Eyeballing the NSA 043

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  8. http://upstore.net/NV5koS
  9.    
  10.    
  11.  “Defeat adversary cyber-security practices
  12. in order to acquire the SIGINT data we need
  13. from anyone, anytime, anywhere.”
  14.  
  15.   - NSA ; SIGINT Strategy 2012 - 2016
  16.  
  17.  
  18. ¤ ICWATCH: This Database Gathers the Resumes of 27,000
  19. Intelligence Workers ::
  20.  
  21. https://github.com/TransparencyToolkit/ICWATCH-Data
  22. https://transparencytoolkit.org/project/icwatch/
  23. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/08/25/icreach-nsa-cia-secret-google-crisscross-proton/
  24. https://motherboard.vice.com/read/this-database-gathers-the-resumes-of-27000-intelligence-workers
  25.  
  26. mirrored: #!gQ8EgbxZ!2hgGLnsfEK-Nss4nUImGL5nDr3QqxUhpqZZNd6TJL3o
  27. _______________________________________
  28. ¤ US Government Designated Prominent Al Jazeera Journalist
  29. as “Member of Al Qaeda” ::
  30.  
  31.  The document cites Zaidan as an example to demonstrate the
  32. powers of SKYNET, a program that analyzes location and
  33. communication data (or “metadata”) from bulk call records
  34. in order to detect suspicious patterns.
  35.  
  36.  In the Terminator movies, SKYNET is a self-aware military
  37. computer system that launches a nuclear war to exterminate
  38. the human race, and then systematically kills the survivors.
  39.  
  40.  According to the presentation, the NSA uses its version of
  41. SKYNET to identify people that it believes move like couriers
  42. used by Al Qaeda’s senior leadership. The program assessed
  43. Zaidan as a likely match, which raises troubling questions
  44. about the US government’s method of identifying terrorist
  45. targets based on metadata.
  46.  
  47.  It appears, however, that Zaidan had already been identified
  48. as an Al Qaeda member before he showed up on SKYNET’s radar.
  49. That he was already assigned a watch list number would seem
  50. to indicate that the government had a prior intelligence
  51. file on him. The Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment,
  52. or TIDE, is a US government database of over one million
  53. names suspected of a connection to terrorism, which is
  54. shared across the US intelligence community.
  55.  
  56. The presentation contains no evidence to explain the designation.
  57.  
  58. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/05/08/u-s-government-designated-prominent-al-jazeera-journalist-al-qaeda-member-put-watch-list/
  59.  
  60. ¤ NSA SKYNET Cloud Analytics-Courier Detection ::
  61.  
  62. http://cryptome.org/2015/05/nsa-skynet-intercept-15-0507.pdf
  63. _______________________________________
  64. ¤ How the NSA Converts Spoken Words Into Searchable Text ::
  65.  
  66.  Most people realize that emails and other digital communications
  67. they once considered private can now become part of their
  68. permanent record.
  69.  
  70.  But even as they increasingly use apps that understand what
  71. they say, most people don’t realize that the words they speak
  72. are not so private anymore, either.
  73.  
  74.  Top-secret documents from the archive of former NSA contractor
  75. Edward Snowden show the National Security Agency can now
  76. automatically recognize the content within phone calls by
  77. creating rough transcripts and phonetic representations that
  78. can be easily searched and stored.
  79.  
  80.  The documents show NSA analysts celebrating the development
  81. of what they called “Google for Voice” nearly a decade ago.
  82.  
  83. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/05/05/nsa-speech-recognition-snowden-searchable-text/
  84.  
  85.  ... the real solution is end-to-end encryption, preferably of
  86. the unbreakable kind.  https://whispersystems.org/
  87.  
  88. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/05/08/keep-nsa-computers-turning-phone-conversations-searchable-text/
  89.  
  90. ¤ NSA Converts Spoken Words Into Searchable Text Documents ::
  91.  
  92. http://cryptome.org/2015/05/nsa-black-budget-sid-rt10-wg-language-intercept-15-0504.pdf
  93. _______________________________________
  94. ¤ Declassified Report Shows Doubts About Value of NSA
  95. Warrantless Spying ::
  96.  
  97.  The secrecy surrounding the National Security Agency’s
  98. post-9/11 warrantless surveillance and bulk data collection
  99. program hampered its effectiveness, and many members of the
  100. intelligence community later struggled to identify any
  101. specific terrorist attacks it thwarted, a newly declassified
  102. document shows.
  103.  
  104.  The document is a lengthy report on a once secret NSA
  105. program code-named Stellarwind. The report was a joint
  106. project in 2009 by inspectors general for five intelligence
  107. and law enforcement agencies, and it was withheld from the
  108. public at the time, although a short, unclassified version
  109. was made public. The government released a redacted version
  110. of the full report to The New York Times on Friday evening
  111. in response to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit.
  112.  
  113. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/25/us/politics/value-of-nsa-warrantless-spying-is-doubted-in-declassified-reports.htm
  114.  
  115. ¤ NSA Stellar Wind OIG Analysis ::
  116.  
  117. http://cryptome.org/2015/04/nsa-stellar-wind-oig-nyt-15-0424.pdf
  118. _______________________________________
  119. ¤ NSA Torus Receivers of 35 Satellite Signals ::
  120.  
  121.  At three satellite facilities, in Britain, Cyprus and New Zealand,
  122. there's a special antenna that allows NSA's partner agencies a
  123. significant increase in their capability to collect satellite
  124. communications.
  125.  
  126.  This antenna is called Torus, and while conventional parabolic
  127. dish antennas can only view one satellite at a time, one single
  128. Torus antenna is able to receive the signals from up to 35
  129. communications satellites.
  130.  
  131.  These rare and expensive Torus antennas are used by some television
  132. networks, but a close look at photos of the Five Eyes satellite
  133. stations has now revealed the locations where Torus antennas are
  134. also used for gathering signals intelligence.
  135.  
  136. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2015/04/torus-antenna-to-significantly-increase.html
  137. _______________________________________
  138. ¤ CSEC Cyberwarfare Toolbox Revealed ::
  139.  
  140.  Top-secret documents obtained by the CBC show Canada’s
  141. electronic spy agency has developed a vast arsenal of
  142. cyberwarfare tools alongside its US and British counterparts
  143. to hack into computers and phones in many parts of the
  144. world, including in friendly trade countries like Mexico
  145. and hotspots like the Middle East. ... ...
  146.  
  147.  The CSE toolbox includes the ability to redirect someone
  148. to a fake website, create unrest by pretending to be
  149. another government or hacker, and siphon classified
  150. information out of computer networks, according to experts
  151. who viewed the documents. ... ...
  152.  
  153.  But the latest top-secret documents released to CBC News
  154. and The Intercept illustrate the development of a large
  155. stockpile of Canadian cyber-spy capabilities that go beyond
  156. hacking for intelligence, including:
  157.  
  158. • destroying infrastructure, which could include electricity,
  159. transportation or banking systems;
  160.  
  161. • creating unrest by using false-flags — ie. making a target
  162. think another country conducted the operation;
  163.  
  164. • disrupting online traffic by such techniques as deleting
  165. emails, freezing internet connections, blocking websites and
  166. redirecting wire money transfers.
  167.  
  168. http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/communication-security-establishment-s-cyberwarfare-toolbox-revealed-1.3002978
  169. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/03/23/canada-cse-hacking-cyberwar-secret-arsenal
  170.  
  171. ¤ CSEC Cyber Threats / Cyberwarfare Toolbox ::
  172.  
  173. http://cryptome.org/2015/03/csec-cyber-threats-cbc-15-0320.pdf
  174. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  175. ¤ NSA Releases William Friedman Papers ::
  176.  
  177. http://cryptome.org/2015/03/nsa-friedman-15-0323.pdf
  178. _______________________________________
  179. ¤ The CIA Campaign to Steal Apple’s Secrets ::
  180.  
  181. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/03/10/ispy-cia-campaign-steal-apples-secrets/
  182. http://www.infowars.com/new-snowden-documents-cia-has-spent-10-years-hacking-iphones-ipads/
  183.  
  184. ¤ NSA-CIA Apple DPA Cryptanalysis ::
  185.  
  186. http://cryptome.org/2015/03/nsa-apple-dpa-intercept-15-0309.zip
  187. _______________________________________
  188. ¤ Leaked Snowden Files Show Most of GCSB’s Targets Are NOT
  189. Security Threats to New Zealand (UPDATED SEVERAL TIMES) ::
  190.  
  191.  New Zealand’s electronic surveillance agency, the GCSB, has
  192. dramatically expanded its spying operations during the years
  193. of John Key's National Government and is automatically funnelling
  194. vast amounts of intelligence to the US National Security Agency,
  195. top-secret documents reveal.
  196.  
  197.  Since 2009, the Government Communications Security Bureau
  198. intelligence base at Waihopai has moved to “full-take collection”,
  199. indiscriminately intercepting Asia-Pacific communications and
  200. providing them en masse to the NSA through the controversial
  201. NSA intelligence system XKeyscore, which is used to monitor
  202. emails and internet browsing habits. ... ...
  203.  
  204.  New Zealand is selling out its close relations with the Pacific
  205. nations to be close with the United States, author Nicky Hager
  206. has said.
  207.  
  208.  Hager, in conjunction with the New Zealand Herald and the
  209. Intercept news site, revealed today how New Zealand’s spies
  210. are targeting the entire email, phone and social media
  211. communications of the country’s closest, friendliest and
  212. most vulnerable neighbours.
  213.  
  214.  This morning, Hager told Radio New Zealand that the documents
  215. revealed even more countries which New Zealand was spying on,
  216. and more information would come.
  217.  
  218.  “The Five Eyes countries led by the US are literally trying
  219. to spy on every country in the world ... and what we’re going
  220. to be hearing about in the next few days is New Zealand in all
  221. kinds of very surprising ways playing a role in that,” he said.
  222.  
  223. http://cryptome.org/2015/03/gcsb-xkeyscore-nz-herald-15-0305.pdf
  224. http://cryptome.org/2015/03/gcsb-xkeyscore-nz-herald-15-0306.pdf
  225. http://cryptome.org/2015/03/gcsb-xkeyscore-nz-star-times-15-0308.pdf
  226. http://cryptome.org/2015/03/nsa-nz-nz-herald-15-0310.pdf
  227. http://cryptome.org/2015/03/gcsb-solomons-nz-herald-15-0314.pdf
  228. http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11411759
  229. http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11411730
  230. http://media.nzherald.co.nz/webcontent/document/pdf/201513/WTO%20document.pdf
  231. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/03/04/new-zealand-gcsb-surveillance-waihopai-xkeyscore/
  232. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/15/new-zealand-gcsb-speargun-mass-surveillance/
  233. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/03/07/new-zealand-ironsand-waihopai-nsa-gcsb/
  234. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/03/22/new-zealand-gcsb-spying-wto-director-general/
  235. http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/67082905/snowden-files-inside-waihopais-domes
  236. https://leaksource.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/gcsb-asia-pacific-spying-five-eyes-nsa-xkeyscore.pdf
  237. https://leaksource.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/gcsb-provide-nsa-nz-data.pdf
  238. https://leaksource.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/gcsb-xks-ironsand-access-multiple-choice-test-check-box.pdf
  239. https://leaksource.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/gcsb-asd-nzsis-asis-south-pacific-spying-high-priority.pdf
  240. http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/national/267923/gcsb-in-mass-collection-of-pacific-data-ferguson
  241. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-31741564
  242. _______________________________________
  243. ¤ How NSA-GCHQ Stole the Keys to the Encryption Castle ::
  244.  
  245.  AMERICAN AND BRITISH spies hacked into the internal computer network
  246. of the largest manufacturer of SIM cards in the world, stealing
  247. encryption keys used to protect the privacy of cellphone communications
  248. across the globe, according to top-secret documents provided to The
  249. Intercept by National Security Agency whistleblower Edward Snowden.
  250.  
  251.  The hack was perpetrated by a joint unit consisting of operatives
  252. from the NSA and its British counterpart Government Communications
  253. Headquarters, or GCHQ. The breach, detailed in a secret 2010 GCHQ
  254. document, gave the surveillance agencies the potential to secretly
  255. monitor a large portion of the world’s cellular communications,
  256. including both voice and data.
  257.  
  258. http://cryptome.org/2015/02/gchq-pcs-harvesting-intercept-15-0219.pdf
  259. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/02/19/great-sim-heist/
  260. http://www.democracynow.org/2015/2/20/nsa_british_gchq_hacked_sim_card
  261. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/02/20/gemalto-heist-shocks-europe/
  262.  
  263. ¤ Gemalto Government National Mobile ID Schemes / Partners ::
  264.  
  265. http://cryptome.org/2015/02/gemalto-gov-national-mobile-id.pdf
  266.  
  267. http://cryptome.org/2015/02/gemalto-partner-list.htm
  268.  
  269. ¤ Gemalto Responds After SIM Encryption Key Heist Exposed ::
  270.  
  271. http://www.gemalto.com/press/Pages/Information-regarding-a-report-mentioning-a-hacking-of-SIM-card-encryption-keys.aspx
  272.  
  273. http://www.infowars.com/sim-card-producer-denies-any-real-risk-from-nsa-hacking-its-encryption-keys/
  274.  
  275. ¤ White House Responds After SIM Encryption Key Heist Exposed ::
  276.  
  277. MIRROR #1 http://postimg.org/image/yj37iju33/
  278.  
  279. MIRROR #2 https://pbs.twimg.com/media/B-U0B20CIAASRpq.png
  280. _______________________________________
  281. ¤ NSA’s “Equation Group” Firmware-imbedded Malware Found ::
  282.  
  283.  NSA stores secret imbedded malware inside the firmware of
  284. harddrives and USB(s).
  285.  
  286.  Malware can be used as a beacon once plugged into an air-gapped
  287. system and data can be accessed remotely while OFFLINE.
  288.  
  289.  Kaspersky’s reconstructions of the spying programs show that
  290. they could work in disk drives sold by more than a dozen
  291. companies, comprising essentially the entire market. They
  292. include Western Digital Corp, Seagate Technology Plc, Toshiba
  293. Corp, IBM, Micron Technology Inc and Samsung Electronics Co Ltd.
  294.  
  295.  Western Digital, Seagate and Micron said they had no knowledge
  296. of these spying programs. Toshiba and Samsung declined to comment.
  297. IBM did not respond to requests for comment.
  298.  
  299. http://cryptome.org/2015/02/nsa-equation-group.pdf
  300. http://www.stuff.co.nz/technology/digital-living/66279485/nsa-hiding-equation-spy-program-on-hard-drives
  301. https://news.yahoo.com/russian-researchers-expose-breakthrough-u-spying-program-194217480--sector.html
  302. http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/02/how-omnipotent-hackers-tied-to-the-nsa-hid-for-14-years-and-were-found-at-last/
  303. _______________________________________
  304. ¤ NY Times’ David Carr Snowden Interview Hours Before Death ::
  305.  
  306. http://timestalks.com/laura-poitras-glenn-greenwald-edward-snowden.html
  307.  
  308. http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/David-Carr-died-New-York-Times-Snowden/2015/02/13/id/624700/
  309. _______________________________________
  310. ¤ NSA Claims Iran Learned from Western Cyberattacks ::
  311.  
  312. http://cryptome.org/2015/02/iran-gchq-intercept-15-0210.pdf
  313.  
  314. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/02/10/nsa-iran-developing-sophisticated-cyber-attacks-learning-attacks/
  315. _______________________________________
  316. ¤ White House Spy “Reform” - Increase Spying! Flaunt It! ::
  317.  
  318. An in-you’re-face attitude is now considered “reform.”
  319.  
  320. http://cryptome.org/2015/02/ic-ppd-28-15-0203.zip
  321.  
  322. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/01/29/one-year-major-report-nsa-still-collecting-bulk-domestic-data-still-clueless-much-good-surveillance/
  323. _______________________________________
  324. ¤ Hypocrisy of Youtube’s CitizenFour Censorship ::
  325.  
  326. http://piratetimes.net/new-snowden-documentary-censored-online/
  327.  
  328. ¤ Citizenfour Snowden Documentary (7-Zipped MP4) ::
  329.  
  330. http://cryptome.org/Citizenfour.7z
  331.  
  332. ¤ Citizenfour Snowden Documentary HD (7-Zip MP4) ::
  333.  
  334. http://cryptome.org/Citizenfour-HD.7z
  335.  
  336. ¤ Citizenfour Screengrabs, 87 PDFs in 13 Files ::
  337.  
  338. http://cryptome.org/2015/01/Citizenfour-Screengrabs-pdfs.7z
  339.  
  340. ¤ Citizenfour Screengrabs, 87 JPGs in 13 Folders ::
  341.  
  342. http://cryptome.org/2015/01/Citizenfour-Screengrabs.7z
  343. _______________________________________
  344. ¤ Western Spy Agencies Secretly Rely on Hackers for Intel ::
  345.  
  346. http://cryptome.org/2015/02/gchq-lovely-horse-intercept-15-0204.pdf
  347.  
  348. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/02/04/demonize-prosecute-hackers-nsa-gchq-rely-intel-expertise/
  349. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  350. ¤ CSEC Eyeballs File Sharing Host User Data ::
  351.  
  352. http://torrentfreak.com/canadian-government-spies-on-millions-of-file-sharers-150128/
  353. http://www.cbc.ca/news/cse-tracks-millions-of-downloads-daily-snowden-documents-1.2930120
  354. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/01/28/canada-cse-levitation-mass-surveillance
  355. http://motherboard.vice.com/read/how-canadian-spies-infiltrated-the-internets-core-to-watch-what-you-do-online?
  356.  
  357. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  358. ¤ NSA MORECOWBELL HTTP GET Attacking ::
  359.  
  360. http://cryptome.org/2015/01/nsa-morecowbell.htm
  361. http://cryptome.org/2015/01/MORECOWBELL.pdf
  362. http://cryptome.org/2015/01/MORECOWBELL-Analysis-Grothoff-etal.pdf
  363. http://cryptome.org/2015/01/Wertheim-NSA-and-Encryption-NotiAMS-Feb15.pdf
  364. http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/visuel/2015/01/24/cowbells-nouvelles-revelations-sur-les-pratiques-de-la-nsa_4561547_3234.html
  365. _______________________________________
  366. ¤ Compilation of Snowden Documents - January 30, 2015 ::
  367.  
  368. https://github.com/nsa-observer/documents/archive/master.zip
  369.  
  370. https://github.com/nsa-observer/documents/tree/master/files/pdf
  371. _______________________________________
  372. ¤ How GCHQ Prepares Interception of Phone Calls From Satellites ::
  373.  
  374. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2015/01/how-gchq-prepares-for-interception-of.html
  375. _______________________________________
  376. ¤ NSA Documents Expose NSA’s Digital Arms Race for Cyber Warfare ::
  377.  
  378.  The NSA’s mass surveillance is just the beginning. Documents from
  379. Edward Snowden show that the intelligence agency is arming America
  380. for future digital wars -- a struggle for control of the Internet
  381. that is already well underway.
  382.  
  383.  Normally, internship applicants need to have polished resumes,
  384. with volunteer work on social projects considered a plus. But at
  385. Politerain, the job posting calls for candidates with significantly
  386. different skill sets. We are, the ad says, “looking for interns who
  387. want to break things.”
  388.  
  389.  Politerain is not a project associated with a conventional company.
  390. It is run by a US government intelligence organization, the National
  391. Security Agency (NSA). More precisely, it’s operated by the NSA’s
  392. digital snipers with Tailored Access Operations (TAO), the department
  393. responsible for breaking into computers.
  394.  
  395.  Potential interns are also told that research into third party
  396. computers might include plans to “remotely degrade or destroy
  397. opponent computers, routers, servers and network enabled devices
  398. by attacking the hardware.” Using a program called Passionatepolka,
  399. for example, they may be asked to “remotely brick network cards."
  400. With programs like Berserkr they would implant “persistent backdoors”
  401. and “parasitic drivers.” Using another piece of software called
  402. Barnfire, they would “erase the BIOS on a brand of servers that
  403. act as a backbone to many rival governments.”
  404.  
  405.  An intern’s tasks might also include remotely destroying the
  406. functionality of hard drives. Ultimately, the goal of the internship
  407. program was “developing an attacker’s mindset.”
  408.  
  409.  The internship listing is eight years old, but the attacker’s mindset
  410. has since become a kind of doctrine for the NSA’s data spies. And the
  411. intelligence service isn’t just trying to achieve mass surveillance
  412. of Internet communication, either. The digital spies of the Five Eyes
  413. alliance -- comprised of the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia
  414. and New Zealand -- want more.
  415.  
  416. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/new-snowden-docs-indicate-scope-of-nsa-preparations-for-cyber-battle-a-1013409.html
  417.  
  418. ¤ Der Spiegel Releases NSA’s Plans for Cyber Warfare ::
  419.  
  420. http://cryptome.org/2015/01/spiegel-15-0117.7z
  421. _______________________________________
  422. ¤ Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA’s War on Internet Security ::
  423.  
  424.  US and British intelligence agencies undertake every effort imaginable
  425. to crack all types of encrypted Internet communication. The cloud, it
  426. seems, is full of holes. The good news: New Snowden documents show that
  427. some forms of encryption still cause problems for the NSA. ... ...
  428.  
  429.  As one document from the Snowden archive shows, the NSA had been
  430. unsuccessful in attempts to decrypt several communications protocols,
  431. at least as of 2012. An NSA presentation for a conference that took
  432. place that year lists the encryption programs the Americans failed to
  433. crack. In the process, the NSA cryptologists divided their targets
  434. into five levels corresponding to the degree of the difficulty of the
  435. attack and the outcome, ranging from “trivial” to “catastrophic.”
  436.  
  437.  Monitoring a document’s path through the Internet is classified as
  438. “trivial.” Recording Facebook chats is considered a “minor” task,
  439. while the level of difficulty involved in decrypting emails sent
  440. through Moscow-based Internet service provider mail.ru is considered
  441. “moderate.” Still, all three of those classifications don’t appear to
  442. pose any significant problems for the NSA.
  443.  
  444.  Things first become troublesome at the fourth level. The presentation
  445. states that the NSA encounters “major” problems in its attempts to
  446. decrypt messages sent through heavily encrypted email service providers
  447. like Zoho or in monitoring users of the Tor network, which was
  448. developed for surfing the web anonymously. Tor, otherwise known as
  449. The Onion Router, is free and open source software that allows users
  450. to surf the web through a network of more than 6,000 linked volunteer
  451. computers. The software automatically encrypts data in a way that
  452. ensures that no single computer in the network has all of a user’s
  453. information. For surveillance experts, it becomes very difficult to
  454. trace the whereabouts of a person who visits a particular website or
  455. to attack a specific person while they are using Tor to surf the Web.
  456.  
  457.  The NSA also has “major” problems with Truecrypt, a program for
  458. encrypting files on computers. Truecrypt’s developers stopped their
  459. work on the program last May, prompting speculation about pressures
  460. from government agencies. A protocol called Off-the-Record (OTR) for
  461. encrypting instant messaging in an end-to-end encryption process also
  462. seems to cause the NSA major problems. Both are programs whose source
  463. code can be viewed, modified, shared and used by anyone. Experts agree
  464. it is far more difficult for intelligence agencies to manipulate open
  465. source software programs than many of the closed systems developed by
  466. companies like Apple and Microsoft. Since anyone can view free and
  467. open source software, it becomes difficult to insert secret back doors
  468. without it being noticed. Transcripts of intercepted chats using OTR
  469. encryption handed over to the intelligence agency by a partner in
  470. Prism -- an NSA program that accesses data from at least nine American
  471. internet companies such as Google, Facebook and Apple -- show that
  472. the NSA’s efforts appear to have been thwarted in these cases: “No
  473. decrypt available for this OTR message.” This shows that OTR at least
  474. sometimes makes communications impossible to read for the NSA.
  475.  
  476.  Things become “catastrophic” for the NSA at level five - when, for
  477. example, a subject uses a combination of Tor, another anonymization
  478. service, the instant messaging system CSpace and a system for Internet
  479. telephony (voice over IP) called ZRTP. This type of combination results
  480. in a “near-total loss/lack of insight to target communications, presence,”
  481. the NSA document states.
  482.  
  483.  ZRTP, which is used to securely encrypt conversations and text chats
  484. on mobile phones, is used in free and open source programs like RedPhone
  485. and Signal. “It’s satisfying to know that the NSA considers encrypted
  486. communication from our apps to be truly opaque,” says RedPhone developer
  487. Moxie Marlinspike.
  488.  
  489. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html
  490.  
  491. ¤ NSA Attacks on VPN, SSL, TLS, SSH, Tor ::
  492.  
  493. http://cryptome.org/2014/12/nsa-spiegel-14-1228.rar
  494. _______________________________________
  495. ¤ Operation Socialist ; How GCHQ Spies Hacked Belgium’s Largest Telco ::
  496.  
  497. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/12/13/belgacom-hack-gchq-inside-story/
  498.  
  499. ¤ GCHQ Belgacom Telecom Hacking (ZIP) ::
  500.  
  501.  Slides show Canada’s intelligence agency, CSEC, was involved in helping
  502. GCHQ intercept Belgacom communications. It also proves 3rd party cookies
  503. are very much instrumental in being used to exploit information about IPs.
  504.  
  505. http://cryptome.org/2014/12/gchq-belgacom-intercept-14-1213.zip
  506. _______________________________________
  507. ¤ Keith Alexander’s Anti-spy Patent Leaked ::
  508.  
  509. http://cryptome.org/2014/12/nsa-alexander-patent-14-1125.pdf
  510.  
  511. ¤ Keith Alexander Now Works To Secure Banking Networks ::
  512.  
  513. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-20/ex-nsa-chief-pitches-advice-on-cyber-threats-to-the-banks.html
  514. _______________________________________
  515. ¤ Operation AURORAGOLD: How the NSA Hacks Cellphone Networks Worldwide ::
  516.  
  517.  Codenamed AURORAGOLD, the covert operation has monitored the content of
  518. messages sent and received by more than 1,200 email accounts associated
  519. with major cellphone network operators, intercepting confidential company
  520. planning papers that help the NSA hack into phone networks.
  521.  
  522.  One high-profile surveillance target is the GSM Association, an influential
  523. UK-headquartered trade group that works closely with large US-based firms
  524. including Microsoft, Facebook, AT&T, and Cisco, and is currently being
  525. funded by the US government to develop privacy-enhancing technologies.
  526.  
  527.  Karsten Nohl, a leading cellphone security expert and cryptographer who
  528. was consulted by The Intercept about details contained in the AURORAGOLD
  529. documents, said that the broad scope of information swept up in the operation
  530. appears aimed at ensuring virtually every cellphone network in the world is
  531. NSA accessible.
  532.  
  533. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/12/04/nsa-auroragold-hack-cellphones/
  534.  
  535. ¤ NSA Operation AURORAGOLD Slides ::
  536.  
  537. http://cryptome.org/2014/12/nsa-aurora-gold-intercept-14-1203.pdf
  538.  
  539. ¤ NSA OPULANT PUP Circumventing Strong Cryptography ::
  540.  
  541.  Last year, the Washington Post reported that the NSA had already managed
  542. to break the most commonly used cellphone encryption algorithm in the world,
  543. known as A5/1. But the information collected under AURORAGOLD allows the
  544. agency to focus on circumventing newer and stronger versions of A5 cellphone
  545. encryption, such as A5/3.
  546.  
  547. http://cryptome.org/2014/12/nsa-opulant-pup-intercept-14-1203.pdf
  548. _______________________________________
  549. ¤ Germany’s Intelligence Agency, the BND, Spies On Civilians Too ::
  550.  
  551.  German MPs examining the surveillance activities the US National
  552. Security Agency have found a legal loophole that allows the Berlin’s
  553. foreign intelligence agency to spy on its own citizens.
  554.  
  555.  The agency, known by its German acronym BND, is not usually allowed
  556. to intercept communications made by Germans or German companies, but a
  557. former BND lawyer told parliament this week that citizens working abroad
  558. for foreign companies were not protected.
  559.  
  560.  The German government confirmed on Saturday that work-related calls
  561. or emails were attributed to the employer. As a result, if the employer
  562. is foreign, the BND could legally intercept them.
  563.  
  564.  Angela Merkel pretends to be outraged about industrial espionage by
  565. the NSA while condoning illegal surveillance itself.
  566.  
  567. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/29/german-loophole-allows-bnd-agency-spy-own-people
  568. http://www.infowars.com/like-the-nsa-and-gchq-germanys-foreign-intelligence-agency-uses-a-legal-loophole-to-spy-on-its-own-citizens/
  569. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20141202/09513729296/like-nsa-gchq-germanys-foreign-intelligence-agency-uses-legal-loophole-to-spy-its-own-citizens.shtml
  570. _______________________________________
  571. ¤ How Vodafone-Subsidiary Telecom Aided GCHQ’s Spying Efforts ::
  572.  
  573.  Previously unpublished documents show how the UK telecom firm Cable
  574. & Wireless, acquired by Vodafone in 2012, played a key role in
  575. establishing one of the Government Communications Headquarters’
  576. (GCHQ) most controversial surveillance programs.
  577.  
  578.  A joint investigation by NDR, WDR, Süddeutsche Zeitung and Channel 4
  579. based on documents leaked by whistleblower Edward Snowden, reveals
  580. that Cable & Wireless actively shaped and provided the most data to
  581. GCHQ mass surveillance programs, and received millions of pounds in
  582. compensation. The documents also suggest that Cable & Wireless
  583. assisted GCHQ in breaking into a competitor’s network.
  584.  
  585.  In response to these allegations, Vodafone said that an internal
  586. investigation found no evidence of unlawful conduct, but the company
  587. would not deny it happened.
  588.  
  589. http://www.channel4.com/news/spy-cable-revealed-how-telecoms-firm-worked-with-gchq
  590. http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/snowden-vodafone-101.html
  591. http://www1.wdr.de/daserste/monitor/videos/videovodafonederlangearmdesbritischengeheimdienstes100.html
  592. http://international.sueddeutsche.de/post/103543418200/snowden-leaks-how-vodafone-subsidiary-cable
  593.  
  594. ¤ GCHQ’s Vodafone Cable Master List ::
  595.  
  596. https://netzpolitik.org/2014/cable-master-list-wir-spiegeln-die-snowden-dokumente-ueber-angezapfte-glasfasern-auch-von-vodafone/
  597.  
  598. ¤ GCHQ Vodafone Gerontic Cables & Slides ::
  599.  
  600. http://cryptome.org/2014/11/vodafone-gchq-slides.pdf
  601. http://cryptome.org/2014/11/vodafone-gchq-netzpolitik-slides-14-1125.pdf
  602. http://cryptome.org/2014/11/vodafone-gchq-netzpolitik-cables-14-1125.pdf
  603.  
  604. ¤ GCHQ Vodafone Gerontic Cables & Slides ZIPPED ::
  605.  
  606. http://cryptome.org/2014/11/Gerontic_GCHQ_SZ.zip
  607.  
  608. ¤ INCENSER: How NSA and GCHQ Are Tapping Internet Cables ::
  609.  
  610. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fi/2014/11/incenser-or-how-nsa-and-gchq-are.html
  611. _______________________________________
  612. ¤ Microsoft SkyDrive (aka OneDrive) Gateway Into NSA PRISM ::
  613.  
  614. http://cryptome.org/2014/11/ms-onedrive-nsa-prism.htm
  615.  
  616.  NOTE: Anything uploaded to “the cloud” is going to be available
  617. for the government to snoop through, the new Apple iphone gadgets
  618. automatically upload all users’ personal files into “the cloud”
  619. and yes, looks like Microsoft is also doing it as well.
  620.  
  621.  You might want to avoid using these new systems, go back to using
  622. older desktop computers which are rather easy to fortify. As for
  623. phones, you can buy an old jitterbug phone - it’s a basic cellphone
  624. without all the other crap included - just plain oldschool, mofos!
  625. And add one more thing - a “Blockit Pocket.” ;)
  626. _______________________________________
  627. ¤ German Investigation of the Cooperation Between NSA-BND Part 1 ::
  628.  
  629. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/11/german-investigation-of-cooperation.html
  630. _______________________________________
  631. ¤ UK Lawyers Spied by GCHQ Spies ::
  632.  
  633. http://cryptome.org/2014/11/uk-lawyers-spies-intercept-14-1106.pdf
  634.  
  635. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/11/06/uk-surveillance-of-lawyers-journalists-gchq/
  636. _______________________________________
  637. ¤ The German Operation Eikonal Part of NSA’s RAMPART-A Program ::
  638.  
  639.  Just over a week ago, the regional German paper Süddeutsche Zeitung
  640. and the regional broadcasters NDR and WDR came with a story saying that
  641. between 2004 and 2008, the German foreign intelligence service BND had
  642. tapped into the Frankfurt internet exchange DE-CIX and shared the
  643. intercepted data with the NSA. As not all communications of German
  644. citizens could be filtered out, this is considered a violation of the
  645. constitution.
  646.  
  647.  Here we will give a summary of what is currently known about this BND
  648. operation and we will combine this with information from earlier reports.
  649. This will show that it was most likely part of the RAMPART-A program of
  650. the NSA, which includes similar interception efforts by foreign partner
  651. agencies. Finally, we will look at where exactly the BND interception
  652. might have taken place.
  653.  
  654. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/10/the-german-operation-eikonal-as-part-of.html
  655. ---------------------------------------
  656. ¤ How Secret Partners Expand NSA’s Surveillance Dragnet ::
  657.  
  658. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/06/18/nsa-surveillance-secret-cable-partners-revealed-rampart-a/
  659. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140619/08062627624/nsa-working-with-denmark-germany-to-access-three-terabits-data-per-second-overseas-cables.shtml
  660. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-uses-33-countries-to-intercept-web-traffic-snowden-files/
  661. http://gigaom.com/2014/06/20/governments-let-nsa-tap-cables-on-their-territory-latest-snowden-revelations-show/
  662.  
  663. ¤ Foreign Partner Access to Black Budget FY 2013 ::
  664.  
  665. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200866/foreignpartneraccessbudgetfy2013-redacted.pdf
  666.  
  667. ¤ Overview Presenting the RAMPART-A Spy Program ::
  668.  
  669. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200860/odd-s3-overviewnov2011-v1-0-redacted-information.pdf
  670.  
  671. ¤ Three RAMPART-A Slides ::
  672.  
  673. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200865/uodds2overview-v1-1-redacted-information-dk.pdf
  674.  
  675. ¤ Black Budget FY 2013 / RAMPART-A Slides (Mirror) ::
  676.  
  677. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-intercept-14-0618.pdf
  678.  
  679. ¤ Update ; Intercept Releases More RAMPART-A Slides ::
  680.  
  681. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-information-intercept-14-0619.pdf
  682. _______________________________________
  683. ¤ Core Secrets: NSA Saboteurs in China and Germany
  684.  
  685.  The National Security Agency has had agents in China, Germany,
  686. and South Korea working on programs that use “physical subversion”
  687. to infiltrate and compromise networks and devices, according to
  688. documents obtained by The Intercept.
  689.  
  690.  The documents, leaked by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden, also
  691. indicate that the agency has used “under cover” operatives to gain
  692. access to sensitive data and systems in the global communications
  693. industry, and that these secret agents may have even dealt with
  694. American firms. The documents describe a range of clandestine field
  695. activities that are among the agency’s “core secrets” when it comes
  696. to computer network attacks, details of which are apparently shared
  697. with only a small number of officials outside the NSA.
  698.  
  699.  “It’s something that many people have been wondering about for a
  700. long time,” said Chris Soghoian, principal technologist for the
  701. American Civil Liberties Union, after reviewing the documents.
  702. “I’ve had conversations with executives at tech companies about
  703. this precise thing. How do you know the NSA is not sending people
  704. into your data centers?”
  705.  
  706.  Previous disclosures about the NSA’s corporate partnerships have
  707. focused largely on US companies providing the agency with vast amounts
  708. of customer data, including phone records and email traffic. But
  709. documents published today by The Intercept suggest that even as the
  710. agency uses secret operatives to penetrate them, companies have also
  711. cooperated more broadly to undermine the physical infrastructure of
  712. the internet than has been previously confirmed.
  713.  
  714.  In addition to so-called “close access” operations, the NSA’s “core
  715. secrets” include the fact that the agency works with US and foreign
  716. companies to weaken their encryption systems; the fact that the NSA
  717. spends “hundreds of millions of dollars” on technology to defeat
  718. commercial encryption; and the fact that the agency works with US
  719. and foreign companies to penetrate computer networks, possibly without
  720. the knowledge of the host countries. Many of the NSA’s core secrets
  721. concern its relationships to domestic and foreign corporations.
  722.  
  723.  Some of the documents in this article appear in a new documentary,
  724. CITIZENFOUR, which tells the story of the Snowden disclosures and is
  725. directed by Intercept co-founder Laura Poitras. The documents describe
  726. a panoply of programs classified with the rare designation of
  727. “Exceptionally Compartmented Information,” or ECI, which are only
  728. disclosed to a “very select” number of government officials.
  729.  
  730. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/10/10/core-secrets/
  731.  
  732. ¤ Top Secret Special Source Operations Classification Guides ::
  733.  
  734. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-whipgenie-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  735.  
  736. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-tarex-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  737.  
  738. ¤ Operation Sentry Eagle (Parts 1 & 2) ::
  739.  
  740. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-sentry-eagle-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  741.  
  742. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-sentry-eagle-2-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  743.  
  744. ¤ NSA Exceptionally Controlled Information ::
  745.  
  746. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-eci-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  747.  
  748. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-eci-pawleys-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  749.  
  750. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-eci-compartments-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  751.  
  752. ¤ NSA National Initiative Task Security (Parts 1 & 2) ::
  753.  
  754. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-nit-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  755.  
  756. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-nit-2-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  757.  
  758. ¤ NSA Computer Network Exploitation ::
  759.  
  760. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-cne-declass-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  761.  
  762. ¤ Following 10 NSA Releases (8.5MB | ZIP) ::
  763.  
  764. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-releases-the-intercept-14-1010.zip
  765. _______________________________________
  766. ¤ Retired NSA Technical Director Explains NSA Slides ::
  767.  
  768. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/www.alexaobrien.com/secondsight/wb/binney.html
  769.  
  770. ¤ Retired NSA Technical Director Explains NSA Slides (ZIP) ::
  771.  
  772. Includes the report and the slides.
  773.  
  774. http://fileb.ag/i627vr7a6bkx
  775. _______________________________________
  776. ¤ ACLU’s FOIA Documents Shed Light on One of the NSA’s Most
  777. Powerful Tools (Other Agencies and Legal Loopholes) ::
  778.  
  779. https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/new-documents-shed-light-one-nsas-most-powerful-tools
  780.  
  781. ¤ Overview of (Other) Signals Intelligence Authorities ::
  782.  
  783. https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/eo12333/NSA/Overview%20of%20Signals%20Intelligence%20Authorities.pdf
  784.  
  785. ¤ DoD-DIA’s 16 Legal Loopholes to Spy On US Persons ::
  786.  
