  2373. https://anonfiles.com/file/9805fddaf90e3ecf37b957e5bed3f474
  2374.  
  2375. ¤ Mirrored Onionshare App w/ Report (RAR) ::
  2376.  
  2377. https://anonfiles.com/file/ea22d9e866875e02a5a0c95e2f69b5d4
  2378. _______________________________________
  2379. ¤ Former NSA-CIA Director Michael Hayden Admits
  2380. Metadata SIGINT Collection Used to Kill People ::
  2381.  
  2382. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yaTGkSoI8Ic
  2383.  
  2384. ¤ The Price of Privacy Debate - Re-Evaluating the NSA ::
  2385.  
  2386. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kV2HDM86XgI
  2387. _______________________________________
  2388. ¤ Glenn Greenwald - “No Place To Hide” (EPUB) ::
  2389.  
  2390. magnet:?xt=urn:btih:2d1ace5d3b854a9afffc4c2b576cdadc4a0e2718
  2391.  
  2392. http://torrage.com/torrent/2D1ACE5D3B854A9AFFFC4C2B576CDADC4A0E2718.torrent
  2393.  
  2394. ¤ Glenn Greenwald - “No Place To Hide” (PDF) ::
  2395.  
  2396. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/npth.7z
  2397.  
  2398. ▼ NSA Documents From “No Place To Hide” ::
  2399.  
  2400. http://hbpub.vo.llnwd.net/o16/video/olmk/holt/greenwald/NoPlaceToHide-Documents-Uncompressed.pdf
  2401.  
  2402. Mirror here » http://fileb.ag/94dwpno2eokp
  2403.  
  2404. ▲ An Avalanche of Snowden Documents To Be Released
  2405. Online Next Week ::
  2406.  
  2407. http://www.engadget.com/2014/05/08/an-avalanche-of-new-snowden-documents-will-go-online-next-week/
  2408. ---------------------------------------
  2409. ¤ NSA’s Largest Cable Tapping Program ::
  2410.  
  2411. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/05/nsas-largest-cable-tapping-program.html
  2412.  
  2413. ¤ Glenn Greenwald On Democracy Now ::
  2414.  
  2415. http://publish.dvlabs.com/democracynow/ipod/dn2014-0513.mp4
  2416. http://publish.dvlabs.com/democracynow/ipod/dn2014-0514.mp4
  2417.  
  2418. ¤ New Snowden Document Implies NSA May Be Putting
  2419. Israel’s Security Ahead of America’s ::
  2420.  
  2421. http://www.infowars.com/new-snowden-document-implies-nsa-may-be-putting-israels-security-ahead-of-americas/
  2422.  
  2423. ¤ New Snowden Documents Reveal Depth Of Facebook
  2424. Infiltration by NSA ::
  2425.  
  2426. http://revolution-news.com/new-snowden-documents-reveal-depth-of-facebook-infiltration-by-nsa/
  2427.  
  2428. http://www.infowars.com/how-the-nsa-fbi-made-facebook-the-perfect-mass-surveillance-tool/
  2429.  
  2430. ¤ Leaked Photos of the NSA’s TAO Factory ::
  2431.  
  2432.  A document included in the trove of National Security
  2433. Agency files released with Glenn Greenwald’s book
  2434. “No Place To Hide” details how the agency’s Tailored
  2435. Access Operations (TAO) unit and other NSA employees
  2436. intercept servers, routers, and other network gear
  2437. being shipped to organizations targeted for surveillance
  2438. and install covert implant firmware onto them before
  2439. they’re delivered.
  2440.  
  2441. http://govtslaves.info/leaked-photos-nsas-router-upgrade-factory/
  2442.  
  2443. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-customs.htm
  2444.  
  2445. ¤ Cisco Letter to Obama Objecting to NSA Implants ::
  2446.  
  2447. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/cisco-implant.pdf
  2448.  
  2449. ¤ No Place to Hide Documents Compared to Previous ::
  2450.  
  2451. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/npth-docs-compare.pdf
  2452. ______________________________________
  2453. ¤ House Leaders and Obama Regime Water Down
  2454. Surveillance Reform Bill ::
  2455.  
  2456. http://newamerica.net/node/110983
  2457. _______________________________________
  2458. ¤ US Justice Department Told Supreme Court to Dismiss
  2459. NSA Spying Cases? ::
  2460.  
  2461. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/17/government-lies-nsa-justice-department-supreme-court
  2462. _______________________________________
  2463. ¤ The New Yorker Interviews Keith Alexander ::
  2464.  
  2465. http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/05/were-at-greater-risk-q-a-with-general-keith-alexander.html
  2466. _______________________________________
  2467. ▼ Leak Spy Documents @ The Intercept Dropbox ::
  2468.  
  2469. http://y6xjgkgwj47us5ca.onion/
  2470.  
  2471. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/intercept-drop.pdf
  2472.  
  2473. ▲ Obama’s Directive Makes Mere Citing of Snowden’s
  2474. Leaks a Punishable Offense ::
  2475.  
  2476.  In a new policy directive from the Obama administrative,
  2477. national security and other government officials will no
  2478. longer be allowed to publicly discuss or even reference
  2479. news reporting that is based on “unauthorized leaks.”
  2480.  
  2481. https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2014/05/09
  2482. _______________________________________
  2483. ¤ Munk Debate on State Surveillance ::
  2484.  
  2485. Greenwald, Ohanian vs Hayden, Dershowitz
  2486.  
  2487. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_d1tw3mEOoE
  2488. ______________________________________
  2489. ¤ NSA ; Manageable Network Plan ::
  2490.  
  2491. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-network-plan.pdf
  2492. ______________________________________
  2493. ¤ United States of Secrets ; How the Government
  2494. Came to Spy on Millions of Americans ::
  2495.  
  2496. Part One: Tuesday, May 13, 2014, at 9 p.m. on PBS
  2497. Part Two: Tuesday, May 20, 2014, at 10 p.m. on PBS
  2498.  
  2499. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/united-states-of-secrets/
  2500.  
  2501. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/pressroom/press-release-united-states-of-secrets-how-the-government-came-to-spy-on-millions-of-americans/
  2502. ______________________________________
  2503. ¤ NSA, Google Inc. Relationship Emails ::
  2504.  
  2505. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-google.pdf
  2506.  
  2507. ¤ NSA Scares CEOs Into Cyber Spying (Related) ::
  2508.  
  2509. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-scares-ceos.pdf
  2510.  
  2511. ¤ Emails Reveal Close Google Relationship With NSA ::
  2512.  
  2513.  “Keep in mind that social media survives by
  2514. selling user data. Spying is their business model.
  2515. In padding their bottom lines executives have
  2516. worked diligently to dilute privacy legislation
  2517. in addition to garnering a myriad of fines. All
  2518. of this data harvesting services a data broker
  2519. industry which generates something in the
  2520. neighborhood of $200 billion in revenue annually.”
  2521.  
  2522.   - Bill Blunden, counterpunch.org
  2523.  
  2524. http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/5/6/nsa-chief-google.html
  2525. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/05/07/googles_nsa_data_dealings_not_as_bad_as_first_thought_theyre_much_worse/
  2526. http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/05/09/the-nsas-corporate-collaborators/
  2527. _______________________________________
  2528. ¤ GCHQ Director Visits NSA for PRISM Data Access ::
  2529.  
  2530. Hosted Dinner: 30 April 2013//1830Hrs - Quarters
  2531. Hosted Discussions: 1 May 2013//0800-0830
  2532.  
  2533.  “PURPOSE OF THE VISIT:  (U//FOUO) As the Director
  2534. of GCHQ, Sir Iain wants to reconnect with NSA
  2535. Leadership on matters of mutual concern, and to
  2536. ensure each partner is aware of the other’s
  2537. activities and future plans.” … …
  2538.  
  2539.  “Unsupervised access to FAA 702 data, in a manner
  2540. similar to Olympics Option, remains on GCHQ’s wish
  2541. list and is something its leadership still desires.”
  2542.  
  2543. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-gchq-lobban-visit.pdf
  2544.  
  2545. ¤ GCHQ Unsupervised PRISM Access in 2012 ::
  2546.  
  2547. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-prism-olympics.pdf
  2548.  
  2549. ¤ NSA Spied “Suspected Terrorists” At 2012 Olympics ::
  2550.  
  2551. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-ghostmachine-echobase.pdf
  2552.  
  2553. ¤ NSA & GCHQ Eyeballed “Suspected Terrorists” Before,
  2554. During and After 2012 Olympics ::
  2555.  
  2556.  The Snowden files do not indicate whether NSA granted
  2557. GCHQ’s request, but they do show that the NSA was
  2558. “supportive” of the idea, and that GCHQ was permitted
  2559. extensive access to PRISM during the London Olympics
  2560. in 2012. The request for the broad access was
  2561. communicated at “leadership” level, according to
  2562. the documents. Neither agency would comment on the
  2563. proposed arrangement or whether it was approved. … …
  2564.  
  2565.  The data sharing between the agencies during the
  2566. Olympics, though, was not isolated to PRISM. … …
  2567. The NSA was funneling troves of intercepted data
  2568. to GCHQ from a system called GHOSTMACHINE, a massive
  2569. cloud database used by the NSA to analyze metadata
  2570. and store, according to one document in the Snowden
  2571. archive, “100s of billions of entries.”
  2572.  
  2573. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/04/30/gchq-prism-nsa-fisa-unsupervised-access-snowden/
  2574. _______________________________________
  2575. ¤ NSA MYSTIC Telephone Interception Program ::
  2576.  
  2577. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1086618/mysticssoweeklybrief.pdf
  2578. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1086616/fromsso-key-brief-overview.pdf
  2579. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1088934/mystic-tearsheet-cropped-v2.pdf
  2580.  
  2581.  The National Security Agency has built a surveillance
  2582. system capable of recording “100 percent” of a foreign
  2583. country’s telephone calls, enabling the agency to rewind
  2584. and review conversations as long as a month after they
  2585. take place, according to people with direct knowledge of
  2586. the effort and documents supplied by former contractor
  2587. Edward Snowden.
  2588.  
  2589.  A senior manager for the program compares it to a time
  2590. machine — one that can replay the voices from any call
  2591. without requiring that a person be identified in advance
  2592. for surveillance.
  2593.  
  2594.  The voice interception program, called MYSTIC, began in
  2595. 2009. Its RETRO tool, short for “retrospective retrieval,”
  2596. and related projects reached full capacity against the
  2597. first target nation in 2011. Planning documents two years
  2598. later anticipated similar operations elsewhere.
  2599.  
  2600.  In the initial deployment, collection systems are recording
  2601. “every single” conversation nationwide, storing billions of
  2602. them in a 30-day rolling buffer that clears the oldest
  2603. calls as new ones arrive, according to a classified summary.
  2604.  
  2605.  The call buffer opens a door “into the past,” the summary
  2606. says, enabling users to “retrieve audio of interest that
  2607. was not tasked at the time of the original call.” Analysts
  2608. listen to only a fraction of 1 percent of the calls, but
  2609. the absolute numbers are high. Each month, they send
  2610. millions of voice clippings, or “cuts,” for processing
  2611. and long-term storage.
  2612.  
  2613. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-surveillance-program-reaches-into-the-past-to-retrieve-replay-phone-calls/2014/03/18/226d2646-ade9-11e3-a49e-76adc9210f19_story.html
  2614.  
  2615. ¤ Washington Post Censors MYSTIC Slides ::
  2616.  
  2617.  The Washington Post is reporting, based on the
  2618. files of whistleblower Edward Snowden, that the NSA
  2619. is able to store every phone call made in an entire
  2620. nation and replay them for up to 30 days. Not only
  2621. can the agency do this, but there is a country where
  2622. it’s actually doing this now–the Post knows where,
  2623. but they won’t say.
  2624.  
  2625. http://www.fair.org/blog/2014/03/19/the-nsa-built-a-time-machine-but-washington-post-wont-say-where/
  2626.  
  2627. ¤ NSA Records All Phone Calls Using Project MYSTIC ::
  2628.  
  2629. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NYq44T5e3lU
  2630.  
  2631. Mirror here » http://fileb.ag/3cva7msxqefx
  2632. _______________________________________
  2633. ¤ NSA/NIS Dagbladet Documents Decensored ::
  2634.  
  2635.  There are a couple images in the latest Dagbladet
  2636. story from the Snowden trove that were originally
  2637. blurred instead of blacked out. This allowed the
  2638. text to be recovered. There was no particular point
  2639. in making a project out of the first, since it had
  2640. already been published previously. The second was
  2641. completely decoded in a matter of a few hours.
  2642.  
  2643. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/DagbladetDecensor.pdf
  2644.  
  2645. ¤ NSA/NIS Aquired Supercomputer to Break Crypto ::
  2646.  
  2647.  The Norwegian Inteligence Service (NIS) is also
  2648. nauseous from the unmanageable amounts of data it
  2649. is served daily. This is partly the reason why NSA
  2650. now purchases a supercomputer codenamed Steelwinter.
  2651. This information comes from a document Edward Snowden
  2652. took from NSA and has later shared with Dagbladet.
  2653. The document, marked “top secret” is a summary of
  2654. how the NSA sees the collaboration with Norway after
  2655. a meeting between the two services in March 2013.
  2656.  
  2657.  The supercomputer NIS buys is a derivation of the
  2658. so-called Windsor Blue supercomputer.
  2659.  
  2660.  “NIS is in the process of acquiring STEEL WINTER
  2661. (a WINDSORBLUE derivative supercomputer) and has
  2662. entered into a partnership with NSA - cryptanalysis
  2663. ( ...) service to develop applications of mutual
  2664. benefit” the document says.
  2665.  
  2666.  “Windsor Blue” is the name of a program for
  2667. supercomputers at the American IT-giant IBM. The
  2668. company is working towards creating a so-called
  2669. exascale supercomputer which means it can make a
  2670. quintillion - 1,000,000,000,000,000,000 - calculations
  2671. per second.
  2672.  
  2673. http://www.dagbladet.no/2014/04/26/nyheter/snowden_i_norge/edward_snowden/nsa/etterretningstjenesten/32991102/
  2674. _______________________________________
  2675. ¤ Germany Blocks Edward Snowden From Testifying ::
  2676.  
  2677. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/01/germany-edward-snowden-nsa-inquiry
  2678. _______________________________________
  2679. ¤ NSA Spies More on Americans Than Russians ::
  2680.  
  2681. http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/edward-snowden-nsa-spies-more-on-americans-than-russians-20140430
  2682. _______________________________________
  2683. ¤ Snowden Asks Putin About Russian Spying ::
  2684.  
  2685. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w1yH554emkY
  2686. http://rt.com/news/snowden-putin-spy-online-140/
  2687. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-04-17/snowden-calls-putin-telethon-discuss-legality-mass-surveillance
  2688. _______________________________________
  2689. ¤ NSA Spied on Human Rights Workers ::
  2690.  
  2691.  The US has spied on the staff of prominent
  2692. human rights organisations, Edward Snowden has
  2693. told the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, Europe’s
  2694. top human rights body.
  2695.  
  2696.  Giving evidence via a videolink from Moscow,
  2697. Snowden said the National Security Agency – for
  2698. which he worked as a contractor – had deliberately
  2699. snooped on bodies like Amnesty International and
  2700. Human Rights Watch.
  2701.  
  2702. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/08/edwards-snowden-us-government-spied-human-rights-workers
  2703.  
  2704. ¤ Edward Snowden Testimony @ Parliamentary Assembly
  2705. of the Council of Europe (Full) ::
  2706.  
  2707. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3f8Lunf1a2w
  2708. _______________________________________
  2709. ¤ EU High Court Allows Banning Metadata Collection ::
  2710.  
  2711.  Due to the particularities of EU lawmaking, the
  2712. effects of the directive (spying) will still be in
  2713. place in most EU member states for the time being.
  2714.  
  2715.  According to EU legal procedure, a directive is
  2716. a type of law that requires each of the 28 member
  2717. countries to “transpose” it into their own national
  2718. laws. In this case, countries could even choose
  2719. whether to expand the six-month requirement to as
  2720. high as two years. ... ...
  2721.  
  2722.  Current EU data retention law will remain in
  2723. effect until repealed legislatively or invalidated
  2724. by domestic courts.
  2725.  
  2726. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/04/eu-high-court-strikes-down-metadata-collection-law/
  2727. _______________________________________
  2728. ¤ Masterspy Orders Snub on Media Contacts ::
  2729.  
  2730. http://www.infowars.com/intelligence-head-who-lied-to-congress-bans-employees-from-talking-to-media/
  2731. _______________________________________
  2732. ¤ US Whines - ‘Anti-Snooping Plans are Unfair’ ::
  2733.  
  2734.  “Recent proposals from countries within the
  2735. European Union to create a Europe-only electronic
  2736. network (dubbed a ‘Schengen cloud’ by advocates) or
  2737. to create national-only electronic networks could
  2738. potentially lead to effective exclusion or discrimination
  2739. against foreign service suppliers that are directly
  2740. offering network services, or dependent on them,”
  2741. the USTR said in its annual report.
  2742.  
  2743. http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2014%20NTE%20Report%20on%20FTB.pdf
  2744. http://inserbia.info/today/2014/04/us-blasts-eus-plan-for-schengen-cloud/
  2745. http://rt.com/news/us-europe-nsa-snowden-549/
  2746. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  2747. ¤ ACLU Offers NSA Document Search ::
  2748.  
  2749. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-search
  2750.  
  2751. ¤ ACLU Offers Mirrored NSA Documents ::
  2752.  
  2753. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  2754. _______________________________________
  2755. ¤ KILLCEN ; Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip ::
  2756.  
  2757.  Includes all news reports, videos, images, slides
  2758. and documents from and related to Snowden’s leaks
  2759. so far, up to April 2nd of 2014. I’m still collecting
  2760. any information that comes out and will provide an
  2761. updated archive from time to time.
  2762.  
  2763.  After decompression - the main folder is titled
  2764. “Eyeballing_Snowden_Info” and it holds a total of
  2765. 927MB decompressed.
  2766.  
  2767.  This was stored on an old OFFLINE system, without
  2768. any WiFi card or modem attached so the archive is
  2769. safe from being modified, exploited or stolen.
  2770.  
  2771. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  2772. (1,325 files | ZIP | 743MB)
  2773.  
  2774. http://fileb.ag/1ixi6dqmbj80
  2775. http://fpsbay.com/download/64465X13965734822241X344921/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  2776. http://davvas.com/l21m47ls819e
  2777. http://jumbofiles.org/newfile?n=528498&Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  2778. _______________________________________
  2779. ¤ It’s Finally Admitted! ::
  2780.  
  2781. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1100298-unclassified-702-response.html
  2782. http://www.emptywheel.net/2014/04/01/james-clapper-confirms-vadm-mike-rogers-needlessly-obfuscated-in-confirmation-hearing/
  2783. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/01/nsa-surveillance-loophole-americans-data
  2784. http://www.zdnet.com/nsa-searched-u-s-calls-emails-without-warrant-u-s-intelligence-chief-admits-7000027938/
  2785. http://rt.com/usa/clapper-wyden-nsa-fisa-665/
  2786. _______________________________________
  2787. ¤ NSA Spy Chiefs of State ::
  2788.  
  2789. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spy-cos.pdf
  2790.  
  2791. ¤ NSA Spy Chiefs of State (Full List) ::
  2792.  
  2793. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-nymrod-spy-cos.pdf
  2794.  
  2795. ¤ GCHQ and NSA Targeted Private German Companies ::
  2796.  
  2797. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/gchq-and-nsa-targeted-private-german-companies-a-961444.html
  2798. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/29/der-spiegel-nsa-ghcq-hacked-german-companies-put-merkel-list-122-targeted-leaders/
  2799. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/03/31/nsas-m31.html
  2800. http://leaksource.info/2014/03/31/122-country-leaders-in-nsas-target-knowledge-database-2009-document/
  2801.  
  2802. ▲ UPDATE ; European Parliament Suspends US
  2803. Trade Talks Due to Political Spying ::
  2804.  
  2805. http://falkvinge.net/2014/03/12/europarl-suspends-u-s-trade-talks-data-sharing-over-mass-surveillance/
  2806. _______________________________________
  2807. ¤ Video Demonstration of Two Intelligence Analysis Tools ::
  2808.  
  2809. http://electrospaces.blogspot.se/2014/03/video-demonstration-of-two-intelligence.html
  2810.  
  2811. ¤ Telephone Call Data Record Link Analysis Software ::
  2812.  
  2813. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J38tKqq9kpY
  2814.  
  2815. ¤ IBM i2 Analysts Notebook - Esri Edition ::
  2816.  
  2817. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MJ5CovDQDYU
  2818.  
  2819. ¤ Report and Both Videos ZIPPED & Mirrored ::
  2820.  
  2821. http://fpsbay.com/download/64445X13961058822231X344721/Two%20Intelligence%20Analysis%20Tools.zip
  2822. _______________________________________
  2823. ¤ NSA’s New Civil Liberties and Privacy Officer ::
  2824.  
  2825.  Becky Richards promises more transparency. She
  2826. also promises the NSA will “build privacy into
  2827. new technologies” to “protect privacy and civil
  2828. liberties” and “to be as transparent with the
  2829. public as possible” as well helping the public
  2830. “understand how we’re protecting their privacy,
  2831. how we’re protecting national security.”
  2832.  
  2833. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-richards-14-0320.htm
  2834. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  2835. ¤ NSA Huawei SHOTGIANT Hardware Exploit ::
  2836.  
  2837. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-huawei.pdf
  2838.  
  2839. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-huawei-02.pdf
  2840.  
  2841. ¤ Huawei Global Cyber Security Assurance ::
  2842.  
  2843. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/huawei-cyber-security.pdf
  2844.  
  2845. ¤ Huawei Network Migration Tool (48.7MB) ::
  2846.  
  2847. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/huawei-network-migration.zip
  2848.  
  2849. ¤ NSA Breached Chinese Telecom Giant Huawei ::
  2850.  
  2851.  The American government conducted a major intelligence
  2852. offensive against China, with targets including the
  2853. Chinese government and networking company Huawei,
  2854. according to documents from former NSA worker Edward
  2855. Snowden that have been viewed by SPIEGEL and the
  2856. New York Times. Among the American intelligence
  2857. service’s targets were former Chinese President
  2858. Hu Jintao, the Chinese Trade Ministry, banks, as
  2859. well as telecommunications companies.
  2860.  
  2861.  But the NSA made a special effort to target Huawei.
  2862. With 150,000 employees and €28 billion ($38.6 billion)
  2863. in annual revenues, the company is the world’s second
  2864. largest network equipment supplier. At the beginning
  2865. of 2009, the NSA began an extensive operation, referred
  2866. to internally as “Shotgiant,” against the company, which
  2867. is considered a major competitor to US-based Cisco. The
  2868. company produces smartphones and tablets, but also mobile
  2869. phone infrastructure, WLAN routers and fiber optic cable
  2870. -- the kind of technology that is decisive in the NSA’s
  2871. battle for data supremacy.
  2872.  
  2873.  A special unit with the US intelligence agency succeeded
  2874. in infiltrating Huwaei’s network and copied a list of
  2875. 1,400 customers as well as internal documents providing
  2876. training to engineers on the use of Huwaei products,
  2877. among other things.
  2878.  
  2879. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/world/asia/nsa-breached-chinese-servers-seen-as-spy-peril.html
  2880. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-spied-on-chinese-government-and-networking-firm-huawei-a-960199.html
  2881. http://news.yahoo.com/nsa-infiltrates-servers-china-telecom-giant-huawei-report-022030765--finance.html
  2882. http://www.forbes.com/sites/rosatrieu/2014/03/24/chinas-huawei-condemns-nsa-spying-calls-for-unity-against-cyber-mischief/
  2883.  
  2884. ¤ Hong Lei Responds to Huawei NSA Backdoors ::
  2885.  
  2886.  “We are seriously concerned with relevant reports. The
  2887. media has disclosed a lot about the eavesdropping,
  2888. surveillance and spying activities that the US has
  2889. carried out on other countries, including China. China
  2890. has lodged representations with the American side on
  2891. many occasions. We require the American side to give a
  2892. clear explanation and stop such behaviours.”
  2893.  
  2894. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t1140281.shtml
  2895. _______________________________________
  2896. ¤ NSA Mapping and Spying System Administrators ::
  2897.  
  2898.  The document consists of several posts – one of
  2899. them is titled “I hunt sys admins” – that were
  2900. published in 2012 on an internal discussion board
  2901. hosted on the agency’s classified servers. They
  2902. were written by an NSA official involved in the
  2903. agency’s effort to break into foreign network
  2904. routers, the devices that connect computer
  2905. networks and transport data across the Internet.
  2906. By infiltrating the computers of system administrators
  2907. who work for foreign phone and Internet companies,
  2908. the NSA can gain access to the calls and emails
  2909. that flow over their networks.
  2910.  
  2911.  The classified posts reveal how the NSA official
  2912. aspired to create a database that would function
  2913. as an international hit list of sys admins to
  2914. potentially target. Yet the document makes clear
  2915. that the admins are not suspected of any criminal
  2916. activity – they are targeted only because they
  2917. control access to networks the agency wants to
  2918. infiltrate. “Who better to target than the person
  2919. that already has the ‘keys to the kingdom’?” one
  2920. of the posts says.
  2921.  
  2922.  The NSA wants more than just passwords. The document
  2923. includes a list of other data that can be harvested
  2924. from computers belonging to sys admins, including
  2925. network maps, customer lists, business correspondence
  2926. and, the author jokes, “pictures of cats in funny
  2927. poses with amusing captions.”
  2928.  
  2929. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-hunt-sysadmins.pdf
  2930. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/document/2014/03/20/hunt-sys-admins/
  2931. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/20/inside-nsa-secret-efforts-hunt-hack-system-administrators/
  2932. _______________________________________
  2933. ¤ NSA Culture, 1980s to the 21st Century ::
  2934.  
  2935. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-sid-culture.pdf
  2936. _______________________________________
  2937. ¤ CSEC SNOWGLOBE Slides ::
  2938.  
  2939. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/cse-snowglobe.pdf
  2940.  
  2941. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1094526/babarfull.pdf
  2942.  
  2943. ¤ Default Le Monde Report ::
  2944.  
  2945. http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2014/03/21/quand-les-canadiens-partent-en-chasse-de-babar_4387233_3210.html
  2946.  