  787. https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/eo12333/DIA/DoD%20HUMINT%20Legal%20Workshop%20Fundamentals%20of%20HUMINT%20Targeting.pdf
  788.  
  789. ¤ Intelligence Law Handbook Defense HUMINT Service ::
  790.  
  791. https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/eo12333/DIA/Intelligence%20Law%20Handbook%20Defense%20HUMINT%20Service.pdf
  792. _______________________________________
  793. ¤ NSA Spies on UN in Vienna ::
  794.  
  795. http://fm4.orf.at/stories/1746596/
  796. http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/28666/intelligence/nsa-spying-un-vienna.html
  797. http://www.techworm.net/2014/09/erich-mochel-leaks-photos-nsa-spying-united-nations.html
  798. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  799. ¤ How Covert Agents Infiltrate the Internet to Manipulate, Deceive,
  800. and Destroy Reputations ::
  801.  
  802. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/02/24/jtrig-manipulation/
  803.  
  804. http://www.infowars.com/cointelrpo-revisited-greenwald-exposes-nsa-agenda-to-destroy-journalists/
  805.  
  806.  One of the many pressing stories that remains to be told from the
  807. Snowden archive is how western intelligence agencies are attempting
  808. to manipulate and control online discourse with extreme tactics of
  809. deception and reputation-destruction. It’s time to tell a chunk of
  810. that story, complete with the relevant documents.
  811.  
  812.  Over the last several weeks, I worked with NBC News to publish a
  813. series of articles about “dirty trick” tactics used by GCHQ’s previously
  814. secret unit, JTRIG (Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group). These
  815. were based on four classified GCHQ documents presented to the NSA
  816. and the other three partners in the English-speaking “Five Eyes”
  817. alliance. Today, we at the Intercept are publishing another new
  818. JTRIG document, in full, entitled “The Art of Deception: Training
  819. for Online Covert Operations.”
  820.  
  821. ¤ GCHQ ; The Art of Deception: Training for Online Covert Operations ::
  822.  
  823. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/document/2014/02/24/art-deception-training-new-generation-online-covert-operations/
  824.  
  825. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1021430/the-art-of-deception-training-for-a-new.pdf
  826. ---------------------------------------
  827. ¤ Hacking Online Polls and Other Ways British Spies
  828. Seek to Control the Internet ::
  829.  
  830.  The secretive British spy agency GCHQ has developed
  831. covert tools to seed the internet with false information,
  832. including the ability to manipulate the results of online
  833. polls, artificially inflate pageview counts on web sites,
  834. “amplify” sanctioned messages on YouTube, and censor video
  835. content judged to be “extremist.” The capabilities, detailed
  836. in documents provided by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden,
  837. even include an old standby for pre-adolescent prank callers
  838. everywhere: A way to connect two unsuspecting phone users
  839. together in a call.
  840.  
  841.  The tools were created by GCHQ’s Joint Threat Research
  842. Intelligence Group (JTRIG), and constitute some of the most
  843. startling methods of propaganda and internet deception
  844. contained within the Snowden archive. Previously disclosed
  845. documents have detailed JTRIG’s use of “fake victim blog
  846. posts,” “false flag operations,” “honey traps” and
  847. psychological manipulation to target online activists,
  848. monitor visitors to WikiLeaks, and spy on YouTube and
  849. Facebook users.
  850.  
  851. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/14/manipulating-online-polls-ways-british-spies-seek-control-internet/
  852.  
  853. http://www.infowars.com/what-exactly-are-the-spy-agencies-actually-doing-with-their-bag-of-dirty-tricks/
  854.  
  855. ¤ GCHQ’s JTRIG Tools and Techniques ::
  856.  
  857. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-jtrigall-intercept-14-0714.pdf
  858. ---------------------------------------
  859. ¤ More Details on GCHQ Propaganda/Deception Tactics ::
  860.  
  861. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/04/04/cuban-twitter-scam-social-media-tool-disseminating-government-propaganda/
  862.  
  863.  This week, the Associated Press exposed a secret
  864. program run by the US Agency for International
  865. Development to create “a Twitter-like Cuban
  866. communications network” run through “secret shell
  867. companies” in order to create the false appearance
  868. of being a privately owned operation. Unbeknownst
  869. to the service’s Cuban users was the fact that
  870. “American contractors were gathering their private
  871. data in the hope that it might be used for political
  872. purposes”–specifically, to manipulate those users
  873. in order to foment dissent in Cuba and subvert its
  874. government. According to top-secret documents
  875. published today by The Intercept, this sort of
  876. operation is frequently discussed at western
  877. intelligence agencies, which have plotted ways to
  878. covertly use social media for “propaganda,” “deception,”
  879. “mass messaging,” and “pushing stories.” ...
  880.  
  881. ¤ GCHQ Full Spectrum Cyber Effects ::
  882.  
  883. “Destroy Deny Degrade Disrupt Deceive Protect”
  884.  
  885. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/gchq-full-spectrum-cyber.pdf
  886.  
  887.  ... The annual SIGDEV conference, according to one
  888. NSA document published today by The Intercept, “enables
  889. unprecedented visibility of SIGINT Development activities
  890. from across the Extended Enterprise, Second Party and US
  891. Intelligence communities.” The 2009 Conference, held at
  892. Fort Meade, included “eighty-six representatives from
  893. the wider US Intelligence Community, covering agencies
  894. as diverse as CIA (a record 50 participants), the Air
  895. Force Research Laboratory and the National Air and
  896. Space Intelligence Center.”
  897.  
  898.  Defenders of surveillance agencies have often insinuated
  899. that such proposals are nothing more than pipe dreams
  900. and wishful thinking on the part of intelligence agents.
  901. But these documents are not merely proposals or hypothetical
  902. scenarios. As described by the NSA document published
  903. today, the purpose of SIGDEV presentations is “to
  904. synchronize discovery efforts, share breakthroughs,
  905. and swap knowledge on the art of analysis.”
  906.  
  907.  For instance: One of the programs described by the newly
  908. released GCHQ document is dubbed “Royal Concierge,” under
  909. which the British agency intercepts email confirmations
  910. of hotel reservations to enable it to subject hotel
  911. guests to electronic monitoring. It also contemplates
  912. how to “influence the hotel choice” of travelers and
  913. to determine whether they stay at “SIGINT friendly”
  914. hotels. The document asks: “Can we influence the hotel
  915. choice? Can we cancel their visit?” ...
  916.  
  917. ¤ NSA 5 Eyes 2009 SIGDEV Conference ::
  918.  
  919. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-5-eyes-2009-sigdev.pdf
  920. ---------------------------------------
  921. ¤ GCHQ Trolls, Spies and Deceives Online Users ::
  922.  
  923. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-online-deception.pdf
  924.  
  925. ¤ GCHQ Disruption Operations ::
  926.  
  927. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-disruption.pdf
  928.  
  929. ¤ GCHQ Spreads Propaganda to Discredit Critics ::
  930.  
  931.  The documents from the GCHQ (the British equivalent
  932. of the NSA), titled “The Art of Deception: Training
  933. for Online Covert Operations,” were given to the
  934. NSA and leaked by Snowden. They reveal that the
  935. GCHQ is involved, through a unit known as JTRIG
  936. (Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group), in
  937. “the monitoring of YouTube and Blogger, the
  938. targeting of Anonymous with the very same DDoS
  939. attacks they accuse “hacktivists” of using, the
  940. use of honey traps (luring people into compromising
  941. situations using sex) and destructive viruses.”
  942.  
  943.  The goals of the JTRIG program are “(1) to inject
  944. all sorts of false material onto the internet in
  945. order to destroy the reputation of its targets;
  946. and (2) to use social sciences and other techniques
  947. to manipulate online discourse and activism to
  948. generate outcomes it considers desirable.”
  949.  
  950. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/02/24/jtrig-manipulation/
  951. http://www.examiner.com/article/government-infiltrating-websites-to-deny-disrupt-degrade-deceive
  952. http://rt.com/news/five-eyes-online-manipulation-deception-564/
  953. ---------------------------------------
  954. ¤ GCHQ Attacked Anonymous in 2012 ::
  955.  
  956. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-anonymous.pdf
  957.  
  958. http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/snowden_anonymous_nbc_document.pdf
  959.  
  960. ¤ GCHQ Cyber Attack Operations ::
  961.  
  962. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-cyber-attack.pdf
  963.  
  964. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1015553/snowden-cyber-offensive1-nbc-document.pdf
  965.  
  966. ¤ GCHQ Full-Spectrum Cyber Effects ::
  967.  
  968. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-cyber-effects.pdf
  969.  
  970. ¤ GCHQ Spies Attacked Anonymous IRC Chats ::
  971.  
  972. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/war-anonymous-british-spies-attacked-hackers-snowden-docs-show-n21361
  973. http://www.zdnet.com/uk-used-denial-of-service-against-anonymous-7000025993/
  974. http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2014-02/05/gchq-ddos-attack-anonymous
  975.  
  976. ¤ British Spies Used Porn and Dirty Tricks to
  977. Lure Targets to Honeypots ::
  978.  
  979. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/snowden-docs-british-spies-used-sex-dirty-tricks-n23091
  980. ---------------------------------------
  981. ¤ NSA & GCHQ Spies on Wikileaks, TPB Visitors ::
  982.  
  983. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/18/snowden-docs-reveal-covert-surveillance-and-pressure-tactics-aimed-at-wikileaks-and-its-supporters/
  984. http://wikileaks.org/NSA-and-GCHQ-spying-on-WikiLeaks.html
  985. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/02/surveillance-and-pressure-wikileaks-readers
  986. http://torrentcrazy.com/news/nsa-authorized-monitoring-of-pirate-bay-and-proxy-users
  987.  
  988. ¤ NSA-GCHQ Discovery SIGINT Targeting ::
  989.  
  990. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-gchq-discovery.pdf
  991.  
  992. ¤ Youtube Targets by SQUEAKYDOLPHIN Presentation ::
  993.  
  994. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-squeakydolphin-videos.htm
  995.  
  996. ¤ GCHQ Psychology SIGDEV ::
  997.  
  998. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-psychology.pdf
  999. ---------------------------------------
  1000. ▲ Reddit Censors All Stories Above ::
  1001.  
  1002. http://www.infowars.com/reddit-censors-big-story-about-government-manipulation-and-disruption-of-the-internet/
  1003. _______________________________________
  1004. ¤ Unraveling NSA’s TURBULENCE Programs ::
  1005.  
  1006. https://robert.sesek.com/2014/9/unraveling_nsa_s_turbulence_programs.html
  1007. _______________________________________
  1008. ¤ New Zealand’s Prime Minister Isn’t Telling the Truth About
  1009. Mass Surveillance ::
  1010.  
  1011. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/15/snowden-new-zealand-surveillance/
  1012.  
  1013. ¤ New Zealand Launched Mass Surveillance Project While Publicly
  1014. Denying It ::
  1015.  
  1016. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/15/new-zealand-gcsb-speargun-mass-surveillance/
  1017.  
  1018. ¤ Snowden and Greenwald Reveal Prime Minister John Key Lied About
  1019. Kiwi Mass Surveillance, Key Calls Greenwald “A Loser” ::
  1020.  
  1021. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140915/06175828518/snowden-greenwald-reveal-pm-john-key-lied-about-kiwi-mass-surveillance-key-hits-back-calling-greenwald-loser.shtml
  1022.  
  1023. ¤ New Zealand Prime Minister Releases GCSB Spy Documents ::
  1024.  
  1025. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/gcsb-nz-pm-nz-herald-14-0916.zip
  1026.  
  1027. ¤ NSA Visit by New Zealand Spy PM Ferguson ::
  1028.  
  1029. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-nz-ferguson-visit-the-intercept-14-0915.pdf
  1030.  
  1031. ¤ The Questions for New Zealand on Mass Surveillance ::
  1032.  
  1033. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/15/questions-new-zealand-mass-surveillance/
  1034. _______________________________________
  1035. ▼ NSA Spooks Deny The Evidence (Provided Below) Exists ::
  1036.  
  1037.  Did the NSA forget Ed Snowden contacted NBC and released
  1038. the evidence contacting authorities regarding his concerns?
  1039.  
  1040. https://news.vice.com/article/the-nsa-has-revealed-new-details-about-its-exhaustive-search-of-edward-snowdens-emails
  1041.  
  1042. ▲ FLASHBACK! Snowden Strikes Back at NSA, Emails NBC News ::
  1043.  
  1044.  Fugitive Edward Snowden on Friday challenged the
  1045. NSA’s insistence that it has no evidence he tried
  1046. to raise concerns about the agency’s surveillance
  1047. activity before he began leaking government documents
  1048. to reporters, calling the response a “clearly tailored
  1049. and incomplete leak ... for a political advantage.”
  1050.  
  1051.  “The NSA’s new discovery of written contact between
  1052. me and its lawyers -- after more than a year of denying
  1053. any such contact existed - raises serious concerns,”
  1054. Snowden said in an email Friday to NBC News. “It
  1055. reveals as false the NSA’s claim to Barton Gellman
  1056. of the Washington Post in December of last year, that
  1057. ‘after extensive investigation, including interviews
  1058. with his former NSA supervisors and co-workers, we
  1059. have not found any evidence to support Mr. Snowden’s
  1060. contention that he brought these matters to anyone’s
  1061. attention.’”
  1062.  
  1063.  Snowden’s email followed Thursday’s release by the US
  1064. Office of the Director of Intelligence of an email
  1065. exchange between Snowden and the NSA’s Office of the
  1066. General Counsel. The Washington Post received and
  1067. published a similar response from Snowden on Thursday.
  1068.  
  1069. http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/edward-snowden-interview/snowden-strikes-back-nsa-emails-nbc-news-n118821
  1070.  
  1071. ▲ NSA Oversight Training, OVSC1800 Minimization Training,
  1072. NSA OGC Snowden Emails on OVSC1800 Course ::
  1073.  
  1074. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-oversight.pdf
  1075. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ovsc1800.pdf
  1076. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ogc-snowden.pdf
  1077. ---------------------------------------
  1078. ¤ NBC Interviews Edward Snowden (Full) ::
  1079.  
  1080. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yNhMXyAdjp8
  1081.  
  1082. Mirror here » http://upstore.net/62ocku
  1083. _______________________________________
  1084. ¤ NSA-GCHQ Breached Deutsche Telekom and Other German Firms ::
  1085.  
  1086.  According to top-secret documents from the NSA and the British
  1087. agency GCHQ, the intelligence agencies are seeking to map the entire
  1088. Internet, including end-user devices. In pursuing that goal, they
  1089. have broken into networks belonging to Deutsche Telekom.
  1090.  
  1091. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/snowden-documents-indicate-nsa-has-breached-deutsche-telekom-a-991503.html
  1092.  
  1093. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/14/nsa-stellar/
  1094.  
  1095. ¤ GCHQ Satellite Teleport Knowledge ::
  1096.  
  1097. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/gchq-stellar-der-spiegel-14-0914.pdf
  1098.  
  1099. ¤ NSA Treasure Map New Release ::
  1100.  
  1101. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-treasure-map-new-der-spiegel-14-0914.pdf
  1102.  
  1103. ¤ NSA Treasure Map Slides ::
  1104.  
  1105. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-treasure-map-der-spiegel-14-0914.pdf
  1106.  
  1107. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1301057/tm-m-402.pdf
  1108. _______________________________________
  1109. ¤ NSA Economic Espionage Benefits American Corporations ::
  1110.  
  1111. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/05/us-governments-plans-use-economic-espionage-benefit-american-corporations/
  1112.  
  1113. ¤ Masterspy Quadrennial Report 2009 (Spy For US Corporations) ::
  1114.  
  1115. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/dni-qicr-2009-the-intercept-14-0905.pdf
  1116.  
  1117. ▲ UPDATE: Obama Rubber Stamps Economic Espionage, Mass Spying ::
  1118.  
  1119. http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/despite-obama-s-pledge-to-curb-it-nsa-mass-surveillance-wins-rubber-stamp-20140913
  1120. _______________________________________
  1121. ¤ Bush-era Justification For Warrantless Wiretapping ::
  1122.  
  1123. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/legal-memos-released-on-bush-era-justification-for-warrantless-wiretapping/2014/09/05/91b86c52-356d-11e4-9e92-0899b306bbea_story.html
  1124. http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/World/2014/Sep-06/269796-bush-era-memos-president-can-wiretap-americans-at-all-times.ashx
  1125. http://mic.com/articles/98116/just-released-bush-administration-memos-explain-deeply-disturbing-government-spying
  1126.  
  1127. ¤ NSA STELLAR WIND Assessed by DoJ 2004 (REDACTED) ::
  1128.  
  1129. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-olc-stellar-wind-wapo-14-0906.pdf
  1130.  
  1131. ¤ NSA STELLAR WIND Assessed by DoJ 2004 (UNREDACTED) ::
  1132.  
  1133. Above DOJ assessment released by WaPo compared to ACLU document.
  1134.  
  1135. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-olc-stellar-wind-annotated.pdf
  1136.  
  1137. ¤ NSA’s STELLAR WIND PROGRAM (DECLASSIFIED 2013) ::
  1138.  
  1139. RAGTIME was the codename for Stellar Wind.
  1140.  
  1141. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  1142.  
  1143. ¤ NSA STELLARWIND Classification Marking ::
  1144.  
  1145. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/09/about-stellarwind-and-another.html
  1146. _______________________________________
  1147. ¤ DNI Releases 47 FISC Yahoo Documents ::
  1148.  
  1149. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/dni-fisc-yahoo-14-0911.zip
  1150. _______________________________________
  1151. KILLCEN ; Eyeballing Snowden’s Info
  1152.  
  1153.  Includes all news reports, videos, images, slides and
  1154. documents from and related to Snowden’s leaks so far,
  1155. up to September 5th of 2014. I’m still collecting any
  1156. information that comes out and will provide an updated
  1157. archive twice per year.
  1158.  
  1159.  Due to the enormous size of this current archive, the
  1160. archive has been split concurrent to the names of each
  1161. file and directory in alphabetical order to facilitate
  1162. the size limit while uploading to the file hosts below.
  1163.  
  1164.  After decompression, the first folder is titled “Eyeballing_
  1165. Snowden_Info_Folder_01” and the second is titled “Eyeballing_
  1166. Snowden_Info_Folder_02” , both holding a total of 1,668 files
  1167. (1.37GB) after being decompressed and consolidated.
  1168.  
  1169.  This was stored on an old OFFLINE system, without any
  1170. WiFi card or modem attached so the archive is safe from
  1171. being modified, exploited or stolen.
  1172.  
  1173. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_01.zip
  1174. (589 files | ZIP | 686MB)
  1175.  
  1176. http://fileb.ag/ojvlj5rqihw2
  1177. http://bitshare.com/files/pigqc2bo/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_01.zip.html
  1178. http://fpsbay.com/download/64709X14099602822363X347361/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_01.zip
  1179.  
  1180. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_02.zip
  1181. (1,079 files | ZIP | 476MB)
  1182.  
  1183. http://fileb.ag/xqtrujp8jcey
  1184. http://bitshare.com/files/ztfcjdwg/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_02.zip.html
  1185. http://fpsbay.com/download/64711X14099654782364X347381/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_02.zip
  1186. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  1187. ¤ NSA ; Ask Zelda (Redacted) ::
  1188.  
  1189. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ask-zelda.pdf
  1190.  
  1191. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/07/nsa-advice-columnist-seriously/
  1192.  
  1193. ¤ NSA ; Ask Zelda (Full, DECLASSIFIED) ::
  1194.  
  1195. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-ask-zelda-14-0828.pdf
  1196. _______________________________________
  1197. ¤ NSA’s Foreign Partnerships ::
  1198.  
  1199. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/09/nsas-foreign-partnerships.html
  1200. _______________________________________
  1201. ¤ Two-Faced Friendship: Turkey Is Partner and Target for NSA ::
  1202.  
  1203. http://www.spiegel.de/international/documents-show-nsa-and-gchq-spied-on-partner-turkey-a-989011.html
  1204.  
  1205. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/08/31/nsaturkeyspiegel/
  1206.  
  1207. ¤ NSA-GCHQ Eyeball Turkey (Original Links) ::
  1208.  
  1209. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34650.pdf
  1210. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34651.pdf
  1211. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34652.pdf
  1212. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34653.pdf
  1213. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34654.pdf
  1214. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34655.pdf
  1215. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34656.pdf
  1216. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34657.pdf
  1217. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34658.pdf
  1218. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34659.pdf
  1219. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34660.pdf
  1220. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34661.pdf
  1221. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34662.pdf
  1222.  
  1223. ¤ NSA-GCHQ Eyeball Turkey (Mirrored) ::
  1224.  
  1225. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-gchq-spy-turkey-der-spiegel-14-0831.pdf
  1226. _______________________________________
  1227. ¤ How the NSA Built Its Own Secret Google ::
  1228.  
  1229. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/08/25/icreach-nsa-cia-secret-google-crisscross-proton
  1230.  
  1231. ¤ NSA ICREACH Slides ::
  1232.  
  1233. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-icreach.pdf
  1234. _______________________________________
  1235. ¤ NSA-GCHQ-CSEC HACIENDA Program for Internet Colonization ::
  1236.  
  1237. http://www.heise.de/ct/artikel/NSA-GCHQ-The-HACIENDA-Program-for-Internet-Colonization-2292681.html
  1238.  
  1239. ¤ NSA-GCHQ-CSEC HACIENDA Slides (ZIP) ::
  1240.  
  1241. http://www.xup.to/dl,62909734/HACIENDA_Slides.zip/
  1242.  
  1243. ¤ NSA-GCHQ-CSEC HACIENDA Slides (PDF) ::
  1244.  
  1245. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-gchq-csec-hacienda-heise-14-0816.pdf
  1246. _______________________________________
  1247. ¤ Now US Corporations Admit They Profit From Spying ::
  1248.  
  1249. Beat them at their own game - lie.
  1250.  
  1251. http://www.forbes.com/sites/quickerbettertech/2014/08/18/the-other-sharing-economy-thats-about-to-change-the-world/
  1252.  
  1253. ¤ Money And Power - The Real Reason For The NSA Spying On Everyone ::
  1254.  
  1255. Put out false information. Flood them with false data.
  1256.  
  1257. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140819/17104028259/money-power-real-reason-nsa-spying-everyone.shtml
  1258. _______________________________________
  1259. ¤ Newly Declassified Documents Regarding the “Now-Discontinued” (?)
  1260. NSA Bulk Electronic Communications Metadata Pursuant to Section 402
  1261. of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ::
  1262.  
  1263. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  1264. _______________________________________
  1265. ¤ GCHQ Covert Mobile Phone Security Tactics ::
  1266.  
  1267. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/gchq-covert-mobiles-the-intercept-14-0812.pdf
  1268.  
  1269. ¤ Compare GCHQ Security Tactics to Jihadist Tactics ::
  1270.  
  1271. https://prod01-cdn03.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/sites/1/2014/08/GCHQ-Jihadist-handbook.gif
  1272. _______________________________________
  1273. ¤ Barack Obama’s Secret “Terrorist-Tracking” System ::
  1274.  
  1275.  Nearly half of the people on the US government’s widely shared
  1276. database of terrorist suspects are not connected to any known
  1277. terrorist group, according to classified government documents
  1278. obtained by The Intercept.
  1279.  
  1280. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/08/05/watch-commander/
  1281.  
  1282. ¤ NCTC Directorate of Terrorist Identities ::
  1283.  
  1284. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nctc-dti-the-intercept.pdf
  1285.  
  1286. ¤ Secret Government Rulebook For Labeling You a Terrorist ::
  1287.  
  1288.  The Obama administration has quietly approved a substantial
  1289. expansion of the terrorist watchlist system, authorizing a
  1290. secret process that requires neither “concrete facts” nor
  1291. “irrefutable evidence” to designate an American or foreigner
  1292. as a terrorist, according to a key government document obtained
  1293. by The Intercept.
  1294.  
  1295. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nctc-watchlist-intercept-14-0723.pdf
  1296. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/07/23/blacklisted/
  1297. http://www.infowars.com/leaked-document-facts-and-evidence-not-considered-when-adding-americans-to-terror-lists/
  1298. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140723/14232027979/intercept-reveals-us-governments-guidebook-declaring-your-terrorist-putting-you-no-fly-list.shtml
  1299. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140723/14321427980/revealed-what-kind-extra-scrutiny-government-gives-to-folks-terrorist-watchlist.shtml
  1300.  
  1301. NOBODY notes
  1302.  
  1303.  Sounds much like the (now defunct) COINTELPRO operation the
  1304. FBI once was launched to target, blacklist and harrass US
  1305. civil rights activists and whistleblowers back in the day -
  1306. only these “dirty tricks” are now fully digitalized.
  1307.  
  1308. ¤ Executive Order 12333: They Do Spy on Americans ::
  1309.  
  1310.  John Tye is but the latest surveillance whistleblower,
  1311. though he took pains to distinguish himself from Snowden
  1312. and his approach to dissent. “Before I left the State
  1313. Department, I filed a complaint with the department’s
  1314. inspector general, arguing that the current system of
  1315. collection and storage of communications by US persons
  1316. under Executive Order 12333 violates the Fourth Amendment,
  1317. which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures,”
  1318. Tye explained. “I have also brought my complaint to the
  1319. House and Senate intelligence committees and to the
  1320. inspector general of the NSA.”
  1321.  
  1322.  These steps — which many say Snowden should’ve taken —
  1323. produced no changes to the objectionable NSA spying and
  1324. wouldn’t be garnering attention at all if not for
  1325. Snowden’s leaks.
  1326.  
  1327. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/meet-executive-order-12333-the-reagan-rule-that-lets-the-nsa-spy-on-americans/2014/07/18/93d2ac22-0b93-11e4-b8e5-d0de80767fc2_story.html
  1328.  
  1329. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/07/a-new-surveillance-whistleblower-emerges/374722/
  1330. _______________________________________
  1331. ¤ Cash, Weapons, Surveillance - The US is a Key Party to Every
  1332. Israeli Attack ::
  1333.  
  1334.  The US government has long lavished overwhelming aid on Israel,
  1335. providing cash, weapons and surveillance technology that play a
  1336. crucial role in Israel’s attacks on its neighbors. But top secret
  1337. documents provided by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden shed
  1338. substantial new light on how the US and its partners directly
  1339. enable Israel’s military assaults – such as the one on Gaza.
  1340.  
  1341. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/08/04/cash-weapons-surveillance/
  1342.  
  1343. ¤ ISNU-NSA Spying Pact (1999 & 2013) ::
  1344.  
  1345. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/israel-us-1999-the-intercept.pdf
  1346.  
  1347. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-israel-2013-the-intercept.pdf
  1348.  
  1349. ¤ US Empire Pays Israel $500,000 in 2004 ::
  1350.  
  1351. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-israel-500k-2004.pdf
  1352.  
  1353. ¤ (RELATED) Terrorism in the Israeli Attack on Gaza ::
  1354.  
  1355. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/29/terrorism-israelgaza-context/
  1356. http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2014/08/04/374016/us-directly-enables-israeli-attacks-on-gaza/
  1357. http://rt.com/news/177716-us-israel-funding-aggression/
  1358.  
  1359. ¤ (RELATED) Gaza Natural Gas - Why Israel Kills for It ::
  1360.  
  1361. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/gaza-natural-gas.zip
  1362. _______________________________________
  1363. ¤ USA-Saudi Arabia Spy Partnership ::
  1364.  
  1365. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-saudi-arabia-intercept-14-0725.pdf
  1366.  
  1367. ¤ NSA’s New Partner in Spying ; Saudi Arabia’s Brutal State Police ::
  1368.  
  1369.  The National Security Agency last year significantly expanded
  1370. its cooperative relationship with the Saudi Ministry of Interior,
  1371. one of the world’s most repressive and abusive government agencies.
  1372. An April 2013 top secret memo provided by NSA whistleblower Edward
  1373. Snowden details the agency’s plans “to provide direct analytic and
  1374. technical support” to the Saudis on “internal security” matters.
  1375.  
  1376.  The Saudi Ministry of Interior—referred to in the document as MOI
  1377. — has been condemned for years as one of the most brutal human rights
  1378. violators in the world. In 2013, the U.S. State Department reported
  1379. that “Ministry of Interior officials sometimes subjected prisoners
  1380. and detainees to torture and other physical abuse,” specifically
  1381. mentioning a 2011 episode in which MOI agents allegedly “poured an
  1382. antiseptic cleaning liquid down [the] throat” of one human rights
  1383. activist. The report also notes the MOI’s use of invasive surveillance
  1384. targeted at political and religious dissidents.
  1385.  
  1386.  But as the State Department publicly catalogued those very abuses,
  1387. the NSA worked to provide increased surveillance assistance to the
  1388. ministry that perpetrated them. The move is part of the Obama
  1389. Administration’s increasingly close ties with the Saudi regime;
  1390. beyond the new cooperation with the MOI, the memo describes “a
  1391. period of rejuvenation” for the NSA’s relationship with the Saudi
  1392. Ministry of Defense.
  1393.  
  1394.  In general, US support for the Saudi regime is long-standing. One
  1395. secret 2007 NSA memo lists Saudi Arabia as one of four countries
  1396. where the US “has [an] interest in regime continuity.”
  1397.  
  1398. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/25/nsas-new-partner-spying-saudi-arabias-brutal-state-police/
  1399. _______________________________________
  1400. ¤ Senate Bill Spy Funding FY 2015 ::
  1401.  
  1402. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/spy-funding-fy2015.pdf
  1403. _______________________________________
  1404. ¤ NSA Spying Costs to US Businesses ::
  1405.  
  1406. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-naf-spy-costs.pdf
  1407.  
  1408. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-29/tech-companies-reel-as-nsa-spying-mars-image-for-clients.html
  1409. _______________________________________
  1410. ¤ Insider - Intelligence Agencies Are Running Governments ::
  1411.  
  1412.  Alex Jones talks with NSA whistleblower William Binney about the
  1413. growing corruption and power of the NSA and how they abuse their
  1414. power behind the scenes to pull strings.
  1415.  
  1416. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DERMBOJBDCk
  1417.  
  1418. http://www.infowars.com/insider-says-intelligence-agencies-are-running-the-government/
  1419. _______________________________________
  1420. ¤ NSA/FISA Spying Timeline ::
  1421.  
  1422.  1978 FISA ; 1981 EO 12333, 1982 DoD Reg 5240.1-R,
  1423. 1993 USSID SP0018 ; 2001 USA Patriot Act, 2002 FISC
  1424. “Raw Take” Share Motion ; 2003 SP002 ; 2004 PR/TT FISA ;
  1425. 2004 NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 ; 2006 BR FISA ; 2006 RAS Memo ;
  1426. 2007 PAA (expired) ; 2008 FAA ; 2008 SP002 (Revised) ;
  1427. 2008 EO 12333 (Revised) ; 2008 RAS Memo (Revised) ;
  1428. 2009 NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Revised).
  1429.  
  1430. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spy-timeline.pdf
  1431.  
  1432. ▲ FISA Surveillance Leaks ::
  1433.  
  1434. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-targeting.pdf
  1435. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  1436. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-certification.pdf
  1437.  
  1438. ▲ Executive Order 12333 (Default 1981) ::
  1439.  
  1440. http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html
  1441.  
  1442. ▲ DoD Regulation 5240.1-R (1982) ::
  1443.  
  1444.  Guidance to DoD components in implementing EO 12333
  1445. and general rules pursuant to FISA.
  1446.  
  1447. http://cryptome.org/dod5240-1-r.htm
  1448.  
  1449. ▲ USSID SP0018 (2003) ::
  1450.  
  1451. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDFinal%20USSID%20SP0018.pdf
  1452.  
  1453. ▲ FISA ; Pen Register and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) ::
  1454.  
  1455.  Opinion of the FISC granting the government application
  1456. seeking the collection of bulk electronic communications
  1457. metadata pursuant to Section 402 of FISA, the Pen Register
  1458. and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) provision.
  1459.  
  1460. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-13-1118/CLEANEDPRTT%201.pdf
  1461.  
  1462. ▲ Bulk Collection Programs Under PATRIOT ACT ::
  1463.  
  1464. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/obama-releases-13-0731.pdf
  1465.  
  1466. ▲ NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Default 2004) ::
  1467.  
  1468. http://cryptome.org/nsa-css-1-23.pdf
  1469.  
  1470. ▲ NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Revised 2009) ::
  1471.  
  1472. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-css-policy-1-23-nyt-14-0727.pdf
  1473.  
  1474. ▲ Executive Order 12333 (Revised 2008) ::
  1475.  
  1476. http://cryptome.org/eo12333-amend.htm
  1477.  
  1478. NSA’s FOIA Release » http://cryptome.org/nsa-eo12333.pdf
  1479.  
  1480. ▲ NSA ; FISA/PAA/FAA Classification Guide ::
  1481.  
  1482. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-fisa-faa-class.pdf
  1483.  
  1484. ▲ NSA Attorney General Dissemination Procedures ::
  1485.  
  1486. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ag-dissemination.pdf
  1487. _______________________________________
  1488. ¤ NSA SIGINT Records Disposition Schedule ::
  1489.  
  1490. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-sigint-rds.pdf
  1491.  
  1492. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/records_management/index.shtml
  1493. _______________________________________
  1494. ¤ The NSA Said Edward Snowden Had No Access to Surveillance
  1495. Intercepts, They Lied ::
  1496.  
  1497.  The contents of the surveillance files — almost half of which
  1498. contained information from US citizens or residents — “tell
  1499. stories of love and heartbreak, illicit sexual liaisons,
  1500. mental-health crises, political and religious conversions,
  1501. financial anxieties and disappointed hopes.”
  1502.  
  1503. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/07/a-devastating-leak-for-edward-snowdens-critics/373991/
  1504. http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2014/07/nsa-said-edward-snowden-had-no-access-surveillance-intercepts-they-lied
  1505. http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/snowden-undermines-presidential-panel-s-defense-of-nsa-spying-20140708
  1506.  
  1507. ¤ Meet the Muslim-American Leaders the FBI and NSA Have
  1508. Been Spying On ::
  1509.  
  1510.  The National Security Agency and FBI have covertly
  1511. monitored the emails of prominent Muslim-Americans—including
  1512. a political candidate and several civil rights activists,
  1513. academics, and lawyers—under secretive procedures intended
  1514. to target terrorists and foreign spies.
  1515.  
  1516.  According to documents provided by NSA whistleblower
  1517. Edward Snowden, the list of Americans monitored by their
  1518. own government includes:
  1519.  
  1520.  • Faisal Gill, a longtime Republican Party operative and
  1521. one-time candidate for public office who held a top-secret
  1522. security clearance and served in the Department of Homeland
  1523. Security under President George W. Bush;
  1524.  
  1525.  • Asim Ghafoor, a prominent attorney who has represented
  1526. clients in terrorism-related cases;
  1527.  
  1528.  • Hooshang Amirahmadi, an Iranian-American professor of
  1529. international relations at Rutgers University;
  1530.  
  1531.  • Agha Saeed, a former political science professor at
  1532. California State University who champions Muslim civil
  1533. liberties and Palestinian rights;
  1534.  
  1535.  • Nihad Awad, the executive director of the Council on
  1536. American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the largest Muslim civil
  1537. rights organization in the country.
  1538.  
  1539. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/07/09/under-surveillance/
  1540. http://www.infowars.com/fbi-directly-spying-on-prominent-muslim-american-politicians-lawyers-and-civil-rights-activists/
  1541. http://electrospaces.blogspot.ca/2014/07/document-shows-that-it-was-not-nsa-but.html
  1542.  
  1543. ¤ NSA FISA Accounts and Emails ::
  1544.  
  1545. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-fisa-accounts.pdf
  1546.  
  1547. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-emails.pdf
  1548.  
  1549. ¤ Those Not Targeted Far Outnumber Foreigners Who Are ::
  1550.  
  1551. NSA targeted domestic communications as well as foreign.
  1552.  
  1553. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-nsa-intercepted-data-those-not-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-who-are/2014/07/05/8139adf8-045a-11e4-8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html
  1554.  
  1555. ▼ NSA OKs Domestic Spying for Suspected Criminals ::
  1556.                               ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  1557.  “The FBI is also permitted to disseminate US person
  1558. information that reasonably appears to be evidence of a
  1559. crime to law enforcement authorities.”
  1560.  
  1561. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/pclob-14-0702.pdf
  1562.  
  1563. ▲ US Government Denies Spying US Persons ::
  1564.  
  1565. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/dni-doj-14-0709.pdf
  1566.  
  1567. NOBODY responds
  1568.  
  1569.  Compare the new DoJ memo (dni-doj-14-0709.pdf)
  1570. with the one during 2007, before any of the NSA
  1571. documents were ever leaked (doj-nsa-memo.pdf)
  1572.  
  1573. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/doj-nsa-memo.pdf
  1574.  
  1575.  Now compare the arrogance of the political class
  1576. back in 2004 up till today.
  1577.  
  1578. http://www.infowars.com/congress-insisted-they-be-kept-in-the-dark-on-nsa-spying/
  1579.  
  1580.  Notice their lack of oversight during the Bush regime
  1581. now stuck in continuum under the Obama regime?
  1582.  
  1583. http://www.infowars.com/senate-committee-passes-cisa-cybersecurity-bill-that-could-broaden-nsa-powers/
  1584.  
  1585.  Just like those in the “Department of Justice” they
  1586. never learn from their mistakes, they are stuck in a
  1587. state of blissful ignorance, they lie and when the truth
  1588. comes out (as it often does), then they deny it happened.
  1589.  
  1590. ¤ Some New Thoughts on the Snowden Cache ::
  1591.  
  1592. http://members.efn.org/~paulmd/SomeNewThoughtsontheSnowdenCache.html
  1593.  
  1594.  “So, apparently the Snowden cache contains quite a large number
  1595. of intercepted communications, not just technical documents,
  1596. PowerPoint slides, and memos. This opens up a whole can of worms,
  1597. and some new possibilities for the cache.
  1598.  
  1599.  Worms first: several journalists have access to an incredibly
  1600. sensitive cache of personal information. According to some NSA
  1601. defenders: Snowden has committed a horrible privacy violation
  1602. of thousands of innocent Americans. This is a big problem, but
  1603. it requires some mental gymnastics not to recognize that if
  1604. Snowden had violated the privacy of innocents by giving this
  1605. information to journalists, so had the NSA by storing it in the
  1606. first place.  Realistically, it’s not one or the other, it’s
  1607. both. Now that we know what it contains, the long term storage
  1608. of that portion cache by journalists becomes very problematic.
  1609. On one hand: it’s evidence, on the other, it’s private information
  1610. on many thousands of people.
  1611.  