  2947. ¤ Le Monde Report Translated to English ::
  2948.  
  2949. http://slexy.org/view/s20ThA9Vog
  2950. _______________________________________
  2951. ¤ DNI National Security / Secrecy Panic ::
  2952.  
  2953. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/litt-14-0318.pdf
  2954. _______________________________________
  2955. ¤ TED ; Ask Snowden ::
  2956.  
  2957. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yVwAodrjZMY
  2958.  
  2959. http://iroots.org/2014/03/18/transcript-edward-snowden-today-at-ted-talk/
  2960. _______________________________________
  2961. ¤ SXSW ; Ask Snowden ::
  2962.  
  2963. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nRQTDNbYjqY
  2964. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/snowden-sxsw.htm
  2965. http://blog.inside.com/blog/2014/3/10/edward-snowden-sxsw-full-transcription-and-video
  2966. _______________________________________
  2967. ¤ NSA ; Ask Zelda ::
  2968.  
  2969. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ask-zelda.pdf
  2970.  
  2971. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/07/nsa-advice-columnist-seriously/
  2972. _______________________________________
  2973. ¤ NSA Third Party (Five Eye) Relationships ::
  2974.  
  2975. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-third-parties.pdf
  2976. _______________________________________
  2977. ¤ Comsec as Essential Public Utility ::
  2978.  
  2979. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/comsec-public-utility.htm
  2980.  
  2981. ¤ Update ; Comsec as Essential Failure ::
  2982.  
  2983. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/comsec-ewafmss.htm
  2984. _______________________________________
  2985. ¤ NSA/CSS Classification/Damage Control ::
  2986.  
  2987. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-policy-1-52.pdf
  2988. _______________________________________
  2989. ¤ NSA/FBI Cryptanalysts Database Sharing ::
  2990.  
  2991. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-crypt-fisa-share.pdf
  2992.  
  2993. ▲ FBI’s Data Intercept Technology Unit (DITU) ::
  2994.  
  2995. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  2996.  
  2997. ▲ FISA Court Releases FBI Spy Documents ::
  2998.  
  2999. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-13-0917-4.pdf
  3000. _______________________________________
  3001. ¤ STELLARWIND Classification Guide ::
  3002.  
  3003. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-stellarwind-class.pdf
  3004.  
  3005. ▲ NSA ; STELLARWIND Program ::
  3006.  
  3007. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  3008. _______________________________________
  3009. ¤ FISC Orders to Preserve NSA Metadata Spying ::
  3010.  
  3011. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/fisc-br14-01-order-14-0312.pdf
  3012. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/fisc-br14-01-tro-14-0311.pdf
  3013. _______________________________________
  3014. ¤ How the NSA Plans to Infect Millions of Computers
  3015. With Malware ::
  3016.  
  3017.  Top-secret documents reveal that the National
  3018. Security Agency is dramatically expanding its
  3019. ability to covertly hack into computers on a mass
  3020. scale by using automated systems that reduce the
  3021. level of human oversight in the process.
  3022.  
  3023.  The classified files – provided previously by NSA
  3024. whistleblower Edward Snowden – contain new details
  3025. about groundbreaking surveillance technology the
  3026. agency has developed to infect potentially millions
  3027. of computers worldwide with malware “implants.” The
  3028. clandestine initiative enables the NSA to break into
  3029. targeted computers and to siphon out data from foreign
  3030. Internet and phone networks.
  3031.  
  3032. https://prod01-cdn02.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/nsa_malware_feature.jpg
  3033. https://prod01-cdn01.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/turbine-large.jpg
  3034. https://prod01-cdn01.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/tao-2-1024x768.png
  3035. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076889/nsa-technology-directorate-analysis-of-converged.pdf
  3036. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1077724/industry-scale-exploitation.pdf
  3037. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1077721/thousands-of-implants.pdf
  3038. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076859/nsa-phishing-tactics-and-man-in-the-middle-attacks.pdf
  3039. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076891/there-is-more-than-one-way-to-quantum.pdf
  3040. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076862/quantum-insert-diagrams.pdf
  3041.  
  3042.  The covert infrastructure that supports the hacking
  3043. efforts operates from the agency’s headquarters in
  3044. Fort Meade, Maryland, and from eavesdropping bases
  3045. in the United Kingdom and Japan. GCHQ, the British
  3046. intelligence agency, appears to have played an integral
  3047. role in helping to develop the implants tactic.
  3048.  
  3049.  The implants being deployed were once reserved for
  3050. a few hundred hard-to-reach targets, whose communications
  3051. could not be monitored through traditional wiretaps. But
  3052. the documents analyzed by The Intercept show how the NSA
  3053. has aggressively accelerated its hacking initiatives in
  3054. the past decade by computerizing some processes previously
  3055. handled by humans. The automated system – codenamed TURBINE
  3056. – is designed to “allow the current implant network to
  3057. scale to large size (millions of implants) by creating
  3058. a system that does automated control implants by groups
  3059. instead of individually.”
  3060.  
  3061. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/12/nsa-plans-infect-millions-computers-malware/
  3062.  
  3063. ¤ “Thousands of Implants” ::
  3064.  
  3065.  “Building the operations floor and increasing the number
  3066. of break-out rooms will enable us to grow from the current
  3067. average of these operations per clay to over per day and will
  3068. facilitate the integration of 55 computer network operations
  3069. and real--time customer support. Sustained collection involving
  3070. automated implants pushing collected data from targets to the
  3071. RDC as well as voice and geolocation collection are managed from
  3072. the Operations Teaming Areas. The increased capacity in this
  3073. area will support a growth from managing an average of I 543
  3074. active implants today to simultaneously managing thousands of
  3075. implanted targets. The increased personnel capacity will support
  3076. this net growth in operations tempo and will allow the integration
  3077. of TAD's Requirements Targeting Division alongside the operators
  3078. in order to better target development and efficiently plan and
  3079. execute endpoint operations.”
  3080.  
  3081. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-thousands-implants.pdf
  3082.  
  3083.  According to one top-secret document from 2012, the agency
  3084. can deploy malware by sending out spam emails that trick targets
  3085. into clicking a malicious link. Once activated, a “back-door
  3086. implant” infects their computers within eight seconds.
  3087.  
  3088.  There’s only one problem with this tactic, codenamed WILLOWVIXEN:
  3089. According to the documents, the spam method has become less
  3090. successful in recent years, as Internet users have become wary
  3091. of unsolicited emails and less likely to click on anything that
  3092. looks suspicious.
  3093.  
  3094.  Consequently, the NSA has turned to new and more advanced
  3095. hacking techniques. These include performing so-called
  3096. “man-in-the-middle” and “man-on-the-side” attacks, which
  3097. covertly force a user’s internet browser to route to NSA
  3098. computer servers that try to infect them with an implant.
  3099.  
  3100.  To perform a man-on-the-side attack, the NSA observes a
  3101. target’s Internet traffic using its global network of covert
  3102. “accesses” to data as it flows over fiber optic cables or
  3103. satellites. When the target visits a website that the NSA
  3104. is able to exploit, the agency’s surveillance sensors alert
  3105. the TURBINE system, which then “shoots” data packets at the
  3106. targeted computer’s IP address within a fraction of a second.
  3107.  
  3108.  In one man-on-the-side technique, codenamed QUANTUMHAND,
  3109. the agency disguises itself as a fake Facebook server. When
  3110. a target attempts to log in to the social media site, the
  3111. NSA transmits malicious data packets that trick the target’s
  3112. computer into thinking they are being sent from the real
  3113. Facebook. By concealing its malware within what looks like
  3114. an ordinary Facebook page, the NSA is able to hack into the
  3115. targeted computer and covertly siphon out data from its
  3116. hard drive. A top-secret animation demonstrates the tactic
  3117. in action.
  3118.  
  3119. ¤ How the NSA Secretly Masqueraded as Facebook to Hack
  3120. Computers for Surveillance ::
  3121.  
  3122. https://player.vimeo.com/video/88822483
  3123.  
  3124. and @ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Td8nZscYvT4
  3125.  
  3126. Mirrored » http://megaswf.com/f/2647410
  3127.  
  3128.  According to Matt Blaze, a surveillance and cryptography
  3129. expert at the University of Pennsylvania, it appears that
  3130. the QUANTUMHAND technique is aimed at targeting specific
  3131. individuals. But he expresses concerns about how it has
  3132. been covertly integrated within Internet networks as part
  3133. of the NSA’s automated TURBINE system.
  3134.  
  3135. ¤ NSA TURBINE Automated Hacking Documents (Mirrored) ::
  3136.  
  3137. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-turbine-turmoil.pdf
  3138. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-industry-exploit.pdf
  3139. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-converged.pdf
  3140. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-quantum-insert.pdf
  3141. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-thousands-implants.pdf
  3142. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-gchq-quantumtheory.pdf
  3143. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-more-than-one-way.pdf
  3144. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-hammerchant.pdf
  3145. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-phishing-mtm.pdf
  3146. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/tao-quantuminsert-bonanza.htm
  3147.  
  3148. ¤ Compare TURBINE Slides (Spiegel vs Intercept) ::
  3149.  
  3150. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spot-differences.pdf
  3151.  
  3152. ¤ NSA Denies Thousands of Implants ::
  3153.  
  3154. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-14-0313.pdf
  3155. _______________________________________
  3156. ¤ NSA Hacking Routers & Social Media (Misc) ::
  3157.  
  3158. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-5-eyes-hacking.pdf
  3159. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-menwith-xkeyscore.pdf
  3160. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-selector.pdf
  3161. _______________________________________
  3162. ¤ Cryptome Eyeballs Deputy Director Richard Ledgett ::
  3163.  
  3164. http://cryptome.org/2014-info/richard-ledgett/richard-ledgett.htm
  3165. _______________________________________
  3166. ¤ NSA Assistance to Dutch Somali Piracy Control ::
  3167.  
  3168.  Alliances between security services are usually
  3169. kept secret. But thousands of NSA documents are
  3170. now in the hands of a select group of journalists,
  3171. thanks to former NSA worker Edward Snowden. They
  3172. show that the NSA is the central organisation in
  3173. an international exchange of tapped telephone and
  3174. internet traffic.
  3175.  
  3176.  The Netherlands is also a part of this. In September,
  3177. the German weekly Der Spiegel published an NSA document
  3178. about the Netherlands. The graph, entitled ‘Netherlands
  3179. – 30 days’, appeared to show that the NSA had listened
  3180. in to 1.8 million Dutch telephone calls.
  3181.  
  3182.  But last month, the cabinet showed that the reality
  3183. was different. The 1.8 million telephone calls, wrote
  3184. home affairs minister Ronald Plasterk and defence
  3185. minister Jeanine Hennis, were not intercepted by
  3186. the Americans, but by the Dutch and then shared with
  3187. the NSA. It was not American, but Dutch espionage.
  3188.  
  3189.  Two new documents give further details. The Netherlands,
  3190. it transpires, intercepts vast amounts of Somali
  3191. telephone traffic and shares it with the NSA. The
  3192. Dutch use the information to combat piracy. But the
  3193. Americans may possibly use the information for
  3194. something else as well: taking out terrorism suspects
  3195. by attacking them with armed drones.
  3196.  
  3197. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-dutch-assist.pdf
  3198.  
  3199. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2014/03/05/the-secret-role-of-the-dutch-in-the-american-war-on-terror/
  3200. _______________________________________
  3201. ¤ NSA Blames Tech Firms, Vice Versa ::
  3202.  
  3203. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/tech-stop-spying.htm
  3204.  
  3205. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/big-data-spying.htm
  3206. ---------------------------------------
  3207. ¤ Tech Firms Spy ::
  3208.  
  3209. http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/online-spying.htm
  3210.  
  3211. ¤ NSA Spies Too ::
  3212.  
  3213. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  3214. _______________________________________
  3215. ¤ GCHQ “OPTIC NERVE” Spy Programme ::
  3216.  
  3217. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-optic-nerve.pdf
  3218.  
  3219. ¤ GCHQ Collects Webcam Photos of Yahoo Users ::
  3220.  
  3221.  The documents show that images were collected
  3222. from webcams at regular intervals, one image
  3223. every five minutes, and were used by the spy
  3224. agency to trial automated facial recognition
  3225. programs.
  3226.  
  3227. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/27/gchq-nsa-webcam-images-internet-yahoo
  3228. http://www.infowars.com/you-read-it-here-first-government-spies-on-innocent-people-via-webcams-laptops-xbox/
  3229. http://news.softpedia.com/news/GCHQ-Collected-Webcam-Images-of-Millions-of-Yahoo-Fans-429705.shtml
  3230. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/02/28/gchq-f28.html
  3231.  
  3232. ¤ FLASHBACK ; Infowars Warned Users in 2006 ::
  3233.  
  3234. http://www.infowars.com/articles/bb/gov_industry_use_computer_mics_spy_on_americans.htm
  3235. _______________________________________
  3236. ¤ NSA Director Alexander’s Phones ::
  3237.  
  3238. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/02/nsa-director-alexanders-phones.html
  3239. _______________________________________
  3240. ¤ NSA Seeks to Expand Database, 26 Feb 2014 ::
  3241.  
  3242. http://www.breitbart.com/InstaBlog/2014/02/27/NSA-Seeks-to-Expand-Database
  3243.  