  1612.  While there are some problems, there are also new possibilities.
  1613. First, it could be a boon for defendants, and those facing legal
  1614. jeopardy, to confront the evidence against them, to receive a
  1615. genuinely fair trial. This is doubly important for drug cases,
  1616. particularly those with DEA involvement, because of the highly
  1617. questionably practice of Parallel Reconstruction, wherein
  1618. classified evidence is laundered, and is reconstructed using
  1619. traditional methods. In effect: perjury. Second, it is prima
  1620. facie evidence to use in lawsuits against the NSA, proof that
  1621. a plaintiff had been spied on. Third, one of the wilder stories:
  1622. Snowden to Reveal the Secrets of Arab Dictators, really can
  1623. happen now. The US government’s dealings with brutal regimes
  1624. are newsworthy, so are the dealings of those regimes against
  1625. their own people.
  1626.  
  1627.  One of the things that makes Cablegate so powerful, and
  1628. simultaneously controversial, is the ability of ordinary
  1629. citizens to query it, and learn what the government had kept
  1630. hidden. In at least one case, it allowed a rendition victim
  1631. to seek justice. I am not suggesting leaking it out in full,
  1632. but ways of allowing ordinary citizens the ability to get
  1633. their own communications, and broadening access, should be
  1634. considered. Contrary to the opinions of those who described
  1635. the Post’s story as a dud, it’s the first page of the next
  1636. chapter of the Snowden Saga, with wide-reaching, and
  1637. unpredictable consequences.”
  1638.  
  1639. By Paul Dietrich, Jul 8, 2014
  1640. _______________________________________
  1641. ¤ Networks vs. Hierarchies: Which Will Win? ::
  1642.  
  1643. http://libertyblitzkrieg.com/2014/06/22/networks-vs-hierarchies-which-will-win-niall-furguson-weighs-in/
  1644. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  1645. ¤ Ultimate Goal of the NSA ; Total Population Control ::
  1646.  
  1647.  At least 80% of all audio calls, not just metadata, are
  1648. recorded and stored in the US, says whistleblower William
  1649. Binney – that’s a “totalitarian mentality.”
  1650.  
  1651. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/11/the-ultimate-goal-of-the-nsa-is-total-population-control
  1652. _______________________________________
  1653. ¤ NSA Hacks TOR in Germany, Calls Users Extremists ::
  1654.  
  1655. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-tor-de.htm
  1656.  
  1657.  It is one of the most sensitive secrets of the NSA,
  1658. the engine of the global monitoring machine: the source
  1659. code of the XKeyscore program, the most comprehensive
  1660. Ausspähprogramm of US foreign intelligence.
  1661.  
  1662.  NDR and WDR have excerpts of the source code. Parts of
  1663. the collection infrastructure ie, so-called software rules
  1664. that define the intelligence, what or who they want to
  1665. investigate.
  1666.  
  1667.  There are only a few numbers and characters to string
  1668. together the programmer. But when the program executes
  1669. XKeyscore these rules, get people and their data in their
  1670. sights. The connections from computers to the Internet
  1671. are identified and stored in a database type. The users
  1672. are quasi marked. It is the dragnet of the 21st century.
  1673.  
  1674. http://download.media.tagesschau.de/video/2014/0703/TV-20140703-0546-2401.webl.webm
  1675.  
  1676. MP4 Video Format » http://fileb.ag/u12my0tpvr8y
  1677.  
  1678. ¤ XKeyscore Targets Tor ::
  1679.  
  1680. http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/xkeyscorerules100.txt
  1681.  
  1682. ¤ NSA Targets the Privacy-conscious Using Tor ::
  1683.  
  1684. http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/nsa230_page-1.html
  1685. ---------------------------------------
  1686. ¤ NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Tor, etc. ::
  1687.  
  1688. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-tor-slides.pdf
  1689.  
  1690. ¤ NSA & GCHQ Counter-Tor Slides ::
  1691.  
  1692.  “Use cookies to identify Tor users when they are not
  1693. using Tor.”
  1694.  
  1695. “Investigate Evercookie persistence.”
  1696.  
  1697. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-stinks.pdf
  1698.  
  1699. ¤ Cookies Threaten Tor User Anonymity ::
  1700.  
  1701.  “Just because you’re using Tor doesn’t mean that your
  1702. browser isn’t storing cookies,” said Jeremiah Grossman,
  1703. a colleague of Hansen’s who also specializes in browser
  1704. vulnerabilities.
  1705.  
  1706.  As Grossman described the procedure to CNET, the NSA is
  1707. aware of Tor’s entry and exit nodes because of its Internet
  1708. wide surveillance.
  1709.  
  1710.  “The very feature that makes Tor a powerful anonymity
  1711. service, and the fact that all Tor users look alike on the
  1712. Internet, makes it easy to differentiate Tor users from
  1713. other Web users,” he wrote.
  1714.  
  1715.  “The NSA then cookies that ad, so that every time you go
  1716. to a site, the cookie identifies you. Even though your IP
  1717. address changed [because of Tor], the cookies gave you away,”
  1718. he said.
  1719.  
  1720. http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57606178-83/nsa-tracks-google-ads-to-find-tor-users/
  1721.  
  1722. ¤ GCHQ ; MULLENIZE Operation to Tag and Identify Packet
  1723. Traffic From Machines ::
  1724.  
  1725.  “Working together, CT and CNE have devised a method to carry
  1726. out large-scale ‘staining’ as a means to identify individual
  1727. machines linked to that IP address. ... ...
  1728.  
  1729.  User Agent Staining is a technique that involves writing a
  1730. unique marker (or stain) onto a target machine. Each stain
  1731. is visible in passively collected SIGINT and is stamped into
  1732. every packet, which enables all the events from that stained
  1733. machine to be brought back together to recreate a browsing
  1734. session.”
  1735.  
  1736. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/gchq-mullenize.pdf
  1737.  
  1738. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/801762/mullenize-28redacted-29.pdf
  1739.  
  1740. ¤ Packet Staining ::
  1741.  
  1742. http://prezi.com/p5et9yawg2c6/ip-packet-staining/
  1743. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-00
  1744. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-01
  1745. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/packet-stain/packet-staining.htm
  1746.  
  1747. ¤ NSA Peeling Back the Layers of Tor ::
  1748.  
  1749. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-egotisticalgiraffe.pdf
  1750. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/egotistical-giraffe-nsa-tor-document
  1751. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity
  1752. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption
  1753.  
  1754. ¤ NSA ; Tor Source Code Vulnerabilities ::
  1755.  
  1756.  “We have seen several targets using Tor. Our goal was to
  1757. analyze Tor source code and determine any vulnerabilities
  1758. in the system. We set up an internal Tor network to analyze
  1759. Tor traffic, in the hopes of discovering ways to passively
  1760. identify it. We also worked to create a custom Tor client
  1761. which allows the user finer control.” ... ...
  1762.  
  1763.  “This accomplishes several things. Most basically, the Tor
  1764. servers, many of which are listed on publicly advertised
  1765. directory servers, are chosen to act as a series of proxies.
  1766. This may seem to be excessively complex, as a single proxy
  1767. server can be used to hide one’s location, but a single-hop
  1768. proxy is vulnerable in two ways. First, by analyzing the
  1769. pattern of the traffic going to and from the proxy server,
  1770. it is possible to deduce which clients are making which requests.
  1771. Second, if an attacker owns the proxy server, then it certainly
  1772. knows who is asking for what, and anonymization is ruined. By
  1773. using multiple hops, Tor is much more resistant to both of
  1774. these attacks. Traffic analysis becomes extraordinarily
  1775. difficult, as it must be coordinated across several machines,
  1776. and an attacker must own all the hops along the circuit in
  1777. order to trace requests back to the originating client.”
  1778.  
  1779. ... ...
  1780.  
  1781.  “In our time in the lab, we found that running an nmap on a
  1782. node that is offering a hidden service will turn up the port
  1783. that the hidden service is using to deal with incoming
  1784. connections. It can then be directly connected to, outside
  1785. of Tor.”
  1786.  
  1787. ... ...
  1788.  
  1789.  “We would have to try to connect to each of the ports we see
  1790. open on a machine to determine if there is a hidden service
  1791. being run. We would not even know which protocol the hidden
  1792. service is running. It may be an HTTP server, an FTP server,
  1793. an SMTP server, etc. The only thing we know is that the protocol
  1794. must run over TCP. It is not enough to attempt to connect once
  1795. to each port, using an HTTP GET request. Several protocols must
  1796. be tried.”
  1797.  
  1798. ... ...
  1799.  
  1800.  “It may also be useful to study Tor directory servers in more
  1801. detail. Our work focused solely on the client, but many attacks
  1802. would be much easier with access to more Tor servers. The
  1803. directory servers ultimately control which Tor servers are
  1804. used by clients. We have found that a server can put itself on
  1805. a directory server multiple times; all it takes is the server
  1806. running several Tor processes, each having a different nickname,
  1807. open port, fingerprint, and LOG FILE. This only requires different
  1808. configuration files for the different processes, which are easy
  1809. to set up. That machine will handle a disproportionate amount of
  1810. traffic, since it is listed several times. This increases the
  1811. density of friendly servers in the cloud without increasing the
  1812. number of servers we have set up. Unfortunately, each listing
  1813. has the same IP address, which would be very noticeable to anyone
  1814. who inspecting the directories.”
  1815.  
  1816. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor.pdf
  1817. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/802061/ces-summer-2006-tor-paper-28redacted-29-1.pdf
  1818. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/secret-nsa-documents-show-campaign-against-tor-encrypted-network/2013/10/04/610f08b6-2d05-11e3-8ade-a1f23cda135e_story.html
  1819.  
  1820. ¤ NSA ; Types of IAT ::
  1821.  
  1822. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-iat-tor.pdf
  1823.  
  1824. ¤ NSA Link Removed by Guardian ::
  1825.  
  1826. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-link-removed.htm
  1827.  
  1828. ¤ Tor Media Reports Disinformative (?) ::
  1829.  
  1830.  “This document doesn’t give much insight into capabilities
  1831. the IC has developed against Tor. It’s apparently quite common
  1832. to run multiple research teams (either known or unknown to
  1833. each other) against a single target, and a few summer
  1834. students with a dozen lab machines is a pretty small
  1835. investment. I’d expect there are other programs with more
  1836. sophisticated attacks, especially now 7 years later.”
  1837.  
  1838. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-disinfo.htm
  1839. _______________________________________
  1840. ¤ UPDATE ; German CIA Agent Arrested ::
  1841.  
  1842. http://cryptocomb.org/?p=869
  1843.  
  1844. ¤ UPDATE ; Der Spiegel Exposed Spy Scandle Between US-Germany, ;
  1845. Angela Merkel Plans to Scrap No-spy Agreement with US-Britain ::
  1846.  
  1847.  A new surveillance scandal is threatening to unsettle US-German
  1848. relations after it emerged that an employee of Germany’s
  1849. intelligence agency has been arrested under suspicion of acting
  1850. as a double agent for the US.
  1851.  
  1852.  According to several reports in the German media, a 31-year-old
  1853. member of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) administration
  1854. department in Pullach was on Wednesday arrested by the country’s
  1855. federal prosecutor, originally under suspicion of passing on
  1856. information to Russian intelligence services. ... ...
  1857.  
  1858.  The plan is in response to the scandal resulting from last
  1859. week’s arrest of a 31-year-old BND “double agent” who spent
  1860. at least two years selling top-secret German intelligence
  1861. documents to his US spymasters in return for cash payments
  1862. of €10,000 (£7,940) per document. ...
  1863.  
  1864.  The double agent is reported to have simply emailed Berlin’s
  1865. American embassy and asked whether officials were interested
  1866. in “co-operation”. He subsequently downloaded at least 300
  1867. secret documents on to USB sticks that he handed to his
  1868. American spymasters at secret location in Austria.
  1869.  
  1870.  He was caught by German counter-espionage agents only after
  1871. he was found offering similar BND documents to Berlin’s Russian
  1872. embassy. The Germans had considered it “impossible” that one
  1873. of their own intelligence men could be working as a “double agent”
  1874. for the Americans.
  1875.  
  1876. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-to-spy-on-us-for-first-time-since-1945-after-double-agentscandal-9590645.html
  1877. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/07/nsa-chancellor-double-agent-german-us-relations
  1878. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/04/germany-arrest-bnd-spying-allegations-double-agent-us
  1879. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/11/world/europe/germany-expels-top-us-intelligence-officer.html?_r=0
  1880.  
  1881. ¤ Der Spiegel Releases NSA-BND Spy Documents ::
  1882.  
  1883. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-spiegel-snowden-14-0618.pdf
  1884.  
  1885. http://www.spiegel.de/international/the-germany-file-of-edward-snowden-documents-available-for-download-a-975917.html
  1886.  
  1887. ¤ NSA-BND_Spy_Documents_2014.zip (Mirror) ::
  1888.  
  1889. http://filedump.org/files/epVgbFV91403117533.html
  1890.  
  1891. ¤ Der Spiegel Release on German SIGADs ::
  1892.  
  1893. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-spiegel-german-sigads.pdf
  1894.  
  1895. ¤ Inside the New NSA-BND Revelations ::
  1896.  
  1897. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/new-snowden-revelations-on-nsa-spying-in-germany-a-975441.html
  1898.  
  1899. http://www.dw.de/new-leaks-show-germanys-collusion-with-nsa/a-17726141
  1900.  
  1901. ¤ NSA and BND Spying Telecommunications ::
  1902.  
  1903. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-german-spying.pdf
  1904.  
  1905. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-der-spiegel-14-0616.pdf
  1906.  
  1907. ¤ Germany Cooperates Closely with NSA ::
  1908.  
  1909. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-reveals-cooperation-between-nsa-and-german-bnd-a-909954.html
  1910.  
  1911. ¤ Key Partners ; Secret Links Between BND and NSA ::
  1912.  
  1913. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-intelligence-worked-closely-with-nsa-on-data-surveillance-a-912355.html
  1914.  
  1915. ▲ FLASHBACK ; Angela Merkel Compares NSA to Stasi ::
  1916.  
  1917.  In an angry exchange with Barack Obama, Angela Merkel
  1918. has compared the snooping practices of the US with those
  1919. of the Stasi, the ubiquitous and all-powerful secret
  1920. police of the communist dictatorship in East Germany,
  1921. where she grew up.
  1922.  
  1923. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/merkel-compares-nsa-stasi-obama
  1924. _______________________________________
  1925. ¤ NSA FORNSAT Intercept in 2002 and Economic Motives ::
  1926.  
  1927. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/07/the-national-security-agency-in-2002.html
  1928. _______________________________________
  1929. ¤ Look Out for Falling Redactions ::
  1930.  
  1931. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-falling-redactions.pdf
  1932. _______________________________________
  1933. ¤ Dump of BOUNDLESSINFORMANT IP Data ::
  1934.  
  1935. https://gist.github.com/9b/de3f0510cccbd5dbfdf0
  1936. _______________________________________
  1937. ¤ NSA Playset ; Tailored Access for Hackers ::
  1938.  
  1939. http://www.nsaplayset.org/
  1940. _______________________________________
  1941. ¤ How Secret Partners Expand NSA’s Surveillance Dragnet ::
  1942.  
  1943. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/06/18/nsa-surveillance-secret-cable-partners-revealed-rampart-a/
  1944. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140619/08062627624/nsa-working-with-denmark-germany-to-access-three-terabits-data-per-second-overseas-cables.shtml
  1945. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-uses-33-countries-to-intercept-web-traffic-snowden-files/
  1946. http://gigaom.com/2014/06/20/governments-let-nsa-tap-cables-on-their-territory-latest-snowden-revelations-show/
  1947.  
  1948. ¤ Foreign Partner Access to Black Budget FY 2013 ::
  1949.  
  1950. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200866/foreignpartneraccessbudgetfy2013-redacted.pdf
  1951.  
  1952. ¤ Overview Presenting the RAMPART-A Spy Program ::
  1953.  
  1954. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200860/odd-s3-overviewnov2011-v1-0-redacted-information.pdf
  1955.  
  1956. ¤ Three RAMPART-A Slides ::
  1957.  
  1958. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200865/uodds2overview-v1-1-redacted-information-dk.pdf
  1959.  
  1960. ¤ Black Budget FY 2013 / RAMPART-A Slides (Mirror) ::
  1961.  
  1962. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-intercept-14-0618.pdf
  1963.  
  1964. ¤ Update ; Intercept Releases More RAMPART-A Slides ::
  1965.  
  1966. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-information-intercept-14-0619.pdf
  1967. _______________________________________
  1968.  Keith Alexander’s talking points for strategic meeting
  1969. between the NSA and the Danish Defense Intelligence
  1970. Service (DDIS).
  1971.  
  1972. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200859/diropeningremarksguidancefordp1-v1-1-v1-0.pdf
  1973. _______________________________________
  1974. ¤ FISA Court Rules to Retain Spy Data Past 5 Years ::
  1975.  
  1976. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/fisc-br14-01-14-0410.pdf
  1977.  
  1978. ¤ NSA Admits They Keep All Spy Data Past 5 Years ::
  1979.  
  1980. http://dailycaller.com/2014/06/10/nsa-our-systems-are-too-complex-to-stop-deleting-evidence/
  1981. _______________________________________
  1982. ¤ Head of GCHQ Very Pissed Off Over Media Coverage ::
  1983.  
  1984. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet-security/10910212/Head-of-GCHQ-launches-thinly-veiled-attack-on-The-Guardian.html
  1985. _______________________________________
  1986. ¤ GCHQ Forced to Reveal Secret Policy for Mass Spying
  1987. of Residents’ Facebook and Google Use ::
  1988.  
  1989. https://www.privacyinternational.org/press-releases/uk-intelligence-forced-to-reveal-secret-policy-for-mass-surveillance-of-residents
  1990. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/17/business/international/british-spy-agencies-said-to-assert-broad-power-to-intercept-web-traffic.html?_r=0
  1991. http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/E/EU_BRITAIN_ONLINE_SURVEILLANCE
  1992.  
  1993.  Britain’s top counter-terrorism official has been forced
  1994. to reveal a secret Government policy justifying the mass
  1995. surveillance of every Facebook, Twitter, Youtube and Google
  1996. user in the UK.
  1997.  
  1998. https://www.privacyinternational.org/sites/privacyinternational.org/files/downloads/press-releases/witness_st_of_charles_blandford_farr.pdf
  1999.  
  2000. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/gchq-farr-pi.pdf (mirror)
  2001. _______________________________________
  2002. ¤ THIS IS HOW THE US GOVERNMENT TREATS WHISTLEBLOWERS ;
  2003. CIA Rendition Jet Was Waiting in Europe to Blackbag Snowden ::
  2004.  
  2005. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/06/13/cia_rendition_jet_was_waiting_in_europe_to_snatch_snowden/
  2006. ---------------------------------------
  2007. ¤ Leak Spy Documents @ The Intercept Dropbox ::
  2008.  
  2009. http://y6xjgkgwj47us5ca.onion/
  2010. _______________________________________
  2011. ¤ PRISM FOIA Request Highly Censored ::
  2012.  
  2013. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-prism-foia-email.pdf
  2014. _______________________________________
  2015. ¤ DEA-NSA SANDKEY Voice Intercepts ::
  2016.  
  2017. http://cryptomeorg.siteprotect.net/dea-nsa-sandkey.pdf
  2018.  
  2019. Mirrored » http://fileb.ag/pmu6ugcxsxq1
  2020. _______________________________________
  2021. ¤ How Governments Around The World Responded To
  2022. Snowden’s Revelations ::
  2023.  
  2024. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140612/03532827554/how-have-governments-around-world-responded-to-snowdens-revelations.shtml
  2025. _______________________________________
  2026. ¤ GCHQ’s Beyond Top Secret Middle Eastern Spy Base ::
  2027.  
  2028. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/06/03/revealed_beyond_top_secret_british_intelligence_middleeast_internet_spy_base/
  2029.  
  2030. ¤ GCHQ’s Middle Eastern Spy Base Eyeball ::
  2031.  
  2032. http://cryptome.org/2014-info/gchq-seeb/gchq-seeb.htm
  2033. _______________________________________
  2034. ¤ UK Teleco Admits Governments Used Secret Cables
  2035. to Tap Phones ::
  2036.  
  2037. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet-security/10880208/Vodafone-governments-use-secret-cables-to-tap-phones.html
  2038. _______________________________________
  2039. ¤ Some Numbers About NSA’s Data Collection ::
  2040.  
  2041. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com.br/2014/06/some-numbers-about-nsas-data-collection.html
  2042. _______________________________________
  2043. ¤ NSA Whistleblower Russel Tice Reveals NSA Has
  2044. Documents “Above Top Secret” and Many Are Burned
  2045. After Covert Operations, Routinely ::
  2046.  
  2047.  “Think of it this way. Remember I told you about the
  2048. NSA doing everything they could to make sure that the
  2049. information from 40 years ago – from spying on Frank
  2050. Church and Lord knows how many other Congressman that
  2051. they were spying on – was hidden?
  2052.  
  2053.  Now do you think they’re going to put that information
  2054. into Powerpoint slides that are easy to explain to
  2055. everybody what they’re doing?
  2056.  
  2057.  They would not even put their own NSA designators on
  2058. the reports [so that no one would know that] it came
  2059. from the NSA. They made the reports look like they were
  2060. Humint (human intelligence) reports. They did it to
  2061. hide the fact that they were NSA and they were doing
  2062. the collection. That’s 40 years ago. [The NSA and other
  2063. agencies are still doing "parallel construction",
  2064. "laundering" information to hide the fact that the
  2065. information is actually from mass NSA surveillance.]
  2066.  
  2067.  Now, what NSA is doing right now is that they’re taking
  2068. the information and they’re putting it in a much higher
  2069. security level. It’s called “ECI” – Exceptionally Controlled
  2070. Information – and it’s called the black program … which I
  2071. was a specialist in, by the way.
  2072.  
  2073.  I specialized in black world – DOD and IC (Intelligence
  2074. Community) – programs, operations and missions … in “VRKs”,
  2075. “ECIs”, and “SAPs”, “STOs”. SAP equals Special Access
  2076. Program. It’s highly unlikely Mr. Snowden had any access
  2077. to these. STO equals Special Technical Operations It’s
  2078. highly unlikely Mr. Snowden had any access to these.
  2079.  
  2080.  Now in that world – the ECI/VRK world – everything in that
  2081. system is classified at a higher level and it has its own
  2082. computer systems that house it. It’s totally separate than
  2083. the system which Mr. Snowden was privy to, which was called
  2084. the “JWICS”: Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications
  2085. System. The JWICS system is what everybody at NSA has access
  2086. to. Mr Snowden had Sys Admin [systems administrator] authority
  2087. for the JWICS.
  2088.  
  2089.  And you still have to have TS/SCI clearance [i.e. Top Secret/
  2090. Sensitive Compartmented Information - also known as “code word”
  2091. - clearance] to get on the JWICS. But the ECI/VRK systems are
  2092. much higher[levels of special compartmentalized clearance]
  2093. than the JWICS. And you have to be in the black world to get
  2094. that [clearance].
  2095.  
  2096.  ECI = Exceptionally Controlled Information. I do not believe
  2097. Mr. Snowden had any access to these ECI controlled networks).
  2098. VRK = Very Restricted Knowledge. I do not believe Mr. Snowden
  2099. had any access to these VRK controlled networks.
  2100.  
  2101.  These programs typically have, at the least, a requirement of
  2102. 100 year or until death, ’till the person first being “read in”
  2103. [i.e. sworn to secrecy as part of access to the higher
  2104. classification program] can talk about them. [As an interesting
  2105. sidenote, the Washington Times reported in 2006 that – when Tice
  2106. offered to testify to Congress about this illegal spying – he
  2107. was informed by the NSA that the Senate and House intelligence
  2108. committees were not cleared to hear such information.]
  2109.  
  2110.  It’s very compartmentalized and – even with stuff that they had
  2111. – you might have something at NSA, that there’s literally 40
  2112. people at NSA that know that it’s going on in the entire agency.
  2113.  
  2114.  When the stuff came out in the New York Times [the first big
  2115. spying story, which broke in 2005] – and I was a source of
  2116. information for the New York Times – that’s when President Bush
  2117. made up that nonsense about the “terrorist surveillance program.”
  2118. By the way, that never existed. That was made up.
  2119.  
  2120.  There was no such thing beforehand. It was made up … to try
  2121. to placate the American people.
  2122.  
  2123.  The NSA IG (Inspector General) – who was not cleared for this –
  2124. all of a sudden is told he has to do an investigation on this;
  2125. something he has no information or knowledge of.
  2126.  
  2127.  So what they did, is they took a few documents and they
  2128. downgraded [he classification level of the documents] – just
  2129. a few – and gave them to them to placate this basic whitewash
  2130. investigation.”
  2131.  
  2132. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/tice-shoot-snowden.pdf
  2133. http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2014/06/original-nsa-whistleblower-snowden-
  2134. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-whistleblower-snowden-never-had-access-to-the-juiciest-documents/
  2135. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=az-YWMNWQuU
  2136. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GJS7F-mShpI
  2137. _______________________________________
  2138. ¤ NSA MYSTIC SIGAD Reporting Tabulation ::
  2139.  
  2140. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-sigad-reporting.pdf
  2141.  
  2142. ¤ NSA SOMALGET Spy Programme ::
  2143.  
  2144. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1164088/somalget.pdf
  2145.  
  2146. ¤ SOMALGET SSO Dictionary Excerpt ::
  2147.  
  2148. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1164086/sso-dictionary-excerpt.pdf
  2149.  
  2150. ¤ MYSTIC/SOMALGET Spy Documents ::
  2151.  
  2152. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-intercept-14-0519.pdf
  2153.  
  2154. ¤ Toward the Identity of “Country X” in MYSTIC ::
  2155.  
  2156. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-mystic-identity.pdf
  2157.  
  2158. ¤ Wikileaks Releases Identity of “Country X” ::
  2159.  
  2160. http://wikileaks.org/WikiLeaks-statement-on-the-mass.html
  2161.  
  2162. http://www.infowars.com/country-x-wikileaks-reveals-nsa-recording-nearly-all-phone-calls-in-afghanistan/
  2163.  
  2164. ¤ Google Idea’s Director Jared Cohen Was Tasked With
  2165. Getting Afghan Telcos to Move Towers to US Bases ::
  2166.  
  2167. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09KABUL2020_a.html
  2168.  
  2169. ¤ Data Pirates of the Caribbean ; The NSA Is
  2170. Recording Every Cell Phone Call in the Bahamas ::
  2171.  
  2172. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/05/19/data-pirates-caribbean-nsa-recording-every-cell-phone-call-bahamas/
  2173.  
  2174. ¤ UPDATE ; The Bahamas Wants to Know Why the NSA is
  2175. Recording Its Phone Calls ::
  2176.  
  2177. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/05/20/bahamas-wants-know-nsa-recording-phone-calls/
  2178. _______________________________________
  2179. ¤ NSA Collecting Millions of Faces From Web Images ::
  2180.  
  2181.  The FBI, DHS, state and local law enforcement
  2182. agencies are now also using the same facial
  2183. recognition systems as the NSA. Other biometric
  2184. identification systems are being developed as well.
  2185. A panopticon for endless spying in the police state.
  2186.  
  2187. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/01/us/nsa-collecting-millions-of-faces-from-web-images.html
  2188.  
  2189. http://rt.com/usa/162868-nsa-snowden-social-facial/
  2190.  
  2191. ¤ NSA Identity Spying ::
  2192.  
  2193. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-identity-spy.pdf
  2194. _______________________________________
  2195. ¤ 10 Things (Most People) Didn’t Know Before Snowden ::
  2196.  
  2197. 1. Everything you do online can be monitored.
  2198. 2. What you do offline can be monitored!
  2199. 3. They are collecting your phone records, too.
  2200. 4. In some countries, it is not just metadata.
  2201. 5. Or ordinary citizens for that matter.
  2202. 6. The NSA engages in industrial espionage.
  2203. 7. The NSA is also hacking the global financial system.
  2204. 8. The NSA is also hacking into online video games.
  2205. 9. The NSA uses pornography to honeytrap targets.
  2206. 10. The NSA dragnet is collecting facial images.
  2207.  
  2208. http://rt.com/usa/163700-year-whistleblower-before-snowden/
  2209.  
  2210. And a few more to think about,
  2211.  
  2212. 11. The NSA has access to crypto-breaking supercomputers.
  2213. 12. The NSA spied on human rights activists, organizations.
  2214. 13. Google does in fact have personal relations in the NSA.
  2215. 14. All electronic products are manufactured with backdoors.
  2216. 15. NSA tampers with electronics being shipped by mail.
  2217. _______________________________________
  2218. ▼ Snowden Strikes Back at NSA, Emails NBC News ::
  2219.  
  2220.  Fugitive Edward Snowden on Friday challenged the
  2221. NSA’s insistence that it has no evidence he tried
  2222. to raise concerns about the agency’s surveillance
  2223. activity before he began leaking government documents
  2224. to reporters, calling the response a “clearly tailored
  2225. and incomplete leak ... for a political advantage.”
  2226.  
  2227.  “The NSA’s new discovery of written contact between
  2228. me and its lawyers -- after more than a year of denying
  2229. any such contact existed - raises serious concerns,”
  2230. Snowden said in an email Friday to NBC News. “It
  2231. reveals as false the NSA’s claim to Barton Gellman
  2232. of the Washington Post in December of last year, that
  2233. ‘after extensive investigation, including interviews
  2234. with his former NSA supervisors and co-workers, we
  2235. have not found any evidence to support Mr. Snowden’s
  2236. contention that he brought these matters to anyone’s
  2237. attention.’”
  2238.  
  2239.  Snowden’s email followed Thursday’s release by the US
  2240. Office of the Director of Intelligence of an email
  2241. exchange between Snowden and the NSA’s Office of the
  2242. General Counsel. The Washington Post received and
  2243. published a similar response from Snowden on Thursday.
  2244.  
  2245. http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/edward-snowden-interview/snowden-strikes-back-nsa-emails-nbc-news-n118821
  2246.  
  2247. ▲ NSA Oversight Training, OVSC1800 Minimization Training,
  2248. NSA OGC Snowden Emails on OVSC1800 Course ::
  2249.  
  2250. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-oversight.pdf
  2251. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ovsc1800.pdf
  2252. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ogc-snowden.pdf
  2253. ---------------------------------------
  2254. ¤ NBC Interviews Edward Snowden (Full) ::
  2255.  
  2256. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yNhMXyAdjp8
  2257.  
  2258. Mirror here » http://upstore.net/62ocku
  2259. _______________________________________
  2260. ¤ What Does GCHQ Know About Our Devices We Don’t? ::
  2261.  
  2262. https://www.privacyinternational.org/blog/what-does-gchq-know-about-our-devices-that-we-dont
  2263.  
  2264. ¤ A Hint? ; “Flashdrive Cache Paths” (Repost) ::
  2265.  
  2266. http://paste.security-portal.cz/view/b30bffb6
  2267. _______________________________________
  2268. ¤ Onionshare App Lets the Next Snowden Send Big Files
  2269. Securely and Anonymously ::
  2270.  
  2271.  OnionShare lets you securely and anonymously
  2272. share a file of any size with someone. It works
  2273. by starting a web server, making it accessible
  2274. as a Tor hidden service, and generating an
  2275. unguessable URL to access and download the file.
  2276. It doesn’t require setting up a server on the
  2277. internet somewhere or using a third party
  2278. filesharing service. You host the file on your
  2279. own computer and use a Tor hidden service to
  2280. make it temporarily accessible over the internet.
  2281. The other user just needs to use Tor Browser to
  2282. download the file from you.
  2283.  
  2284. https://github.com/micahflee/onionshare
  2285. http://www.wired.com/2014/05/onionshare/
  2286.  
  2287. ¤ Mirrored Onionshare App w/ Report (ZIP) ::
  2288.  
  2289. https://anonfiles.com/file/9805fddaf90e3ecf37b957e5bed3f474
  2290.  
  2291. ¤ Mirrored Onionshare App w/ Report (RAR) ::
  2292.  
  2293. https://anonfiles.com/file/ea22d9e866875e02a5a0c95e2f69b5d4
  2294. _______________________________________
  2295. ¤ Former NSA-CIA Director Michael Hayden Admits
  2296. Metadata SIGINT Collection Used to Kill People ::
  2297.  
  2298. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yaTGkSoI8Ic
  2299.  
  2300. ¤ The Price of Privacy Debate - Re-Evaluating the NSA ::
  2301.  
  2302. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kV2HDM86XgI
  2303. _______________________________________
  2304. ¤ Glenn Greenwald - “No Place To Hide” (EPUB) ::
  2305.  
  2306. magnet:?xt=urn:btih:2d1ace5d3b854a9afffc4c2b576cdadc4a0e2718
  2307.  
  2308. http://torrage.com/torrent/2D1ACE5D3B854A9AFFFC4C2B576CDADC4A0E2718.torrent
  2309.  
  2310. ¤ Glenn Greenwald - “No Place To Hide” (PDF) ::
  2311.  
  2312. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/npth.7z
  2313.  
  2314. ▼ NSA Documents From “No Place To Hide” ::
  2315.  
  2316. http://hbpub.vo.llnwd.net/o16/video/olmk/holt/greenwald/NoPlaceToHide-Documents-Uncompressed.pdf
  2317.  
  2318. Mirror here » http://fileb.ag/94dwpno2eokp
  2319.  
  2320. ▲ An Avalanche of Snowden Documents To Be Released
  2321. Online Next Week ::
  2322.  
  2323. http://www.engadget.com/2014/05/08/an-avalanche-of-new-snowden-documents-will-go-online-next-week/
  2324. ---------------------------------------
  2325. ¤ NSA’s Largest Cable Tapping Program ::
  2326.  
  2327. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/05/nsas-largest-cable-tapping-program.html
  2328.  
  2329. ¤ Glenn Greenwald On Democracy Now ::
  2330.  
  2331. http://publish.dvlabs.com/democracynow/ipod/dn2014-0513.mp4
  2332. http://publish.dvlabs.com/democracynow/ipod/dn2014-0514.mp4
  2333.  
  2334. ¤ New Snowden Document Implies NSA May Be Putting
  2335. Israel’s Security Ahead of America’s ::
  2336.  
  2337. http://www.infowars.com/new-snowden-document-implies-nsa-may-be-putting-israels-security-ahead-of-americas/
  2338.  
  2339. ¤ New Snowden Documents Reveal Depth Of Facebook
  2340. Infiltration by NSA ::
  2341.  
  2342. http://revolution-news.com/new-snowden-documents-reveal-depth-of-facebook-infiltration-by-nsa/
  2343.  
  2344. http://www.infowars.com/how-the-nsa-fbi-made-facebook-the-perfect-mass-surveillance-tool/
  2345.  
  2346. ¤ Leaked Photos of the NSA’s TAO Factory ::
  2347.  
  2348.  A document included in the trove of National Security
  2349. Agency files released with Glenn Greenwald’s book
  2350. “No Place To Hide” details how the agency’s Tailored
  2351. Access Operations (TAO) unit and other NSA employees
  2352. intercept servers, routers, and other network gear
  2353. being shipped to organizations targeted for surveillance
  2354. and install covert implant firmware onto them before
  2355. they’re delivered.
  2356.  
  2357. http://govtslaves.info/leaked-photos-nsas-router-upgrade-factory/
  2358.  
  2359. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-customs.htm
  2360.  
  2361. ¤ Cisco Letter to Obama Objecting to NSA Implants ::
  2362.  
  2363. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/cisco-implant.pdf
  2364.  
  2365. ¤ No Place to Hide Documents Compared to Previous ::
  2366.  
  2367. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/npth-docs-compare.pdf
  2368. ______________________________________
  2369. ¤ House Leaders and Obama Regime Water Down
  2370. Surveillance Reform Bill ::
  2371.  
  2372. http://newamerica.net/node/110983
  2373. _______________________________________
  2374. ¤ US Justice Department Told Supreme Court to Dismiss
  2375. NSA Spying Cases? ::
  2376.  
  2377. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/17/government-lies-nsa-justice-department-supreme-court
  2378. _______________________________________
  2379. ¤ The New Yorker Interviews Keith Alexander ::
  2380.  
  2381. http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/05/were-at-greater-risk-q-a-with-general-keith-alexander.html
  2382. _______________________________________
  2383. ▼ Leak Spy Documents @ The Intercept Dropbox ::
  2384.  
  2385. http://y6xjgkgwj47us5ca.onion/
  2386.  
  2387. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/intercept-drop.pdf
  2388.  
  2389. ▲ Obama’s Directive Makes Mere Citing of Snowden’s
  2390. Leaks a Punishable Offense ::
  2391.  
  2392.  In a new policy directive from the Obama administrative,
  2393. national security and other government officials will no
  2394. longer be allowed to publicly discuss or even reference
  2395. news reporting that is based on “unauthorized leaks.”
  2396.  
  2397. https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2014/05/09
  2398. _______________________________________
  2399. ¤ Munk Debate on State Surveillance ::
  2400.  
  2401. Greenwald, Ohanian vs Hayden, Dershowitz
  2402.  
  2403. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_d1tw3mEOoE
  2404. ______________________________________
  2405. ¤ NSA ; Manageable Network Plan ::
  2406.  
  2407. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-network-plan.pdf
  2408. ______________________________________
  2409. ¤ United States of Secrets ; How the Government
  2410. Came to Spy on Millions of Americans ::
  2411.  
  2412. Part One: Tuesday, May 13, 2014, at 9 p.m. on PBS
  2413. Part Two: Tuesday, May 20, 2014, at 10 p.m. on PBS
  2414.  
  2415. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/united-states-of-secrets/
  2416.  
  2417. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/pressroom/press-release-united-states-of-secrets-how-the-government-came-to-spy-on-millions-of-americans/
  2418. ______________________________________
  2419. ¤ NSA, Google Inc. Relationship Emails ::
  2420.  
  2421. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-google.pdf
  2422.  
  2423. ¤ NSA Scares CEOs Into Cyber Spying (Related) ::
  2424.  
  2425. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-scares-ceos.pdf
  2426.  
  2427. ¤ Emails Reveal Close Google Relationship With NSA ::
  2428.  
  2429.  “Keep in mind that social media survives by
  2430. selling user data. Spying is their business model.
  2431. In padding their bottom lines executives have
  2432. worked diligently to dilute privacy legislation
  2433. in addition to garnering a myriad of fines. All
  2434. of this data harvesting services a data broker
  2435. industry which generates something in the
  2436. neighborhood of $200 billion in revenue annually.”
  2437.  
  2438.   - Bill Blunden, counterpunch.org
  2439.  
  2440. http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/5/6/nsa-chief-google.html
  2441. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/05/07/googles_nsa_data_dealings_not_as_bad_as_first_thought_theyre_much_worse/
  2442. http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/05/09/the-nsas-corporate-collaborators/
  2443. _______________________________________
  2444. ¤ GCHQ Director Visits NSA for PRISM Data Access ::
  2445.  
  2446. Hosted Dinner: 30 April 2013//1830Hrs - Quarters
  2447. Hosted Discussions: 1 May 2013//0800-0830
  2448.  
  2449.  “PURPOSE OF THE VISIT:  (U//FOUO) As the Director
  2450. of GCHQ, Sir Iain wants to reconnect with NSA
  2451. Leadership on matters of mutual concern, and to
  2452. ensure each partner is aware of the other’s
  2453. activities and future plans.” … …
  2454.  
  2455.  “Unsupervised access to FAA 702 data, in a manner
  2456. similar to Olympics Option, remains on GCHQ’s wish
  2457. list and is something its leadership still desires.”
  2458.  
  2459. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-gchq-lobban-visit.pdf
  2460.  
  2461. ¤ GCHQ Unsupervised PRISM Access in 2012 ::
  2462.  
  2463. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-prism-olympics.pdf
  2464.  
  2465. ¤ NSA Spied “Suspected Terrorists” At 2012 Olympics ::
  2466.  
  2467. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-ghostmachine-echobase.pdf
  2468.  
  2469. ¤ NSA & GCHQ Eyeballed “Suspected Terrorists” Before,
  2470. During and After 2012 Olympics ::
  2471.  
  2472.  The Snowden files do not indicate whether NSA granted
  2473. GCHQ’s request, but they do show that the NSA was
  2474. “supportive” of the idea, and that GCHQ was permitted
  2475. extensive access to PRISM during the London Olympics
  2476. in 2012. The request for the broad access was
  2477. communicated at “leadership” level, according to
  2478. the documents. Neither agency would comment on the
  2479. proposed arrangement or whether it was approved. … …
  2480.  
  2481.  The data sharing between the agencies during the
  2482. Olympics, though, was not isolated to PRISM. … …
  2483. The NSA was funneling troves of intercepted data
  2484. to GCHQ from a system called GHOSTMACHINE, a massive
  2485. cloud database used by the NSA to analyze metadata
  2486. and store, according to one document in the Snowden
  2487. archive, “100s of billions of entries.”
  2488.  
  2489. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/04/30/gchq-prism-nsa-fisa-unsupervised-access-snowden/
  2490. _______________________________________
  2491. ¤ NSA MYSTIC Telephone Interception Program ::
  2492.  
  2493. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1086618/mysticssoweeklybrief.pdf
  2494. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1086616/fromsso-key-brief-overview.pdf
  2495. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1088934/mystic-tearsheet-cropped-v2.pdf
  2496.  
  2497.  The National Security Agency has built a surveillance
  2498. system capable of recording “100 percent” of a foreign
  2499. country’s telephone calls, enabling the agency to rewind
  2500. and review conversations as long as a month after they
  2501. take place, according to people with direct knowledge of
  2502. the effort and documents supplied by former contractor
  2503. Edward Snowden.
  2504.  
  2505.  A senior manager for the program compares it to a time
  2506. machine — one that can replay the voices from any call
  2507. without requiring that a person be identified in advance
  2508. for surveillance.
  2509.  
  2510.  The voice interception program, called MYSTIC, began in
  2511. 2009. Its RETRO tool, short for “retrospective retrieval,”
  2512. and related projects reached full capacity against the
  2513. first target nation in 2011. Planning documents two years
  2514. later anticipated similar operations elsewhere.
  2515.  
  2516.  In the initial deployment, collection systems are recording
  2517. “every single” conversation nationwide, storing billions of
  2518. them in a 30-day rolling buffer that clears the oldest
  2519. calls as new ones arrive, according to a classified summary.
  2520.  
  2521.  The call buffer opens a door “into the past,” the summary
  2522. says, enabling users to “retrieve audio of interest that
  2523. was not tasked at the time of the original call.” Analysts
  2524. listen to only a fraction of 1 percent of the calls, but
  2525. the absolute numbers are high. Each month, they send
  2526. millions of voice clippings, or “cuts,” for processing
  2527. and long-term storage.
  2528.  
  2529. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-surveillance-program-reaches-into-the-past-to-retrieve-replay-phone-calls/2014/03/18/226d2646-ade9-11e3-a49e-76adc9210f19_story.html
  2530.  
  2531. ¤ Washington Post Censors MYSTIC Slides ::
  2532.  
  2533.  The Washington Post is reporting, based on the
  2534. files of whistleblower Edward Snowden, that the NSA
  2535. is able to store every phone call made in an entire
  2536. nation and replay them for up to 30 days. Not only
  2537. can the agency do this, but there is a country where
  2538. it’s actually doing this now–the Post knows where,
  2539. but they won’t say.
  2540.  
  2541. http://www.fair.org/blog/2014/03/19/the-nsa-built-a-time-machine-but-washington-post-wont-say-where/
  2542.  
  2543. ¤ NSA Records All Phone Calls Using Project MYSTIC ::
  2544.  
  2545. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NYq44T5e3lU
  2546.  
  2547. Mirror here » http://fileb.ag/3cva7msxqefx
  2548. _______________________________________
  2549. ¤ NSA/NIS Dagbladet Documents Decensored ::
  2550.  
  2551.  There are a couple images in the latest Dagbladet
  2552. story from the Snowden trove that were originally
  2553. blurred instead of blacked out. This allowed the
  2554. text to be recovered. There was no particular point
  2555. in making a project out of the first, since it had
  2556. already been published previously. The second was
  2557. completely decoded in a matter of a few hours.
  2558.  
  2559. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/DagbladetDecensor.pdf
  2560.  
  2561. ¤ NSA/NIS Aquired Supercomputer to Break Crypto ::
  2562.  
  2563.  The Norwegian Inteligence Service (NIS) is also
  2564. nauseous from the unmanageable amounts of data it
  2565. is served daily. This is partly the reason why NSA
  2566. now purchases a supercomputer codenamed Steelwinter.
  2567. This information comes from a document Edward Snowden
  2568. took from NSA and has later shared with Dagbladet.
  2569. The document, marked “top secret” is a summary of
  2570. how the NSA sees the collaboration with Norway after
  2571. a meeting between the two services in March 2013.
  2572.  
  2573.  The supercomputer NIS buys is a derivation of the
  2574. so-called Windsor Blue supercomputer.
  2575.  
  2576.  “NIS is in the process of acquiring STEEL WINTER
  2577. (a WINDSORBLUE derivative supercomputer) and has
  2578. entered into a partnership with NSA - cryptanalysis
  2579. ( ...) service to develop applications of mutual
  2580. benefit” the document says.
  2581.  
  2582.  “Windsor Blue” is the name of a program for
  2583. supercomputers at the American IT-giant IBM. The
  2584. company is working towards creating a so-called
  2585. exascale supercomputer which means it can make a
  2586. quintillion - 1,000,000,000,000,000,000 - calculations
  2587. per second.
  2588.  
  2589. http://www.dagbladet.no/2014/04/26/nyheter/snowden_i_norge/edward_snowden/nsa/etterretningstjenesten/32991102/
  2590. _______________________________________
  2591. ¤ Germany Blocks Edward Snowden From Testifying ::
  2592.  
  2593. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/01/germany-edward-snowden-nsa-inquiry
  2594. _______________________________________
  2595. ¤ NSA Spies More on Americans Than Russians ::
  2596.  
  2597. http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/edward-snowden-nsa-spies-more-on-americans-than-russians-20140430
  2598. _______________________________________
  2599. ¤ Snowden Asks Putin About Russian Spying ::
  2600.  
  2601. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w1yH554emkY
  2602. http://rt.com/news/snowden-putin-spy-online-140/
  2603. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-04-17/snowden-calls-putin-telethon-discuss-legality-mass-surveillance
  2604. _______________________________________
  2605. ¤ NSA Spied on Human Rights Workers ::
  2606.  
  2607.  The US has spied on the staff of prominent
  2608. human rights organisations, Edward Snowden has
  2609. told the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, Europe’s
  2610. top human rights body.
  2611.  
  2612.  Giving evidence via a videolink from Moscow,
  2613. Snowden said the National Security Agency – for
  2614. which he worked as a contractor – had deliberately
  2615. snooped on bodies like Amnesty International and
  2616. Human Rights Watch.
  2617.  
  2618. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/08/edwards-snowden-us-government-spied-human-rights-workers
  2619.  
  2620. ¤ Edward Snowden Testimony @ Parliamentary Assembly
  2621. of the Council of Europe (Full) ::
  2622.  
  2623. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3f8Lunf1a2w
  2624. _______________________________________
  2625. ¤ EU High Court Allows Banning Metadata Collection ::
  2626.  
  2627.  Due to the particularities of EU lawmaking, the
  2628. effects of the directive (spying) will still be in
  2629. place in most EU member states for the time being.
  2630.  
  2631.  According to EU legal procedure, a directive is
  2632. a type of law that requires each of the 28 member
  2633. countries to “transpose” it into their own national
  2634. laws. In this case, countries could even choose
  2635. whether to expand the six-month requirement to as
  2636. high as two years. ... ...
  2637.  
  2638.  Current EU data retention law will remain in
  2639. effect until repealed legislatively or invalidated
  2640. by domestic courts.
  2641.  
  2642. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/04/eu-high-court-strikes-down-metadata-collection-law/
  2643. _______________________________________
  2644. ¤ Masterspy Orders Snub on Media Contacts ::
  2645.  
  2646. http://www.infowars.com/intelligence-head-who-lied-to-congress-bans-employees-from-talking-to-media/
  2647. _______________________________________
  2648. ¤ US Whines - ‘Anti-Snooping Plans are Unfair’ ::
  2649.  
  2650.  “Recent proposals from countries within the
  2651. European Union to create a Europe-only electronic
  2652. network (dubbed a ‘Schengen cloud’ by advocates) or
  2653. to create national-only electronic networks could
  2654. potentially lead to effective exclusion or discrimination
  2655. against foreign service suppliers that are directly
  2656. offering network services, or dependent on them,”
  2657. the USTR said in its annual report.
  2658.  
  2659. http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2014%20NTE%20Report%20on%20FTB.pdf
  2660. http://inserbia.info/today/2014/04/us-blasts-eus-plan-for-schengen-cloud/
  2661. http://rt.com/news/us-europe-nsa-snowden-549/
  2662. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  2663. ¤ ACLU Offers NSA Document Search ::
  2664.  
  2665. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-search
  2666.  
  2667. ¤ ACLU Offers Mirrored NSA Documents ::
  2668.  
  2669. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  2670. _______________________________________
  2671. ¤ KILLCEN ; Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip ::
  2672.  
  2673.  Includes all news reports, videos, images, slides
  2674. and documents from and related to Snowden’s leaks
  2675. so far, up to April 2nd of 2014. I’m still collecting
  2676. any information that comes out and will provide an
  2677. updated archive from time to time.
  2678.  
  2679.  After decompression - the main folder is titled
  2680. “Eyeballing_Snowden_Info” and it holds a total of
  2681. 927MB decompressed.
  2682.  
  2683.  This was stored on an old OFFLINE system, without
  2684. any WiFi card or modem attached so the archive is
  2685. safe from being modified, exploited or stolen.
  2686.  
  2687. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  2688. (1,325 files | ZIP | 743MB)
  2689.  
  2690. http://fileb.ag/1ixi6dqmbj80
  2691. http://fpsbay.com/download/64465X13965734822241X344921/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  2692. http://davvas.com/l21m47ls819e
  2693. http://jumbofiles.org/newfile?n=528498&Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  2694. _______________________________________
  2695. ¤ It’s Finally Admitted! ::
  2696.  
  2697. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1100298-unclassified-702-response.html
  2698. http://www.emptywheel.net/2014/04/01/james-clapper-confirms-vadm-mike-rogers-needlessly-obfuscated-in-confirmation-hearing/
  2699. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/01/nsa-surveillance-loophole-americans-data
  2700. http://www.zdnet.com/nsa-searched-u-s-calls-emails-without-warrant-u-s-intelligence-chief-admits-7000027938/
  2701. http://rt.com/usa/clapper-wyden-nsa-fisa-665/
  2702. _______________________________________
  2703. ¤ NSA Spy Chiefs of State ::
  2704.  
  2705. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spy-cos.pdf
  2706.  
  2707. ¤ NSA Spy Chiefs of State (Full List) ::
  2708.  
  2709. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-nymrod-spy-cos.pdf
  2710.  
  2711. ¤ GCHQ and NSA Targeted Private German Companies ::
  2712.  
  2713. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/gchq-and-nsa-targeted-private-german-companies-a-961444.html
  2714. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/29/der-spiegel-nsa-ghcq-hacked-german-companies-put-merkel-list-122-targeted-leaders/
  2715. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/03/31/nsas-m31.html
  2716. http://leaksource.info/2014/03/31/122-country-leaders-in-nsas-target-knowledge-database-2009-document/
  2717.  
  2718. ▲ UPDATE ; European Parliament Suspends US
  2719. Trade Talks Due to Political Spying ::
  2720.  
  2721. http://falkvinge.net/2014/03/12/europarl-suspends-u-s-trade-talks-data-sharing-over-mass-surveillance/
  2722. _______________________________________
  2723. ¤ Video Demonstration of Two Intelligence Analysis Tools ::
  2724.  
  2725. http://electrospaces.blogspot.se/2014/03/video-demonstration-of-two-intelligence.html
  2726.  
  2727. ¤ Telephone Call Data Record Link Analysis Software ::
  2728.  
  2729. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J38tKqq9kpY
  2730.  
  2731. ¤ IBM i2 Analysts Notebook - Esri Edition ::
  2732.  
  2733. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MJ5CovDQDYU
  2734.  
  2735. ¤ Report and Both Videos ZIPPED & Mirrored ::
  2736.  
  2737. http://fpsbay.com/download/64445X13961058822231X344721/Two%20Intelligence%20Analysis%20Tools.zip
  2738. _______________________________________
  2739. ¤ NSA’s New Civil Liberties and Privacy Officer ::
  2740.  
  2741.  Becky Richards promises more transparency. She
  2742. also promises the NSA will “build privacy into
  2743. new technologies” to “protect privacy and civil
  2744. liberties” and “to be as transparent with the
  2745. public as possible” as well helping the public
  2746. “understand how we’re protecting their privacy,
  2747. how we’re protecting national security.”
  2748.  
  2749. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-richards-14-0320.htm
  2750. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  2751. ¤ NSA Huawei SHOTGIANT Hardware Exploit ::
  2752.  
  2753. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-huawei.pdf
  2754.  
  2755. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-huawei-02.pdf
  2756.  
  2757. ¤ Huawei Global Cyber Security Assurance ::
  2758.  
  2759. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/huawei-cyber-security.pdf
  2760.  
  2761. ¤ Huawei Network Migration Tool (48.7MB) ::
  2762.  
  2763. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/huawei-network-migration.zip
  2764.  
  2765. ¤ NSA Breached Chinese Telecom Giant Huawei ::
  2766.  
  2767.  The American government conducted a major intelligence
  2768. offensive against China, with targets including the
  2769. Chinese government and networking company Huawei,
  2770. according to documents from former NSA worker Edward
  2771. Snowden that have been viewed by SPIEGEL and the
  2772. New York Times. Among the American intelligence
  2773. service’s targets were former Chinese President
  2774. Hu Jintao, the Chinese Trade Ministry, banks, as
  2775. well as telecommunications companies.
  2776.  
  2777.  But the NSA made a special effort to target Huawei.
  2778. With 150,000 employees and €28 billion ($38.6 billion)
  2779. in annual revenues, the company is the world’s second
  2780. largest network equipment supplier. At the beginning
  2781. of 2009, the NSA began an extensive operation, referred
  2782. to internally as “Shotgiant,” against the company, which
  2783. is considered a major competitor to US-based Cisco. The
  2784. company produces smartphones and tablets, but also mobile
  2785. phone infrastructure, WLAN routers and fiber optic cable
  2786. -- the kind of technology that is decisive in the NSA’s
  2787. battle for data supremacy.
  2788.  
  2789.  A special unit with the US intelligence agency succeeded
  2790. in infiltrating Huwaei’s network and copied a list of
  2791. 1,400 customers as well as internal documents providing
  2792. training to engineers on the use of Huwaei products,
  2793. among other things.
  2794.  
  2795. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/world/asia/nsa-breached-chinese-servers-seen-as-spy-peril.html
  2796. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-spied-on-chinese-government-and-networking-firm-huawei-a-960199.html
  2797. http://news.yahoo.com/nsa-infiltrates-servers-china-telecom-giant-huawei-report-022030765--finance.html
  2798. http://www.forbes.com/sites/rosatrieu/2014/03/24/chinas-huawei-condemns-nsa-spying-calls-for-unity-against-cyber-mischief/
  2799.  
  2800. ¤ Hong Lei Responds to Huawei NSA Backdoors ::
  2801.  
  2802.  “We are seriously concerned with relevant reports. The
  2803. media has disclosed a lot about the eavesdropping,
  2804. surveillance and spying activities that the US has
  2805. carried out on other countries, including China. China
  2806. has lodged representations with the American side on
  2807. many occasions. We require the American side to give a
  2808. clear explanation and stop such behaviours.”
  2809.  
  2810. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t1140281.shtml
  2811. _______________________________________
  2812. ¤ NSA Mapping and Spying System Administrators ::
  2813.  
  2814.  The document consists of several posts – one of
  2815. them is titled “I hunt sys admins” – that were
  2816. published in 2012 on an internal discussion board
  2817. hosted on the agency’s classified servers. They
  2818. were written by an NSA official involved in the
  2819. agency’s effort to break into foreign network
  2820. routers, the devices that connect computer
  2821. networks and transport data across the Internet.
  2822. By infiltrating the computers of system administrators
  2823. who work for foreign phone and Internet companies,
  2824. the NSA can gain access to the calls and emails
  2825. that flow over their networks.
  2826.  
  2827.  The classified posts reveal how the NSA official
  2828. aspired to create a database that would function
  2829. as an international hit list of sys admins to
  2830. potentially target. Yet the document makes clear
  2831. that the admins are not suspected of any criminal
  2832. activity – they are targeted only because they
  2833. control access to networks the agency wants to
  2834. infiltrate. “Who better to target than the person
  2835. that already has the ‘keys to the kingdom’?” one
  2836. of the posts says.
  2837.  
  2838.  The NSA wants more than just passwords. The document
  2839. includes a list of other data that can be harvested
  2840. from computers belonging to sys admins, including
  2841. network maps, customer lists, business correspondence
  2842. and, the author jokes, “pictures of cats in funny
  2843. poses with amusing captions.”
  2844.  
  2845. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-hunt-sysadmins.pdf
  2846. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/document/2014/03/20/hunt-sys-admins/
  2847. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/20/inside-nsa-secret-efforts-hunt-hack-system-administrators/
  2848. _______________________________________
  2849. ¤ NSA Culture, 1980s to the 21st Century ::
  2850.  
  2851. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-sid-culture.pdf
  2852. _______________________________________
  2853. ¤ CSEC SNOWGLOBE Slides ::
  2854.  
  2855. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/cse-snowglobe.pdf
  2856.  
  2857. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1094526/babarfull.pdf
  2858.  
  2859. ¤ Default Le Monde Report ::
  2860.  
  2861. http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2014/03/21/quand-les-canadiens-partent-en-chasse-de-babar_4387233_3210.html
  2862.  
  2863. ¤ Le Monde Report Translated to English ::
  2864.  
  2865. http://slexy.org/view/s20ThA9Vog
  2866. _______________________________________
  2867. ¤ DNI National Security / Secrecy Panic ::
  2868.  
  2869. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/litt-14-0318.pdf
  2870. _______________________________________
  2871. ¤ TED ; Ask Snowden ::
  2872.  
  2873. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yVwAodrjZMY
  2874.  
  2875. http://iroots.org/2014/03/18/transcript-edward-snowden-today-at-ted-talk/
  2876. _______________________________________
  2877. ¤ SXSW ; Ask Snowden ::
  2878.  
  2879. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nRQTDNbYjqY
  2880. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/snowden-sxsw.htm
  2881. http://blog.inside.com/blog/2014/3/10/edward-snowden-sxsw-full-transcription-and-video
  2882. _______________________________________
  2883. ¤ NSA ; Ask Zelda ::
  2884.  
  2885. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ask-zelda.pdf
  2886.  
  2887. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/07/nsa-advice-columnist-seriously/
  2888. _______________________________________
  2889. ¤ NSA Third Party (Five Eye) Relationships ::
  2890.  
  2891. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-third-parties.pdf
  2892. _______________________________________
  2893. ¤ Comsec as Essential Public Utility ::
  2894.  
  2895. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/comsec-public-utility.htm
  2896.  
  2897. ¤ Update ; Comsec as Essential Failure ::
  2898.  
  2899. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/comsec-ewafmss.htm
  2900. _______________________________________
  2901. ¤ NSA/CSS Classification/Damage Control ::
  2902.  
  2903. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-policy-1-52.pdf
  2904. _______________________________________
  2905. ¤ NSA/FBI Cryptanalysts Database Sharing ::
  2906.  
  2907. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-crypt-fisa-share.pdf
  2908.  
  2909. ▲ FBI’s Data Intercept Technology Unit (DITU) ::
  2910.  
  2911. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  2912.  
  2913. ▲ FISA Court Releases FBI Spy Documents ::
  2914.  
  2915. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-13-0917-4.pdf
  2916. _______________________________________
  2917. ¤ STELLARWIND Classification Guide ::
  2918.  
  2919. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-stellarwind-class.pdf
  2920.  
  2921. ▲ NSA ; STELLARWIND Program ::
  2922.  
  2923. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  2924. _______________________________________
  2925. ¤ FISC Orders to Preserve NSA Metadata Spying ::
  2926.  
  2927. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/fisc-br14-01-order-14-0312.pdf
  2928. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/fisc-br14-01-tro-14-0311.pdf
  2929. _______________________________________
  2930. ¤ How the NSA Plans to Infect Millions of Computers
  2931. With Malware ::
  2932.  
  2933.  Top-secret documents reveal that the National
  2934. Security Agency is dramatically expanding its
  2935. ability to covertly hack into computers on a mass
  2936. scale by using automated systems that reduce the
  2937. level of human oversight in the process.
  2938.  
  2939.  The classified files – provided previously by NSA
  2940. whistleblower Edward Snowden – contain new details
  2941. about groundbreaking surveillance technology the
  2942. agency has developed to infect potentially millions
  2943. of computers worldwide with malware “implants.” The
  2944. clandestine initiative enables the NSA to break into
  2945. targeted computers and to siphon out data from foreign
  2946. Internet and phone networks.
  2947.  
  2948. https://prod01-cdn02.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/nsa_malware_feature.jpg
  2949. https://prod01-cdn01.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/turbine-large.jpg
  2950. https://prod01-cdn01.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/tao-2-1024x768.png
  2951. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076889/nsa-technology-directorate-analysis-of-converged.pdf
  2952. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1077724/industry-scale-exploitation.pdf
  2953. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1077721/thousands-of-implants.pdf
  2954. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076859/nsa-phishing-tactics-and-man-in-the-middle-attacks.pdf
  2955. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076891/there-is-more-than-one-way-to-quantum.pdf
  2956. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076862/quantum-insert-diagrams.pdf
  2957.  
  2958.  The covert infrastructure that supports the hacking
  2959. efforts operates from the agency’s headquarters in
  2960. Fort Meade, Maryland, and from eavesdropping bases
  2961. in the United Kingdom and Japan. GCHQ, the British
  2962. intelligence agency, appears to have played an integral
  2963. role in helping to develop the implants tactic.
  2964.  
  2965.  The implants being deployed were once reserved for
  2966. a few hundred hard-to-reach targets, whose communications
  2967. could not be monitored through traditional wiretaps. But
  2968. the documents analyzed by The Intercept show how the NSA
  2969. has aggressively accelerated its hacking initiatives in
  2970. the past decade by computerizing some processes previously
  2971. handled by humans. The automated system – codenamed TURBINE
  2972. – is designed to “allow the current implant network to
  2973. scale to large size (millions of implants) by creating
  2974. a system that does automated control implants by groups
  2975. instead of individually.”
  2976.  
  2977. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/12/nsa-plans-infect-millions-computers-malware/
  2978.  
  2979. ¤ “Thousands of Implants” ::
  2980.  
  2981.  “Building the operations floor and increasing the number
  2982. of break-out rooms will enable us to grow from the current
  2983. average of these operations per clay to over per day and will
  2984. facilitate the integration of 55 computer network operations
  2985. and real--time customer support. Sustained collection involving
  2986. automated implants pushing collected data from targets to the
  2987. RDC as well as voice and geolocation collection are managed from
  2988. the Operations Teaming Areas. The increased capacity in this
  2989. area will support a growth from managing an average of I 543
  2990. active implants today to simultaneously managing thousands of
  2991. implanted targets. The increased personnel capacity will support
  2992. this net growth in operations tempo and will allow the integration
  2993. of TAD's Requirements Targeting Division alongside the operators
  2994. in order to better target development and efficiently plan and
  2995. execute endpoint operations.”
  2996.  
  2997. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-thousands-implants.pdf
  2998.  
  2999.  According to one top-secret document from 2012, the agency
  3000. can deploy malware by sending out spam emails that trick targets
  3001. into clicking a malicious link. Once activated, a “back-door
  3002. implant” infects their computers within eight seconds.
  3003.  
  3004.  There’s only one problem with this tactic, codenamed WILLOWVIXEN:
  3005. According to the documents, the spam method has become less
  3006. successful in recent years, as Internet users have become wary
  3007. of unsolicited emails and less likely to click on anything that
  3008. looks suspicious.
  3009.  
  3010.  Consequently, the NSA has turned to new and more advanced
  3011. hacking techniques. These include performing so-called
  3012. “man-in-the-middle” and “man-on-the-side” attacks, which
  3013. covertly force a user’s internet browser to route to NSA
  3014. computer servers that try to infect them with an implant.
  3015.  
  3016.  To perform a man-on-the-side attack, the NSA observes a
  3017. target’s Internet traffic using its global network of covert
  3018. “accesses” to data as it flows over fiber optic cables or
  3019. satellites. When the target visits a website that the NSA
  3020. is able to exploit, the agency’s surveillance sensors alert
  3021. the TURBINE system, which then “shoots” data packets at the
  3022. targeted computer’s IP address within a fraction of a second.
  3023.  
  3024.  In one man-on-the-side technique, codenamed QUANTUMHAND,
  3025. the agency disguises itself as a fake Facebook server. When
  3026. a target attempts to log in to the social media site, the
  3027. NSA transmits malicious data packets that trick the target’s
  3028. computer into thinking they are being sent from the real
  3029. Facebook. By concealing its malware within what looks like
  3030. an ordinary Facebook page, the NSA is able to hack into the
  3031. targeted computer and covertly siphon out data from its
  3032. hard drive. A top-secret animation demonstrates the tactic
  3033. in action.
  3034.  
  3035. ¤ How the NSA Secretly Masqueraded as Facebook to Hack
  3036. Computers for Surveillance ::
  3037.  
  3038. https://player.vimeo.com/video/88822483
  3039.  
  3040. and @ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Td8nZscYvT4
  3041.  
  3042. Mirrored » http://megaswf.com/f/2647410
  3043.  
  3044.  According to Matt Blaze, a surveillance and cryptography
  3045. expert at the University of Pennsylvania, it appears that
  3046. the QUANTUMHAND technique is aimed at targeting specific
  3047. individuals. But he expresses concerns about how it has
  3048. been covertly integrated within Internet networks as part
  3049. of the NSA’s automated TURBINE system.
  3050.  
  3051. ¤ NSA TURBINE Automated Hacking Documents (Mirrored) ::
  3052.  
  3053. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-turbine-turmoil.pdf
  3054. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-industry-exploit.pdf
  3055. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-converged.pdf
  3056. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-quantum-insert.pdf
  3057. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-thousands-implants.pdf
  3058. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-gchq-quantumtheory.pdf
  3059. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-more-than-one-way.pdf
  3060. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-hammerchant.pdf
  3061. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-phishing-mtm.pdf
  3062. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/tao-quantuminsert-bonanza.htm
  3063.  
  3064. ¤ Compare TURBINE Slides (Spiegel vs Intercept) ::
  3065.  
  3066. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spot-differences.pdf
  3067.  
  3068. ¤ NSA Denies Thousands of Implants ::
  3069.  
  3070. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-14-0313.pdf
  3071. _______________________________________
  3072. ¤ NSA Hacking Routers & Social Media (Misc) ::
  3073.  
  3074. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-5-eyes-hacking.pdf
  3075. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-menwith-xkeyscore.pdf
  3076. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-selector.pdf
  3077. _______________________________________
  3078. ¤ Cryptome Eyeballs Deputy Director Richard Ledgett ::
  3079.  
  3080. http://cryptome.org/2014-info/richard-ledgett/richard-ledgett.htm
  3081. _______________________________________
  3082. ¤ NSA Assistance to Dutch Somali Piracy Control ::
  3083.  
  3084.  Alliances between security services are usually
  3085. kept secret. But thousands of NSA documents are
  3086. now in the hands of a select group of journalists,
  3087. thanks to former NSA worker Edward Snowden. They
  3088. show that the NSA is the central organisation in
  3089. an international exchange of tapped telephone and
  3090. internet traffic.
  3091.  
  3092.  The Netherlands is also a part of this. In September,
  3093. the German weekly Der Spiegel published an NSA document
  3094. about the Netherlands. The graph, entitled ‘Netherlands
  3095. – 30 days’, appeared to show that the NSA had listened
  3096. in to 1.8 million Dutch telephone calls.
  3097.  
  3098.  But last month, the cabinet showed that the reality
  3099. was different. The 1.8 million telephone calls, wrote
  3100. home affairs minister Ronald Plasterk and defence
  3101. minister Jeanine Hennis, were not intercepted by
  3102. the Americans, but by the Dutch and then shared with
  3103. the NSA. It was not American, but Dutch espionage.
  3104.  
  3105.  Two new documents give further details. The Netherlands,
  3106. it transpires, intercepts vast amounts of Somali
  3107. telephone traffic and shares it with the NSA. The
  3108. Dutch use the information to combat piracy. But the
  3109. Americans may possibly use the information for
  3110. something else as well: taking out terrorism suspects
  3111. by attacking them with armed drones.
  3112.  
  3113. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-dutch-assist.pdf
  3114.  
  3115. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2014/03/05/the-secret-role-of-the-dutch-in-the-american-war-on-terror/
  3116. _______________________________________
  3117. ¤ NSA Blames Tech Firms, Vice Versa ::
  3118.  
  3119. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/tech-stop-spying.htm
  3120.  
  3121. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/big-data-spying.htm
  3122. ---------------------------------------
  3123. ¤ Tech Firms Spy ::
  3124.  
  3125. http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/online-spying.htm
  3126.  
  3127. ¤ NSA Spies Too ::
  3128.  
  3129. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  3130. _______________________________________
  3131. ¤ GCHQ “OPTIC NERVE” Spy Programme ::
  3132.  
  3133. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-optic-nerve.pdf
  3134.  
  3135. ¤ GCHQ Collects Webcam Photos of Yahoo Users ::
  3136.  
  3137.  The documents show that images were collected
  3138. from webcams at regular intervals, one image
  3139. every five minutes, and were used by the spy
  3140. agency to trial automated facial recognition
  3141. programs.
  3142.  
  3143. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/27/gchq-nsa-webcam-images-internet-yahoo
  3144. http://www.infowars.com/you-read-it-here-first-government-spies-on-innocent-people-via-webcams-laptops-xbox/
  3145. http://news.softpedia.com/news/GCHQ-Collected-Webcam-Images-of-Millions-of-Yahoo-Fans-429705.shtml
  3146. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/02/28/gchq-f28.html
  3147.  
  3148. ¤ FLASHBACK ; Infowars Warned Users in 2006 ::
  3149.  
  3150. http://www.infowars.com/articles/bb/gov_industry_use_computer_mics_spy_on_americans.htm
  3151. _______________________________________
  3152. ¤ NSA Director Alexander’s Phones ::
  3153.  
  3154. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/02/nsa-director-alexanders-phones.html
  3155. _______________________________________
  3156. ¤ NSA Seeks to Expand Database, 26 Feb 2014 ::
  3157.  
  3158. http://www.breitbart.com/InstaBlog/2014/02/27/NSA-Seeks-to-Expand-Database
  3159.  
  3160. http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br14-01-motion-140226.pdf
  3161. _______________________________________
  3162. ¤ NSA Bugged Top German Officials After Orders
  3163. Not to Spy On Chancellor Claims New Whistleblower ::
  3164.  
  3165. http://www.mintpressnews.com/snowden-2-0-new-active-duty-nsa-whistleblower/180502/
  3166.  
  3167. http://techcrunch.com/2014/02/24/report-nsa-bugged-top-german-officials-after-obama-ordered-cease-of-spying-on-chancellor/
  3168. _______________________________________
  3169. ¤ NSA Observer ::
  3170.  
  3171. https://nsa-observer.laquadrature.net/
  3172. _______________________________________
  3173. ¤ Spy Documents Released Since June 2013 ::
  3174.  
  3175. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  3176.  
  3177. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/snowden-tabulations.htm
  3178. _______________________________________
  3179. ¤ NSA Spying Zero Hedge Connections ::
  3180.  
  3181. http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2014/02/ZH%20browsing%20govt_1.jpg
  3182.  
  3183. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-02-19/while-browsing-zero-hedge-certain-government-agency
  3184. _______________________________________
  3185. ¤ NYT Samantha Storey Inept Redactions ::
  3186.  
  3187. Inlcudes two GCHQ documents.
  3188.  
  3189. 01 “MOBILE THEME BRIEFING MAY 28 2010”
  3190.  
  3191. 02 “Converged Analysis of Smartphone Devices”
  3192.  
  3193. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nyt-leak.zip
  3194. _______________________________________
  3195. ¤ NSA’s Secret Role in the US Assassination Program ::
  3196.  
  3197.  An anonymous former drone operator for Joint
  3198. Special Operations Command (JSOC) told The
  3199. Intercept — a new publication helmed by
  3200. Glenn Greenwald, who broke the first of many
  3201. NSA revelations last year — that the US military
  3202. and CIA use the NSA’s metadata analysis and
  3203. phone-tracking abilities to identify airstrike
  3204. targets without confirming their veracity on
  3205. the ground.
  3206.  
  3207. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/10/the-nsas-secret-role/
  3208. https://www.activistpost.com/2013/10/add-death-by-drone-to-nsas-list-of.html
  3209. http://www.infowars.com/new-whistleblower-reveals-nsa-picking-drone-targets-based-on-bad-data-death-by-unreliable-metadata/
  3210. _______________________________________
  3211. ¤ ASD Helps NSA Spy on Law Firms, Laywers ::
  3212.  
  3213.  A top-secret document, obtained by the
  3214. former NSA contractor Edward J. Snowden,
  3215. shows that an American law firm was
  3216. monitored while representing a foreign
  3217. government in trade disputes with the
  3218. United States. The disclosure offers a
  3219. rare glimpse of a specific instance in
  3220. which Americans were ensnared by the
  3221. eavesdroppers, and is of particular
  3222. interest because lawyers in the United
  3223. States with clients overseas have
  3224. expressed growing concern that their
  3225. confidential communications could be
  3226. compromised by such surveillance.
  3227.  
  3228. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/us/eavesdropping-ensnared-american-law-firm.html
  3229. http://www.activistpost.com/2014/02/new-snowden-docs-implicate-nsa-in.html
  3230. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/asia-pacific/198506-report-spies-watched-us-lawyers-in-trade-deal
  3231.  
  3232. NOBODY comments
  3233.  
  3234. NY Times has not provided any documentation.
  3235.  
  3236.  There should be an FOIA request to the IC
  3237. and perhaps to the DNI for this document to
  3238. be declassified for research in public domain.
  3239. _______________________________________
  3240. ¤ NSA FISA Business Spying ::
  3241.  
  3242. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-fisa-business.pdf
  3243.  
  3244. ¤ NSA Course on FISA Spying Operations ::
  3245.  
  3246. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-fisa-course.pdf
  3247. _______________________________________
  3248. ¤ Snowden Allegedly Used Web Scraper Tool ::
  3249.  
  3250. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/us/snowden-used-low-cost-tool-to-best-nsa.html?hp&_r=1
  3251. _______________________________________
  3252. ¤ Ex-chancellor Gerhard Schröder Allegedly
  3253. Spied by NSA (No Documentation Presented) ::
  3254.  
  3255.  Munich daily Sueddeutsche Zeitung and
  3256. public broadcaster NDR reported Tuesday
  3257. that Merkel’s predecessor Gerhard Schroeder
  3258. was added to the NSA’s National Sigint
  3259. Requirement List as number 388 in 2002.
  3260.  
  3261. http://www.dw.de/reports-nsa-first-targeted-german-chancellor-schr%C3%B6der-then-merkel/a-17408683
  3262. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/04/us-nsa-gerhard-schroeder-surveillance?view=mobile
  3263. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/ausspaeh-affaere-die-spionage-botschaft-12635377.html
  3264.  
  3265. ¤ New Interpretations of NSA Monitoring
  3266. the German Chancellor ::
  3267.  
  3268. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/02/new-interpretations-of-nsa-monitoring.html
  3269. _______________________________________
  3270. ¤ Dutch Intelligence Claims Responsibility for
  3271. Phone Call Spying ::
  3272.  
  3273. http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2014/02/the_netherlands_not_usa_gather.php
  3274.  
  3275. http://static3.volkskrant.nl/static/asset/2014/kamerbrief_met_reactie_op_berichtgeving_metadata_telefoonverkeer_3761.pdf
  3276. _______________________________________
  3277. ¤ First Congressman To Battle the NSA is Dead ::
  3278.  
  3279. http://pando.com/2014/02/04/the-first-congressman-to-battle-the-nsa-is-dead-no-one-noticed-no-one-cares/
  3280. _______________________________________
  3281. ¤ Mike Rogers Wants Journalists With Leaks Jailed ::
  3282.  
  3283. http://nypost.com/2014/02/05/pol-journalist-fencing-snowden-secrets-should-be-jailed/
  3284. _______________________________________
  3285.  On Saturday 20 July 2013, in the basement of the
  3286. Guardian’s office in Kings Cross, London, watched by
  3287. two GCHQ technicians, Guardian editors destroyed
  3288. hard drives and memory cards on which encrypted files
  3289. leaked by Edward Snowden had been stored. This is
  3290. the first time footage of the event has been released.
  3291.  
  3292. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUokM5d1qic
  3293. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  3294. ¤ CSEC IP Profiling & Mission Impacts ::
  3295.  
  3296. http://www.cbc.ca/news2/pdf/airports_redacted.pdf
  3297.  
  3298. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/csec-ip-profile.pdf
  3299.  
  3300. ¤ CSEC Objects to Disclosure of IP Profiling ::
  3301.  
  3302. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/csec-14-0131.pdf
  3303.  
  3304. ¤ CSEC Used Airport Wi-Fi to Track Travellers ::
  3305.  
  3306.  A top secret document retrieved by US whistleblower
  3307. Edward Snowden and obtained by CBC News shows
  3308. that Canada’s electronic spy agency used information
  3309. from the free internet service at a major Canadian
  3310. airport to track the wireless devices of thousands
  3311. of ordinary airline passengers for days after they
  3312. left the terminal.
  3313.  
  3314.  After reviewing the document, one of Canada’s
  3315. foremost authorities on cyber-security says the
  3316. clandestine operation by the Communications
  3317. Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) was almost
  3318. certainly illegal. ... ...