  3244. http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br14-01-motion-140226.pdf
  3245. _______________________________________
  3246. ¤ NSA Bugged Top German Officials After Orders
  3247. Not to Spy On Chancellor Claims New Whistleblower ::
  3248.  
  3249. http://www.mintpressnews.com/snowden-2-0-new-active-duty-nsa-whistleblower/180502/
  3250.  
  3251. http://techcrunch.com/2014/02/24/report-nsa-bugged-top-german-officials-after-obama-ordered-cease-of-spying-on-chancellor/
  3252. _______________________________________
  3253. ¤ NSA Observer ::
  3254.  
  3255. https://nsa-observer.laquadrature.net/
  3256. _______________________________________
  3257. ¤ Spy Documents Released Since June 2013 ::
  3258.  
  3259. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  3260.  
  3261. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/snowden-tabulations.htm
  3262. _______________________________________
  3263. ¤ NSA Spying Zero Hedge Connections ::
  3264.  
  3265. http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2014/02/ZH%20browsing%20govt_1.jpg
  3266.  
  3267. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-02-19/while-browsing-zero-hedge-certain-government-agency
  3268. _______________________________________
  3269. ¤ NYT Samantha Storey Inept Redactions ::
  3270.  
  3271. Inlcudes two GCHQ documents.
  3272.  
  3273. 01 “MOBILE THEME BRIEFING MAY 28 2010”
  3274.  
  3275. 02 “Converged Analysis of Smartphone Devices”
  3276.  
  3277. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nyt-leak.zip
  3278. _______________________________________
  3279. ¤ NSA’s Secret Role in the US Assassination Program ::
  3280.  
  3281.  An anonymous former drone operator for Joint
  3282. Special Operations Command (JSOC) told The
  3283. Intercept — a new publication helmed by
  3284. Glenn Greenwald, who broke the first of many
  3285. NSA revelations last year — that the US military
  3286. and CIA use the NSA’s metadata analysis and
  3287. phone-tracking abilities to identify airstrike
  3288. targets without confirming their veracity on
  3289. the ground.
  3290.  
  3291. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/10/the-nsas-secret-role/
  3292. https://www.activistpost.com/2013/10/add-death-by-drone-to-nsas-list-of.html
  3293. http://www.infowars.com/new-whistleblower-reveals-nsa-picking-drone-targets-based-on-bad-data-death-by-unreliable-metadata/
  3294. _______________________________________
  3295. ¤ ASD Helps NSA Spy on Law Firms, Laywers ::
  3296.  
  3297.  A top-secret document, obtained by the
  3298. former NSA contractor Edward J. Snowden,
  3299. shows that an American law firm was
  3300. monitored while representing a foreign
  3301. government in trade disputes with the
  3302. United States. The disclosure offers a
  3303. rare glimpse of a specific instance in
  3304. which Americans were ensnared by the
  3305. eavesdroppers, and is of particular
  3306. interest because lawyers in the United
  3307. States with clients overseas have
  3308. expressed growing concern that their
  3309. confidential communications could be
  3310. compromised by such surveillance.
  3311.  
  3312. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/us/eavesdropping-ensnared-american-law-firm.html
  3313. http://www.activistpost.com/2014/02/new-snowden-docs-implicate-nsa-in.html
  3314. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/asia-pacific/198506-report-spies-watched-us-lawyers-in-trade-deal
  3315.  
  3316. NOBODY comments
  3317.  
  3318. NY Times has not provided any documentation.
  3319.  
  3320.  There should be an FOIA request to the IC
  3321. and perhaps to the DNI for this document to
  3322. be declassified for research in public domain.
  3323. _______________________________________
  3324. ¤ NSA FISA Business Spying ::
  3325.  
  3326. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-fisa-business.pdf
  3327.  
  3328. ¤ NSA Course on FISA Spying Operations ::
  3329.  
  3330. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-fisa-course.pdf
  3331. _______________________________________
  3332. ¤ Snowden Allegedly Used Web Scraper Tool ::
  3333.  
  3334. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/us/snowden-used-low-cost-tool-to-best-nsa.html?hp&_r=1
  3335. _______________________________________
  3336. ¤ Ex-chancellor Gerhard Schröder Allegedly
  3337. Spied by NSA (No Documentation Presented) ::
  3338.  
  3339.  Munich daily Sueddeutsche Zeitung and
  3340. public broadcaster NDR reported Tuesday
  3341. that Merkel’s predecessor Gerhard Schroeder
  3342. was added to the NSA’s National Sigint
  3343. Requirement List as number 388 in 2002.
  3344.  
  3345. http://www.dw.de/reports-nsa-first-targeted-german-chancellor-schr%C3%B6der-then-merkel/a-17408683
  3346. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/04/us-nsa-gerhard-schroeder-surveillance?view=mobile
  3347. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/ausspaeh-affaere-die-spionage-botschaft-12635377.html
  3348.  
  3349. ¤ New Interpretations of NSA Monitoring
  3350. the German Chancellor ::
  3351.  
  3352. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/02/new-interpretations-of-nsa-monitoring.html
  3353. _______________________________________
  3354. ¤ Dutch Intelligence Claims Responsibility for
  3355. Phone Call Spying ::
  3356.  
  3357. http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2014/02/the_netherlands_not_usa_gather.php
  3358.  
  3359. http://static3.volkskrant.nl/static/asset/2014/kamerbrief_met_reactie_op_berichtgeving_metadata_telefoonverkeer_3761.pdf
  3360. _______________________________________
  3361. ¤ First Congressman To Battle the NSA is Dead ::
  3362.  
  3363. http://pando.com/2014/02/04/the-first-congressman-to-battle-the-nsa-is-dead-no-one-noticed-no-one-cares/
  3364. _______________________________________
  3365. ¤ Mike Rogers Wants Journalists With Leaks Jailed ::
  3366.  
  3367. http://nypost.com/2014/02/05/pol-journalist-fencing-snowden-secrets-should-be-jailed/
  3368. _______________________________________
  3369.  On Saturday 20 July 2013, in the basement of the
  3370. Guardian’s office in Kings Cross, London, watched by
  3371. two GCHQ technicians, Guardian editors destroyed
  3372. hard drives and memory cards on which encrypted files
  3373. leaked by Edward Snowden had been stored. This is
  3374. the first time footage of the event has been released.
  3375.  
  3376. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUokM5d1qic
  3377. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  3378. ¤ CSEC IP Profiling & Mission Impacts ::
  3379.  
  3380. http://www.cbc.ca/news2/pdf/airports_redacted.pdf
  3381.  
  3382. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/csec-ip-profile.pdf
  3383.  
  3384. ¤ CSEC Objects to Disclosure of IP Profiling ::
  3385.  
  3386. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/csec-14-0131.pdf
  3387.  
  3388. ¤ CSEC Used Airport Wi-Fi to Track Travellers ::
  3389.  
  3390.  A top secret document retrieved by US whistleblower
  3391. Edward Snowden and obtained by CBC News shows
  3392. that Canada’s electronic spy agency used information
  3393. from the free internet service at a major Canadian
  3394. airport to track the wireless devices of thousands
  3395. of ordinary airline passengers for days after they
  3396. left the terminal.
  3397.  
  3398.  After reviewing the document, one of Canada’s
  3399. foremost authorities on cyber-security says the
  3400. clandestine operation by the Communications
  3401. Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) was almost
  3402. certainly illegal. ... ...
  3403.  
  3404.  The document indicates the passenger tracking
  3405. operation was a trial run of a powerful new
  3406. software program CSEC was developing with help
  3407. from its US counterpart, the NSA.
  3408.  
  3409.  In the document, CSEC called the new technologies
  3410. “game-changing,” and said they could be used for
  3411. tracking “any target that makes occasional forays
  3412. into other cities/regions.”
  3413.  
  3414. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/csec-used-airport-wi-fi-to-track-canadian-travellers-edward-snowden-documents-1.2517881
  3415.  
  3416.  CSEC concluded: “Can then take seeds from these
  3417. airports and repeat to cover whole world.”
  3418.  
  3419. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/01/new-snowden-docs-show-canadian-spies-tracked-thousands-of-travelers/
  3420.  
  3421. ¤ More Details Into CSEC IP Profiling ::
  3422.  
  3423. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/02/did-csec-really-tracked-canadian.html
  3424.  
  3425. ¤ How Canada’s CSEC Maps Phone and Internet Connections ::
  3426.  
  3427. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/03/olympia-how-canadas-csec-maps-phone-and.html
  3428. _______________________________________
  3429. ¤ NSA, GCHQ Allegedly Hack Cryptographer ::
  3430.  
  3431. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-gchq-quisquater.pdf
  3432.  
  3433. ¤ ... And Now It’s Personal ::
  3434.  
  3435. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/stopping-nsa.htm
  3436. _______________________________________
  3437. ¤ GCHQ Snooped on YouTube and Facebook ::
  3438.  
  3439.  Documents taken from the National Security
  3440. Agency by Edward Snowden and obtained by NBC
  3441. News detail how British cyber spies demonstrated
  3442. a pilot program to their US partners in 2012
  3443. in which they were able to monitor YouTube in
  3444. real time and collect addresses from the billions
  3445. of videos watched daily, as well as some user
  3446. information, for analysis. At the time the
  3447. documents were printed, they were also able to
  3448. spy on Facebook and Twitter.
  3449.  
  3450.  Called “Psychology A New Kind of SIGDEV”
  3451. (Signals Development), the presentation includes
  3452. a section that spells out “Broad real-time
  3453. monitoring of online activity” of YouTube videos,
  3454. URLs “liked” on Facebook, and Blogspot/Blogger
  3455. visits. The monitoring program is called
  3456. “Squeaky Dolphin.”
  3457.  
  3458.  Experts told NBC News the documents show the
  3459. British had to have been either physically able
  3460. to tap the cables carrying the world’s web
  3461. traffic or able to use a third party to gain
  3462. physical access to the massive stream of data,
  3463. and would be able to extract some key data
  3464. about specific users as well.
  3465.  
  3466. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-squeaky-dolphin.pdf
  3467. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-newtons-cat.pdf
  3468. http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/Sections/NEWS/snowden_youtube_nbc_document.pdf
  3469. http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2014/01/27/22469304-snowden-docs-reveal-british-spies-snooped-on-youtube-and-facebook?lite
  3470. _______________________________________
  3471. ¤ NSA/GCHQ Smartphone App Location Spying ::
  3472.  
  3473. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/27/nsa-gchq-smartphone-app-angry-birds-personal-data
  3474. https://www.propublica.org/article/spy-agencies-probe-angry-birds-and-other-apps-for-personal-data
  3475. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/28/world/spy-agencies-scour-phone-apps-for-personal-data.html?_r=0
  3476.  
  3477. ¤ GCHQ Mobile Theme Briefing ::
  3478.  
  3479.  “Over 200 3rd party Location Aware Applications
  3480. on the iPhone alone.”
  3481.  
  3482. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-mobile-theme.pdf
  3483.  
  3484. ¤ NSA Converged Analysis of Smartphone Devices ::
  3485.  
  3486. “Android Phones pass GPS data in the clear.”
  3487.  
  3488. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-smartphones-analysis.pdf
  3489. _______________________________________
  3490. ¤ Obama Grants NSA Exemption From Law ::
  3491.  
  3492.  The National Security Agency program that
  3493. collects data on nearly every US phone call
  3494. isn’t legal, a privacy review board said
  3495. Thursday in a newly released report.
  3496.  
  3497. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/pclob-14-0123.pdf
  3498.  
  3499.  “We have not identified a single instance
  3500. involving a threat to the United States in
  3501. which the program made a concrete difference
  3502. in the outcome of a counterterrorism
  3503. investigation,” the board wrote in the
  3504. report released Thursday.
  3505.  
  3506.  Despite Obama’s promise to reform the NSA,
  3507. domestic spying will continue.
  3508.  
  3509. http://edition.cnn.com/2014/01/23/politics/nsa-telephone-records-privacy/index.html?hpt=hp_t3
  3510. _______________________________________
  3511. ¤ Snowden Speaks ::
  3512.  
  3513. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/snowden-video-13-0126.zip
  3514. _______________________________________
  3515. ▼ Snowden Calls Russian-Spy Story “Absurd” ::
  3516.  
  3517. http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/01/snowden-calls-russian-spy-story-absurd.html
  3518.  
  3519. ▲ NSA is NOT the Source of All Spying ::
  3520.          ¯¯¯
  3521. http://20committee.com/2014/01/18/the-end-of-the-snowden-operation/
  3522.  
  3523. NOBODY’s comment blocked @ 20committee.com
  3524.  
  3525.  Reform? Reform was never intended to come
  3526. from politicians or the white house. Reform
  3527. will come from peoples’ change of online use ;
  3528. growing public use of open-source encryption,
  3529. growing use of services such as Tor, a growing
  3530. amount of computers air-gapped, growing use of
  3531. hardcopy backups rather than “the cloud” - and
  3532. add to that, more people bleaching their cookies
  3533. among other web browser cache, surging VPN use,
  3534. growing use of proxies. Sudden disconnections
  3535. of users’ modems when not actually being used. The
  3536. use of alternative search engines (such as ixquick,
  3537. duckduckgo, startpage, privatelee, et al) and
  3538. also consider the growing use of XPIs such as
  3539. Noscript, Ghostery, HTTPS Everywhere and others.
  3540.  
  3541. Reform?
  3542.  
  3543.  How about the death of RSA and a new generation
  3544. of young privacy-crypto-enthusiasts who start to
  3545. say “fuck the corporate platforms” and change it
  3546. whether legal or not?
  3547.  
  3548. The reform will come from people taking action.
  3549.  
  3550.  Here’s what I’d like to know - will “big government”
  3551. follow up reform with their “internet kill switch?”
  3552. _______________________________________
  3553. ¤ NSA Redactions Fail, Fail and Fail Again ::
  3554.  
  3555. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-redaction-fails.pdf
  3556. _______________________________________
  3557. ¤ NSA’s Upstream Collection Detailed ::
  3558.  
  3559.  The corporate partnerships are one of
  3560. three ways NSA is intercepting the world’s
  3561. main internet cables:
  3562.  
  3563.  - Cooperation with telecommunication companies
  3564.  - Cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies
  3565.  - Unilateral cable tapping operations
  3566.  
  3567. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/01/slides-about-nsas-upstream-collection.html
  3568. ---------------------------------------
  3569. http://postimg.org/image/9viuxblpd/
  3570. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOAv7zbJkCk
  3571. http://www.dailydot.com/news/nsa-fairview-slides-brazil-spying/
  3572. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-codenames.htm
  3573. _______________________________________
  3574. ¤ 24 FISA Court Documents DECLASSIFIED ::
  3575.  
  3576. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc-13-0117.zip
  3577.  
  3578. ¤ FISA Court Orders Comparison ::
  3579.  
  3580. http://cryptome.org/vz-slip.jpg
  3581. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc/fisc-orders-compare.htm
  3582. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc2/fisc-before-after-obama.htm
  3583. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc3/fisc-br-11-07-v-11-57.htm
  3584. ---------------------------------------
  3585. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  3586. _______________________________________
  3587. ¤ SMS Text Messages - A Goldmine to Exploit ::
  3588.  
  3589. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-sms-exploit.pdf
  3590.  
  3591. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1006111/sms.pdf
  3592.  
  3593. ¤ NSA Vacuuming SMS Texts Around the World ::
  3594.  
  3595.  The documents also reveal the UK spy agency
  3596. GCHQ has made use of the NSA database to search
  3597. the metadata of “untargeted and unwarranted”
  3598. communications belonging to people in the UK.
  3599.  
  3600.  The NSA program, codenamed Dishfire, collects
  3601. “pretty much everything it can”, according to
  3602. GCHQ documents, rather than merely storing the
  3603. communications of existing surveillance targets.
  3604.  
  3605.  The NSA has made extensive use of its vast
  3606. text message database to extract information
  3607. on people’s travel plans, contact books, financial
  3608. transactions and more – including of individuals
  3609. under no suspicion of illegal activity.
  3610.  
  3611. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/16/nsa-collects-millions-text-messages-daily-untargeted-global-sweep
  3612. _______________________________________
  3613. ¤ NSA Covert Radio Signals Break Air-gaps ::
  3614.  
  3615. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-radio.htm
  3616.  
  3617. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-open-computers-not-connected-to-internet.html
  3618.  
  3619.  The technology, which the agency has used
  3620. since at least 2008, relies on a covert
  3621. channel of radio waves that can be transmitted
  3622. from tiny circuit boards and USB cards inserted
  3623. surreptitiously into the computers. In some
  3624. cases, they are sent to a briefcase-size
  3625. relay station that intelligence agencies can
  3626. set up miles away from the target.
  3627.  
  3628.  The radio frequency technology has helped
  3629. solve one of the biggest problems facing
  3630. American intelligence agencies for years:
  3631. getting into computers that adversaries,
  3632. and some American partners, have tried to
  3633. make impervious to spying or cyberattack.
  3634. In most cases, the radio frequency hardware
  3635. must be physically inserted by a spy, a
  3636. manufacturer or an unwitting user.
  3637. ---------------------------------------
  3638. Refer to NSA’s Tailored Access Operations
  3639.  
  3640. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=23643
  3641. _______________________________________
  3642. ¤ NSA Windows Event Monitoring ::
  3643.  
  3644. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-windows-event.pdf
  3645. ---------------------------------------
  3646. ¤ Locate And Destroy WinRM Registry ::
  3647.  
  3648. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/e8a662d4
  3649. _______________________________________
  3650. ¤ NSA Reducing the Effectiveness of Hash ::
  3651.  
  3652. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-pass-hash.pdf
  3653. _______________________________________
  3654. ¤ NSA’s Organizational Designations ::
  3655.  
  3656. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/01/nsas-organizational-designations.html
  3657. _______________________________________
  3658. ¤ Analysis of NSA’s 215 Metadata Spy Programs ::
  3659.  
  3660. http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/NSAshane3.pdf
  3661. _______________________________________
  3662. ¤ John Inglis Explains Why US-Based Collection
  3663. of Internet Metadata Doesn’t Work ::
  3664.  
  3665. http://www.npr.org/2014/01/10/261282601/transcript-nsa-deputy-director-john-inglis?live=1
  3666.  
  3667. http://www.emptywheel.net/2014/01/10/john-inglis-explains-why-us-based-collection-of-internet-metadata-doesnt-work/
  3668. _______________________________________
  3669. ¤ Rand Paul to Lead Class-Action Lawsuit
  3670. Against Obama Over NSA Spying ::
  3671.  
  3672. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2014/01/03/Rand-Paul-to-Sue-Obama-over-NSA-Spying
  3673. _______________________________________
  3674. ¤ NSA Quantum Computing Research for Cracking
  3675. All Encryption ::
  3676.  
  3677.  In room-size metal boxes ­secure against
  3678. electromagnetic leaks, the National Security
  3679. Agency is racing to build a computer that
  3680. could break nearly every kind of encryption
  3681. used to protect banking, medical, business
  3682. and government records around the world.
  3683.  
  3684.  According to documents provided by former
  3685. NSA contractor Edward Snowden, the effort
  3686. to build “a cryptologically useful quantum
  3687. computer” — a machine exponentially faster
  3688. than classical computers — is part of a
  3689. $79.7 million research program titled
  3690. “Penetrating Hard Targets.” Much of the
  3691. work is hosted under classified contracts
  3692. at a laboratory in College Park, Md.
  3693.  
  3694. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-computer.pdf
  3695. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-computer-2.pdf
  3696. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-seeks-to-build-quantum-computer-that-could-crack-most-types-of-encryption/2014/01/02/8fff297e-7195-11e3-8def-a33011492df2_print.html
  3697. _______________________________________
  3698. ¤ NSA and Random Number Generators ::
  3699.  
  3700. http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/12/a-few-more-notes-on-nsa-random-number.html
  3701. _______________________________________
  3702. ¤ Updated List of NSA Codenames ::
  3703.  
  3704. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-codenames.htm
  3705. _______________________________________
  3706. ¤ Jacob Appelbaum Explains New NSA Leaks ::
  3707.  
  3708. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b0w36GAyZIA
  3709.  
  3710. Mirror » http://fileb.ag/xwcp0jrewk2o
  3711.  
  3712. ¤ Jacob’s NSA Slides @ioerror (ZIP) ::
  3713.  
  3714. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-catalog.zip
  3715.  
  3716. ¤ NSA Catalog Image Formats (16.7MB) Mirrored ::
  3717.  
  3718. http://upsto.re/CtXqio
  3719. http://f.lui.li/get_1228_a2b4.html
  3720. http://blakker.pl/files/get/fenW1XyGrl/nsa-catalog-images.zip
  3721.  
  3722. ¤ Documents Reveal Top NSA Hacking Unit ::
  3723.  
  3724.  The NSA’s TAO hacking unit is considered
  3725. to be the intelligence agency’s top secret
  3726. weapon. It maintains its own covert network,
  3727. infiltrates computers around the world and
  3728. even intercepts shipping deliveries to plant
  3729. back doors in electronics ordered by those
  3730. it is targeting. ... ...
  3731.  
  3732. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-nsa-uses-powerful-toolbox-in-effort-to-spy-on-global-networks-a-940969.html
  3733.  
  3734.  The insert method and other variants of
  3735. QUANTUM are closely linked to a shadow
  3736. network operated by the NSA alongside the
  3737. Internet, with its own, well-hidden
  3738. infrastructure comprised of “covert”
  3739. routers and servers. It appears the NSA
  3740. also incorporates routers and servers
  3741. from non-NSA networks into its covert
  3742. network by infecting these networks with
  3743. “implants” that then allow the government
  3744. hackers to control the computers remotely.
  3745.  
  3746.  In this way, the intelligence service seeks
  3747. to identify and track its targets based on
  3748. their digital footprints. These identifiers
  3749. could include certain email addresses or
  3750. website cookies set on a person’s computer.
  3751. Of course, a cookie doesn’t automatically
  3752. identify a person, but it can if it includes
  3753. additional information like an email address.
  3754. In that case, a cookie becomes something
  3755. like the web equivalent of a fingerprint.
  3756. ---------------------------------------
  3757. ¤ NSA QUANTUM Theory (FOXACID) ::
  3758.  
  3759. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-quantumtheory.pdf
  3760.  
  3761. ¤ NSA/GCHQ QUANTUM Tasking Techniques ::
  3762.  
  3763.  “YahooBcookie’s are unique to a specific
  3764. computer and can hold other <yahoo> addresses
  3765. that are being logged into on that computer
  3766. as long as the user does not clear browser
  3767. cookies.”
  3768.  
  3769. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-quantum-tasking.pdf
  3770.  
  3771. ¤ NSA QFIRE Packet Injection Attacks ::
  3772.  
  3773. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-qfire.pdf
  3774. ---------------------------------------
  3775. ¤ NSA Catalog for Hardware Backdoors ::
  3776.  
  3777.  The specialists at ANT, which presumably
  3778. stands for Advanced or Access Network Technology,
  3779. could be described as master carpenters for
  3780. the NSA’s department for Tailored Access
  3781. Operations (TAO). In cases where TAO’s usual
  3782. hacking and data-skimming methods don’t suffice,
  3783. ANT workers step in with their special tools,
  3784. penetrating networking equipment, monitoring
  3785. mobile phones and computers and diverting or
  3786. even modifying data. Such implants, as they are
  3787. referred to in NSA parlance, have played a
  3788. considerable role in the intelligence agency’s
  3789. ability to establish a global covert network
  3790. that operates alongside the Internet.
  3791.  
  3792.  Some of the equipment available is quite
  3793. inexpensive. A rigged monitor cable that
  3794. allows “TAO personnel to see what is displayed
  3795. on the targeted monitor,” for example, is
  3796. available for just $30. But an “active GSM
  3797. base station” -- a tool that makes it possible
  3798. to mimic a mobile phone tower and thus monitor
  3799. cell phones -- costs a full $40,000. Computer
  3800. bugging devices disguised as normal USB plugs,
  3801. capable of sending and receiving data via radio
  3802. undetected, are available in packs of 50 for
  3803. over $1 million.
  3804.  
  3805.  The ANT division doesn’t just manufacture
  3806. surveillance hardware. It also develops software
  3807. for special tasks. The ANT developers have a
  3808. clear preference for planting their malicious
  3809. code in so-called BIOS, software located on a
  3810. computer’s motherboard that is the first thing
  3811. to load when a computer is turned on.
  3812.  
  3813.  This has a number of valuable advantages: an
  3814. infected PC or server appears to be functioning
  3815. normally, so the infection remains invisible
  3816. to virus protection and other security programs.
  3817. And even if the hard drive of an infected
  3818. computer has been completely erased and a new
  3819. operating system is installed, the ANT malware
  3820. can continue to function and ensures that new
  3821. spyware can once again be loaded onto what is
  3822. presumed to be a clean computer. The ANT
  3823. developers call this “Persistence” and believe
  3824. this approach has provided them with the
  3825. possibility of permanent access.
  3826.  
  3827.  Another program attacks the firmware in
  3828. hard drives manufactured by Western Digital,
  3829. Seagate, Maxtor and Samsung, all of which,
  3830. with the exception of latter, are American
  3831. companies. Here, too, it appears the US
  3832. intelligence agency is compromising the
  3833. technology and products of American companies.
  3834.  
  3835. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-tao-ant-pdf.pdf
  3836. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/catalog-reveals-nsa-has-back-doors-for-numerous-devices-a-940994.html
  3837. http://gizmodo.com/the-nsa-actually-intercepted-packages-to-put-backdoors-1491169592
  3838. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/29/der-spiegel-nsa-hacking-unit-tao
  3839. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/31/snow-d31.html
  3840.  
  3841. ¤ NSA Cisco / Juniper Router Backdoors ::
  3842.  
  3843. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-firewalls.pdf
  3844.  
  3845. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-router.pdf
  3846.  
  3847. ¤ NSA Computer Monitor Backdoor ::
  3848.  
  3849. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-bildschirm.pdf
  3850.  
  3851. ¤ NSA PCI Bus Backdoor ::
  3852.  
  3853. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-rechner.pdf
  3854.  
  3855. ¤ NSA Motherboard Backdoor (#BadBIOS) ::
  3856.  
  3857. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-server.pdf
  3858.  