  3319.  
  3320.  The document indicates the passenger tracking
  3321. operation was a trial run of a powerful new
  3322. software program CSEC was developing with help
  3323. from its US counterpart, the NSA.
  3324.  
  3325.  In the document, CSEC called the new technologies
  3326. “game-changing,” and said they could be used for
  3327. tracking “any target that makes occasional forays
  3328. into other cities/regions.”
  3329.  
  3330. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/csec-used-airport-wi-fi-to-track-canadian-travellers-edward-snowden-documents-1.2517881
  3331.  
  3332.  CSEC concluded: “Can then take seeds from these
  3333. airports and repeat to cover whole world.”
  3334.  
  3335. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/01/new-snowden-docs-show-canadian-spies-tracked-thousands-of-travelers/
  3336.  
  3337. ¤ More Details Into CSEC IP Profiling ::
  3338.  
  3339. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/02/did-csec-really-tracked-canadian.html
  3340.  
  3341. ¤ How Canada’s CSEC Maps Phone and Internet Connections ::
  3342.  
  3343. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/03/olympia-how-canadas-csec-maps-phone-and.html
  3344. _______________________________________
  3345. ¤ NSA, GCHQ Allegedly Hack Cryptographer ::
  3346.  
  3347. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-gchq-quisquater.pdf
  3348.  
  3349. ¤ ... And Now It’s Personal ::
  3350.  
  3351. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/stopping-nsa.htm
  3352. _______________________________________
  3353. ¤ GCHQ Snooped on YouTube and Facebook ::
  3354.  
  3355.  Documents taken from the National Security
  3356. Agency by Edward Snowden and obtained by NBC
  3357. News detail how British cyber spies demonstrated
  3358. a pilot program to their US partners in 2012
  3359. in which they were able to monitor YouTube in
  3360. real time and collect addresses from the billions
  3361. of videos watched daily, as well as some user
  3362. information, for analysis. At the time the
  3363. documents were printed, they were also able to
  3364. spy on Facebook and Twitter.
  3365.  
  3366.  Called “Psychology A New Kind of SIGDEV”
  3367. (Signals Development), the presentation includes
  3368. a section that spells out “Broad real-time
  3369. monitoring of online activity” of YouTube videos,
  3370. URLs “liked” on Facebook, and Blogspot/Blogger
  3371. visits. The monitoring program is called
  3372. “Squeaky Dolphin.”
  3373.  
  3374.  Experts told NBC News the documents show the
  3375. British had to have been either physically able
  3376. to tap the cables carrying the world’s web
  3377. traffic or able to use a third party to gain
  3378. physical access to the massive stream of data,
  3379. and would be able to extract some key data
  3380. about specific users as well.
  3381.  
  3382. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-squeaky-dolphin.pdf
  3383. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-newtons-cat.pdf
  3384. http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/Sections/NEWS/snowden_youtube_nbc_document.pdf
  3385. http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2014/01/27/22469304-snowden-docs-reveal-british-spies-snooped-on-youtube-and-facebook?lite
  3386. _______________________________________
  3387. ¤ NSA/GCHQ Smartphone App Location Spying ::
  3388.  
  3389. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/27/nsa-gchq-smartphone-app-angry-birds-personal-data
  3390. https://www.propublica.org/article/spy-agencies-probe-angry-birds-and-other-apps-for-personal-data
  3391. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/28/world/spy-agencies-scour-phone-apps-for-personal-data.html?_r=0
  3392.  
  3393. ¤ GCHQ Mobile Theme Briefing ::
  3394.  
  3395.  “Over 200 3rd party Location Aware Applications
  3396. on the iPhone alone.”
  3397.  
  3398. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-mobile-theme.pdf
  3399.  
  3400. ¤ NSA Converged Analysis of Smartphone Devices ::
  3401.  
  3402. “Android Phones pass GPS data in the clear.”
  3403.  
  3404. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-smartphones-analysis.pdf
  3405. _______________________________________
  3406. ¤ Obama Grants NSA Exemption From Law ::
  3407.  
  3408.  The National Security Agency program that
  3409. collects data on nearly every US phone call
  3410. isn’t legal, a privacy review board said
  3411. Thursday in a newly released report.
  3412.  
  3413. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/pclob-14-0123.pdf
  3414.  
  3415.  “We have not identified a single instance
  3416. involving a threat to the United States in
  3417. which the program made a concrete difference
  3418. in the outcome of a counterterrorism
  3419. investigation,” the board wrote in the
  3420. report released Thursday.
  3421.  
  3422.  Despite Obama’s promise to reform the NSA,
  3423. domestic spying will continue.
  3424.  
  3425. http://edition.cnn.com/2014/01/23/politics/nsa-telephone-records-privacy/index.html?hpt=hp_t3
  3426. _______________________________________
  3427. ¤ Snowden Speaks ::
  3428.  
  3429. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/snowden-video-13-0126.zip
  3430. _______________________________________
  3431. ▼ Snowden Calls Russian-Spy Story “Absurd” ::
  3432.  
  3433. http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/01/snowden-calls-russian-spy-story-absurd.html
  3434.  
  3435. ▲ NSA is NOT the Source of All Spying ::
  3436.          ¯¯¯
  3437. http://20committee.com/2014/01/18/the-end-of-the-snowden-operation/
  3438.  
  3439. NOBODY’s comment blocked @ 20committee.com
  3440.  
  3441.  Reform? Reform was never intended to come
  3442. from politicians or the white house. Reform
  3443. will come from peoples’ change of online use ;
  3444. growing public use of open-source encryption,
  3445. growing use of services such as Tor, a growing
  3446. amount of computers air-gapped, growing use of
  3447. hardcopy backups rather than “the cloud” - and
  3448. add to that, more people bleaching their cookies
  3449. among other web browser cache, surging VPN use,
  3450. growing use of proxies. Sudden disconnections
  3451. of users’ modems when not actually being used. The
  3452. use of alternative search engines (such as ixquick,
  3453. duckduckgo, startpage, privatelee, et al) and
  3454. also consider the growing use of XPIs such as
  3455. Noscript, Ghostery, HTTPS Everywhere and others.
  3456.  
  3457. Reform?
  3458.  
  3459.  How about the death of RSA and a new generation
  3460. of young privacy-crypto-enthusiasts who start to
  3461. say “fuck the corporate platforms” and change it
  3462. whether legal or not?
  3463.  
  3464. The reform will come from people taking action.
  3465.  
  3466.  Here’s what I’d like to know - will “big government”
  3467. follow up reform with their “internet kill switch?”
  3468. _______________________________________
  3469. ¤ NSA Redactions Fail, Fail and Fail Again ::
  3470.  
  3471. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-redaction-fails.pdf
  3472. _______________________________________
  3473. ¤ NSA’s Upstream Collection Detailed ::
  3474.  
  3475.  The corporate partnerships are one of
  3476. three ways NSA is intercepting the world’s
  3477. main internet cables:
  3478.  
  3479.  - Cooperation with telecommunication companies
  3480.  - Cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies
  3481.  - Unilateral cable tapping operations
  3482.  
  3483. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/01/slides-about-nsas-upstream-collection.html
  3484. ---------------------------------------
  3485. http://postimg.org/image/9viuxblpd/
  3486. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOAv7zbJkCk
  3487. http://www.dailydot.com/news/nsa-fairview-slides-brazil-spying/
  3488. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-codenames.htm
  3489. _______________________________________
  3490. ¤ 24 FISA Court Documents DECLASSIFIED ::
  3491.  
  3492. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc-13-0117.zip
  3493.  
  3494. ¤ FISA Court Orders Comparison ::
  3495.  
  3496. http://cryptome.org/vz-slip.jpg
  3497. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc/fisc-orders-compare.htm
  3498. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc2/fisc-before-after-obama.htm
  3499. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc3/fisc-br-11-07-v-11-57.htm
  3500. ---------------------------------------
  3501. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  3502. _______________________________________
  3503. ¤ SMS Text Messages - A Goldmine to Exploit ::
  3504.  
  3505. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-sms-exploit.pdf
  3506.  
  3507. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1006111/sms.pdf
  3508.  
  3509. ¤ NSA Vacuuming SMS Texts Around the World ::
  3510.  
  3511.  The documents also reveal the UK spy agency
  3512. GCHQ has made use of the NSA database to search
  3513. the metadata of “untargeted and unwarranted”
  3514. communications belonging to people in the UK.
  3515.  
  3516.  The NSA program, codenamed Dishfire, collects
  3517. “pretty much everything it can”, according to
  3518. GCHQ documents, rather than merely storing the
  3519. communications of existing surveillance targets.
  3520.  
  3521.  The NSA has made extensive use of its vast
  3522. text message database to extract information
  3523. on people’s travel plans, contact books, financial
  3524. transactions and more – including of individuals
  3525. under no suspicion of illegal activity.
  3526.  
  3527. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/16/nsa-collects-millions-text-messages-daily-untargeted-global-sweep
  3528. _______________________________________
  3529. ¤ NSA Covert Radio Signals Break Air-gaps ::
  3530.  
  3531. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-radio.htm
  3532.  
  3533. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-open-computers-not-connected-to-internet.html
  3534.  
  3535.  The technology, which the agency has used
  3536. since at least 2008, relies on a covert
  3537. channel of radio waves that can be transmitted
  3538. from tiny circuit boards and USB cards inserted
  3539. surreptitiously into the computers. In some
  3540. cases, they are sent to a briefcase-size
  3541. relay station that intelligence agencies can
  3542. set up miles away from the target.
  3543.  
  3544.  The radio frequency technology has helped
  3545. solve one of the biggest problems facing
  3546. American intelligence agencies for years:
  3547. getting into computers that adversaries,
  3548. and some American partners, have tried to
  3549. make impervious to spying or cyberattack.
  3550. In most cases, the radio frequency hardware
  3551. must be physically inserted by a spy, a
  3552. manufacturer or an unwitting user.
  3553. ---------------------------------------
  3554. Refer to NSA’s Tailored Access Operations
  3555.  
  3556. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=23643
  3557. _______________________________________
  3558. ¤ NSA Windows Event Monitoring ::
  3559.  
  3560. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-windows-event.pdf
  3561. ---------------------------------------
  3562. ¤ Locate And Destroy WinRM Registry ::
  3563.  
  3564. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/e8a662d4
  3565. _______________________________________
  3566. ¤ NSA Reducing the Effectiveness of Hash ::
  3567.  
  3568. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-pass-hash.pdf
  3569. _______________________________________
  3570. ¤ NSA’s Organizational Designations ::
  3571.  
  3572. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/01/nsas-organizational-designations.html
  3573. _______________________________________
  3574. ¤ Analysis of NSA’s 215 Metadata Spy Programs ::
  3575.  
  3576. http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/NSAshane3.pdf
  3577. _______________________________________
  3578. ¤ John Inglis Explains Why US-Based Collection
  3579. of Internet Metadata Doesn’t Work ::
  3580.  
  3581. http://www.npr.org/2014/01/10/261282601/transcript-nsa-deputy-director-john-inglis?live=1
  3582.  
  3583. http://www.emptywheel.net/2014/01/10/john-inglis-explains-why-us-based-collection-of-internet-metadata-doesnt-work/
  3584. _______________________________________
  3585. ¤ Rand Paul to Lead Class-Action Lawsuit
  3586. Against Obama Over NSA Spying ::
  3587.  
  3588. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2014/01/03/Rand-Paul-to-Sue-Obama-over-NSA-Spying
  3589. _______________________________________
  3590. ¤ NSA Quantum Computing Research for Cracking
  3591. All Encryption ::
  3592.  
  3593.  In room-size metal boxes ­secure against
  3594. electromagnetic leaks, the National Security
  3595. Agency is racing to build a computer that
  3596. could break nearly every kind of encryption
  3597. used to protect banking, medical, business
  3598. and government records around the world.
  3599.  
  3600.  According to documents provided by former
  3601. NSA contractor Edward Snowden, the effort
  3602. to build “a cryptologically useful quantum
  3603. computer” — a machine exponentially faster
  3604. than classical computers — is part of a
  3605. $79.7 million research program titled
  3606. “Penetrating Hard Targets.” Much of the
  3607. work is hosted under classified contracts
  3608. at a laboratory in College Park, Md.
  3609.  
  3610. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-computer.pdf
  3611. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-computer-2.pdf
  3612. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-seeks-to-build-quantum-computer-that-could-crack-most-types-of-encryption/2014/01/02/8fff297e-7195-11e3-8def-a33011492df2_print.html
  3613. _______________________________________
  3614. ¤ NSA and Random Number Generators ::
  3615.  
  3616. http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/12/a-few-more-notes-on-nsa-random-number.html
  3617. _______________________________________
  3618. ¤ Updated List of NSA Codenames ::
  3619.  
  3620. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-codenames.htm
  3621. _______________________________________
  3622. ¤ Jacob Appelbaum Explains New NSA Leaks ::
  3623.  
  3624. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b0w36GAyZIA
  3625.  
  3626. Mirror » http://fileb.ag/xwcp0jrewk2o
  3627.  
  3628. ¤ Jacob’s NSA Slides @ioerror (ZIP) ::
  3629.  
  3630. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-catalog.zip
  3631.  
  3632. ¤ NSA Catalog Image Formats (16.7MB) Mirrored ::
  3633.  
  3634. http://upsto.re/CtXqio
  3635. http://f.lui.li/get_1228_a2b4.html
  3636. http://blakker.pl/files/get/fenW1XyGrl/nsa-catalog-images.zip
  3637.  
  3638. ¤ Documents Reveal Top NSA Hacking Unit ::
  3639.  
  3640.  The NSA’s TAO hacking unit is considered
  3641. to be the intelligence agency’s top secret
  3642. weapon. It maintains its own covert network,
  3643. infiltrates computers around the world and
  3644. even intercepts shipping deliveries to plant
  3645. back doors in electronics ordered by those
  3646. it is targeting. ... ...
  3647.  
  3648. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-nsa-uses-powerful-toolbox-in-effort-to-spy-on-global-networks-a-940969.html
  3649.  
  3650.  The insert method and other variants of
  3651. QUANTUM are closely linked to a shadow
  3652. network operated by the NSA alongside the
  3653. Internet, with its own, well-hidden
  3654. infrastructure comprised of “covert”
  3655. routers and servers. It appears the NSA
  3656. also incorporates routers and servers
  3657. from non-NSA networks into its covert
  3658. network by infecting these networks with
  3659. “implants” that then allow the government
  3660. hackers to control the computers remotely.
  3661.  
  3662.  In this way, the intelligence service seeks
  3663. to identify and track its targets based on
  3664. their digital footprints. These identifiers
  3665. could include certain email addresses or
  3666. website cookies set on a person’s computer.
  3667. Of course, a cookie doesn’t automatically
  3668. identify a person, but it can if it includes
  3669. additional information like an email address.
  3670. In that case, a cookie becomes something
  3671. like the web equivalent of a fingerprint.
  3672. ---------------------------------------
  3673. ¤ NSA QUANTUM Theory (FOXACID) ::
  3674.  
  3675. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-quantumtheory.pdf
  3676.  
  3677. ¤ NSA/GCHQ QUANTUM Tasking Techniques ::
  3678.  
  3679.  “YahooBcookie’s are unique to a specific
  3680. computer and can hold other <yahoo> addresses
  3681. that are being logged into on that computer
  3682. as long as the user does not clear browser
  3683. cookies.”
  3684.  
  3685. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-quantum-tasking.pdf
  3686.  
  3687. ¤ NSA QFIRE Packet Injection Attacks ::
  3688.  
  3689. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-qfire.pdf
  3690. ---------------------------------------
  3691. ¤ NSA Catalog for Hardware Backdoors ::
  3692.  
  3693.  The specialists at ANT, which presumably
  3694. stands for Advanced or Access Network Technology,
  3695. could be described as master carpenters for
  3696. the NSA’s department for Tailored Access
  3697. Operations (TAO). In cases where TAO’s usual
  3698. hacking and data-skimming methods don’t suffice,
  3699. ANT workers step in with their special tools,
  3700. penetrating networking equipment, monitoring
  3701. mobile phones and computers and diverting or
  3702. even modifying data. Such implants, as they are
  3703. referred to in NSA parlance, have played a
  3704. considerable role in the intelligence agency’s
  3705. ability to establish a global covert network
  3706. that operates alongside the Internet.
  3707.  
  3708.  Some of the equipment available is quite
  3709. inexpensive. A rigged monitor cable that
  3710. allows “TAO personnel to see what is displayed
  3711. on the targeted monitor,” for example, is
  3712. available for just $30. But an “active GSM
  3713. base station” -- a tool that makes it possible
  3714. to mimic a mobile phone tower and thus monitor
  3715. cell phones -- costs a full $40,000. Computer
  3716. bugging devices disguised as normal USB plugs,
  3717. capable of sending and receiving data via radio
  3718. undetected, are available in packs of 50 for
  3719. over $1 million.
  3720.  
  3721.  The ANT division doesn’t just manufacture
  3722. surveillance hardware. It also develops software
  3723. for special tasks. The ANT developers have a
  3724. clear preference for planting their malicious
  3725. code in so-called BIOS, software located on a
  3726. computer’s motherboard that is the first thing
  3727. to load when a computer is turned on.
  3728.  
  3729.  This has a number of valuable advantages: an
  3730. infected PC or server appears to be functioning
  3731. normally, so the infection remains invisible
  3732. to virus protection and other security programs.
  3733. And even if the hard drive of an infected
  3734. computer has been completely erased and a new
  3735. operating system is installed, the ANT malware
  3736. can continue to function and ensures that new
  3737. spyware can once again be loaded onto what is
  3738. presumed to be a clean computer. The ANT
  3739. developers call this “Persistence” and believe
  3740. this approach has provided them with the
  3741. possibility of permanent access.
  3742.  
  3743.  Another program attacks the firmware in
  3744. hard drives manufactured by Western Digital,
  3745. Seagate, Maxtor and Samsung, all of which,
  3746. with the exception of latter, are American
  3747. companies. Here, too, it appears the US
  3748. intelligence agency is compromising the
  3749. technology and products of American companies.
  3750.  
  3751. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-tao-ant-pdf.pdf
  3752. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/catalog-reveals-nsa-has-back-doors-for-numerous-devices-a-940994.html
  3753. http://gizmodo.com/the-nsa-actually-intercepted-packages-to-put-backdoors-1491169592
  3754. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/29/der-spiegel-nsa-hacking-unit-tao
  3755. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/31/snow-d31.html
  3756.  
  3757. ¤ NSA Cisco / Juniper Router Backdoors ::
  3758.  
  3759. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-firewalls.pdf
  3760.  
  3761. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-router.pdf
  3762.  
  3763. ¤ NSA Computer Monitor Backdoor ::
  3764.  
  3765. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-bildschirm.pdf
  3766.  
  3767. ¤ NSA PCI Bus Backdoor ::
  3768.  
  3769. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-rechner.pdf
  3770.  
  3771. ¤ NSA Motherboard Backdoor (#BadBIOS) ::
  3772.  
  3773. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-server.pdf
  3774.  
  3775. ¤ NSA Keyboard Backdoor ::
  3776.  
  3777. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-tastatu.pdf
  3778.  
  3779. ¤ NSA Apple iPhone Backdoor ::
  3780.  
  3781. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-handys.pdf
  3782.  
  3783. ¤ NSA WiFi Card / Apple Airport Backdoors ::
  3784.  
  3785. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-mobilfunk.pdf
  3786.  
  3787. ¤ NSA Active 802.11 Netcard Backdoor ::
  3788.  
  3789. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-w-lan.pdf
  3790.  
  3791. ¤ NSA USB Backdoor to Bridge Air-gaps ::
  3792.  
  3793. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-usb.pdf
  3794.  
  3795. ¤ NSA Alternative SIGINT Hunter ::
  3796.  
  3797. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-raumuber.pdf
  3798.  
  3799. ¤ NSA Keystroke, Screenshot & SIGINT Hunting ::
  3800.  
  3801. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/greenwald-13-1231.pdf
  3802.  
  3803. http://truth-out.org/news/item/20948-glenn-greenwald-the-nsa-can-literally-watch-every-keystroke-you-make
  3804.  
  3805. ¤ Jacob Appelbaum Comment on Der Spiegel Reports ::
  3806.  
  3807. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/appelbaum-der-spiegel.htm
  3808. ---------------------------------------
  3809. BLOWBACK SETS IN ...
  3810.  
  3811. ¤ IT Firms Lose Billions After NSA Scandal ::
  3812.  
  3813. http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/it-firms-lose-billions-after-nsa-scandal-exposed-by-whistleblower-edward-snowden-9028599.html
  3814.  
  3815. ¤ Foreign Firms Won’t Buy American Tech ::
  3816.  
  3817. https://www.informationweek.com/security/risk-management/nsa-fallout-why-foreign-firms-wont-buy-american-tech/d/d-id/1113384
  3818. ---------------------------------------
  3819. ¤ Apple Claims They Know Nothing About Backdoors ::
  3820.  
  3821. http://www.infowars.com/apple-says-it-knows-nothing-about-your-iphone-spying-on-you/
  3822.  
  3823. ¤ Apple Inc. Lying Exposed ::
  3824.  
  3825.  Logs from a properly air-gapped Mac OSX show
  3826. the system attempting to access the Airport -
  3827. yet the Airport card was physically disconnected.
  3828.  
  3829. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/77d624be
  3830.  
  3831. ¤ Cyber–Security Experts Ask If Apple “Flaw”
  3832. Was Really NSA Backdoor ::
  3833.  
  3834.  Following an admission by Apple that a “bug”
  3835. in its operating system had left devices open
  3836. to potential hacking, experts are questioning
  3837. whether the security hole was intentional, in
  3838. order to allow the NSA backdoor access as part
  3839. of its mass spying program.
  3840.  
  3841. http://www.infowars.com/cyber-security-experts-ask-apple-flaw-was-really-nsa-backdoor/
  3842. ---------------------------------------
  3843. ¤ Intel CEO Refuses To Answer Questions On
  3844. Whether NSA Can Access Processors ::
  3845.  
  3846. http://www.infowars.com/intel-ceo-refuses-to-answer-questions-on-whether-nsa-can-access-processors/
  3847.  
  3848. ¤ Dell Inc. Apologizes for the ‘Inconvenience’
  3849. of Helping NSA Install Backdoors ::
  3850.  
  3851. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131230/17174425718/dells-twitter-account-apologizes-inconvenience-helping-nsa-place-hidden-bios-bug.shtml
  3852.  
  3853. http://www.infowars.com/dells-twitter-account-apologizes-for-the-inconvenience-of-helping-nsa-install-spyware/
  3854.  
  3855. ¤ Locate And Destroy 802.11 Registry ::
  3856.  
  3857.  How to disable SOMBERKNAVE implant to
  3858. properly air-gap the Windows XP system.
  3859.  
  3860. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/bdd440b3
  3861. _______________________________________
  3862. ¤ NSA Whistleblower ; Planned Police State ::
  3863.  
  3864. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x9Kcgme2I0c
  3865.  
  3866. ¤ NSA Whistleblower ; National Security Scam ::
  3867.  
  3868. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xPemLhvwfos
  3869. _______________________________________
  3870. ¤ Edward Snowden Interview by Barton Gellman ::
  3871.  
  3872. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/edward-snowden-after-months-of-nsa-revelations-says-his-missions-accomplished/2013/12/23/49fc36de-6c1c-11e3-a523-fe73f0ff6b8d_story.html
  3873.  
  3874.  Beginning in October 2012, he said, he
  3875. brought his misgivings to two superiors
  3876. in the NSA’s Technology Directorate and
  3877. two more in the NSA Threat Operations
  3878. Center’s regional base in Hawaii. For
  3879. each of them, and 15 other co-workers,
  3880. Snowden said he opened a data query tool
  3881. called BOUNDLESSINFORMANT, which used
  3882. color-coded “heat maps” to depict the
  3883. volume of data ingested by NSA taps.
  3884.  
  3885.  His colleagues were often “astonished to
  3886. learn we are collecting more in the United
  3887. States on Americans than we are on Russians
  3888. in Russia,” he said. Many of them were
  3889. troubled, he said, and several said they
  3890. did not want to know any more.
  3891. ---------------------------------------
  3892. BOUNDLESS INFORMANT REPORTS/DOCS REFER HERE ;
  3893.  
  3894. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=19580
  3895. _______________________________________
  3896. ¤ New York Judge, William Pauley III, Declares
  3897. Metadata Hoarding Legal ::
  3898.  
  3899. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/pauley-13-1227.pdf
  3900. http://www.scribd.com/doc/194082600/NSA-Opinion
  3901. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/nsa-phone-surveillance-ruling-101569.html
  3902. http://www.infowars.com/judge-falls-for-the-big-lie-about-nsa-spying/
  3903. /\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/
  3904. \/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\
  3905. ¤ Judge Declares Metadata Hoarding Violates
  3906. Fourth Amendment Rights ::
  3907.  
  3908. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-048-049.pdf
  3909.  
  3910.  A federal judge ruled Monday that the
  3911. National Security Agency program which
  3912. collects information on nearly all telephone
  3913. calls made to, from or within the United
  3914. States is likely unconstitutional.
  3915.  
  3916.  US District Court Judge Richard Leon found
  3917. that the program appears to violate the
  3918. Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable
  3919. searches and seizures. He also said the
  3920. Justice Department had failed to demonstrate
  3921. that collecting the information had helped
  3922. to head off terrorist attacks.
  3923.  
  3924.  Acting on a lawsuit brought by conservative
  3925. legal activist Larry Klayman, Leon issued
  3926. a preliminary injunction barring the NSA
  3927. from collecting so-called metadata pertaining
  3928. to the Verizon accounts of Klayman and one
  3929. of his clients. However, the judge stayed
  3930. the order to allow for an appeal.
  3931.  
  3932. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/national-security-agency-phones-judge-101203.html
  3933. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/17/cour-d17.html
  3934.  
  3935.  Leon’s 68-page opinion is the first
  3936. significant legal setback for the NSA’s
  3937. surveillance program since it was disclosed
  3938. in June in news stories based on leaks
  3939. from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden.
  3940. For seven years, the metadata program has
  3941. been approved repeatedly by numerous judges
  3942. on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  3943. Court and found constitutional by at least
  3944. one judge sitting in a criminal case.
  3945.  
  3946. https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2013cv0851-48
  3947.  
  3948. ¤ Klayman v. NSA 7 Court Documents ::
  3949.  
  3950. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-051-058.zip
  3951.  
  3952. ▼ Delay Motion for Class Action Lawsuit ::
  3953.  
  3954. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-060.pdf
  3955.  
  3956. ▲ White House Tries to Prevent Judge From
  3957. Ruling on Surveillance Efforts ::
  3958.  
  3959. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/22/us/white-house-tries-to-prevent-judge-from-ruling-on-surveillance-efforts.html?_r=0
  3960.  
  3961. ¤ Bulk Metadata Collection Ruled Illegal ::
  3962.  
  3963. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/leon-13-1216.pdf
  3964. ---------------------------------------
  3965. ¤ White House Spying Review Group Report ::
  3966.  
  3967. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/obama-nsa-report.pdf
  3968.  
  3969. ¤ White House Spy Report Commentary ::
  3970.  
  3971. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/prgi-comments-001.htm
  3972. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/prgi-comments-002.htm
  3973.  
  3974. ¤ Obama Advisory Committee Whitewashes US
  3975. Spying Programs ::
  3976.  
  3977. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/19/spyi-d19.html
  3978. ---------------------------------------
  3979. ▼ FLASHBACK ; Michael Hayden Admits They
  3980. Will NOT Stifle Surveillance ::
  3981.  
  3982. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XS6nfkbNvlo
  3983.  
  3984. http://www.infowars.com/former-nsa-boss-government-will-continue-surveillance-so-get-used-to-it/
  3985.  
  3986. ▲ Counter-spy_Manual.zip
  3987. (22 files | ZIP | 2.93MB)
  3988.  
  3989. http://paste.darkbyte.ru/view/5459487
  3990.  
  3991. http://ae7.st/p/26c (mirror)
  3992. _______________________________________
  3993. ¤ NSA/CSS Mission Slides ::
  3994.  
  3995.  These slides, from an internal presentation
  3996. in the first week of October 2001, show how
  3997. critical the NSA sees electronic eavesdropping.
  3998.  
  3999. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-css-mission.pdf
  4000.  
  4001. “ 1B. Ability to exploit:
  4002.  
  4003.  - Military Information
  4004.  - Economic Information
  4005.  - Information Operations Information
  4006.  - Political Information ”
  4007. _______________________________________
  4008. ¤ Eben Moglen & Bruce Schneier Talk About
  4009. NSA Leaks, Software and Cryptography ::
  4010.  
  4011. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N8Sc6pUR1mA
  4012. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  4013. ¤ NSA Rigging RSA Crypto Market ::
  4014.  
  4015. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/20/us-usa-security-rsa-idUSBRE9BJ1C220131220
  4016.  
  4017. ¤ RSA Cryptographers Duped and Bribed by NSA ::
  4018.  
  4019. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-kills-rsa.htm
  4020.  
  4021. ¤ NSA Kills RSA Trust and Therefore RSA Jobs ::
  4022.  
  4023. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-kills-rsa-workers.htm
  4024.  
  4025. ¤ List of Canceled RSA Talks Continues to Grow ::
  4026.  
  4027. http://threatpost.com/list-of-canceled-rsa-talks-continues-to-grow/103508
  4028.  
  4029. ¤ FLASHBACK ; NSA Rigging the Crypto Market ::
  4030.  
  4031. http://cryptome.org/jya/nsa-sun.htm
  4032. _______________________________________
  4033. ¤ Did British Telecom Provides Backdoors
  4034. for NSA and GCHQ (?) ::
  4035.  
  4036.  In a paper titled ‘The Internet Dark Age’
  4037. the researchers say that BT is shipping
  4038. hardware with backdoors that allow secret
  4039. government access in order to make network
  4040. compromise easier. “BT are directly responsible
  4041. for covertly embedding secret spy equipment
  4042. in millions of homes and businesses within
  4043. the UK,” the paper states.
  4044.  
  4045.  Recently on Cryptome (the better leaks
  4046. than wikileaks site), a paper appeared
  4047. pointing out that BT (British Telecom)
  4048. assigns all their modems an extra address
  4049. in the 30.x.x.x address space, and then
  4050. attaches SSH and SNMP to that address.
  4051. This looks like what many ISPs do, assigning
  4052. a second IP address for management, except
  4053. for one thing: the 30.0.0.0/8 block is
  4054. assigned to the United States Department
  4055. of Defense. This has caused a fevered round
  4056. of speculation that this is actually a
  4057. secret backdoor for the NSA/GCHQ, so that
  4058. they can secretly monitor and control
  4059. peoples’ home networks.
  4060.  
  4061.  Maybe, but it’s probably not the case.
  4062. The better explanation is that BT simply
  4063. chose this address space because it’s
  4064. non-routable. While it’s assigned public
  4065. address, it’s only used inside the private
  4066. DoD military network. Try tracerouting to
  4067. that address space, you’ll see that your
  4068. packets go nowhere.
  4069.  
  4070. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/Full-Disclosure.pdf
  4071. http://www.csoonline.com/article/744697/report-accuses-bt-of-supplying-backdoors-for-gchq-and-nsa
  4072. http://blog.erratasec.com/2013/12/dod-address-space-its-not-conspiracy.html
  4073.  
  4074. ¤ Bruce Schneier Leaves British Telecom ::
  4075.  
  4076.  “Yes, it’s true. And contrary to rumors,
  4077. this has nothing to do with the NSA or GCHQ.
  4078. No, BT wasn’t always happy with my writings
  4079. on the topic, but it knew that I am an
  4080. independent thinker and didn’t try to
  4081. muzzle me in any way. I’m just ready to
  4082. leave. I spent seven years at BT, and
  4083. seven years at Counterpane Internet
  4084. Security, Inc., before BT bought us.
  4085. It’s past time for something new.”
  4086.  
  4087. http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/12/yes_im_leaving.html
  4088. http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/12/nsa-surveillance-critic-bruce-schneier-to-leave-post-at-bt/
  4089. http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2319296/bruce-schneier-leaves-bt-after-eight-years-as-security-futurologist
  4090. ---------------------------------------
  4091. ¤ NSA Infected Around 50,000 Networks Worldwide ::
  4092.  
  4093.  The American intelligence service - NSA -
  4094. infected more than 50,000 computer networks
  4095. worldwide with malicious software designed
  4096. to steal sensitive information. Documents
  4097. provided by former NSA-employee Edward Snowden
  4098. and seen by this newspaper, prove this.
  4099.  
  4100.  A management presentation dating from 2012
  4101. explains how the NSA collects information
  4102. worldwide. In addition, the presentation
  4103. shows that the intelligence service uses
  4104. ‘Computer Network Exploitation’ (CNE) in
  4105. more than 50,000 locations. CNE is the
  4106. secret infiltration of computer systems
  4107. achieved by installing malware, malicious
  4108. software.
  4109.  
  4110.  One example of this type of hacking was
  4111. discovered in September 2013 at the Belgium
  4112. telecom provider Belgacom. For a number of
  4113. years the British intelligence service - GCHQ –
  4114. has been installing this malicious software
  4115. in the Belgacom network in order to tap
  4116. their customers’ telephone and data traffic.
  4117. The Belgacom network was infiltrated by GCHQ
  4118. through a process of luring employees to a
  4119. false Linkedin page.
  4120.  
  4121. http://www.nrc.nl/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/nsa568.jpg
  4122. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-cryptologic-platform.pdf
  4123. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/11/23/nsa-infected-50000-computer-networks-with-malicious-software/
  4124. http://hothardware.com/News/Dutch-News-Agency-Reports-NSA-Infected-50000-Networks-With-Malware/
  4125.  
  4126. ¤ NSA Power to Generate Profits and Pay ::
  4127.  
  4128.  The NSA SIGINT Strategy 2012-2016 pretty
  4129. well covers all the comsec and crypto
  4130. initiatives to covertly exploit people,
  4131. cryptographers, anonymizers, informants,
  4132. planted spies, security firms, networks,
  4133. governments, nations, friends, lovers
  4134. and citizens.
  4135.  
  4136.  Not sure leaks, lawsuits and protests
  4137. will deter this bounty of profits for
  4138. the comsec industry, unless the public
  4139. is aroused to demand the 3 branches grasp
  4140. the nettle, and all those making money
  4141. from this deception operation decide to
  4142. give up their profits, perks and prestige.
  4143.  
  4144.  I mean those on the comsec and crypto
  4145. lists, those participating in standards
  4146. committees, those enjoying contracts and
  4147. grants in think tanks and universities,
  4148. those in law firms and public interest
  4149. orgs, those in the media and academia,
  4150. those in non-spy gov agencies, pretending
  4151. to be in opposition as they scramble to
  4152. rejigger their products and sales pitches,
  4153. to exploit what is being fabricated to
  4154. diminish Snowden’s revelations with new
  4155. forms of secrecy, technology, law,
  4156. regulations, bribery, lobbying, grants,
  4157. contracts, list lurking, online and
  4158. offline spying, break-ins, the usual
  4159. kaboodle, to assure the NSA goals are
  4160. fulfilled.
  4161.  
  4162. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-power-profit-pay.htm
  4163.  
  4164. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-cryptologic-platform.pdf
  4165.  
  4166. ¤ NSA’s Global Interception Network ::
  4167.  
  4168. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  4169. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  4170. ¤ GCHQ Accused of Spying European, German
  4171. and Israeli Politicians (No Documentation) ::
  4172.  
  4173. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/snowden-documents-show-gchq-targeted-european-and-german-politicians-a-940135.html
  4174. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/dec/20/gchq-targeted-aid-agencies-german-government-eu-commissioner
  4175. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/21/world/nsa-dragnet-included-allies-aid-groups-and-business-elite.html?_r=0
  4176. _______________________________________
  4177. ¤ CBS 60min ; Inside the NSA (Part One) ::
  4178.  
  4179. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WgPNyAYOr04
  4180.  
  4181. ¤ CBS 60min ; The Snowden Affair (Part Two) ::
  4182.  
  4183. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5AaREKHQI8E
  4184.  
  4185. ¤ NSA Interviewed by CBS - Transcript ::
  4186.  
  4187. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-60mins/nsa-60mins.htm
  4188. _______________________________________
  4189. ¤ Proposal for Distribution of Snowden Cache ::
  4190.  
  4191. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/snowden-cache-dist.htm
  4192. _______________________________________
  4193. ¤ EU Data Retention Directive “Unlawful”
  4194. and “Incompatible” with Charter of Rights ::
  4195.  
  4196. http://www.scribd.com/doc/191078925/Data-Retention-Challenge-Press-Release
  4197.  
  4198. http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2318838/eu-data-retention-directive-unlawful-and-incompatible-with-charter-of-rights
  4199. _______________________________________
  4200. ¤ GOOGLE CENSORING NSA SEARCH RESULTS (?) ::
  4201.  
  4202. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/17/edward-snowden-doesnt-show-up-once-in-googles-list-of-top-2013-searches/
  4203. _______________________________________
  4204. ¤ Clapper, Feinstein, Obama Total Disregard
  4205. of Public Concerns ::
  4206.  
  4207. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/spies-reign-obama.htm
  4208.  
  4209. ¤ Merkel Throws a Pissy Fit ::
  4210.  
  4211. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/merkel-compares-nsa-stasi-obama
  4212. _______________________________________
  4213. ¤ GCHQ’s Use of FLYING PIG to Spy ::
  4214.  
  4215.  “FLYING PIG is a program that allows
  4216. analysts to query GCHQ’s vast repository
  4217. of metadata about the world’s secure
  4218. communications over TLS/SSL. It’s
  4219. certainly not a program through which
  4220. the GCHQ, or NSA for that matter, performs
  4221. man-in-the-middle attacks against internet
  4222. services like Google, as reported by others,
  4223. including Bruce Schneier. The reports that
  4224. claim the NSA performed MITM attacks against
  4225. Google are based on a small piece of a
  4226. document that describes a FLYING PIG
  4227. (which is a not an NSA program, as you may
  4228. have noticed) use case (presumably, an
  4229. investigation into the DigiNotar CA breach).
  4230. That’s not to say the GCHQ doesn’t perform
  4231. MITM attacks, but there’s no evidence to
  4232. be found in this document. Though, FLYING PIG
  4233. may be used to prepare MITM attacks, e.g.
  4234. by providing information about a target.”
  4235.  
  4236. http://koen.io/2013/12/flying-pig-gchq-tls-ssl-knowledge-base/
  4237.  
  4238. ¤ NSA Use of FLYING PIG to Spy ::
  4239.  
  4240. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/785152-166819124-mitm-google.html
  4241. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130910/10470024468/flying-pig-nsa-is-running-man-middle-attacks-imitating-googles-servers.shtml
  4242. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57602701-38/nsa-disguised-itself-as-google-to-spy-say-reports/
  4243. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  4244. ¤ John Young Breaks Down the NSA Leaks ::
  4245.  
  4246. http://www.corbettreport.com/mp3/2013-12-17%20John%20Young.mp3
  4247.  