  3859. ¤ NSA Keyboard Backdoor ::
  3860.  
  3861. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-tastatu.pdf
  3862.  
  3863. ¤ NSA Apple iPhone Backdoor ::
  3864.  
  3865. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-handys.pdf
  3866.  
  3867. ¤ NSA WiFi Card / Apple Airport Backdoors ::
  3868.  
  3869. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-mobilfunk.pdf
  3870.  
  3871. ¤ NSA Active 802.11 Netcard Backdoor ::
  3872.  
  3873. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-w-lan.pdf
  3874.  
  3875. ¤ NSA USB Backdoor to Bridge Air-gaps ::
  3876.  
  3877. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-usb.pdf
  3878.  
  3879. ¤ NSA Alternative SIGINT Hunter ::
  3880.  
  3881. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-raumuber.pdf
  3882.  
  3883. ¤ NSA Keystroke, Screenshot & SIGINT Hunting ::
  3884.  
  3885. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/greenwald-13-1231.pdf
  3886.  
  3887. http://truth-out.org/news/item/20948-glenn-greenwald-the-nsa-can-literally-watch-every-keystroke-you-make
  3888.  
  3889. ¤ Jacob Appelbaum Comment on Der Spiegel Reports ::
  3890.  
  3891. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/appelbaum-der-spiegel.htm
  3892. ---------------------------------------
  3893. BLOWBACK SETS IN ...
  3894.  
  3895. ¤ IT Firms Lose Billions After NSA Scandal ::
  3896.  
  3897. http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/it-firms-lose-billions-after-nsa-scandal-exposed-by-whistleblower-edward-snowden-9028599.html
  3898.  
  3899. ¤ Foreign Firms Won’t Buy American Tech ::
  3900.  
  3901. https://www.informationweek.com/security/risk-management/nsa-fallout-why-foreign-firms-wont-buy-american-tech/d/d-id/1113384
  3902. ---------------------------------------
  3903. ¤ Apple Claims They Know Nothing About Backdoors ::
  3904.  
  3905. http://www.infowars.com/apple-says-it-knows-nothing-about-your-iphone-spying-on-you/
  3906.  
  3907. ¤ Apple Inc. Lying Exposed ::
  3908.  
  3909.  Logs from a properly air-gapped Mac OSX show
  3910. the system attempting to access the Airport -
  3911. yet the Airport card was physically disconnected.
  3912.  
  3913. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/77d624be
  3914.  
  3915. ¤ Cyber–Security Experts Ask If Apple “Flaw”
  3916. Was Really NSA Backdoor ::
  3917.  
  3918.  Following an admission by Apple that a “bug”
  3919. in its operating system had left devices open
  3920. to potential hacking, experts are questioning
  3921. whether the security hole was intentional, in
  3922. order to allow the NSA backdoor access as part
  3923. of its mass spying program.
  3924.  
  3925. http://www.infowars.com/cyber-security-experts-ask-apple-flaw-was-really-nsa-backdoor/
  3926. ---------------------------------------
  3927. ¤ Intel CEO Refuses To Answer Questions On
  3928. Whether NSA Can Access Processors ::
  3929.  
  3930. http://www.infowars.com/intel-ceo-refuses-to-answer-questions-on-whether-nsa-can-access-processors/
  3931.  
  3932. ¤ Dell Inc. Apologizes for the ‘Inconvenience’
  3933. of Helping NSA Install Backdoors ::
  3934.  
  3935. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131230/17174425718/dells-twitter-account-apologizes-inconvenience-helping-nsa-place-hidden-bios-bug.shtml
  3936.  
  3937. http://www.infowars.com/dells-twitter-account-apologizes-for-the-inconvenience-of-helping-nsa-install-spyware/
  3938.  
  3939. ¤ Locate And Destroy 802.11 Registry ::
  3940.  
  3941.  How to disable SOMBERKNAVE implant to
  3942. properly air-gap the Windows XP system.
  3943.  
  3944. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/bdd440b3
  3945. _______________________________________
  3946. ¤ NSA Whistleblower ; Planned Police State ::
  3947.  
  3948. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x9Kcgme2I0c
  3949.  
  3950. ¤ NSA Whistleblower ; National Security Scam ::
  3951.  
  3952. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xPemLhvwfos
  3953. _______________________________________
  3954. ¤ Edward Snowden Interview by Barton Gellman ::
  3955.  
  3956. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/edward-snowden-after-months-of-nsa-revelations-says-his-missions-accomplished/2013/12/23/49fc36de-6c1c-11e3-a523-fe73f0ff6b8d_story.html
  3957.  
  3958.  Beginning in October 2012, he said, he
  3959. brought his misgivings to two superiors
  3960. in the NSA’s Technology Directorate and
  3961. two more in the NSA Threat Operations
  3962. Center’s regional base in Hawaii. For
  3963. each of them, and 15 other co-workers,
  3964. Snowden said he opened a data query tool
  3965. called BOUNDLESSINFORMANT, which used
  3966. color-coded “heat maps” to depict the
  3967. volume of data ingested by NSA taps.
  3968.  
  3969.  His colleagues were often “astonished to
  3970. learn we are collecting more in the United
  3971. States on Americans than we are on Russians
  3972. in Russia,” he said. Many of them were
  3973. troubled, he said, and several said they
  3974. did not want to know any more.
  3975. ---------------------------------------
  3976. BOUNDLESS INFORMANT REPORTS/DOCS REFER HERE ;
  3977.  
  3978. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=19580
  3979. _______________________________________
  3980. ¤ New York Judge, William Pauley III, Declares
  3981. Metadata Hoarding Legal ::
  3982.  
  3983. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/pauley-13-1227.pdf
  3984. http://www.scribd.com/doc/194082600/NSA-Opinion
  3985. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/nsa-phone-surveillance-ruling-101569.html
  3986. http://www.infowars.com/judge-falls-for-the-big-lie-about-nsa-spying/
  3987. /\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/
  3988. \/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\
  3989. ¤ Judge Declares Metadata Hoarding Violates
  3990. Fourth Amendment Rights ::
  3991.  
  3992. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-048-049.pdf
  3993.  
  3994.  A federal judge ruled Monday that the
  3995. National Security Agency program which
  3996. collects information on nearly all telephone
  3997. calls made to, from or within the United
  3998. States is likely unconstitutional.
  3999.  
  4000.  US District Court Judge Richard Leon found
  4001. that the program appears to violate the
  4002. Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable
  4003. searches and seizures. He also said the
  4004. Justice Department had failed to demonstrate
  4005. that collecting the information had helped
  4006. to head off terrorist attacks.
  4007.  
  4008.  Acting on a lawsuit brought by conservative
  4009. legal activist Larry Klayman, Leon issued
  4010. a preliminary injunction barring the NSA
  4011. from collecting so-called metadata pertaining
  4012. to the Verizon accounts of Klayman and one
  4013. of his clients. However, the judge stayed
  4014. the order to allow for an appeal.
  4015.  
  4016. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/national-security-agency-phones-judge-101203.html
  4017. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/17/cour-d17.html
  4018.  
  4019.  Leon’s 68-page opinion is the first
  4020. significant legal setback for the NSA’s
  4021. surveillance program since it was disclosed
  4022. in June in news stories based on leaks
  4023. from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden.
  4024. For seven years, the metadata program has
  4025. been approved repeatedly by numerous judges
  4026. on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  4027. Court and found constitutional by at least
  4028. one judge sitting in a criminal case.
  4029.  
  4030. https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2013cv0851-48
  4031.  
  4032. ¤ Klayman v. NSA 7 Court Documents ::
  4033.  
  4034. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-051-058.zip
  4035.  
  4036. ▼ Delay Motion for Class Action Lawsuit ::
  4037.  
  4038. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-060.pdf
  4039.  
  4040. ▲ White House Tries to Prevent Judge From
  4041. Ruling on Surveillance Efforts ::
  4042.  
  4043. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/22/us/white-house-tries-to-prevent-judge-from-ruling-on-surveillance-efforts.html?_r=0
  4044.  
  4045. ¤ Bulk Metadata Collection Ruled Illegal ::
  4046.  
  4047. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/leon-13-1216.pdf
  4048. ---------------------------------------
  4049. ¤ White House Spying Review Group Report ::
  4050.  
  4051. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/obama-nsa-report.pdf
  4052.  
  4053. ¤ White House Spy Report Commentary ::
  4054.  
  4055. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/prgi-comments-001.htm
  4056. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/prgi-comments-002.htm
  4057.  
  4058. ¤ Obama Advisory Committee Whitewashes US
  4059. Spying Programs ::
  4060.  
  4061. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/19/spyi-d19.html
  4062. ---------------------------------------
  4063. ▼ FLASHBACK ; Michael Hayden Admits They
  4064. Will NOT Stifle Surveillance ::
  4065.  
  4066. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XS6nfkbNvlo
  4067.  
  4068. http://www.infowars.com/former-nsa-boss-government-will-continue-surveillance-so-get-used-to-it/
  4069.  
  4070. ▲ Counter-spy_Manual.zip
  4071. (22 files | ZIP | 2.93MB)
  4072.  
  4073. http://paste.darkbyte.ru/view/5459487
  4074.  
  4075. http://ae7.st/p/26c (mirror)
  4076. _______________________________________
  4077. ¤ NSA/CSS Mission Slides ::
  4078.  
  4079.  These slides, from an internal presentation
  4080. in the first week of October 2001, show how
  4081. critical the NSA sees electronic eavesdropping.
  4082.  
  4083. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-css-mission.pdf
  4084.  
  4085. “ 1B. Ability to exploit:
  4086.  
  4087.  - Military Information
  4088.  - Economic Information
  4089.  - Information Operations Information
  4090.  - Political Information ”
  4091. _______________________________________
  4092. ¤ Eben Moglen & Bruce Schneier Talk About
  4093. NSA Leaks, Software and Cryptography ::
  4094.  
  4095. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N8Sc6pUR1mA
  4096. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  4097. ¤ NSA Rigging RSA Crypto Market ::
  4098.  
  4099. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/20/us-usa-security-rsa-idUSBRE9BJ1C220131220
  4100.  
  4101. ¤ RSA Cryptographers Duped and Bribed by NSA ::
  4102.  
  4103. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-kills-rsa.htm
  4104.  
  4105. ¤ NSA Kills RSA Trust and Therefore RSA Jobs ::
  4106.  
  4107. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-kills-rsa-workers.htm
  4108.  
  4109. ¤ List of Canceled RSA Talks Continues to Grow ::
  4110.  
  4111. http://threatpost.com/list-of-canceled-rsa-talks-continues-to-grow/103508
  4112.  
  4113. ¤ FLASHBACK ; NSA Rigging the Crypto Market ::
  4114.  
  4115. http://cryptome.org/jya/nsa-sun.htm
  4116. _______________________________________
  4117. ¤ Did British Telecom Provides Backdoors
  4118. for NSA and GCHQ (?) ::
  4119.  
  4120.  In a paper titled ‘The Internet Dark Age’
  4121. the researchers say that BT is shipping
  4122. hardware with backdoors that allow secret
  4123. government access in order to make network
  4124. compromise easier. “BT are directly responsible
  4125. for covertly embedding secret spy equipment
  4126. in millions of homes and businesses within
  4127. the UK,” the paper states.
  4128.  
  4129.  Recently on Cryptome (the better leaks
  4130. than wikileaks site), a paper appeared
  4131. pointing out that BT (British Telecom)
  4132. assigns all their modems an extra address
  4133. in the 30.x.x.x address space, and then
  4134. attaches SSH and SNMP to that address.
  4135. This looks like what many ISPs do, assigning
  4136. a second IP address for management, except
  4137. for one thing: the 30.0.0.0/8 block is
  4138. assigned to the United States Department
  4139. of Defense. This has caused a fevered round
  4140. of speculation that this is actually a
  4141. secret backdoor for the NSA/GCHQ, so that
  4142. they can secretly monitor and control
  4143. peoples’ home networks.
  4144.  
  4145.  Maybe, but it’s probably not the case.
  4146. The better explanation is that BT simply
  4147. chose this address space because it’s
  4148. non-routable. While it’s assigned public
  4149. address, it’s only used inside the private
  4150. DoD military network. Try tracerouting to
  4151. that address space, you’ll see that your
  4152. packets go nowhere.
  4153.  
  4154. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/Full-Disclosure.pdf
  4155. http://www.csoonline.com/article/744697/report-accuses-bt-of-supplying-backdoors-for-gchq-and-nsa
  4156. http://blog.erratasec.com/2013/12/dod-address-space-its-not-conspiracy.html
  4157.  
  4158. ¤ Bruce Schneier Leaves British Telecom ::
  4159.  
  4160.  “Yes, it’s true. And contrary to rumors,
  4161. this has nothing to do with the NSA or GCHQ.
  4162. No, BT wasn’t always happy with my writings
  4163. on the topic, but it knew that I am an
  4164. independent thinker and didn’t try to
  4165. muzzle me in any way. I’m just ready to
  4166. leave. I spent seven years at BT, and
  4167. seven years at Counterpane Internet
  4168. Security, Inc., before BT bought us.
  4169. It’s past time for something new.”
  4170.  