  4248. http://www.corbettreport.com/interview-793-john-young-breaks-down-the-snowdennsa-saga/
  4249. _______________________________________
  4250. ¤ FASCIA Database of Device-Location Records ::
  4251.  
  4252. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-fascia.pdf
  4253. ---------------------------------------
  4254. ¤ hdfs:// Cloud Holds FASCIA Database ::
  4255.  
  4256. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ghost-machine.pdf
  4257.  
  4258.  HDFS stands for “Hadoop Distributed File
  4259. System” which was inspired by Google Inc,
  4260. and later managed by big data corporations
  4261. such as IBM, Yahoo, Facebook, et al.
  4262.  
  4263.  HDFS is designed to reliably store very
  4264. large files across machines in a large
  4265. cluster.
  4266.  
  4267. ¤ Hadoop Emerging Technology ::
  4268.  
  4269.  “Hadoop is a data processing system that
  4270. follows the MapReduce paradigm for scalable
  4271. data analysis.” ... “Largest install is at
  4272. Yahoo, a major contributor.”
  4273.  
  4274.  HDFS is a scalable file system with two
  4275. major components, a central metadata server
  4276. and file servers from data.
  4277.  
  4278. http://www.upload-box.com/index.php/files/get/uTqMG-LMlY/hadoop-emerging-technology.pdf
  4279.  
  4280. ¤ Yahoo - Managing a Hadoop Cluster ::
  4281.  
  4282.  This was taken from the Yahoo website,
  4283. posted on public domain.
  4284.  
  4285. http://msfire.tk/files/get/SIut69QW7Q/yahoo-hadoop.zip
  4286.  
  4287. ¤ Apache Hadoop FileSystem and its Usage
  4288. in Facebook (This File Is Mirrored) ::
  4289.  
  4290. http://4lodzik.de/xu2/files/get/U-eeftxCDJ/facebook-hadhoop.zip
  4291. http://www.uploadmini.com/index.php/files/get/rnvpDpXfZu/facebook-hadhoop.zip
  4292. http://cloudseminar.berkeley.edu/data/hdfs.pdf
  4293.  
  4294. ¤ hadoop_install.zip (Mirrored) ::
  4295.  
  4296. http://fileb.ag/nukq1uicayye
  4297. http://f.ishoo.ru/files/get/vfym4eZHvY/hadoop-install.zip
  4298. http://cloud.elearning.uq.edu.au/download/hadoop_install.zip
  4299. ---------------------------------------
  4300. ¤ CO-TRAVELER Cellphone Tracking ; FASCIA
  4301. Database Available With Ghostmachine ::
  4302.  
  4303. “Proxies can make IP resolution challenging.”
  4304.  
  4305. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-cotraveler.pdf
  4306.  
  4307. ¤ CHALKFUN Location Tool Highly Censored ::
  4308.  
  4309. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-chalkfun.pdf
  4310.  
  4311. ¤ NSA Targets Device Location Verification ::
  4312.  
  4313. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-target-location.pdf
  4314.  
  4315. ¤ NSA’s Global Interception Network ::
  4316.  
  4317. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  4318.  
  4319. ¤ NSA Tracking Cellphone Locations ::
  4320.  
  4321.  In unveiling new Edward Snowden revelations
  4322. about NSA spying, the Washington Post has
  4323. once again whitewashed the fact that the
  4324. content of all our communications have
  4325. been stored and analyzed under the Echelon
  4326. program since the 1990s.
  4327.  
  4328.  The new details concern how, “The National
  4329. Security Agency is gathering nearly 5
  4330. billion records a day on the whereabouts
  4331. of cellphones around the world.”
  4332.  
  4333.  However, the report reveals itself to
  4334. be little more than an exercise in soft-
  4335. peddling when it claims that, “The NSA
  4336. does not target Americans’ location data
  4337. by design, but the agency acquires a
  4338. substantial amount of information on
  4339. the whereabouts of domestic cellphones
  4340. “incidentally.”
  4341.  
  4342.  This notion that the NSA just accidentally
  4343. happens to record the locations of Americans
  4344. using data from their cellphones, and is
  4345. not deliberately engaging in domestic
  4346. surveillance, is yet another example of
  4347. damage control by the establishment.
  4348.  
  4349. http://www.infowars.com/new-nsa-revelations-another-limited-hangout-whitewash/
  4350. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/_ie-fallbacks/NSA_Co-traveler_g.jpg
  4351. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/fascia-the-nsas-huge-trove-of-location-records/637/
  4352. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/how-to-tell-if-a-target-is-foreign/635/
  4353. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-c6ca94801fac_print.html
  4354. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/04/nsa-storing-cell-phone-records-daily-snowden
  4355. ---------------------------------------
  4356. ¤ NSA Uses Google Cookies and GSM Geohashes
  4357. to Pinpoint Targets ::
  4358.  
  4359.  The National Security Agency is ‘secretly’
  4360. piggybacking on the tools that enable
  4361. Internet advertisers to track consumers,
  4362. using cookies and location data to pinpoint
  4363. targets for government hacking and to
  4364. bolster surveillance.
  4365.  
  4366. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-sigint-successes.pdf
  4367. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gsm-tracking.pdf
  4368. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-signal-surveillance-success-stories/647/
  4369. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-google-cookies-to-pinpoint-targets-for-hacking/
  4370. http://boingboing.net/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-googles-tracking-co.html
  4371. http://www.theverge.com/2013/12/10/5198592/nsa-reportedly-piggybacking-on-google-advertising-cookies
  4372. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/14/snow-d14.html
  4373. ---------------------------------------
  4374. ¤ FLASHBACK ; Anonymizing Google’s Cookie ::
  4375.  
  4376. http://www.imilly.com/google-cookie.htm
  4377. ---------------------------------------
  4378. ¤ How Marketers Will Find and Track You
  4379. In a World Without Cookies ::
  4380.  
  4381. http://blog.thefetch.com/2013/11/18/cookie-monsters-how-marketers-will-find-and-track-you-in-a-world-without-cookies/
  4382. _______________________________________
  4383. ¤ How the NSA Targets Italy ::
  4384.  
  4385. http://espresso.repubblica.it/foto/2013/12/05/galleria/nsa-intercettazioni-1.144400
  4386. http://espresso.repubblica.it/inchieste/2013/12/05/news/revealed-how-the-nsa-targets-italy-1.144428
  4387. http://www.pcworld.com/article/2070480/nsa-spies-on-italians-from-roof-of-us-embassy-in-rome-magazine-reports.html
  4388.  
  4389. ¤ SCS_Italy_Spying.zip | 371KB ::
  4390.  
  4391. http://ge.tt/api/1/files/2Bbc4C81/0/blob?download
  4392. http://megaswf.com/f/2625421
  4393. http://msfire.tk/files/get/srIJUWgvYg/scs-italy-spying.zip
  4394. _______________________________________
  4395. ¤ Swedish Intelligence Agency (FRA) Spied
  4396. on Russian Leaders for NSA ::
  4397.  
  4398. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-spied-ru.htm
  4399. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-ru-baltic.pdf
  4400. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0yP7n8qZrz0
  4401. http://rt.com/news/sweden-spied-russia-nsa-759/
  4402. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-leaks-sweden-spied-on-russian-leaders-for-us/
  4403. http://www.thelocal.se/20131211/sweden-aided-in-nsa-hacking-operations-report
  4404.  
  4405. ¤ NSA & FRA Quantum Hacking Programme ::
  4406.  
  4407. http://www.svt.se/ug/fra-part-of-top-secret-hacker-project
  4408.  
  4409. ¤ NSA & FRA Relationship Was “Top Secret” ::
  4410.  
  4411. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-spies.pdf
  4412.  
  4413. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/889126/nsa-intelligence-relationship-with-sweden.pdf
  4414.  
  4415. ¤ NSA & FRA Relationship “Actively Engaged” ::
  4416.  
  4417. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-relationship.pdf
  4418.  
  4419. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/894384/nsa-internal-pm-on-fra-and-sweden-relations.pdf
  4420.  
  4421. ¤ NSA & FRA Joint Quantum Spy Agenda ::
  4422.  
  4423. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-spying-agenda.pdf
  4424.  
  4425. ¤ NSA/GCHQ/FRA Quantum Spying Accomplishments ::
  4426.  
  4427. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-fra-quantum.pdf
  4428. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-quantum-2.pdf
  4429. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/gchq-se-fra-quantum-3.pdf
  4430.  
  4431. ¤ NSA/GCHQ/FRA Communication Intelligence ::
  4432.  
  4433. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-se-fra-comint.pdf
  4434. ---------------------------------------
  4435. PAST XKEYSCORE REPORTS/DOCUMENTS REFER HERE ;
  4436.  
  4437. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=16647
  4438. ---------------------------------------
  4439. ¤ NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Website Viewers ::
  4440.  
  4441. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-xkeyscore-slide.pdf
  4442.  
  4443. ¤ NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Tor, etc. ::
  4444.  
  4445. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-tor-slides.pdf
  4446.  
  4447. ¤ NSA/FRA XKeyscore Exploit Sources ::
  4448.  
  4449. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-sources.pdf
  4450.  
  4451. ¤ NSA/FRA XKeyscore Data Hoarding Plans ::
  4452.  
  4453. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-xkeyscore.pdf
  4454. _______________________________________
  4455.  “Earlier, a map showing SCS locations
  4456. worldwide was published by the German
  4457. magazine Der Spiegel. Initially an unredacted
  4458. map was put online by accident, but before
  4459. it was replaced, it was already copied onto
  4460. several websites. This map showed 74 staffed
  4461. SCS locations, 14 unmanned remote controlled
  4462. locations and 8 other locations as of August
  4463. 2010. Except for the SCS locations in Europe,
  4464. the names of all other cities were blurred
  4465. by Der Spiegel.”
  4466.  
  4467.   - electrospaces.blogspot.fr
  4468.  
  4469. REDACTED MAP (CENSORED)
  4470.  
  4471. https://lh3.ggpht.com/-ymi_oEW0XcI/UpzfqqqPRsI/AAAAAAAABCs/WU4lKnfs52w/s320/scs-global-map-redacted.jpg
  4472.  
  4473. UNREDACTED MAP (DEFAULT)
  4474.  
  4475. http://postimg.org/image/6kzpypy1l/
  4476.  
  4477. BOTH REDACTED AND UNREDACTED (ZIP | 223KB)
  4478.  
  4479. http://f.lui.li/get_1065_f4ab.html
  4480. ---------------------------------------
  4481. ¤ Decensoring SCS Locations ::
  4482.  
  4483. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/decensoring-scs-slides.htm
  4484.  
  4485. The NSA spies under diplomatic cover.
  4486. _______________________________________
  4487. ¤ Five Eyes ::
  4488.  
  4489. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-5-eyes-partners.pdf
  4490. _______________________________________
  4491. ¤ A Conspiracy So Vast ::
  4492.  
  4493. http://www.lewrockwell.com/2013/12/andrew-p-napolitano/a-conspiracy-so-vast%E2%80%A8/
  4494. _______________________________________
  4495. ¤ PayPal Corporation Said To Be Implicated
  4496. in Withheld NSA Documents ::
  4497.  
  4498. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tTivPZZorWY
  4499.  
  4500. http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/2013/12/11/bfp-breaking-news-omidyars-paypal-corporation-said-to-be-implicated-in-withheld-nsa-documents/
  4501. _______________________________________
  4502. ¤ NSA GCHQ Spies on Video Game Geeks ::
  4503.  
  4504. Say hello to undercover NSA orcs.
  4505.  
  4506. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-spy-games.pdf
  4507. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-spy-games.pdf
  4508. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/12/world-of-spycraft-nsa-gchq-hacked-wow-and-xbox-live-other-games/
  4509. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/09/nsa-spies-online-games-world-warcraft-second-life
  4510. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2013/12/09/Report--NSA-spying-on-virtual-worlds--online-games
  4511. http://www.businessinsider.com/spy-agencies-infiltrated-video-games-nsa-gchq-world-of-warcraft-2013-12
  4512. _______________________________________
  4513. ¤ Rollingstone Describes NSA’s Influx of Money ::
  4514.  
  4515.  September 11th, which also happened to
  4516. be Drake’s first day at Fort Meade, changed
  4517. the equation. Drake explains the shift in
  4518. two ways: The first was a massive expansion
  4519. of US spying capabilities as the agency
  4520. “unchained itself from the Constitution,”
  4521. and began to spy on Americans and foreign
  4522. citizens, at home and abroad. The other
  4523. change, felt across the entire intelligence
  4524. community, was a rapid expansion of the NSA
  4525. itself.
  4526.  
  4527.  “Massive amounts of money were pumped
  4528. into the NSA after 9/11, and Congress was
  4529. saying, ‘How big do you want the check?’”
  4530. says Drake. With virtually every agency
  4531. involved in tracking terrorists clamoring
  4532. for its SIGINT, or signals intelligence,
  4533. the NSA expanded its outposts in Texas,
  4534. Georgia, Hawaii, Colorado and Utah, as
  4535. well as listening posts abroad, and also
  4536. went on a building spree at Fort Meade,
  4537. where the NSA’s sprawling 5,000-acre
  4538. campus is now almost 10 times the size
  4539. of the Pentagon. By 2013, according to
  4540. The Washington Post, the NSA had expanded
  4541. its workforce by one-third, to about
  4542. 33,000. The number of private companies
  4543. it depended upon more than tripled during
  4544. that time.
  4545.  
  4546.  Soon, thanks to this influx of money
  4547. and the increasing reliance on the private
  4548. sector to handle even sensitive jobs,
  4549. the very heart of America’s intelligence
  4550. infrastructure was being outsourced to
  4551. contractors. “Essentially, 9/11 was a
  4552. massive jobs program, in which the ticket
  4553. you needed for the party was your clearance,”
  4554. says Drake. “And tons of people were
  4555. getting those clearances. So you had
  4556. this huge apparatus being built, and
  4557. the government was just managing it.
  4558. And in some cases, they weren’t even
  4559. doing that.” ... ...
  4560.  
  4561.  By the time Snowden joined the agency’s
  4562. workforce, the surveillance he would
  4563. later expose was becoming not just
  4564. institutionalized but very big business.
  4565. “It was around 2009, 2010 that you saw
  4566. the full flower of that massive, massive
  4567. bubble of money,” says Drake. “And people
  4568. were taking it for a ride as far as it
  4569. could go.” ... ...
  4570.  
  4571.  Prior to 2009, Snowden had considered
  4572. leaking government secrets when he was
  4573. at the CIA, but held off, he later said,
  4574. not wanting to harm agents in the field,
  4575. and hoping that Obama would reform the
  4576. system. His optimism didn’t last long.
  4577. “I watched as Obama advanced the very
  4578. policies that I thought would be reined
  4579. in,” he later said. As a result, he added,
  4580. “I got hardened.” The more Snowden saw of
  4581. the NSA’s actual business – and, particularly,
  4582. the more he read “true information,”
  4583. including a 2009 Inspector General’s report
  4584. detailing the Bush era’s warrantless-
  4585. surveillance program – the more he realized
  4586. that there were actually two governments:
  4587. the one that was elected, and the other,
  4588. secret regime, governing in the dark.
  4589. “If the highest officials in government
  4590. can break the law without fearing punishment
  4591. or even any repercussions at all, secret
  4592. powers become tremendously dangerous.”
  4593.  
  4594. http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/snowden-and-greenwald-the-men-who-leaked-the-secrets-20131204
  4595. _______________________________________
  4596. ¤ Rajiv Pant Describes Snowden Files Transfer ::
  4597.  
  4598. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nyt-snowden-transfer.htm
  4599. _______________________________________
  4600. ¤ Is British Intelligence in Damage Control? ::
  4601.  
  4602. http://www.globalresearch.ca/british-intelligence-operation-to-kidnap-snowden-number-one-mi-6-officer-working-undercover-in-moscow-embassy/5358555
  4603. _______________________________________
  4604. ¤ Snowden Leaks “Greatest Intelligence
  4605. Failure Since World War 2” Exaggerated ::
  4606.  
  4607.  The Director of NSA claims Snowden stole
  4608. 200,000 documents. Allegations in Australian
  4609. press claim he stole “up to 20,000.” British
  4610. authorities accuse Snowden of stealing 58,000.
  4611. Claims are bruited in the 5 Eyes that this
  4612. is the “greatest intelligence failure since
  4613. World War 2.” High officials and ex-spies
  4614. accuse Snowden and related media of engaging
  4615. in terrorism.
  4616.  
  4617.  This suggests a counter-espionage campaign
  4618. to exaggerate Snowden’s damage, of betrayal
  4619. to his country, of aiding the enemy, of
  4620. threatening national security. It is
  4621. successfully restricting release of the
  4622. Snowden material and will likely become
  4623. more forceful as releases continue to the
  4624. extent of legislation (open or secret)
  4625. to criminalize release as a national
  4626. security threat.
  4627.  
  4628. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/snowden-civil-war.htm
  4629. _______________________________________
  4630. ¤ KILLCEN ; Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z ::
  4631.  
  4632.  Includes most reports, slides and
  4633. documents all related to the recent
  4634. Snowden leaks so far up to December
  4635. 4th of 2013. I’m still collecting
  4636. any information that comes out and
  4637. will provide updated archives from
  4638. time to time. Grab this while you can.
  4639.  
  4640.  After decompression - the folder is
  4641. titled “Eyeballing_Snowden_Info” and
  4642. holds a total of 371MB decompressed.
  4643.  
  4644. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z
  4645. (783 files | 7zip | 286MB)
  4646.  
  4647. http://fileb.ag/iv8x797lqzdw
  4648. http://uploadhero.co/dl/aBBhCePf
  4649. http://bitshare.com/files/fuxhd3ry/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z.html
  4650. http://www.upload-box.com/index.php/files/get/0VPCtiKFxf/eyeballing-snowden-info.7z
  4651. http://f.ishoo.ru/files/get/3GfGXXqGSH/eyeballing-snowden-info.7z
  4652. http://davvas.com/frrbbi2975xe
  4653. http://BillionUploads.com/hpww20r554x4
  4654. http://bayfiles.net/file/119rR/Y6ax0Z/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z
  4655. _______________________________________
  4656. ¤ indonesia-spying-slides.zip (mirrored) ::
  4657.  
  4658. http://up.sef.ps/xu/files/get/Aen2UBNeep/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  4659. http://document-space.com/index.php/files/get/yWGp5DplsK/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  4660. http://www.quickupdown.com/files/get/BEqtDnYz8M/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  4661.  
  4662. ¤ Australian Intelligence Agency (ASD)
  4663. Swaps Bulk Metadata With the NSA ::
  4664.  
  4665.  Australia’s intelligence apparatus mines
  4666. the telecommunications data of ordinary
  4667. Australians, and hands over the material
  4668. to the US and its closest allies, according
  4669. to the latest leaked document from Edward
  4670. Snowden, partly published by the Guardian
  4671. Australia web site.
  4672.  
  4673.  The document obtained by the former US
  4674. National Security Agency (NSA) contractor
  4675. confirms that the electronic surveillance
  4676. agency, the Australian Signals Directorate
  4677. (ASD), monitors the domestic population,
  4678. as well as the people and governments of
  4679. many Asian countries.
  4680.  
  4681.  Despite Australian legislation supposedly
  4682. restricting the ASD’s internal spying,
  4683. the agency hands over to the NSA and its
  4684. global partners so-called metadata of
  4685. the phone calls, texts, emails, on-line
  4686. address books and social media posts of
  4687. millions of people.
  4688.  
  4689.  This exposure of mass surveillance follows
  4690. the recent revelations, also from documents
  4691. leaked by Snowden, that the ASD, then known
  4692. as the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD),
  4693. tapped the phone calls of Indonesian
  4694. prez Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and that
  4695. Australian embassies throughout Asia
  4696. operate as electronic listening posts
  4697. for the US-led spying network.
  4698.  
  4699. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/australia-spied-on-indonesian-president-leaked-docu
  4700. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/canberra-jakarta-and-the-digital-great-game/5100502
  4701. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/18/australia-tried-to-monitor-indonesian-presidents-phone
  4702. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/data-d03.html
  4703. http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1359356/indonesian-ambassador-australia-recalled-over-spying-claims
  4704. http://www.voanews.com/content/indonesia-to-review-cooperation-with-australia-due-to-spying-claims/1792523.html
  4705.  
  4706. ¤ Australian Media Denounces Exposure of
  4707. Indonesia Spying Operations ::
  4708.  
  4709.  The Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s
  4710. (ABC) recent joint reporting of Australian
  4711. espionage operations targeting Indonesian
  4712. political figures has been furiously
  4713. denounced by other media outlets for
  4714. breaching “national security” and the
  4715. “national interest.” The reaction
  4716. underscores the extent to which the
  4717. media establishment has been integrated
  4718. into the state-intelligence apparatus.
  4719.  
  4720.  On November 18, after being approached
  4721. by the Guardian with documents leaked
  4722. by former National Security Agency (NSA)
  4723. contractor Edward Snowden, the ABC
  4724. co-released the story, revealing Australian
  4725. phone tapping of Indonesian Prez Susilo
  4726. Bambang Yudhoyono, his wife and eight
  4727. senior political figures. The report
  4728. triggered a still-unresolved diplomatic
  4729. crisis for the Australian government, with
  4730. the Indonesian president suspending military
  4731. and intelligence cooperation.
  4732.  
  4733. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/medi-d03.html
  4734. _______________________________________
  4735. ¤ NSA G8 - G20 Summit SIGINT Directive ::
  4736.  
  4737.  Top secret documents retrieved by US
  4738. whistleblower Edward Snowden show that
  4739. Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s dictatorship
  4740. allowed the largest American spy agency
  4741. to conduct widespread surveillance in
  4742. Canada during the 2010 G8 and G20 summits.
  4743.  
  4744.  The documents are being reported exclusively
  4745. by CBC News.
  4746.  
  4747.  The briefing notes, stamped “Top Secret,”
  4748. show the US turned its Ottawa embassy into
  4749. a security command post during a six-day
  4750. spying operation by the National Security
  4751. Agency while US Prez Barack Obama and 25
  4752. other foreign heads of government were on
  4753. Canadian soil in June of 2010.
  4754.  
  4755.  The covert US operation was no secret to
  4756. Canadian authorities. ... ...
  4757.  
  4758.  The world was still struggling to climb
  4759. out of the great recession of 2008. Leaders
  4760. were debating a wide array of possible
  4761. measures including a global tax on banks,
  4762. an idea strongly opposed by both the US
  4763. and Canadian governments. That notion was
  4764. eventually scotched.
  4765.  
  4766. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-g8-g20-spying.pdf
  4767. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/read-snowden-nsa-document-on-g8-g20-summit-surveillance-1.2447387
  4768. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/new-snowden-docs-show-u-s-spied-during-g20-in-toronto-1.2442448
  4769. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/cana-d03.html
  4770. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/14/cses-d14.html
  4771.  
  4772. ¤ Canada’s CSEC Slides Expose Espionage
  4773. Against Brazilian Ministry ::
  4774.  
  4775. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/cse-br/cse-br.htm
  4776.  
  4777.  UPDATE ; 18 CSEC slides posted on PDF @
  4778. cryptome.org, November 30, 2013.
  4779.  
  4780. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/csec-br-spy.pdf
  4781.  
  4782. ¤ Interpreting the CSEC Presentation ::
  4783.  
  4784. http://theoreti.ca/?p=5057
  4785.  
  4786. ¤ Ministério de Minas e Energia está na
  4787. mira de espiões americanos e canadenses ::
  4788.  
  4789. http://m.g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/10/ministerio-das-minas-e-energia-esta-na-mira-de-espioes-americanos-e-canadenses.html
  4790.  
  4791. TRANSLATED @ slexy.org
  4792.  
  4793. http://slexy.org/view/s2tDGSktog
  4794.  
  4795. ¤ American and Canadian Spies Target Brazilian
  4796. Energy and Mining Ministry (English) ::
  4797.  
  4798. http://g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/10/american-and-canadian-spies-target-brazilian-energy-and-mining-ministry.html
  4799.  
  4800. ¤ Canada’s CSEC Provides Data to NSA ::
  4801.  
  4802.  The politicians and corporate media would have Canadians
  4803. believe that they have only “moved on” from discussing
  4804. CSEC’s activities because there is nothing for Canadians
  4805. to worry about.
  4806.  
  4807.  In reality, the CSEC is a vital tool of the Canadian ruling
  4808. class that plays an important role in the pursuit of its
  4809. imperialist foreign policy and in the surveillance and
  4810. suppression of opposition at home. The size of CSEC’s
  4811. staff—it employs almost 2,000 people and a further thousand
  4812. military personnel assist its work—give an inkling of the
  4813. scale of its activities.
  4814.  
  4815.  These include everything from supporting the overseas
  4816. operations of the Canadian military, to spying on governments
  4817. that are reputed allies of Canada and assisting CSIS and the
  4818. RCMP in conducting a vast program of domestic surveillance.
  4819. Of especial importance is the CSEC’s partnership with the NSA.
  4820. According to former NSA technical director William Binney,
  4821. the two organizations “have integrated personnel” i.e. swap
  4822. personnel to improve seamless collaboration. They also share
  4823. Internet surveillance programs.
  4824.  
  4825.  As a further element of its collaboration with the Five Eyes
  4826. alliance, CSEC was relied on in the project of spying on
  4827. diplomats and officials during the 2009 London G20 meeting
  4828. according to a report in the British newspaper The Guardian,
  4829. which was based on documents supplied by Snowden. The highly
  4830. sensitive operation involved the penetration of delegates’
  4831. smartphones to monitor their email messages and calls.
  4832.  
  4833. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/09/28/csec-s28.html
  4834.  
  4835. http://www.scribd.com/doc/188094600/CSEC-Presentation
  4836.  
  4837. ¤ NSA CSEC Partnership ::
  4838.  
  4839. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-csec-partners.pdf
  4840. _______________________________________
  4841. ¤ EU Nations Address Mass Spying ::
  4842.  
  4843. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/eu-mass-spying.pdf
  4844.  
  4845. ¤ EU Hearings On NSA ::
  4846.  
  4847. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/libe/events.html?id=hearings
  4848. http://euobserver.com/justice/121979
  4849. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/11/viviane-reding-nsa-needs-counterweight.html
  4850.  
  4851. ¤ EU/US Data Protection Hoot ::
  4852.  
  4853. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/eu-us-data-protect-13-1127.pdf
  4854.  
  4855. ¤ EU to Run Yet Another Ineffectual Probe ::
  4856.  
  4857. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/02/edward-snowden-un-investigation-surveillance
  4858. _______________________________________
  4859.  Draft state-level legislation called the
  4860. Fourth Amendment Protection Act would –
  4861. in theory – forbid local governments from
  4862. providing services to federal agencies
  4863. that collect electronic data from Americans
  4864. without a personalized warrant.
  4865.  
  4866.  No Utah lawmaker has came forward to
  4867. introduce the suggested legislation yet,
  4868. but at least one legislator has committed
  4869. to doing so, according to Mike Maharrey
  4870. of the Tenth Amendment Center. He declined
  4871. to identify the lawmaker before the bill
  4872. is introduced.
  4873.  
  4874.  “We are still very early in the campaign,
  4875. and this is in fact a multi-step, multi-year
  4876. long-term strategy,” says Maharrey, whose
  4877. group is part of the OffNow coalition along
  4878. with the Bill of Rights Defense Committee
  4879. and a handful of other groups.
  4880.  
  4881.  The campaign is looking beyond Utah,
  4882. Maharrey adds.
  4883.  
  4884. http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/12/03/some-nsa-opponents-want-to-nullify-surveillance-with-state-law
  4885. _______________________________________
  4886. ¤ Guardian’s Reporters Face Threats and
  4887. Intimidation From British Dictatorship ::
  4888.  
  4889.  In the months since, the Guardian has
  4890. continued to make officials here exceedingly
  4891. nervous by exposing the joint operations of
  4892. US and British intelligence — particularly
  4893. their cooperation in data collection and
  4894. snooping programs involving British citizens
  4895. and close allies on the European continent.
  4896.  
  4897.  In response, the Guardian is being called
  4898. to account by British authorities for
  4899. jeopardizing national security. The
  4900. Guardian’s top editor, Alan Rusbridger,
  4901. is being forced to appear before a
  4902. parliamentary committee Tuesday to explain
  4903. the news outlet’s actions.
  4904.  
  4905. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/britain-targets-guardian-newspaper-over-intelligence-leaks-related-to-edward-snowden/2013/11/29/1ec3d9c0-581e-11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html
  4906. http://www.infowars.com/uk-police-threaten-guardian-editor-with-terrorism-charges-over-snowden-leaks/
  4907. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/10/18/guar-o18.html
  4908.  
  4909. ¤ Alan Rusbridger Interviewed ::
  4910.  
  4911. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/q-and-a-with-alan-rusbridger-editor-of-the-guardian/2013/11/29/11b36798-5821-11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html
  4912.  
  4913. ¤ US Dictatorship Fuels the Same Threats
  4914. as the British Dictatorship ::
  4915.  
  4916.  Glenn Greenwald, the Guardian reporter who
  4917. published Edward Snowden’s leaks, was
  4918. recently suggested to be a criminal for
  4919. shining light on the NSA’s abuse of power.
  4920. This is a key identifiable step when societies
  4921. close down; it is a point of no return. It
  4922. seems the United States is reaching the event
  4923. horizon to a police state.
  4924.  
  4925. http://falkvinge.net/2013/06/30/with-journalism-persecuted-the-united-states-is-now-at-event-horizon-to-a-police-state/
  4926.  
  4927. Cryptome noted
  4928.  
  4929.  “There have been no reports of leakage
  4930. from the insurance stashes, the publication
  4931. outlets or the various reported transmissions
  4932. among them (except for the Miranda snatch by
  4933. UKG), although there could be some which have
  4934. not been disclosed, not known, were sold or
  4935. bartered, or were stolen for future use.
  4936.  
  4937.  It is likely that intelligence and law
  4938. enforcement agencies have made stringent
  4939. efforts to access the documents by customarily
  4940. secret burglary, bribery, barter, purchase,
  4941. deception, co-optation.
  4942.  
  4943.  Those multiple persons and outlets who have
  4944. had access, or suspected of access, are
  4945. certain to have been targeted, some perhaps
  4946. successfully persuaded to cooperate with
  4947. promises of confidentiality, backed by
  4948. threats if cooperation is refused -- a
  4949. standard coercive means of authorities.
  4950.  
  4951.  While Edward Snowden is knowledgeable
  4952. about counter-espionage and likely advised
  4953. his initial correspondents, who in turn
  4954. advised successive cooperators, usually
  4955. these counter-operations are not revealed,
  4956. but hints of them are leaked to discourage
  4957. participation.
  4958.  
  4959.  Beyond that, it is customary to foment
  4960. disputes and disagreements among competing
  4961. publications, reporters, opinionators,
  4962. experts, the spying industry and consumers,
  4963. along with threats against families, friends
  4964. and employers, as now occurring, to rattle
  4965. and pressure targets to consider cooperating
  4966. with authorities, including use of rewards
  4967. -- monetary and career -- for informants.”
  4968.  
  4969. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-related-targets.htm
  4970. _______________________________________
  4971. ¤ NSA Describes Dutch SIGINT Spying ::
  4972.  
  4973. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-dutch-sigint.pdf
  4974. _______________________________________
  4975. ¤ Mass Surveillance Is Big Business ;
  4976. Corporations Are as Good at Spying as
  4977. Governments ::
  4978.  
  4979. http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/mass-surveillance-is-big-business-corporations-are-as-good-at-spying-as-governments
  4980. _______________________________________
  4981. ¤ NSA Spies on Pornography Viewing to
  4982. Discredit Targeted Enemies ::
  4983.  
  4984. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-muslim-porn.pdf
  4985. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131127/00243625384/nsa-spied-porn-habits-radicalizers-planned-to-use-details-to-embarrass-them.shtml
  4986. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/26/nsa-porn-muslims_n_4346128.html
  4987. http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/11/26/1258660/-NSA-spied-on-radicalizers-to-discredit-them
  4988. _______________________________________
  4989. ¤ NSA WINDSTOP, MUSCULAR, INCENSER Slides ::
  4990.  
  4991. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-windstop-muscular-incenser.pdf
  4992.  
  4993. ¤ What Else Do We Know About MUSCULAR? ::
  4994.  
  4995. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-muscular.htm
  4996.  
  4997. ¤ NSA WINDSTOP Month of Mass Spying ::
  4998.  
  4999. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-windstop.pdf
  5000.  
  5001. ¤ NSA Collection Optimization Overview ::
  5002.  
  5003. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-overview.pdf
  5004.  
  5005. ¤ NSA Content Acquisition Optimization ::
  5006.  
  5007. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-content.pdf
  5008.  
  5009. ¤ NSA Collection Optimization Slides ::
  5010.  
  5011. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-slides.pdf
  5012.  
  5013. ¤ NSA SSO Cryptologic Provider ::
  5014.  
  5015. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sso-crypto.pdf
  5016.  
  5017. ¤ NSA SSO Yahoo, Google Exploitation ::
  5018.  
  5019. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sso-yahoo-google.pdf
  5020.  
  5021. ¤ NSA and GCHQ Breaks 3rd Party SSL to
  5022. Steal Email Metadata ::
  5023.  
  5024.  Even though they cooperate with the US
  5025. spy agency on court-ordered surveillance,
  5026. firms like Google and Yahoo are subject to
  5027. additional surveillance they never agreed to.
  5028.  
  5029.  Web companies host copies of your data on
  5030. servers around the world, reducing the
  5031. chance of losing your information should
  5032. one fail. When you log in to an account
  5033. with these firms, the data sent between
  5034. you and their servers is encrypted, making
  5035. it difficult to snoop – but the internal
  5036. transfers between data centres are unencrypted.
  5037. And because many of the transfers take place
  5038. outside the US, approval from a FISA court
  5039. isn’t required to tap the information.
  5040.  
  5041.  The National Security Agency has secretly
  5042. broken into the main communications links
  5043. that connect Yahoo and Google data centers
  5044. around the world, according to documents
  5045. obtained from former NSA contractor Edward
  5046. Snowden and interviews with knowledgeable
  5047. officials.
  5048.  
  5049.  By tapping those links, the agency has
  5050. positioned itself to collect at will from
  5051. hundreds of millions of user accounts,
  5052. many of them belonging to Americans. The
  5053. NSA does not keep everything it collects,
  5054. but it keeps a lot.
  5055.  
  5056.  The NSA’s principal tool to exploit the
  5057. data links is a project called MUSCULAR,
  5058. operated jointly with the agency’s British
  5059. counterpart, the Government Communications
  5060. Headquarters. From undisclosed interception
  5061. points, the NSA and the GCHQ are copying
  5062. entire data flows across fiber-optic cables
  5063. that carry information among the data
  5064. centers of the Silicon Valley giants.
  5065.  
  5066. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html
  5067. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-10-31/news/43528723_1_data-centers-google-claire-cain-miller
  5068. http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn24519-nsa-snoops-tech-companies-fibreoptic-networks.html
  5069. http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/04/eric-schmidt-nsa-spying-data-centres-outrageous
  5070. http://article.wn.com/view/2013/10/30/NSA_Broke_Into_Yahoo_Google_Data_Centers_Report/
  5071.  
  5072. ¤ NSA Collects Bulk Email Address Books ::
  5073.  
  5074.  In June, President Obama said the NSA’s
  5075. email collecting program “does not apply
  5076. to US citizens.”
  5077.  
  5078.  The National Security Agency is harvesting
  5079. hundreds of millions of contact lists from
  5080. personal e-mail and instant messaging
  5081. accounts around the world, many of them
  5082. belonging to Americans, according to
  5083. senior intelligence officials and top-secret
  5084. documents provided by former NSA contractor
  5085. Edward Snowden.
  5086.  
  5087.  The collection program, which has not
  5088. been disclosed before, intercepts e-mail
  5089. address books and “buddy lists” from
  5090. instant messaging services as they move
  5091. across global data links. Online services
  5092. often transmit those contacts when a user
  5093. logs on, composes a message, or synchronizes
  5094. a computer or mobile device with information
  5095. stored on remote servers.
  5096.  
  5097. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-collects-millions-of-e-mail-address-books-globally/2013/10/14/8e58b5be-34f9-11e3-80c6-7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html
  5098. http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/10/14/report-nsa-collects-millions-of-contact-lists-from-personal-email-and-instant-messaging-accounts-globally/
  5099. http://www.theatlanticwire.com/technology/2013/10/nsa-collects-email-address-books-contact-lists/70535/
  5100.  
  5101. ¤ Special Collection Services Wikis ::
  5102.  
  5103. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/scs-fr-us.pdf
  5104.  
  5105. ¤ NSA Exploits Microsoft Vulnerabilities ::
  5106.  
  5107. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-microsoft.pdf
  5108. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/841655/microsoft-realms-redacted.pdf
  5109. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-microsoft-cloud-exploit.pdf
  5110. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/841654/microsoft-in-cloud-exploitation-redacted.pdf
  5111. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/microsoft-nsa-collaboration-user-data
  5112. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  5113. ¤ NSA’s Boundless Informant ::
  5114.  
  5115. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-boundless-informant.pdf
  5116.  
  5117. ¤ NSA’s Boundless Informant Collected
  5118. 124+ Billion Phone Calls in One Month ::
  5119.  
  5120. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-125b-calls.htm
  5121.  
  5122. ¤ NSA’s Boundless Informant Metadata ::
  5123.  
  5124. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/10/boundlessinformant-only-shows-metadata.html
  5125.  
  5126. ¤ Guardian’s Boundless Informant Report ::
  5127.  
  5128. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-boundless-informant-global-datamining
  5129.  
  5130. ¤ Le Monde’s Boundless Informant Report ::
  5131.  
  5132. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/france-in-the-nsa-s-crosshair-phone-networks-under-surveillance_3499741_651865.html
  5133.  
  5134. ¤ Three Boundless Informant “Heatmaps” ::
  5135.  
  5136. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-boundless-informant-images.htm
  5137.  
  5138. ¤ NSA Boundless Informant Spied Norway ::
  5139.  
  5140. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundlessinformant-no-33m.pdf
  5141.  
  5142. ¤ US Says France, Spain Aided NSA Spying ::
  5143.  
  5144. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-us-france-spain.htm
  5145. ---------------------------------------
  5146. NOBODY comments ▼
  5147.  
  5148.  Le Monde’s Boundless Informant document
  5149. differs from the Guardians.
  5150.  
  5151. Le Monde’s Boundless Informant Graph ...
  5152.  
  5153. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807033/boundless-monde.pdf
  5154.  
  5155. Guardians’ Boundless Informant Graph ...
  5156.  
  5157. http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2013/6/8/1370716131074/boundless-heatmap-008.jpg
  5158.  
  5159.  Le Monde shows 3,095,533,478 intercepts
  5160. in the US compared to the Guardian showing
  5161. 2,392,343,446 US intercepts.
  5162.  
  5163.  Le Monde’s Boundless Informant graph
  5164. shows the “aggregate” estimate, both
  5165. digital networks (DNI) and telephony (DNR)
  5166. interception ; while the Guardian’s graph
  5167. only shows the digital “DNI” estimate.
  5168. ---------------------------------------
  5169. ¤ DRTBOX and the DRT Surveillance Systems ::
  5170.  
  5171. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/11/drtbox-and-drt-surveillance-systems.html
  5172.  
  5173. ¤ BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Explicated ::
  5174.  
  5175.  This was written from a person who purports
  5176. to actually use the Boundless Informant tool.
  5177.  
  5178. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundless-informant-explicated.htm
  5179.  
  5180. ¤ RE-BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Explicated ::
  5181.  
  5182. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundless-informant-gm-place.htm
  5183.  
  5184. ¤ BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Screenshots Can Be
  5185. Misleading ::
  5186.  
  5187. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/11/screenshots-from-boundlessinformant-can.html
  5188.  
  5189. ¤ DNI Masterspy Says Le Monde Misleads
  5190. on NSA Spying ::
  5191.  
  5192. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/dni-13-1022.pdf
  5193.  
  5194.  “Recent articles published in the
  5195. French newspaper Le Monde contain
  5196. inaccurate and misleading information
  5197. regarding US foreign intelligence
  5198. activities. The allegation that the
  5199. National Security Agency collected more
  5200. than 70 million “recordings of French
  5201. citizens’ telephone data” is false.
  5202.  
  5203.  While we are not going to discuss the
  5204. details of our activities, we have
  5205. repeatedly made it clear that the
  5206. United States gathers intelligence of
  5207. the type gathered by all nations. The
  5208. US collects intelligence to protect the
  5209. nation, its interests, and its allies
  5210. from, among other things, threats such
  5211. as terrorism and the proliferation of
  5212. weapons of mass destruction.
  5213.  
  5214.  The United States values our longstanding
  5215. friendship and alliance with France and
  5216. we will continue to cooperate on security
  5217. and intelligence matters going forward.”
  5218.  
  5219. James R. Clapper
  5220. Director of National Intelligence
  5221. ---------------------------------------
  5222. ¤ Snowden Responds to Feinstein’s Stupidity ::
  5223.  
  5224. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/330497-snowden-fires-back-at-feinstein-over-surveillance-claim
  5225.  
  5226.  “Today, no telephone in America makes
  5227. a call without leaving a record with the
  5228. NSA. Today, no Internet transaction enters
  5229. or leaves America without passing through
  5230. the NSA’s hands,” Snowden said in a
  5231. statement Thursday.
  5232.  
  5233.  “Our representatives in Congress tell us
  5234. this is not surveillance. They’re wrong.”
  5235. _______________________________________
  5236. ¤ US and UK Governments Still Worry Over
  5237. Cache of Encrypted Documents by Snowden ::
  5238.  
  5239.  US and British intelligence officials
  5240. say they are concerned about a “doomsday”
  5241. collection of highly classified, heavily
  5242. encrypted materials they believe former
  5243. National Security Agency contractor
  5244. Edward Snowden may have stored away.
  5245.  
  5246.  One source saw the cache of documents
  5247. as an “insurance policy” for Snowden
  5248. should he feel threatened by arrest or
  5249. other harm. ... ...
  5250.  
  5251.  Adding merit to the suspicion that the
  5252. well-secured cache may be an insurance
  5253. policy of sorts, Greenwald said in June
  5254. that “if anything happens at all to
  5255. Edward Snowden, he has arranged for them
  5256. to get access to the full archives.”
  5257.  
  5258. http://www.infowars.com/us-uk-officials-worry-snowden-still-has-doomsday-collection-of-classified-material/
  5259. _______________________________________
  5260. ¤ (Go Figure) Obama’s “Overhaul” of Spy
  5261. Programs Cloaked in More Secrecy ::
  5262.  
  5263.  Obama has been gradually tweaking vast
  5264. government surveillance policies. But he
  5265. is not disclosing those changes to the
  5266. public. Has he stopped spying on friendly
  5267. world leaders? He won’t say. Has he stopped
  5268. eavesdropping on the United Nations, the
  5269. World Bank and the International Monetary
  5270. Fund? He won’t say.
  5271.  
  5272.  Even the report by the group Obama created
  5273. to review and recommend changes to his
  5274. surveillance programs has been kept secret.
  5275.  
  5276. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/11/25/209465/obamas-overhaul-of-spy-programs.html
  5277. _______________________________________
  5278. ¤ NSA Report Outlined Goals for More Power ::
  5279.  
  5280.  Officials at the National Security Agency,
  5281. intent on maintaining its dominance in
  5282. intelligence collection, pledged last year
  5283. to push to expand its surveillance powers,
  5284. according to a top-secret strategy document.
  5285.  
  5286.  Written as an agency mission statement with
  5287. broad goals, the five-page document said
  5288. that existing American laws were not adequate
  5289. to meet the needs of the NSA to conduct broad
  5290. surveillance in what it cited as “the golden
  5291. age of Sigint,” or signals intelligence.
  5292. “The interpretation and guidelines for
  5293. applying our authorities, and in some cases
  5294. the authorities themselves, have not kept
  5295. pace with the complexity of the technology
  5296. and target environments, or the operational
  5297. expectations levied on NSA’s mission,” the
  5298. document concluded.
  5299.  
  5300. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategy-2012-2016.pdf
  5301. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-power-goals.htm
  5302. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/23/us/politics/nsa-report-outlined-goals-for-more-power.html
  5303. http://rt.com/usa/snowden-leak-expand-surveillance-goal-185/
  5304. http://www.dailydot.com/politics/snowden-leak-nsa-power/
  5305.  
  5306. ¤ NSA TreasureMap Description ::
  5307.  
  5308.  The NY Times today cites an NSA tool
  5309. called Treasure Map and describes its
  5310. capabilities but does not publish visual
  5311. examples. Also cited is Packaged Goods,
  5312. an associated tool. If publicly available,
  5313. Cryptome asked for pointers to the two.
  5314.  
  5315. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-treasuremap.htm
  5316. _______________________________________
  5317. ¤ Documents Show Tony Blair Let US Spy Britons ::
  5318.  
  5319. http://www.channel4.com/news/nsa-edward-snowden-america-britain-tony-blair
  5320. _______________________________________
  5321. ¤ GCHQ ROYAL CONCIERGE Diplomatic Hotel Spy ::
  5322.  
  5323. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/gchq-royal-concierge-de.pdf
  5324.  
  5325. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/gchq-royal-concierge.jpg
  5326.  
  5327. ¤ GCHQ Monitors Diplomats Hotel Bookings ::
  5328.  
  5329.  Britain’s GCHQ intelligence service monitors
  5330. diplomats’ travels using a sophisticated
  5331. automated system that tracks hotel bookings.
  5332. Once a room has been identified, it opens
  5333. the door to a variety of spying options.
  5334.  
  5335. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/gchq-monitors-hotel-reservations-to-track-diplomats-a-933914.html
  5336. _______________________________________
  5337. ¤ Supreme Court Blocks Challenge to Spying ::
  5338.  
  5339.  “We ask the NSA to immediately suspend
  5340. collection of solely domestic communications
  5341. pending the competition of a public rulemaking
  5342. as required by law. We intend to renew our
  5343. request each week until we receive your
  5344. response,” EPIC said.
  5345.  
  5346.  Five months later, though, the Supreme Court
  5347. said this week that it would not be hearing
  5348. EPIC’s plea. A document began circulating
  5349. early Monday in which the high court listed
  5350. the petition filed by the privacy advocates
  5351. as denied.
  5352.  
  5353. http://rt.com/usa/supreme-court-nsa-spying-906/
  5354.  
  5355. http://www.infowars.com/supreme-court-blocks-challenge-to-nsa-phone-tracking/
  5356. _______________________________________
  5357. ¤ NSA Deputy Director John Inglis Speaks ::
  5358.  
  5359. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ydkw4xgZ-Y
  5360.  
  5361. ¤ Intelligence Community Lawyers Argue
  5362. Over Metadata Hoarding ::
  5363.  
  5364. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131105/08030825135/dni-lawyer-argues-that-curbing-metadata-collections-will-damage-americans-privacy.shtml
  5365.  
  5366. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/intelligence-community-lawyers-argue-that-curbing-metadata-collections-will/
  5367.  
  5368. ¤ Bill Clinton Warns We Have No Security,
  5369. No Privacy ::
  5370.  
  5371. http://www.infowars.com/bill-clinton-on-nsa-spying-we-are-on-the-verge-of-having-the-worst-of-all-worlds-well-have-no-security-and-no-privacy/
  5372.  
  5373. ¤ Obama Regime Pledges to Continue Illegal
  5374. Spying Programs ::
  5375.  
  5376. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/11/06/spyi-n06.html
  5377.  
  5378. ¤ John McCain Interview by Der Spiegel ::
  5379.  
  5380. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/mccain-nsa-affair.pdf
  5381.  
  5382. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-john-mccain-on-nsa-spying-on-angela-merkel-a-932721.html
  5383. _______________________________________
  5384. ¤ NSA & GCHQ “Bullrun” Decryption Brief ::
  5385.  
  5386. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-bullrun-brief-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  5387.  
  5388. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784284/bullrun-briefing-sheet-from-gchq.pdf
  5389.  
  5390. ¤ NSA & GCHQ “Bullrun” Decryption Guide ::
  5391.  
  5392. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-bullrun-2-16-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  5393.  
  5394. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784047/bullrun-guide-final.pdf
  5395.  
  5396. ¤ NSA ; Cryptanalysis & Exploitation ::
  5397.  
  5398. “TOP SECRET//COMINT at a minimum”
  5399.  
  5400.  “(TS//SI) The fact that NSA/CSS makes
  5401. cryptographic modifications to commercial
  5402. or indigenous cryptographic information
  5403. security devices or systems in order to
  5404. make them exploitable.”
  5405.  
  5406. “TOP SECRET//COMINT at a minimum”
  5407.  
  5408.  “(U//FOUO) The fact that NSA/CSS
  5409. successfully exploits cryptographic
  5410. components of commercial information
  5411. security devices or systems when the
  5412. device or system specified.”
  5413.  
  5414. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-cryptanalysis-2-12-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  5415.  
  5416. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784048/crypt-guide2.pdf
  5417.  
  5418. ¤ NSA & GCHQ Breaks Other SIGINT Crypto ::
  5419.  
  5420. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  5421. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  5422. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-redacts.jpg
  5423.  
  5424. ¤ NSA and GCHQ Defeats Encryption ::
  5425.  
  5426.  US and British intelligence agencies
  5427. have successfully cracked much of the
  5428. online encryption relied upon by hundreds
  5429. of millions of people to protect the
  5430. privacy of their personal data, online
  5431. transactions and emails, according to
  5432. top-secret documents revealed by former
  5433. contractor Edward Snowden. ...
  5434.  
  5435.  Those methods include covert measures
  5436. to ensure NSA control over setting of
  5437. international encryption standards, the
  5438. use of supercomputers to break encryption
  5439. with “brute force”, and – the most closely
  5440. guarded secret of all – collaboration with
  5441. technology companies and internet service
  5442. providers themselves.
  5443.  
  5444.  Through these covert partnerships, the
  5445. agencies have inserted secret vulnerabilities
  5446. – known as backdoors or trapdoors – into
  5447. commercial encryption software. ... ...
  5448.  
  5449.  Independent security experts have long
  5450. suspected that the NSA has been introducing
  5451. weaknesses into security standards, a fact
  5452. confirmed for the first time by another
  5453. secret document. It shows the agency
  5454. worked covertly to get its own version
  5455. of a draft security standard issued by
  5456. the US National Institute of Standards
  5457. and Technology approved for worldwide
  5458. use in 2006.
  5459.  
  5460. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security
  5461.  
  5462. ¤ Full Guardian Report Mirrored ::
  5463.  
  5464. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  5465.  
  5466. ¤ Full New York Times Report Mirrored ::
  5467.  
  5468. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-nyt-13-0905.pdf
  5469.  
  5470. ¤ Full ProPublica Report Mirrored ::
  5471.  
  5472. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  5473.  
  5474. ¤ Bruce Schneier - NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  5475.  
  5476. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-01.pdf
  5477. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-02.pdf
  5478. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-03.pdf
  5479.  
  5480. ¤ Matthew Green - NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  5481.  
  5482. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-matthew-green-13-0905.pdf
  5483. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-matthew-green-13-0910.pdf
  5484.  
  5485. ¤ DNI Response to NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  5486.  
  5487. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-masterspy-13-0906.htm
  5488.  
  5489. ¤ Cryptography List Members Face Ulcers ::
  5490.  
  5491. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-cryptography-13-0905.htm
  5492.  
  5493. ¤ Documents Confirm “Back Doors” Inserted
  5494. Into Web and Software to Exploit Crypto ::
  5495.  
  5496. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-gchq-encryption-snowden-478/
  5497.  
  5498. http://www.infowars.com/documents-confirm-nsa-inserts-back-doors-into-web-software/
  5499.  
  5500.  A range of US hardware and software
  5501. companies are in danger of being dragged
  5502. into the widening scandal over internet
  5503. surveillance, following the latest leaks
  5504. from Edward Snowden, the former National
  5505. Security Agency contractor.
  5506.  
  5507.  The leaked documents include NSA claims
  5508. that it has collaborated with technology
  5509. companies to plant “back doors” into
  5510. their systems – or ways for the agency
  5511. secretly to penetrate systems without
  5512. the users’ knowledge.
  5513.  
  5514. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0054adb2-1709-11e3-9ec2-00144feabdc0.html
  5515.  
  5516. ¤ You Are the Enemy of the Police State ::
  5517.  
  5518. http://anewdomain.net/2013/09/06/john-c-dvorak-nsa-spying-americans-now-enemy/
  5519. _______________________________________
  5520. ¤ SSL Inspector ::
  5521.  
  5522. http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/NETRONOME-2011-SSLInsp-en.pdf
  5523.  
  5524. ¤ Examining SSL-Encrypted Communications ::
  5525.  
  5526. http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/METRONOME-2011-ExamSSL-Comm-en.pdf
  5527. _______________________________________
  5528. ¤ Bobby R. Inman Suggests NSA Declassify
  5529. All Suspected Leaks From Snowden ASAP ::
  5530.  
  5531. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/03/world/no-morsel-too-minuscule-for-all-consuming-nsa.html?_r=0
  5532.  
  5533. ¤ Around 42 Years to Publish All Leaks ::
  5534.  
  5535. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-tally.htm
  5536.  
  5537. ¤ US SIGINT Strategic Mission 2007 ::
  5538.  
  5539. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategic-mission-2007.pdf
  5540.  
  5541. ¤ US SIGINT Strategic Mission 2013 ::
  5542.  
  5543. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategic-mission-2013.pdf
  5544.  
  5545. ¤ A Weeks Worth of Eavesdropping ::
  5546.  
  5547. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-week-spy-2009.pdf
  5548. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  5549. ¤ Greenwald’s Partner, David Miranda
  5550. Accused of Terrorism in the UK ::
  5551.  
  5552. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/01/us-uk-nsa-idUSBRE9A013O20131101
  5553. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  5554. ¤ Meet the Spies Doing the NSA’s Dirty Work ::
  5555.  
  5556.  The heart of the FBI’s signals intelligence
  5557. activities is an obscure organization called
  5558. the Data Intercept Technology Unit, or DITU
  5559. (pronounced DEE-too). The handful of news
  5560. articles that mentioned it prior to revelations
  5561. of NSA surveillance this summer did so mostly
  5562. in passing. It has barely been discussed in
  5563. congressional testimony. An NSA PowerPoint
  5564. presentation given to journalists by former
  5565. NSA contractor Edward Snowden hints at DITU’s
  5566. pivotal role in the NSA’s Prism system --
  5567. it appears as a nondescript box on a flowchart
  5568. showing how the NSA task[s] information to
  5569. be collected, which is then gathered and
  5570. delivered by the DITU.
  5571.  
  5572.  The DITU is located in a sprawling compound
  5573. at Marine Corps Base Quantico in Virginia,
  5574. home of the FBI’s training academy and the
  5575. bureau’s Operational Technology Division,
  5576. which runs all the FBI’s technical intelligence
  5577. collection, processing, and reporting.
  5578.  
  5579. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  5580.  
  5581. ¤ More PRISM Slides Published ::
  5582.  
  5583. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-prism-13-1021.pdf
  5584. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807036/prism-entier.pdf
  5585. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/espionnage-de-la-nsa-tous-les-documents-publies-par-le-monde_3499986_651865.html
  5586.  
  5587.  
  5588. ¤ PRISM ; FAA Passive Spying ::
  5589.  
  5590. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-wanadoo-alcatel.pdf
  5591. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807031/wanadoo-alcatel.pdf
  5592. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/espionnage-de-la-nsa-tous-les-documents-publies-par-le-monde_3499986_651865.html
  5593.  
  5594. ¤ Compare PRISM Slide Publication ::
  5595.  
  5596. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/10/le-monde-prism/le-monde-prism.htm
  5597.  
  5598. ¤ NSA PRISM Slides From Guardian ::
  5599.  
  5600. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-prism-guardian-13-1101.pdf
  5601.  
  5602. ¤ Le Monde’s PRISM Report (TRANSLATED) ::
  5603.  
  5604. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/l-ampleur-de-l-espionnage-mondial-par-la-nsa_3499756_651865.html
  5605.  
  5606.  The magnitude of the global espionage
  5607. by the NSA.
  5608.  
  5609.  During the summer, the documents provided to the Guardian
  5610. and the Washington Post by former NSA employee Edward
  5611. Snowden helped unveil the extent of surveillance and
  5612. espionage carried out by the NSA and its allies. Le Monde
  5613. also now has access to some of these documents.
  5614.  
  5615.  Before the summer, the NSA was the most secretive intelligence
  5616. agencies of the United States. Then came Edward Snowden,
  5617. who was granted an asylum for a year in Russia. Wanting to
  5618. denounce "the largest program of arbitrary monitoring of human
  5619. history," the American working for a subcontractor of the NSA
  5620. has obtained several thousands of highly confidential documents.
  5621.  
  5622.  In early June, the first secrets of the National Security
  5623. Agency in these parts start to filter. The Guardian reveals
  5624. that the telephone operator Verizon provides NSA phone data
  5625. of several million Americans, according to a court order secret.
  5626. Then it was the turn of the Prism program to be unveiled. It
  5627. allows the US Secret Service, and first and foremost to the
  5628. NSA, to access a privileged manner, since December 2007,
  5629. data from nine major Internet companies, including Google,
  5630. Facebook and Microsoft.
  5631.  
  5632. MONITORING OF SUBMARINE CABLE
  5633.  
  5634.  A document providing internal training on Prism, which Le
  5635. Monde has also had access, how the NSA analysts can query
  5636. the databases of Web giants, research documents, emails or
  5637. instant discussions. All within a legal framework that
  5638. overcomes the request of an individual mandate. The companies
  5639. named in the documents have denied that the NSA had a direct
  5640. and unilateral access to their servers.
  5641.  
  5642.  In addition to this targeted surveillance, Snowden records
  5643. reveal another method of massive collection of the NSA called
  5644. Upstream. This system can collect data from the submarine
  5645. cable and Internet infrastructures. A logical strategy, when
  5646. we know that 99% of global communications now pass through
  5647. diving.
  5648.  
  5649.  To learn more about the context of the revelations of the
  5650. World, the editorial read : "Fight Big Brother"
  5651.  
  5652.  The British equivalent of the NSA, the Government Communications
  5653. Headquarters (GCHQ), plays a major role in this system, because
  5654. of the historical proximity of Great Britain and the United States,
  5655. confidentiality agreements and a financial dependence of those
  5656. services from London to Washington. There are also technical
  5657. reasons : a significant portion of submarine cables linking
  5658. Europe to America through Britain. With Edward Snowden, the
  5659. Tempora program , which aims to "control the Internet" by
  5660. monitoring these cables, has been revealed. "You're in an
  5661. enviable position, says a document presenting Tempora, presented
  5662. by the Guardian, have fun and pull in the best." Turning a page
  5663. of the document presenting the Prism program, we discover Upstream
  5664. relies on four programs (Blarney, Fairview, and oakstar Stormbrew)
  5665. which we know to date, the outline. Fairview, for example,
  5666. would largely on intercepted telephone conversations via the
  5667. major US carriers.
  5668.  
  5669. DATA ANALYSIS TOOLS
  5670.  
  5671.  Many tools are needed to sort the mass of intercepted data.
  5672. One of them is called XKeyscore, and its operation has been
  5673. detailed in the columns of the Guardian. The extreme precision
  5674. of the data are clear. With XKeyscore, analysts can access
  5675. the content of e-mails to a list of websites visited by their
  5676. target or the keywords entered by the latter in the search
  5677. engines.
  5678.  
  5679.  The framework for this research is not binding, as the Guardian
  5680. explained, and many Americans are data made available to agents.
  5681. According to the presentation materials, to promote the
  5682. capabilities of the tool, three hundred terrorists have been
  5683. arrested since 2008 thanks to XKeyscore.
  5684.  
  5685.  NSA and GCHQ not only devote their considerable resources
  5686. monitoring the fight against terrorism, but also to spy allies.
  5687. At the G20 summit in London in 2009, computers of diplomats
  5688. and heads of state were monitored by GCHQ, as well as some of
  5689. their phone calls. NSA, she focused on the European Union (EU),
  5690. as revealed by Der Spiegel, always on the basis of documents
  5691. Snowden. NSA has installed cookies on the premises of the EU
  5692. representation in Washington. The EU delegation to the UN in
  5693. New York, and the building of the Council of the European Union
  5694. in Brussels were also scrutinized by the US agency. Brazil is
  5695. also one of the countries affected by this intelligence. According
  5696. to Brazilian media group O Globo, its political leaders as some
  5697. companies have been targeted.
  5698.  
  5699.  The Snowden documents have informed the considerable efforts
  5700. made by the United States to start listening to Internet, in a
  5701. sometimes unclear legal framework and often away from real
  5702. democratic debate. Interviewed by Le Monde, the US authorities
  5703. have assured that the Prism program was the subject of a
  5704. parliamentary debate in the United States and was working
  5705. in a strictly regulated legal framework. Asked on September 12
  5706. revelations Snowden, James Clapper, the US Director of National
  5707. Intelligence, said: "What happened - and that is harmful - sparked
  5708. conversation and debate that it probably was necessary."
  5709. _______________________________________
  5710. ¤ UN Resolution Against US Spying ::
  5711.  
  5712. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/un-v-us-spying.htm
  5713.  
  5714. ¤ 21 Nations Line Up Behind UN Effort ::
  5715.  
  5716. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/10/25/exclusive_21_nations_line_up_behind_un_effort_to_restrain_nsa
  5717.  
  5718. ¤ Government May Stop Spying On So-called
  5719. ‘World Leaders’, But Not You ::
  5720.  
  5721. http://www.infowars.com/government-may-stop-spying-on-world-leaders-but-not-you/
  5722.  
  5723. NOBODY comments
  5724.  
  5725.  100% expected. They will continue to
  5726. spy on 99.9% of the world, no doubt.
  5727. Any secret data-hoardering agency will.
  5728. We must adjust to it by learning how
  5729. to counter their surveillance.
  5730.  
  5731. ¤ UPDATE ; Inside America’s Plan to Kill
  5732. Online Privacy Rights Everywhere ::
  5733.  
  5734.  The United States and its key intelligence
  5735. allies are quietly working behind the scenes
  5736. to kneecap a mounting movement in the United
  5737. Nations to promote a universal human right
  5738. to online privacy, according to diplomatic
  5739. sources and an internal American government
  5740. document obtained by The Cable.
  5741.  
  5742.  The diplomatic battle is playing out in an
  5743. obscure UN General Assembly committee that
  5744. is considering a proposal by Brazil and
  5745. Germany to place constraints on unchecked
  5746. internet surveillance by the National
  5747. Security Agency and other foreign intelligence
  5748. services. American representatives have made
  5749. it clear that they won’t tolerate such
  5750. checks on their global surveillance network.
  5751. The stakes are high, particularly in
  5752. Washington -- which is seeking to contain
  5753. an international backlash against NSA
  5754. spying -- and in Brasilia, where Brazilian
  5755. President Dilma Roussef is personally
  5756. involved in monitoring the UN negotiations.
  5757.  
  5758. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/us-kill-privacy.htm
  5759.  
  5760. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/11/20/exclusive_inside_americas_plan_to_kill_online_privacy_rights_everywhere
  5761. _______________________________________
  5762. ¤ Keith Alexander Promotes NSA / Scorns
  5763. Public News Coverage ::
  5764.  
  5765. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Kc5Xvr24Aw
  5766. http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2013/10/nsa-chief-stop-reporters-selling-spy-documents-175896.html
  5767. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/25/europe-erupts-nsa-spying-chief-government
  5768. _______________________________________
  5769. ¤ Leaked Memos Reveal GCHQ Efforts to
  5770. Keep Mass Surveillance Secret ::
  5771.  
  5772. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/25/leaked-memos-gchq-mass-surveillance-secret-snowden
  5773. _______________________________________
  5774. ¤ US Dictatorship Spied Mexican Dictator ::
  5775.  
  5776.  The National Security Agency (NSA) has
  5777. a division for particularly difficult
  5778. missions. Called “Tailored Access Operations”
  5779. (TAO), this department devises special
  5780. methods for special targets.
  5781.  
  5782.  That category includes surveillance of
  5783. neighboring Mexico, and in May 2010,
  5784. the division reported its mission
  5785. accomplished. A report classified as
  5786. “top secret” said: “TAO successfully
  5787. exploited a key mail server in the
  5788. Mexican Presidencia domain within the
  5789. Mexican Presidential network to gain
  5790. first-ever access to President Felipe
  5791. Calderon’s public email account.”
  5792.  
  5793. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-hacked-email-account-of-mexican-president-a-928817.html
  5794.  
  5795. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-leak-mx-2.htm
  5796.  
  5797. Cryptome comments ▼
  5798.  
  5799.  This spying was apparently done from
  5800. the NSA’s Medina Regional SIGINT Operations
  5801. Center (MRSOC), Lackland Air Force Base
  5802. Annex, San Antonio, TX (formerly Medina
  5803. Regional SIGINT Operations Center):
  5804.  
  5805. http://cryptome.org/2012-info/nsa-mrsoc-2012/nsa-mrsoc-2012.htm
  5806.  
  5807. http://cryptome.org/mrsoc.pdf
  5808. _______________________________________
  5809. ¤ More NSA Targets Revealed ::
  5810.  
  5811. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-selected-coverage.htm
  5812.  
  5813. ¤ NSA Spies on French Government ::
  5814.  
  5815. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-close-access-sigads.pdf
  5816.  
  5817. ¤ NSA Spies on Indian Government ::
  5818.  
  5819. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/india-close-access-sigads.pdf
  5820.  
  5821. ¤ NSA Spies on Everyone ::
  5822.  
  5823. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/24/nsa-surveillance-world-leaders-calls
  5824.  
  5825. ¤ EU Rules New Policy to Curb NSA Spying ::
  5826.  
  5827. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/17/eu-rules-data-us-edward-snowden
  5828.  
  5829. ¤ Other Governments “Envious” of NSA ::
  5830.  
  5831. http://theweek.com/article/index/251628/why-the-nsa-spies-on-france-and-germany
  5832.  
  5833.  David Addington, Cheney’s chief of staff,
  5834. thought that the NSA should use its
  5835. technology to intercept emails and
  5836. telephone calls sent from one domestic
  5837. terminal to another, and was upset to
  5838. learn that Hayden thought differently.
  5839. That was a line he would only cross,
  5840. deliberately, with court and congressional
  5841. approval. Addington dropped the idea,
  5842. but as we now know, the agency added
  5843. to its portfolio a mandate to monitor
  5844. suspicious communications that transited
  5845. the border of the United States, and
  5846. later began to collect reams of metadata
  5847. in order to analyze it.
  5848.  
  5849.  Hayden wasn’t being cautious just for
  5850. the record: NSA’s job was to collect
  5851. foreign intelligence — to steal stuff,
  5852. or purloin letters, real and digital,
  5853. in order to provide policymakers with a
  5854. decision advantage. The advantage the
  5855. NSA provided was accurate information
  5856. about what people who interacted with
  5857. the United States said in private about
  5858. their intentions; that gap between saying
  5859. and doing, and the ability to predict
  5860. action from it, allows the president of
  5861. the United States to stay a step ahead.
  5862.  
  5863.  It’s one thing to say that the United
  5864. States’ actions don’t always match up
  5865. with the values we espouse, and that’s
  5866. true. When our hypocrisy is exposed,
  5867. our moral authority wanes and our
  5868. ability to maneuver is reduced.
  5869.  
  5870.  It’s quite another to assume that other
  5871. countries are any purer. They never have
  5872. been and probably won’t be. Many are much
  5873. purer than others, so the amount of
  5874. resources the intelligence community
  5875. devotes to harder strategic targets ought
  5876. to correspond with how honest our allies
  5877. are, or how little they deceive us. The
  5878. egg comes before the chicken: How the hell
  5879. can we figure out which allies are more
  5880. reliable if we don’t figure out the
  5881. correspondence between public and private
  5882. words and actions.
  5883.  
  5884.  Of course, Brazil, France, Germany, and
  5885. Mexico do exactly the same thing. They
  5886. want their leaders to gain a decision
  5887. advantage in the give and take between
  5888. countries. They want to know what US
  5889. policymakers will do before the Americans
  5890. do it. And in the case of Brazil and
  5891. France, they aggressively spy on the
  5892. United States, on US citizens and
  5893. politicians, in order to collect that
  5894. information. The difference lies in the
  5895. scale of intelligence collection: The
  5896. US has the most effective, most distributed,
  5897. most sophisticated intelligence community
  5898. in the West. It is Goliath. And other
  5899. countries, rightly in their mind, are
  5900. envious.
  5901. _______________________________________
  5902. ¤ NSA Involvement in Drone Kill Operations ::
  5903.  
  5904. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/documents-reveal-nsas-extensive-involvement-in-targeted-killing-program/2013/10/16/29775278-3674-11e3-8a0e-4e2cf80831fc_story.html
  5905. _______________________________________
  5906. ¤ 58 Things Learned About NSA Spying ::
  5907.  
  5908. http://www.tedgioia.com/nsa_facts.html
  5909. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  5910. ¤ Brazil Prepares to Counter NSA’s PRISM
  5911. with ‘Secure Email’ Plan ::
  5912.  
  5913. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/10/14/brazil_waxes_lyrical_on_security/
  5914. _______________________________________
  5915. ¤ Dutch Cabinet Response to Parliamentary
  5916. Questions About NSA Wiretapping ::
  5917.  
  5918. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/10/dutch-govt-response-to-parliamentary.html
  5919. _______________________________________
  5920.  This week Edward Snowden received the
  5921. Integrity Award from the Sam Adams Associates
  5922. for Integrity in Intelligence. These videos
  5923. from the award ceremony are the first of
  5924. Mr Snowden after being granted asylum in
  5925. Russia.
  5926.  
  5927. http://wikileaks.org/Video-Edward-Snowden-wins-Sam.html
  5928. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  5929. ▼ GCHQ Freaks Out Over Recent Leaks ::
  5930.  
  5931.  Andrew Parker, the director general
  5932. of the Security Service, said the
  5933. exposing of intelligence techniques,
  5934. by the Guardian newspaper, had given
  5935. fanatics the ability to evade the spy
  5936. agencies.
  5937.  
  5938. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/10365026/GCHQ-leaks-have-gifted-terrorists-ability-to-attack-at-will-warns-spy-chief.html
  5939.  
  5940. ¤ NSA & GCHQ Counter-Tor Slides ::
  5941.  
  5942.  “Use cookies to identify Tor users when
  5943. they are not using Tor.”
  5944.  
  5945. “Investigate Evercookie persistence.”
  5946.  
  5947. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-stinks.pdf
  5948. ---------------------------------------
  5949.  Here is evercookie.sol found from an
  5950. old bleach log.
  5951.  
  5952. C:\Documents and Settings\Owner\Application Data\
  5953. Macromedia\Flash Player\#SharedObjects\ED5YHQQU\
  5954. bbcdn-bbnaut.ibillboard.com\server-static-files\
  5955. bbnaut.swf\evercookie.sol
  5956.  
  5957. bbnaut.swf holding evercookie.sol
  5958.  
  5959.  “SWF is an Adobe Flash file format used
  5960. for multimedia, vector graphics and
  5961. ActionScript. Originating with FutureWave
  5962. Software, then transferred to Macromedia,
  5963. and then coming under the control of Adobe,
  5964. SWF files can contain animations or applets
  5965. of varying degrees of interactivity and
  5966. function.
  5967.  
  5968.  There are also various third party
  5969. programs that can produce files in
  5970. this format, such as Multimedia Fusion,
  5971. Captivate and SWiSH Max.”
  5972.  
  5973.  “.sol files are created by Adobe Flash
  5974. Player to hold Local Shared Objects,
  5975. data stored on the system running the
  5976. Flash player.”
  5977. ---------------------------------------
  5978. ▲ NOBODY comments on Evercookie
  5979.  
  5980.  Evercookie is an .sol format, created
  5981. as a macromedia (or flashplayer) cache.
  5982. It can be found within Windows systems
  5983. and can be wiped out here ;
  5984.  
  5985. C:\Documents and Settings\User\
  5986. Application Data\Macromedia\
  5987.  
  5988. and may also be cloned here ;
  5989.  
  5990. C:\WINDOWS\system32\Macromed\Flash\
  5991.  
  5992.  I recommend users ALWAYS bleach their
  5993. cache, cookies, logs, TEMP.
  5994.  
  5995. The %TEMP% directory can be found here ;
  5996.  
  5997. C:\Documents and Settings\User\
  5998. Local Settings\Temp\
  5999. ---------------------------------------
  6000. • Adobe Flash Player Registry »
  6001.  
  6002. http://code.str0.be/view/1d23ed24
  6003.  
  6004. http://ae7.st/p/6ci  (mirror)
  6005.  
  6006. • swflash.ocx Raw Data Dump »
  6007.  
  6008. http://code.str0.be/view/41185b11
  6009.  
  6010. http://ae7.st/p/1ve  (mirror)
  6011.  
  6012. • Evercookie Cache Format Registry »
  6013.  
  6014. http://pb.stoleyour.com/view/1d527692
  6015.  
  6016. http://ae7.st/p/35m  (mirror)
  6017.  
  6018. • Adobe “Asset Cache” Format Registry »
  6019.  
  6020. http://pb.stoleyour.com/view/722ea22f
  6021.  
  6022. http://ae7.st/p/4rq  (mirror)
  6023.  
  6024. • Macromedia - a Third-party Cacher »
  6025.  
  6026. http://p.pomf.se/1252
  6027.  
  6028. http://ae7.st/p/5dk  (mirror)
  6029. ---------------------------------------
  6030. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evercookie
  6031.  
  6032.  Evercookie is a JavaScript-based
  6033. application created by Samy Kamkar
  6034. which produces zombie cookies in a
  6035. web browser that are intentionally
  6036. difficult to delete. ... ...
  6037.  
  6038.  An Evercookie is not merely difficult
  6039. to delete. It actively resists deletion
  6040. by copying itself in different forms on
  6041. the user’s machine and resurrecting
  6042. itself if it notices that some of the
  6043. copies are missing or expired.
  6044.  
  6045.  Specifically, when creating a new cookie,
  6046. Evercookie uses the following storage
  6047. mechanisms when available:
  6048.  
  6049. • Standard HTTP cookies
  6050. • Local Shared Objects (Flash cookies)
  6051. • Silverlight Isolated Storage
  6052. • Storing cookies in RGB values of
  6053. auto-generated, force-cached PNGs
  6054. using HTML5 Canvas tag to read pixels
  6055. (cookies) back out
  6056. • Storing cookies in Web history
  6057. • Storing cookies in HTTP ETags
  6058. • Storing cookies in Web cache
  6059. • window.name caching
  6060. • Internet Explorer userData storage
  6061. • HTML5 Session Storage
  6062. • HTML5 Local Storage
  6063. • HTML5 Global Storage
  6064. • HTML5 Database Storage via SQLite
  6065. ---------------------------------------
  6066. ¤ Cookies Threaten Tor User Anonymity ::
  6067.  
  6068.  “Just because you’re using Tor doesn’t
  6069. mean that your browser isn't storing
  6070. cookies,” said Jeremiah Grossman, a
  6071. colleague of Hansen’s who also specializes
  6072. in browser vulnerabilities.
  6073.  
  6074.  As Grossman described the procedure to
  6075. CNET, the NSA is aware of Tor’s entry
  6076. and exit nodes because of its Internet
  6077. wide surveillance.
  6078.  
  6079.  “The very feature that makes Tor a
  6080. powerful anonymity service, and the
  6081. fact that all Tor users look alike on
  6082. the Internet, makes it easy to
  6083. differentiate Tor users from other
  6084. Web users,” he wrote.
  6085.  
  6086.  “The NSA then cookies that ad, so that
  6087. every time you go to a site, the cookie
  6088. identifies you. Even though your IP
  6089. address changed [because of Tor], the
  6090. cookies gave you away,” he said.
  6091.  
  6092. http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57606178-83/nsa-tracks-google-ads-to-find-tor-users/
  6093. ---------------------------------------
  6094. ¤ GCHQ ; MULLENIZE Operation to Tag and
  6095. Identify Packet Traffic From Machines ::
  6096.  
  6097.  “Working together, CT and CNE have
  6098. devised a method to carry out large-scale
  6099. ‘staining’ as a means to identify
  6100. individual machines linked to that
  6101. IP address. ... ...
  6102.  
  6103.  User Agent Staining is a technique that
  6104. involves writing a unique marker (or stain)
  6105. onto a target machine. Each stain is
  6106. visible in passively collected SIGINT
  6107. and is stamped into every packet, which
  6108. enables all the events from that stained
  6109. machine to be brought back together to
  6110. recreate a browsing session.”
  6111.  
  6112. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/gchq-mullenize.pdf
  6113.  
  6114. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/801762/mullenize-28redacted-29.pdf
  6115.  
  6116. ¤ Packet Staining ::
  6117.  
  6118. http://prezi.com/p5et9yawg2c6/ip-packet-staining/
  6119. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-00
  6120. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-01
  6121. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/packet-stain/packet-staining.htm
  6122.  
  6123. ¤ NSA Peeling Back the Layers of Tor ::
  6124.  
  6125. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-egotisticalgiraffe.pdf
  6126. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/egotistical-giraffe-nsa-tor-document
  6127. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity
  6128. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption
  6129.  
  6130. ¤ NSA ; Tor Source Code Vulnerabilities ::
  6131.  
  6132.  “We have seen several targets using Tor.
  6133. Our goal was to analyze Tor source code
  6134. and determine any vulnerabilities in
  6135. the system. We set up an internal Tor
  6136. network to analyze Tor traffic, in the
  6137. hopes of discovering ways to passively
  6138. identify it. We also worked to create
  6139. a custom Tor client which allows the
  6140. user finer control.” ... ...