  4171. http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/12/yes_im_leaving.html
  4172. http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/12/nsa-surveillance-critic-bruce-schneier-to-leave-post-at-bt/
  4173. http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2319296/bruce-schneier-leaves-bt-after-eight-years-as-security-futurologist
  4174. ---------------------------------------
  4175. ¤ NSA Infected Around 50,000 Networks Worldwide ::
  4176.  
  4177.  The American intelligence service - NSA -
  4178. infected more than 50,000 computer networks
  4179. worldwide with malicious software designed
  4180. to steal sensitive information. Documents
  4181. provided by former NSA-employee Edward Snowden
  4182. and seen by this newspaper, prove this.
  4183.  
  4184.  A management presentation dating from 2012
  4185. explains how the NSA collects information
  4186. worldwide. In addition, the presentation
  4187. shows that the intelligence service uses
  4188. ‘Computer Network Exploitation’ (CNE) in
  4189. more than 50,000 locations. CNE is the
  4190. secret infiltration of computer systems
  4191. achieved by installing malware, malicious
  4192. software.
  4193.  
  4194.  One example of this type of hacking was
  4195. discovered in September 2013 at the Belgium
  4196. telecom provider Belgacom. For a number of
  4197. years the British intelligence service - GCHQ –
  4198. has been installing this malicious software
  4199. in the Belgacom network in order to tap
  4200. their customers’ telephone and data traffic.
  4201. The Belgacom network was infiltrated by GCHQ
  4202. through a process of luring employees to a
  4203. false Linkedin page.
  4204.  
  4205. http://www.nrc.nl/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/nsa568.jpg
  4206. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-cryptologic-platform.pdf
  4207. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/11/23/nsa-infected-50000-computer-networks-with-malicious-software/
  4208. http://hothardware.com/News/Dutch-News-Agency-Reports-NSA-Infected-50000-Networks-With-Malware/
  4209.  
  4210. ¤ NSA Power to Generate Profits and Pay ::
  4211.  
  4212.  The NSA SIGINT Strategy 2012-2016 pretty
  4213. well covers all the comsec and crypto
  4214. initiatives to covertly exploit people,
  4215. cryptographers, anonymizers, informants,
  4216. planted spies, security firms, networks,
  4217. governments, nations, friends, lovers
  4218. and citizens.
  4219.  
  4220.  Not sure leaks, lawsuits and protests
  4221. will deter this bounty of profits for
  4222. the comsec industry, unless the public
  4223. is aroused to demand the 3 branches grasp
  4224. the nettle, and all those making money
  4225. from this deception operation decide to
  4226. give up their profits, perks and prestige.
  4227.  
  4228.  I mean those on the comsec and crypto
  4229. lists, those participating in standards
  4230. committees, those enjoying contracts and
  4231. grants in think tanks and universities,
  4232. those in law firms and public interest
  4233. orgs, those in the media and academia,
  4234. those in non-spy gov agencies, pretending
  4235. to be in opposition as they scramble to
  4236. rejigger their products and sales pitches,
  4237. to exploit what is being fabricated to
  4238. diminish Snowden’s revelations with new
  4239. forms of secrecy, technology, law,
  4240. regulations, bribery, lobbying, grants,
  4241. contracts, list lurking, online and
  4242. offline spying, break-ins, the usual
  4243. kaboodle, to assure the NSA goals are
  4244. fulfilled.
  4245.  
  4246. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-power-profit-pay.htm
  4247.  
  4248. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-cryptologic-platform.pdf
  4249.  
  4250. ¤ NSA’s Global Interception Network ::
  4251.  
  4252. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  4253. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  4254. ¤ GCHQ Accused of Spying European, German
  4255. and Israeli Politicians (No Documentation) ::
  4256.  
  4257. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/snowden-documents-show-gchq-targeted-european-and-german-politicians-a-940135.html
  4258. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/dec/20/gchq-targeted-aid-agencies-german-government-eu-commissioner
  4259. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/21/world/nsa-dragnet-included-allies-aid-groups-and-business-elite.html?_r=0
  4260. _______________________________________
  4261. ¤ CBS 60min ; Inside the NSA (Part One) ::
  4262.  
  4263. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WgPNyAYOr04
  4264.  
  4265. ¤ CBS 60min ; The Snowden Affair (Part Two) ::
  4266.  
  4267. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5AaREKHQI8E
  4268.  
  4269. ¤ NSA Interviewed by CBS - Transcript ::
  4270.  
  4271. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-60mins/nsa-60mins.htm
  4272. _______________________________________
  4273. ¤ Proposal for Distribution of Snowden Cache ::
  4274.  
  4275. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/snowden-cache-dist.htm
  4276. _______________________________________
  4277. ¤ EU Data Retention Directive “Unlawful”
  4278. and “Incompatible” with Charter of Rights ::
  4279.  
  4280. http://www.scribd.com/doc/191078925/Data-Retention-Challenge-Press-Release
  4281.  
  4282. http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2318838/eu-data-retention-directive-unlawful-and-incompatible-with-charter-of-rights
  4283. _______________________________________
  4284. ¤ GOOGLE CENSORING NSA SEARCH RESULTS (?) ::
  4285.  
  4286. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/17/edward-snowden-doesnt-show-up-once-in-googles-list-of-top-2013-searches/
  4287. _______________________________________
  4288. ¤ Clapper, Feinstein, Obama Total Disregard
  4289. of Public Concerns ::
  4290.  
  4291. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/spies-reign-obama.htm
  4292.  
  4293. ¤ Merkel Throws a Pissy Fit ::
  4294.  
  4295. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/merkel-compares-nsa-stasi-obama
  4296. _______________________________________
  4297. ¤ GCHQ’s Use of FLYING PIG to Spy ::
  4298.  
  4299.  “FLYING PIG is a program that allows
  4300. analysts to query GCHQ’s vast repository
  4301. of metadata about the world’s secure
  4302. communications over TLS/SSL. It’s
  4303. certainly not a program through which
  4304. the GCHQ, or NSA for that matter, performs
  4305. man-in-the-middle attacks against internet
  4306. services like Google, as reported by others,
  4307. including Bruce Schneier. The reports that
  4308. claim the NSA performed MITM attacks against
  4309. Google are based on a small piece of a
  4310. document that describes a FLYING PIG
  4311. (which is a not an NSA program, as you may
  4312. have noticed) use case (presumably, an
  4313. investigation into the DigiNotar CA breach).
  4314. That’s not to say the GCHQ doesn’t perform
  4315. MITM attacks, but there’s no evidence to
  4316. be found in this document. Though, FLYING PIG
  4317. may be used to prepare MITM attacks, e.g.
  4318. by providing information about a target.”
  4319.  
  4320. http://koen.io/2013/12/flying-pig-gchq-tls-ssl-knowledge-base/
  4321.  
  4322. ¤ NSA Use of FLYING PIG to Spy ::
  4323.  
  4324. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/785152-166819124-mitm-google.html
  4325. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130910/10470024468/flying-pig-nsa-is-running-man-middle-attacks-imitating-googles-servers.shtml
  4326. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57602701-38/nsa-disguised-itself-as-google-to-spy-say-reports/
  4327. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  4328. ¤ John Young Breaks Down the NSA Leaks ::
  4329.  
  4330. http://www.corbettreport.com/mp3/2013-12-17%20John%20Young.mp3
  4331.  
  4332. http://www.corbettreport.com/interview-793-john-young-breaks-down-the-snowdennsa-saga/
  4333. _______________________________________
  4334. ¤ FASCIA Database of Device-Location Records ::
  4335.  
  4336. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-fascia.pdf
  4337. ---------------------------------------
  4338. ¤ hdfs:// Cloud Holds FASCIA Database ::
  4339.  
  4340. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ghost-machine.pdf
  4341.  
  4342.  HDFS stands for “Hadoop Distributed File
  4343. System” which was inspired by Google Inc,
  4344. and later managed by big data corporations
  4345. such as IBM, Yahoo, Facebook, et al.
  4346.  
  4347.  HDFS is designed to reliably store very
  4348. large files across machines in a large
  4349. cluster.
  4350.  
  4351. ¤ Hadoop Emerging Technology ::
  4352.  
  4353.  “Hadoop is a data processing system that
  4354. follows the MapReduce paradigm for scalable
  4355. data analysis.” ... “Largest install is at
  4356. Yahoo, a major contributor.”
  4357.  
  4358.  HDFS is a scalable file system with two
  4359. major components, a central metadata server
  4360. and file servers from data.
  4361.  
  4362. http://www.upload-box.com/index.php/files/get/uTqMG-LMlY/hadoop-emerging-technology.pdf
  4363.  
  4364. ¤ Yahoo - Managing a Hadoop Cluster ::
  4365.  
  4366.  This was taken from the Yahoo website,
  4367. posted on public domain.
  4368.  
  4369. http://msfire.tk/files/get/SIut69QW7Q/yahoo-hadoop.zip
  4370.  
  4371. ¤ Apache Hadoop FileSystem and its Usage
  4372. in Facebook (This File Is Mirrored) ::
  4373.  
  4374. http://4lodzik.de/xu2/files/get/U-eeftxCDJ/facebook-hadhoop.zip
  4375. http://www.uploadmini.com/index.php/files/get/rnvpDpXfZu/facebook-hadhoop.zip
  4376. http://cloudseminar.berkeley.edu/data/hdfs.pdf
  4377.  
  4378. ¤ hadoop_install.zip (Mirrored) ::
  4379.  
  4380. http://fileb.ag/nukq1uicayye
  4381. http://f.ishoo.ru/files/get/vfym4eZHvY/hadoop-install.zip
  4382. http://cloud.elearning.uq.edu.au/download/hadoop_install.zip
  4383. ---------------------------------------
  4384. ¤ CO-TRAVELER Cellphone Tracking ; FASCIA
  4385. Database Available With Ghostmachine ::
  4386.  
  4387. “Proxies can make IP resolution challenging.”
  4388.  
  4389. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-cotraveler.pdf
  4390.  
  4391. ¤ CHALKFUN Location Tool Highly Censored ::
  4392.  
  4393. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-chalkfun.pdf
  4394.  
  4395. ¤ NSA Targets Device Location Verification ::
  4396.  
  4397. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-target-location.pdf
  4398.  
  4399. ¤ NSA’s Global Interception Network ::
  4400.  
  4401. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  4402.  
  4403. ¤ NSA Tracking Cellphone Locations ::
  4404.  
  4405.  In unveiling new Edward Snowden revelations
  4406. about NSA spying, the Washington Post has
  4407. once again whitewashed the fact that the
  4408. content of all our communications have
  4409. been stored and analyzed under the Echelon
  4410. program since the 1990s.
  4411.  
  4412.  The new details concern how, “The National
  4413. Security Agency is gathering nearly 5
  4414. billion records a day on the whereabouts
  4415. of cellphones around the world.”
  4416.  
  4417.  However, the report reveals itself to
  4418. be little more than an exercise in soft-
  4419. peddling when it claims that, “The NSA
  4420. does not target Americans’ location data
  4421. by design, but the agency acquires a
  4422. substantial amount of information on
  4423. the whereabouts of domestic cellphones
  4424. “incidentally.”
  4425.  
  4426.  This notion that the NSA just accidentally
  4427. happens to record the locations of Americans
  4428. using data from their cellphones, and is
  4429. not deliberately engaging in domestic
  4430. surveillance, is yet another example of
  4431. damage control by the establishment.
  4432.  
  4433. http://www.infowars.com/new-nsa-revelations-another-limited-hangout-whitewash/
  4434. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/_ie-fallbacks/NSA_Co-traveler_g.jpg
  4435. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/fascia-the-nsas-huge-trove-of-location-records/637/
  4436. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/how-to-tell-if-a-target-is-foreign/635/
  4437. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-c6ca94801fac_print.html
  4438. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/04/nsa-storing-cell-phone-records-daily-snowden
  4439. ---------------------------------------
  4440. ¤ NSA Uses Google Cookies and GSM Geohashes
  4441. to Pinpoint Targets ::
  4442.  
  4443.  The National Security Agency is ‘secretly’
  4444. piggybacking on the tools that enable
  4445. Internet advertisers to track consumers,
  4446. using cookies and location data to pinpoint
  4447. targets for government hacking and to
  4448. bolster surveillance.
  4449.  
  4450. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-sigint-successes.pdf
  4451. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gsm-tracking.pdf
  4452. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-signal-surveillance-success-stories/647/
  4453. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-google-cookies-to-pinpoint-targets-for-hacking/
  4454. http://boingboing.net/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-googles-tracking-co.html
  4455. http://www.theverge.com/2013/12/10/5198592/nsa-reportedly-piggybacking-on-google-advertising-cookies
  4456. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/14/snow-d14.html
  4457. ---------------------------------------
  4458. ¤ FLASHBACK ; Anonymizing Google’s Cookie ::
  4459.  
  4460. http://www.imilly.com/google-cookie.htm
  4461. ---------------------------------------
  4462. ¤ How Marketers Will Find and Track You
  4463. In a World Without Cookies ::
  4464.  
  4465. http://blog.thefetch.com/2013/11/18/cookie-monsters-how-marketers-will-find-and-track-you-in-a-world-without-cookies/
  4466. _______________________________________
  4467. ¤ How the NSA Targets Italy ::
  4468.  
  4469. http://espresso.repubblica.it/foto/2013/12/05/galleria/nsa-intercettazioni-1.144400
  4470. http://espresso.repubblica.it/inchieste/2013/12/05/news/revealed-how-the-nsa-targets-italy-1.144428
  4471. http://www.pcworld.com/article/2070480/nsa-spies-on-italians-from-roof-of-us-embassy-in-rome-magazine-reports.html
  4472.  
  4473. ¤ SCS_Italy_Spying.zip | 371KB ::
  4474.  
  4475. http://ge.tt/api/1/files/2Bbc4C81/0/blob?download
  4476. http://megaswf.com/f/2625421
  4477. http://msfire.tk/files/get/srIJUWgvYg/scs-italy-spying.zip
  4478. _______________________________________
  4479. ¤ Swedish Intelligence Agency (FRA) Spied
  4480. on Russian Leaders for NSA ::
  4481.  
  4482. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-spied-ru.htm
  4483. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-ru-baltic.pdf
  4484. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0yP7n8qZrz0
  4485. http://rt.com/news/sweden-spied-russia-nsa-759/
  4486. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-leaks-sweden-spied-on-russian-leaders-for-us/
  4487. http://www.thelocal.se/20131211/sweden-aided-in-nsa-hacking-operations-report
  4488.  
  4489. ¤ NSA & FRA Quantum Hacking Programme ::
  4490.  
  4491. http://www.svt.se/ug/fra-part-of-top-secret-hacker-project
  4492.  
  4493. ¤ NSA & FRA Relationship Was “Top Secret” ::
  4494.  
  4495. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-spies.pdf
  4496.  
  4497. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/889126/nsa-intelligence-relationship-with-sweden.pdf
  4498.  
  4499. ¤ NSA & FRA Relationship “Actively Engaged” ::
  4500.  
  4501. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-relationship.pdf
  4502.  
  4503. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/894384/nsa-internal-pm-on-fra-and-sweden-relations.pdf
  4504.  
  4505. ¤ NSA & FRA Joint Quantum Spy Agenda ::
  4506.  
  4507. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-spying-agenda.pdf
  4508.  
  4509. ¤ NSA/GCHQ/FRA Quantum Spying Accomplishments ::
  4510.  
  4511. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-fra-quantum.pdf
  4512. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-quantum-2.pdf
  4513. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/gchq-se-fra-quantum-3.pdf
  4514.  
  4515. ¤ NSA/GCHQ/FRA Communication Intelligence ::
  4516.  
  4517. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-se-fra-comint.pdf
  4518. ---------------------------------------
  4519. PAST XKEYSCORE REPORTS/DOCUMENTS REFER HERE ;
  4520.  
  4521. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=16647
  4522. ---------------------------------------
  4523. ¤ NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Website Viewers ::
  4524.  
  4525. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-xkeyscore-slide.pdf
  4526.  
  4527. ¤ NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Tor, etc. ::
  4528.  
  4529. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-tor-slides.pdf
  4530.  
  4531. ¤ NSA/FRA XKeyscore Exploit Sources ::
  4532.  
  4533. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-sources.pdf
  4534.  
  4535. ¤ NSA/FRA XKeyscore Data Hoarding Plans ::
  4536.  
  4537. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-xkeyscore.pdf
  4538. _______________________________________
  4539.  “Earlier, a map showing SCS locations
  4540. worldwide was published by the German
  4541. magazine Der Spiegel. Initially an unredacted
  4542. map was put online by accident, but before
  4543. it was replaced, it was already copied onto
  4544. several websites. This map showed 74 staffed
  4545. SCS locations, 14 unmanned remote controlled
  4546. locations and 8 other locations as of August
  4547. 2010. Except for the SCS locations in Europe,
  4548. the names of all other cities were blurred
  4549. by Der Spiegel.”
  4550.  
  4551.   - electrospaces.blogspot.fr
  4552.  
  4553. REDACTED MAP (CENSORED)
  4554.  
  4555. https://lh3.ggpht.com/-ymi_oEW0XcI/UpzfqqqPRsI/AAAAAAAABCs/WU4lKnfs52w/s320/scs-global-map-redacted.jpg
  4556.  
  4557. UNREDACTED MAP (DEFAULT)
  4558.  
  4559. http://postimg.org/image/6kzpypy1l/
  4560.  
  4561. BOTH REDACTED AND UNREDACTED (ZIP | 223KB)
  4562.  
  4563. http://f.lui.li/get_1065_f4ab.html
  4564. ---------------------------------------
  4565. ¤ Decensoring SCS Locations ::
  4566.  
  4567. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/decensoring-scs-slides.htm
  4568.  
  4569. The NSA spies under diplomatic cover.
  4570. _______________________________________
  4571. ¤ Five Eyes ::
  4572.  
  4573. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-5-eyes-partners.pdf
  4574. _______________________________________
  4575. ¤ A Conspiracy So Vast ::
  4576.  
  4577. http://www.lewrockwell.com/2013/12/andrew-p-napolitano/a-conspiracy-so-vast%E2%80%A8/
  4578. _______________________________________
  4579. ¤ PayPal Corporation Said To Be Implicated
  4580. in Withheld NSA Documents ::
  4581.  
  4582. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tTivPZZorWY
  4583.  
  4584. http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/2013/12/11/bfp-breaking-news-omidyars-paypal-corporation-said-to-be-implicated-in-withheld-nsa-documents/
  4585. _______________________________________
  4586. ¤ NSA GCHQ Spies on Video Game Geeks ::
  4587.  
  4588. Say hello to undercover NSA orcs.
  4589.  
  4590. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-spy-games.pdf
  4591. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-spy-games.pdf
  4592. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/12/world-of-spycraft-nsa-gchq-hacked-wow-and-xbox-live-other-games/
  4593. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/09/nsa-spies-online-games-world-warcraft-second-life
  4594. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2013/12/09/Report--NSA-spying-on-virtual-worlds--online-games
  4595. http://www.businessinsider.com/spy-agencies-infiltrated-video-games-nsa-gchq-world-of-warcraft-2013-12
  4596. _______________________________________
  4597. ¤ Rollingstone Describes NSA’s Influx of Money ::
  4598.  
  4599.  September 11th, which also happened to
  4600. be Drake’s first day at Fort Meade, changed
  4601. the equation. Drake explains the shift in
  4602. two ways: The first was a massive expansion
  4603. of US spying capabilities as the agency
  4604. “unchained itself from the Constitution,”
  4605. and began to spy on Americans and foreign
  4606. citizens, at home and abroad. The other
  4607. change, felt across the entire intelligence
  4608. community, was a rapid expansion of the NSA
  4609. itself.
  4610.  
  4611.  “Massive amounts of money were pumped
  4612. into the NSA after 9/11, and Congress was
  4613. saying, ‘How big do you want the check?’”
  4614. says Drake. With virtually every agency
  4615. involved in tracking terrorists clamoring
  4616. for its SIGINT, or signals intelligence,
  4617. the NSA expanded its outposts in Texas,
  4618. Georgia, Hawaii, Colorado and Utah, as
  4619. well as listening posts abroad, and also
  4620. went on a building spree at Fort Meade,
  4621. where the NSA’s sprawling 5,000-acre
  4622. campus is now almost 10 times the size
  4623. of the Pentagon. By 2013, according to
  4624. The Washington Post, the NSA had expanded
  4625. its workforce by one-third, to about
  4626. 33,000. The number of private companies
  4627. it depended upon more than tripled during
  4628. that time.
  4629.  
  4630.  Soon, thanks to this influx of money
  4631. and the increasing reliance on the private
  4632. sector to handle even sensitive jobs,
  4633. the very heart of America’s intelligence
  4634. infrastructure was being outsourced to
  4635. contractors. “Essentially, 9/11 was a
  4636. massive jobs program, in which the ticket
  4637. you needed for the party was your clearance,”
  4638. says Drake. “And tons of people were
  4639. getting those clearances. So you had
  4640. this huge apparatus being built, and
  4641. the government was just managing it.
  4642. And in some cases, they weren’t even
  4643. doing that.” ... ...
  4644.  
  4645.  By the time Snowden joined the agency’s
  4646. workforce, the surveillance he would
  4647. later expose was becoming not just
  4648. institutionalized but very big business.
  4649. “It was around 2009, 2010 that you saw
  4650. the full flower of that massive, massive
  4651. bubble of money,” says Drake. “And people
  4652. were taking it for a ride as far as it
  4653. could go.” ... ...
  4654.  
  4655.  Prior to 2009, Snowden had considered
  4656. leaking government secrets when he was
  4657. at the CIA, but held off, he later said,
  4658. not wanting to harm agents in the field,
  4659. and hoping that Obama would reform the
  4660. system. His optimism didn’t last long.
  4661. “I watched as Obama advanced the very
  4662. policies that I thought would be reined
  4663. in,” he later said. As a result, he added,
  4664. “I got hardened.” The more Snowden saw of
  4665. the NSA’s actual business – and, particularly,
  4666. the more he read “true information,”
  4667. including a 2009 Inspector General’s report
  4668. detailing the Bush era’s warrantless-
  4669. surveillance program – the more he realized
  4670. that there were actually two governments:
  4671. the one that was elected, and the other,
  4672. secret regime, governing in the dark.
  4673. “If the highest officials in government
  4674. can break the law without fearing punishment
  4675. or even any repercussions at all, secret
  4676. powers become tremendously dangerous.”
  4677.  
  4678. http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/snowden-and-greenwald-the-men-who-leaked-the-secrets-20131204
  4679. _______________________________________
  4680. ¤ Rajiv Pant Describes Snowden Files Transfer ::
  4681.  
  4682. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nyt-snowden-transfer.htm
  4683. _______________________________________
  4684. ¤ Is British Intelligence in Damage Control? ::
  4685.  
  4686. http://www.globalresearch.ca/british-intelligence-operation-to-kidnap-snowden-number-one-mi-6-officer-working-undercover-in-moscow-embassy/5358555
  4687. _______________________________________
  4688. ¤ Snowden Leaks “Greatest Intelligence
  4689. Failure Since World War 2” Exaggerated ::
  4690.  
  4691.  The Director of NSA claims Snowden stole
  4692. 200,000 documents. Allegations in Australian
  4693. press claim he stole “up to 20,000.” British
  4694. authorities accuse Snowden of stealing 58,000.
  4695. Claims are bruited in the 5 Eyes that this
  4696. is the “greatest intelligence failure since
  4697. World War 2.” High officials and ex-spies
  4698. accuse Snowden and related media of engaging
  4699. in terrorism.
  4700.  
  4701.  This suggests a counter-espionage campaign
  4702. to exaggerate Snowden’s damage, of betrayal
  4703. to his country, of aiding the enemy, of
  4704. threatening national security. It is
  4705. successfully restricting release of the
  4706. Snowden material and will likely become
  4707. more forceful as releases continue to the
  4708. extent of legislation (open or secret)
  4709. to criminalize release as a national
  4710. security threat.
  4711.  
  4712. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/snowden-civil-war.htm
  4713. _______________________________________
  4714. ¤ KILLCEN ; Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z ::
  4715.  
  4716.  Includes most reports, slides and
  4717. documents all related to the recent
  4718. Snowden leaks so far up to December
  4719. 4th of 2013. I’m still collecting
  4720. any information that comes out and
  4721. will provide updated archives from
  4722. time to time. Grab this while you can.
  4723.  
  4724.  After decompression - the folder is
  4725. titled “Eyeballing_Snowden_Info” and
  4726. holds a total of 371MB decompressed.
  4727.  
  4728. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z
  4729. (783 files | 7zip | 286MB)
  4730.  
  4731. http://fileb.ag/iv8x797lqzdw
  4732. http://uploadhero.co/dl/aBBhCePf
  4733. http://bitshare.com/files/fuxhd3ry/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z.html
  4734. http://www.upload-box.com/index.php/files/get/0VPCtiKFxf/eyeballing-snowden-info.7z
  4735. http://f.ishoo.ru/files/get/3GfGXXqGSH/eyeballing-snowden-info.7z
  4736. http://davvas.com/frrbbi2975xe
  4737. http://BillionUploads.com/hpww20r554x4
  4738. http://bayfiles.net/file/119rR/Y6ax0Z/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z
  4739. _______________________________________
  4740. ¤ indonesia-spying-slides.zip (mirrored) ::
  4741.  
  4742. http://up.sef.ps/xu/files/get/Aen2UBNeep/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  4743. http://document-space.com/index.php/files/get/yWGp5DplsK/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  4744. http://www.quickupdown.com/files/get/BEqtDnYz8M/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  4745.  
  4746. ¤ Australian Intelligence Agency (ASD)
  4747. Swaps Bulk Metadata With the NSA ::
  4748.  
  4749.  Australia’s intelligence apparatus mines
  4750. the telecommunications data of ordinary
  4751. Australians, and hands over the material
  4752. to the US and its closest allies, according
  4753. to the latest leaked document from Edward
  4754. Snowden, partly published by the Guardian
  4755. Australia web site.
  4756.  
  4757.  The document obtained by the former US
  4758. National Security Agency (NSA) contractor
  4759. confirms that the electronic surveillance
  4760. agency, the Australian Signals Directorate
  4761. (ASD), monitors the domestic population,
  4762. as well as the people and governments of
  4763. many Asian countries.
  4764.  
  4765.  Despite Australian legislation supposedly
  4766. restricting the ASD’s internal spying,