  6141.  
  6142.  “This accomplishes several things.
  6143. Most basically, the Tor servers, many
  6144. of which are listed on publicly advertised
  6145. directory servers, are chosen to act as
  6146. a series of proxies. This may seem to
  6147. be excessively complex, as a single
  6148. proxy server can be used to hide one’s
  6149. location, but a single-hop proxy is
  6150. vulnerable in two ways. First, by
  6151. analyzing the pattern of the traffic
  6152. going to and from the proxy server,
  6153. it is possible to deduce which clients
  6154. are making which requests. Second, if
  6155. an attacker owns the proxy server, then
  6156. it certainly knows who is asking for what,
  6157. and anonymization is ruined. By using
  6158. multiple hops, Tor is much more resistant
  6159. to both of these attacks. Traffic analysis
  6160. becomes extraordinarily difficult, as it
  6161. must be coordinated across several machines,
  6162. and an attacker must own all the hops
  6163. along the circuit in order to trace
  6164. requests back to the originating client.”
  6165.  
  6166. ... ...
  6167.  
  6168.  “In our time in the lab, we found that
  6169. running an nmap on a node that is offering
  6170. a hidden service will turn up the port
  6171. that the hidden service is using to deal
  6172. with incoming connections. It can then be
  6173. directly connected to, outside of Tor.”
  6174.  
  6175. ... ...
  6176.  
  6177.  “We would have to try to connect to
  6178. each of the ports we see open on a
  6179. machine to determine if there is a
  6180. hidden service being run. We would not
  6181. even know which protocol the hidden
  6182. service is running. It may be an HTTP
  6183. server, an FTP server, an SMTP server,
  6184. etc. The only thing we know is that
  6185. the protocol must run over TCP. It is
  6186. not enough to attempt to connect once
  6187. to each port, using an HTTP GET request.
  6188. Several protocols must be tried.”
  6189.  
  6190. ... ...
  6191.  
  6192.  “It may also be useful to study Tor
  6193. directory servers in more detail. Our
  6194. work focused solely on the client, but
  6195. many attacks would be much easier with
  6196. access to more Tor servers. The directory
  6197. servers ultimately control which Tor
  6198. servers are used by clients. We have found
  6199. that a server can put itself on a directory
  6200. server multiple times; all it takes is the
  6201. server running several Tor processes, each
  6202. having a different nickname, open port,
  6203. fingerprint, and LOG FILE. This only
  6204. requires different configuration files
  6205. for the different processes, which are
  6206. easy to set up. That machine will handle
  6207. a disproportionate amount of traffic,
  6208. since it is listed several times. This
  6209. increases the density of friendly servers
  6210. in the cloud without increasing the number
  6211. of servers we have set up. Unfortunately,
  6212. each listing has the same IP address,
  6213. which would be very noticeable to anyone
  6214. who inspecting the directories.”
  6215.  
  6216. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor.pdf
  6217. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/802061/ces-summer-2006-tor-paper-28redacted-29-1.pdf
  6218. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/secret-nsa-documents-show-campaign-against-tor-encrypted-network/2013/10/04/610f08b6-2d05-11e3-8ade-a1f23cda135e_story.html
  6219.  
  6220. ¤ NSA ; Types of IAT ::
  6221.  
  6222. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-iat-tor.pdf
  6223.  
  6224. ¤ NSA Link Removed by Guardian ::
  6225.  
  6226. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-link-removed.htm
  6227.  
  6228. ¤ Tor Media Reports Disinformative (?) ::
  6229.  
  6230.  “This document doesn’t give much insight
  6231. into capabilities the IC has developed
  6232. against Tor. It’s apparently quite common
  6233. to run multiple research teams (either
  6234. known or unknown to each other) against
  6235. a single target, and a few summer students
  6236. with a dozen lab machines is a pretty
  6237. small investment. I’d expect there are
  6238. other programs with more sophisticated
  6239. attacks, especially now 7 years later.”
  6240.  
  6241. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-disinfo.htm
  6242. _______________________________________
  6243. ¤ Greenwald and Gibson Q&A @ Reddit ::
  6244.  
  6245. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/greenwald-gibson-reddit.pdf
  6246. _______________________________________
  6247. ¤ Mike Rogers Says He’d Like To See
  6248. Snowden On a Hit List ::
  6249.  
  6250. http://www.infowars.com/former-nsa-head-says-hed-like-to-see-snowden-on-us-kill-list/
  6251.  
  6252.  “I must admit, in my darker moment over
  6253. the past several months, I’d also thought
  6254. of nominating Mr. Snowden, but it was
  6255. for a different list,” Hayden said during
  6256. a panel discussion, according to Brendan
  6257. Sasso of The Hill.
  6258.  
  6259.  Sasso notes that the audience laughed,
  6260. and Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich), chairman
  6261. of the House Intelligence Committee who
  6262. was also on the panel, responded, “I can
  6263. help you with that.”
  6264.  
  6265. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/326315-former-nsa-chief-jokes-about-putting-snowden-on-kill-list
  6266.  
  6267.  The conversation then turned specifically
  6268. to the government’s use of targeted
  6269. killings, with Hayden noting “Yes, we
  6270. do targeted killings, and I certainly
  6271. hope they make full use of the capacities
  6272. of the National Security Agency when we
  6273. do that.”
  6274.  
  6275.  Hayden was responding to a question
  6276. about a new project announced by journalists
  6277. Glenn Greenwald and Jeremy Scahill,
  6278. delving into the NSA’s alleged role in
  6279. assassinations.
  6280.  
  6281. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-assassination-leaks-greenwald-514/
  6282. _______________________________________
  6283. ¤ NSA Police Guard Threatens Reporters ::
  6284.  
  6285. Infowars crew arrive at Utah Data Center.
  6286.  
  6287. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-goons-confiscate-cameras-from-reporters/
  6288.  
  6289. http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/56958862-90/data-center-utah-amp.html.csp
  6290. _______________________________________
  6291. ¤ Cost and Responsibility for Snowden’s
  6292. Breaches ::
  6293.  
  6294. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/snowden-cost.htm
  6295.  
  6296. ¤ Questioning Snowden Truth ::
  6297.  
  6298. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/questioning-snowden-truth.htm
  6299. _______________________________________
  6300. ¤ NSA Gathers Data on Social Networks
  6301. of US Citizens ::
  6302.  
  6303.  The new disclosures add to the growing
  6304. body of knowledge in recent months about
  6305. the NSA’s access to and use of private
  6306. information concerning Americans, prompting
  6307. lawmakers in Washington to call for reining
  6308. in the agency and President Obama to order
  6309. an examination of its surveillance policies.
  6310. Almost everything about the agency’s
  6311. operations is hidden, and the decision
  6312. to revise the limits concerning Americans
  6313. was made in secret, without review by the
  6314. nation’s intelligence court or any public
  6315. debate. As far back as 2006, a Justice
  6316. Department memo warned of the potential
  6317. for the “misuse” of such information
  6318. without adequate safeguards.
  6319.  
  6320. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-syanpse.htm
  6321. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-syanpse-large.jpg
  6322. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/us/nsa-examines-social-networks-of-us-citizens.html?_r=0
  6323.  
  6324. ¤ NSA Director Admits NSA Collects Data
  6325. From American Social Networks ::
  6326.  
  6327. http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/US_NSA_SURVEILLANCE_SOCIAL_NETWORKS?SITE=AP
  6328. _______________________________________
  6329. ¤ GCHQ Faces Legal Challenge in European
  6330. Court Over Online Privacy ::
  6331.  
  6332. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/03/gchq-legal-challenge-europe-privacy-surveillance
  6333. _______________________________________
  6334. UNITED STATES ONLY COUNTRY TO VOTE “NO”
  6335. TO A NEW TREATY FOR DIGITAL PRIVACY ::
  6336.  
  6337.  Led by the German government, a loose
  6338. coalition of privacy chiefs from countries
  6339. across the world is pushing to update an
  6340. influential international human rights
  6341. treaty that enshrines the right to privacy.
  6342.  
  6343. ... ...
  6344.  
  6345.  The annual conference was attended by a
  6346. diverse selection of privacy and data
  6347. protection officials from across the
  6348. world, with representatives attending
  6349. from countries including Japan, New Zealand,
  6350. France, Slovenia, Uruguay, Belgium, Ireland,
  6351. Finland, Spain, Australia, Germany, Burkina
  6352. Faso, Canada, the United States, and the
  6353. United Kingdom.
  6354.  
  6355.  During a closed session at the conference
  6356. open only to the privacy chiefs, a
  6357. resolution was put forward for a vote
  6358. on the proposal to update Article 17.
  6359. They voted overwhelmingly in favor of
  6360. the idea, recognizing a need to “create
  6361. globally applicable standards for data
  6362. protection and the protection of privacy
  6363. in accordance with the rule of law.”
  6364.  
  6365.  Notably, only one country did not approve
  6366. of the resolution ... the United States.
  6367.  
  6368.  At this point, the proposed Article 17
  6369. protocol is still a long way off. It will
  6370. eventually need to be put forward at the
  6371. United Nations and voted on by member
  6372. states, and that could take time. But
  6373. the growing appetite to amend the
  6374. international treaty in light of the
  6375. Snowden revelations is highly symbolic
  6376. if nothing else, reflecting widespread
  6377. concerns about the power of mass surveillance
  6378. technology in the digital age to trample
  6379. over basic universal privacy rights.
  6380.  
  6381. https://privacyconference2013.org/web/pageFiles/kcfinder/files/5.%20International%20law%20resolution%20EN%281%29.pdf
  6382.  
  6383. http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/09/26/article_17_surveillance_update_countries_want_digital_privacy_in_the_iccpr.html
  6384.  
  6385. NOBODY comments
  6386.  
  6387.  “The problem is not just the NSA, but
  6388. all secret agencies around the world,
  6389. in general. All secret agencies and
  6390. their third-party vendors or allies
  6391. break (or bypass) crypto and manufacture
  6392. backdoors in electronic communication
  6393. devices by stealth. Not just the NSA.
  6394. Not just the GCHQ. Not just the GFO.
  6395. Not just the ISNU, et al. The major
  6396. problem is trust. If you desire privacy,
  6397. you must kill any trust in security.
  6398.  
  6399.  Security does not exist on the web.
  6400. Digital privacy is a hoax. It’s null.
  6401. It’s a wet dream. It’s justice FUBAR.”
  6402. _______________________________________
  6403. ¤ Deutsche Telekom Defies NSA Spying ::
  6404.  
  6405. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303983904579096082938662594.html
  6406.  
  6407. ¤ Deutsche DSL Phone Switch Data Dump ::
  6408.  
  6409. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dtag-dsl-switches.txt
  6410. _______________________________________
  6411. ¤ Senate FISA Hearings, September 2013 ::
  6412.  
  6413. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/edgar-13-0926.pdf
  6414. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/wittes-13-0926.pdf
  6415. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-nsa-doj-13-0926.pdf
  6416. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-13-0926.pdf
  6417. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-13-0926.pdf
  6418.  
  6419. ¤ Dianne Feinstein Accidentally Confirms
  6420. NSA Tapped the Internet Backbone ::
  6421.  
  6422. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130927/13562624678/dianne-feinstein-accidentally-confirms-that-nsa-tapped-internet-backbone.shtml
  6423. http://www.infowars.com/dianne-feinstein-accidentally-confirms-that-nsa-tapped-the-internet-backbone/
  6424. http://www.c-spanvideo.org/clip/4466341
  6425.  
  6426.  In short, “upstream” capabilities are tapping the
  6427. backbone itself, via the willing assistance of the
  6428. telcos (who still have remained mostly silent on all
  6429. of this) as opposed to “downstream” collection, which
  6430. requires going to the internet companies directly.
  6431.  
  6432. ¤ Senators Blame Public News Covering Leaks ::
  6433.  
  6434. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/26/senators-nsa-media_n_3998229.html
  6435.  
  6436. ▼ Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying ::
  6437.  
  6438. (1) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56175
  6439. (2) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56176
  6440. (3) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56177
  6441. (4) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56178
  6442. (5) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56179
  6443. _______________________________________
  6444. ¤ Declassified Documents Reveal the NSA
  6445. Wiretapped Martin Luther King, Muhammad
  6446. Ali and Two US Senators ::
  6447.  
  6448. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/26/nsa-surveillance-anti-vietnam-muhammad-ali-mlk
  6449. _______________________________________
  6450. ¤ NSA Hacked Indian Politicos, Scientists ::
  6451.  
  6452.  According to a top secret document disclosed by NSA
  6453. whistleblower Edward Snowden and obtained by The Hindu,
  6454. the PRISM programme was deployed by the American agency
  6455. to gather key information from India by tapping directly
  6456. into the servers of tech giants which provide services
  6457. such as email, video sharing, voice-over-IPs, online chats,
  6458. file transfer and social networking services.
  6459.  
  6460.  And, according to the PRISM document seen by The Hindu,
  6461. much of the communication targeted by the NSA is unrelated
  6462. to terrorism, contrary to claims of Indian and American
  6463. officials.
  6464.  
  6465.  Instead, much of the surveillance was focused on India’s
  6466. domestic politics and the country’s strategic and commercial
  6467. interests.
  6468.  
  6469. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/nsa-targets-indian-politics-space-nprogrammes/article5161299.ece
  6470.  
  6471.  According to the 2010 COMINT (communication intelligence)
  6472. document about “Close Access SIGADs”, the offices of Indian
  6473. diplomats and high-ranking military officials stationed
  6474. at these important posts were targets of four different
  6475. kinds of electronic snooping devices:
  6476.  
  6477.  Lifesaver, which facilitates imaging of the hard drive
  6478. of computers.
  6479.  
  6480. Highlands, which makes digital collection from implants.
  6481.  
  6482. Vagrant, which collects data of open computer screens.
  6483.  
  6484. Magnetic, which is a collection of digital signals.
  6485.  
  6486. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/nsa-planted-bugs-at-indian-missions-in-dc-un/article5164944.ece
  6487. _______________________________________
  6488. ¤ Secret Bunkers, a Challenge for US Intelligence ::
  6489.  
  6490.  Accessing archived government documents, the National
  6491. Security Archive, an anti-secrecy group, has revealed a
  6492. decades-long effort by the US to detect, monitor, and
  6493. in some cases plan the destruction of, “more than 10,000
  6494. such facilities worldwide, many of them in hostile territory,
  6495. and many presumably intended to hide or protect lethal military
  6496. equipment and activities, including weapons of mass destruction,
  6497. that could threaten US or allied interests.”
  6498.  
  6499. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/secret-bunkers-a-challenge-for-us-intelligence/article5164833.ece
  6500. _______________________________________
  6501. ¤ More Unreported, Unredacted NSA Slides ::
  6502.  
  6503. http://leaksource.wordpress.com/2013/09/09/unreportedunredacted-nsa-slidesprogram-names-revealed-on-brazil-news/
  6504. _______________________________________
  6505. ¤ Guardian’s Alan Rusbridger on the Inside Story of
  6506. NSA Leaks ::
  6507.  
  6508. http://leaksource.wordpress.com/2013/09/24/guardians-alan-rusbridger-on-the-inside-story-of-snowden-nsa-leaks/
  6509. _______________________________________
  6510. ¤ PRISM Part of the BLARNEY Program ::
  6511.  
  6512. http://electrospaces.blogspot.nl/2013/09/prism-as-part-of-blarney-program.html
  6513. _______________________________________
  6514. ¤ New Separate Internet Being Built by
  6515. Countries Targeted by NSA and GCHQ ::
  6516.  
  6517. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/U564-Imphandze-BRICS-Leaflet.pdf
  6518. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/2013-submarine-cable-market-industry-report.pdf
  6519. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/BRICS-BUSINESS-FORUM-JOINT-COMMUNIQUE-26-March-2013.pdf
  6520.  
  6521. ¤ New Separate Internet Will Not be
  6522. Under United States Control ::
  6523.  
  6524.  The President of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff announces publicly
  6525. the creation of a world internet system INDEPENDENT from
  6526. US and Britain or “US-centric internet.”
  6527.  
  6528.  Not many understand that, while the immediate trigger for
  6529. the decision (coupled with the cancellation of a summit with
  6530. the US president) was the revelations on NSA spying, the reason
  6531. why Rousseff can take such a historic step is that the
  6532. alternative infrastructure: The BRICS cable from Vladivostock,
  6533. Russia to Shantou, China to Chennai, India to Cape Town,
  6534. South Africa to Fortaleza, Brazil, is being built and it’s,
  6535. actually, in its final phase of implementation.
  6536.  
  6537.  “The global backlash is only beginning and will get far more
  6538. severe in coming months,” said Sascha Meinrath, director
  6539. of the Open Technology Institute at the Washington-based New
  6540. America Foundation think-tank. “This notion of national
  6541. privacy sovereignty is going to be an increasingly salient
  6542. issue around the globe.”
  6543.  
  6544. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/www.globalresearch.ca/the-brics-independent-internet-in-defiance-of-the-us-centric-internet/5350272
  6545. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/brazil-plans-to-go-offline-from-uscentric-internet/article5137689.ece
  6546. http://www.excitingrio.com/brazil-looks-break-us-centric-internet/
  6547. http://indrus.in/economics/2013/03/01/brics_cable_connecting_continents_brick_by_brick_22617.html
  6548.  
  6549. ¤ The BRICS Fiber-optic Cable ::
  6550.  
  6551.  A 34,000 km, 2 fibre pair, 12.8 Tbit/s capacity, fibre
  6552. optic cable system.
  6553.  
  6554. http://www.bricscable.com/
  6555.  
  6556. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OkQI4bJcDGw
  6557. _______________________________________
  6558. ¤ No Phone Company Ever Challenged NSA Spying ::
  6559.  
  6560.  A newly declassified opinion from the Foreign Intelligence
  6561. Surveillance Court from this summer shows the court’s
  6562. interpretation of the controversial Section 215 of the USA
  6563. PATRIOT Act that’s used to justify the National Security
  6564. Agency’s bulk telephone metadata collections, and reveals
  6565. that none of the companies that have been served with such
  6566. orders has ever challenged one.
  6567.  
  6568. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/fisc-no-phone-company-ever-challenged-metadata-collection-orders/102334
  6569. _______________________________________
  6570. ¤ Corporations Worry About Long-Term Blowback of NSA
  6571. Revelations ::
  6572.  
  6573.  With all of the disturbing revelations that have come
  6574. to light in the last few weeks regarding the NSA’s
  6575. collection methods and its efforts to weaken cryptographic
  6576. protocols and security products, experts say that perhaps
  6577. the most worrisome result of all of this is that no one
  6578. knows who or what they can trust anymore.
  6579.  
  6580.  The fallout from the most-recent NSA leaks, which revealed
  6581. the agency’s ability to subvert some cryptographic standards
  6582. and its “partnerships” with software and hardware vendors
  6583. to insert backdoors into various unnamed products, has
  6584. continued to accumulate over the course of the last couple
  6585. of weeks. Cryptographers and security researchers have been
  6586. eager to determine which products and protocols are suspect,
  6587. and the discussion has veered in a lot of different directions.
  6588. But one thing that’s become clear is that when the government
  6589. lost the so-called Crypto Wars in the 1990s, the NSA didn’t
  6590. just go back to Fort Meade and tend to its knitting.
  6591.  
  6592. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/experts-worry-about-long-term-implications-of-nsa-revelations/102355
  6593.  
  6594. ¤ The Sky is Not Falling – It’s Fallen ::
  6595.  
  6596.  The security community didn’t invent the concept of fear,
  6597. uncertainty and doubt, but it has perfected it and raised
  6598. it to the level of religion. It’s the way that security products
  6599. are marketed and sold, but it’s also the way that the intelligence
  6600. community justifies its extra-legal and, in some cases,
  6601. unconstitutional, data-gathering practices. Just as vendors
  6602. use the specter of catastrophic hacks, data loss and public
  6603. embarrassment to push their wares, the NSA and its allies
  6604. have used the dark shadow of 9/11 and global terrorism to
  6605. justify their increasingly aggressive practices, some of which
  6606. have now been shown to have deliberately weakened some of the
  6607. fundamental building blocks of security.
  6608.  
  6609.  The most damning bit of string in this ball is the news that
  6610. the NSA likely inserted a back door into a key cryptographic
  6611. algorithm known as DUAL EC DRBG. That’s bad. What’s worse
  6612. is that RSA on Thursday sent a warning to its developer
  6613. customers warning them to immediately stop using the company’s
  6614. BSAFE library because it uses the compromised random number
  6615. generator. That means that untold numbers of products that
  6616. include the BSAFE crypto libraries are compromised.
  6617.  
  6618. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/the-sky-is-not-falling-its-fallen/102372
  6619. _______________________________________
  6620. ¤ President Surveillance Program Review ::
  6621.  
  6622.  “The program was reauthorized by the
  6623. President approximately every 45 days,
  6624. with certain modifications. Collectively,
  6625. the activities carried out under these
  6626. Authorizations are referred to as the
  6627. “President’s Surveillance Program” or
  6628. “PSP.” One of the activities authorized
  6629. as part of the PSP was the interception of
  6630. the content of communications into and out
  6631. of the United States where there was a
  6632. reasonable basis to conclude that one
  6633. party to the communication was a member
  6634. of al-Qa’ida or related terrorist organizations.
  6635.  
  6636.  This aspect of the PSP was publicly
  6637. acknowledged and described by the President,
  6638. the Attorney General, and other Administration
  6639. officials beginning in December 2005 following
  6640. a series of articles published in The New York
  6641. Times. The Attorney General subsequently
  6642. publicly acknowledged the fact that other
  6643. intelligence activities were also authorized
  6644. under the same Presidential Authorization,
  6645. but the details of those activities remain
  6646. classified.” ... ...
  6647.  
  6648.  “Prior to September 11,2001, the Foreign
  6649. Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and
  6650. Executive Order 12333 were generally viewed
  6651. as the principal governing authorities for
  6652. conducting electronic surveillance for
  6653. national security purposes. The Foreign
  6654. Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C.
  6655. § 1801, et seq., was enacted in 1978 to
  6656. "provide legislative authorization and
  6657. regulation for all electronic surveillance
  6658. conducted within the United States for
  6659. foreign intelligence purposes."”
  6660.  
  6661. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/psp-09-0710.pdf
  6662.  
  6663. ¤ NSA ; PSP Analysis Loophole to Snoop
  6664. Domestic Contacts Along with Metadata ::
  6665.  
  6666. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-ig-09-0324.pdf
  6667.  
  6668. NOBODY comments (nsa-ig-09-0324.pdf)
  6669.  
  6670.  The President’s Surveillance Program (PSP)
  6671. should be of high interest. As mentioned
  6672. on page 17, the PSP did not - “did not” -
  6673. require special approval. Therefore, just
  6674. another gap. Also take in consideration
  6675. other abuse against FISA laws, court order
  6676. to stifle FAA 702 upstream analysis, EO 12333,
  6677. and of-course NSA’s now admitted abuse -
  6678. deliberately ignoring restrictions against
  6679. domestic communications (a risk to comsec).
  6680. _______________________________________
  6681. ¤ Britain’s GCHQ Hacked Belgian Telecom
  6682. Firm ::
  6683.  
  6684.  Documents from the archive of whistleblower
  6685. Edward Snowden indicate that Britain’s
  6686. GCHQ intelligence service was behind a
  6687. cyber attack against Belgacom, a partly
  6688. state-owned Belgian telecoms company.
  6689. A “top secret” Government Communications
  6690. Headquarters (GCHQ) presentation seen by
  6691. SPIEGEL indicate that the goal of project,
  6692. conducted under the codename “Operation
  6693. Socialist,” was “to enable better
  6694. exploitation of Belgacom” and to
  6695. improve understanding of the provider’s
  6696. infrastructure. ... ...
  6697.  
  6698.  According to the slides in the GCHQ
  6699. presentation, the attack was directed
  6700. at several Belgacom employees and
  6701. involved the planting of a highly
  6702. developed attack technology referred
  6703. to as a “Quantum Insert” (“QI”). It
  6704. appears to be a method with which the
  6705. person being targeted, without their
  6706. knowledge, is redirected to websites
  6707. that then plant malware on their
  6708. computers that can then manipulate
  6709. them. Some of the employees whose
  6710. computers were infiltrated had “good
  6711. access” to important parts of Belgacom’s
  6712. infrastructure, and this seemed to
  6713. please the British spies, according
  6714. to the slides.
  6715.    
  6716. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/british-spy-agency-gchq-hacked-belgian-telecoms-firm-a-923406.html
  6717. http://www.infowars.com/latest-snowden-leaks-show-gchq-gleefully-hacking-belgian-telco/
  6718. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130920/16112724595/latest-snowden-leaks-show-gchq-gleefully-hacking-belgian-telco.shtml
  6719. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/belgacom-hack-en.htm
  6720. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/belgacom.htm
  6721. _______________________________________
  6722. ¤ European Parliament Brief on NSA ::
  6723.  
  6724. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/europarl-nsa.pdf
  6725.  
  6726. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/briefingnote_/briefingnote_en.pdf
  6727. _______________________________________
  6728. ¤ NSA Buys Vupen Exploits ::
  6729.  
  6730. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-vupen.pdf
  6731. http://news.softpedia.com/news/Security-Firm-VUPEN-Confirms-the-NSA-Bought-Exploits-Service-Subscription-383597.shtml
  6732. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/nsa-bought-exploit-service-from-vupen-contract-shows
  6733. _______________________________________
  6734. ¤ US Government Foreign Telecommunications
  6735. Providers Network Security Agreements ::
  6736.  
  6737. http://publicintelligence.net/us-nsas/
  6738. http://info.publicintelligence.net/US-NSAs.zip
  6739. http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/agreements-with-private-companies-protect-us-access-to-cables-data-for-surveillance/2013/07/06/aa5d017a-df77-11e2-b2d4-ea6d8f477a01_story.html
  6740. _______________________________________
  6741. ¤ FISA Court Releases FBI Spy Documents ::
  6742.  
  6743. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-13-0917-4.pdf
  6744. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  6745. ▼ FISC Orders All Spy Data Disclosure
  6746. Allocated to One Release ::
  6747.  
  6748. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-five-13-0918.pdf
  6749.  
  6750. ¤ Linkedin Moves to Disclose Spy Data ::
  6751.  
  6752. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-linkedin-13-0917.pdf
  6753.  
  6754. ¤ FISC Schedule for Microsoft, Google,
  6755. Yahoo and Facebook Spy Data Release ::
  6756.  
  6757. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-ms-google-yahoo-fb-13-0913.pdf
  6758.  
  6759. ¤ Microsoft, Google Spy Data Briefing
  6760. Schedule ::
  6761.  
  6762. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/ms-goog-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  6763.  
  6764. ¤ Google Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  6765.  
  6766. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/google-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  6767.  
  6768. ¤ Yahoo Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  6769.  
  6770. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/yahoo-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  6771.  
  6772. ¤ Facebook Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  6773.  
  6774. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/facebook-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  6775. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  6776. ¤ DoJ Stonewalls USA Today ::
  6777.  
  6778.  In response to a FOIA request from
  6779. USA TODAY, the Justice Department said
  6780. its ethics office never looked into
  6781. complaints from two federal judges
  6782. that they had been misled about NSA
  6783. surveillance.
  6784.  
  6785. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/usa-today-doj.pdf
  6786. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/usa-today-doj-shots.jpg
  6787. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/09/19/nsa-surveillance-justice-opr-investigation/2805867/
  6788. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  6789.  Perry Metzger: Matthew Green tweeted
  6790. earlier today that Johns Hopkins will
  6791. be hosting a roundtable at 10am EDT
  6792. tomorrow (Wednesday, September 18th)
  6793. to discuss the NSA crypto revelations.
  6794.  
  6795. Livestream will be at:
  6796.  
  6797. https://connect.johnshopkins.edu/jhuisicrypto/
  6798. _______________________________________
  6799. ¤ NSA Spying Documents to be Released as
  6800. Result of EFF Lawsuit Against NSA ::
  6801.  
  6802. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/hundreds-pages-nsa-spying-documents-be-released-result-eff-lawsuit
  6803.  
  6804. ¤ Government Releases NSA Surveillance
  6805. Docs and Previously Secret FISA Court
  6806. Opinions In Response to EFF Lawsuit ::
  6807.  
  6808. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/government-releases-nsa-surveillance-docs-and-previously-secret-fisa-court
  6809.  
  6810.  The Director of National Intelligence
  6811. (DNI) just today released hundreds of
  6812. pages of documents related to the
  6813. government’s secret interpretation of
  6814. Patriot Act Section 215 and the NSA’s
  6815. (mis)use of its massive database of
  6816. every American’s phone records. The
  6817. documents were released as a result
  6818. of EFF’s ongoing Freedom of Information
  6819. Act lawsuit.
  6820.  
  6821.  We’ve posted links to each document
  6822. below. While the government also posted
  6823. many of the documents here ...
  6824.  
  6825. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  6826.  
  6827. ... our copies are completely searchable.
  6828.  
  6829. Links to the documents ;
  6830.  
  6831. • May 24, 2006 — Order from the Foreign
  6832. Intelligence Surveillance Court
  6833.  
  6834. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/docket_06-05_1dec201_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6835.  
  6836. • December 12, 2008 — Supplemental Opinion
  6837. from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  6838. Court
  6839.  
  6840. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/4_february_2011_production_br10-82_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  6841.  
  6842. • January 28, 2009 — Order Regarding Preliminary
  6843. Notice of Compliance Incident Dated January 15,
  6844. 2009 from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  6845. Court
  6846.  
  6847. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_alert_list_order_1-28-09_final_redacted1.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6848.  
  6849. • January 28, 2009 — Order Regarding Preliminary
  6850. Notice of Compliance Incident Dated January 15,
  6851. 2009 from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  6852. Court - With Cover Letter and Attached Declarations
  6853.  
  6854. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/5_march_09_production-final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  6855.  
  6856. • February 26, 2009 — Notice of Compliance
  6857. Incident
  6858.  
  6859. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_doj_notice_with_supp_decl_as_filed_26_feb_09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  6860.  
  6861. • March 2, 2009 — Order from the Foreign
  6862. Intelligence Court
  6863.  
  6864. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_order_3-2-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  6865.  
  6866. • June 22, 2009 — Order from the Foreign
  6867. Intelligence Court
  6868.  
  6869. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-06_order_and_supplemental_order_6-22-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6870.  
  6871. • June 25, 2009 — Implementation of the Foreign
  6872. Intelligence Surveillance Court Authorized
  6873. Business Records FISA
  6874.  
  6875. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/nsa_business_records_fisa_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6876.  
  6877. • August 19, 2009 — Report of the United
  6878. States with Attachments and Cover Letter
  6879.  
  6880. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/4_september_09_production_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  6881.  
  6882. • September 3, 2009 — Primary Order from the
  6883. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
  6884.  
  6885. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-13_orders_signed_3_sept_09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6886.  
  6887. • September 25, 2009 — Order Regarding Further
  6888. Compliance Incidence from the Foreign Intelligence
  6889. Surveillance Court
  6890.  
  6891. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-13_-_september_25_order_regarding_further_compliance_incidents_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6892.  
  6893. • November 5, 2009 — Supplemental Opinion
  6894. and Order from the Foreign Intelligence
  6895. Surveillance Court
  6896.  
  6897. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-15_supplemental_order_and_opinion_11-5-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6898.  
  6899. ¤ Gems Mined from the NSA Documents and
  6900. FISA Court Opinions Released Today ::
  6901.  
  6902. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/gems-mined-nsa-docs-released-today
  6903.  
  6904. ¤ NSA FISA Business Records Offer a Lot
  6905. to Learn (NSA Networks Not Encrypted) ::
  6906.  
  6907. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-fisa-business-records.htm
  6908. _______________________________________
  6909. ¤ NSA Spy Community Architecture 2011 ::
  6910.  
  6911. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-spy-architecture.pdf
  6912.  
  6913. ¤ DNI Spy Community Architecture 2009 ::
  6914.  
  6915. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-spy-architecture.pdf
  6916. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  6917. ¤ Keith’s Information Dominance Center ::
  6918.  
  6919. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/info-dominance.pdf
  6920. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/08/the_cowboy_of_the_nsa_keith_alexander?print=yes
  6921. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-09-15/man-charge-nsa-modeled-his-office-bridge-starship-enterprise
  6922. _______________________________________
  6923. ¤ Germany’s Domestic Spy Agency Hands
  6924. Over Data to the NSA ::
  6925.  
  6926.  Germany’s Federal Office for the
  6927. Protection of the Constitution regularly
  6928. hands over classified data to the NSA,
  6929. media report. The revelation comes as
  6930. Edward Snowden’s leaks show that
  6931. Germany’s foreign spy agencies share
  6932. troves of data with the US and UK.
  6933.  
  6934.  Citing secret government documents,
  6935. Suddeutsche Zeitung reported that
  6936. Germany’s Federal Office for the
  6937. Protection of the Constitution, charged
  6938. with domestic security, works closely
  6939. with the US and regularly sends them
  6940. information.
  6941.  
  6942.  The security service gathers intelligence
  6943. on internal security threats. The documents
  6944. obtained by Sueddeutsche Zeitung recorded
  6945. 864 data packages sent to the NSA, as
  6946. well as regular meetings between officers
  6947. of the German Federal Office and the NSA.
  6948.  
  6949. http://rt.com/news/germany-shares-data-nsa-spying-858/
  6950. _______________________________________
  6951. ¤ Dutch Government Response to Snowden’s
  6952. Revelations ::
  6953.  
  6954. This is an unofficial translation.
  6955.  
  6956. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/09/dutch-govt-response-to-revelations-by.html
  6957.  
  6958.  On September 13th 2013, the Dutch
  6959. government responded (.pdf, in Dutch)
  6960. to the revelations by Edward Snowded.
  6961.  
  6962. http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2013/09/14/kabinetsreactie-op-onthullingen-edward-snowden/nederlandse-kabinetsreactie-edward-snowden-13-sept-2013-1.pdf
  6963.  
  6964. https://www.aivd.nl/publish/pages/2533/nederlandse_kabinetsreactie_edward_snowden_13_sept_2013.pdf
  6965. _______________________________________
  6966. ¤ NSA Spied Credit Card Transactions ::
  6967.  
  6968. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-finance-spy-de.pdf
  6969. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-finance-spy-slides.jpg
  6970. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-exclusive-nsa-spies-on-international-bank-transactions-a-922276.html
  6971. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/report-nsa-credit-card-transactions-92390.html
  6972. http://weaselzippers.us/2013/06/06/wsj-report-nsa-tracking-credit-card-transactions-also-has-access-to-phone-records-from-att-and-sprint-along-with-verizon/
  6973. _______________________________________
  6974. ¤ NSA Brazil Spy Slides Decensored ::
  6975.  
  6976. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/09/nsa-br-mx-3/nsa-br-mx-3.htm
  6977.  
  6978. ¤ All SATC Slides, Brazil Spying Reports ::
  6979.  
  6980. NSA_SATC_Slides.zip
  6981. (54 files | ZIP | 3.37MB)
  6982.  
  6983. http://filebeam.com/dacf6706b520431f2c4052484abd5b36
  6984.  
  6985. Why does the NSA spy on Brazil?
  6986.  
  6987.  (1) The US wants to maintain global economic power,
  6988. (2) the US wants to maintain control over major natural
  6989. resources and (3) the US is afraid the new economic powers
  6990. (within the BRICS) may destabilize their economic power
  6991. and control over natural resources.
  6992. _______________________________________
  6993. ¤ A Font to Discourage NSA Snooping ::
  6994.  
  6995.  The ZXX font is designed to be difficult for
  6996. machines to read.
  6997.  
  6998. http://dl.dropbox.com/u/20517415/ZXX.zip
  6999. http://reason.com/blog/2013/06/21/dont-want-the-nsa-to-read-your-email-use
  7000. http://reason.com/archives/2013/09/14/a-font-to-discourage-nsa-snooping
  7001. _______________________________________
  7002. ¤ IETF Draft to Prevent NSA Intercepts ::
  7003.  
  7004. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/prism-proof.htm
  7005.  
  7006. http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-hallambaker-prismproof-req-00.txt
  7007. _______________________________________
  7008. ¤ NSA Targeted Israel for Surveillance,
  7009. Also Sharing Data With Israeli SIGINT
  7010. National Unit ::
  7011.  
  7012.  A copy of a top-secret deal inked
  7013. in 2009 between the NSA and the
  7014. Israeli Signals-intelligence National
  7015. Unit (ISNU) was provided by NSA
  7016. leaker Edward J. Snowden to the
  7017. Guardian newspaper, which posted
  7018. it Wednesday.
  7019.  
  7020.  It reveals that the NSA “routinely”
  7021. passed to its Israeli counterpart
  7022. raw signals intelligence, referred
  7023. to as “SIGINT,” including the vast
  7024. swathes of digital data traffic that
  7025. the agency gathers under secret court
  7026. authority from US Internet providers.
  7027.  
  7028.  So sensitive is this data that even
  7029. before being disseminated to other US
  7030. agencies, the NSA has to subject it
  7031. to a court-mandated process called
  7032. minimization, under which the names
  7033. of any Americans are removed unless
  7034. they are essential for foreign
  7035. intelligence interest.
  7036.  
  7037.  But the US-Israeli agreement states
  7038. that the data shared with Israel
  7039. “includes, but is not limited to,
  7040. unevaluated and unminimized transcripts,
  7041. gists, facsimiles, telex, voice and
  7042. Digital Network Intelligence metadata
  7043. and content.”
  7044.  
  7045.  “NSA routinely sends ISNU minimized
  7046. and unminimized raw collection associated
  7047. with selectors from multiple Target office
  7048. Primary Interest (TOPI) offices in Analysis
  7049. and Production, S2 as part of SIGINT
  7050. relationship between the two organizations.”
  7051.  
  7052. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-israel-spy-share.pdf
  7053. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/785495/doc1.pdf
  7054. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/11/nsa-americans-personal-data-israel-documents
  7055. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/sep/11/nsa-shares-raw-data-americans-israeli-spy-agency/
  7056. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/09/11/the-nsa-is-sharing-data-with-israel-before-filtering-out-americans-information/
  7057. http://killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/09/11/irony_alert_nsa_targets_israel_and_still_gives_your_data_to_its_spies
  7058.  
  7059.  Other documents leaked by Mr. Snowden
  7060. reveal that Israel was one of the nations
  7061. that spy most aggressively against the
  7062. United States.
  7063.  
  7064.  “To further safeguard our classified
  7065. networks, we continue to strengthen
  7066. insider threat detection capabilities
  7067. across the Community. In addition, we
  7068. are investing in target surveillance
  7069. and offensive CI against key targets,
  7070. such as China, Russia, Iran, Israel,
  7071. Pakistan, and Cuba.”  - Page 3
  7072.  
  7073. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  7074. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  7075. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/middle-east-north-africa/319513-leaked-documents-reveal-us-sees-israel-as-a-major-spying-threat
  7076.  
  7077. NOBODY comments
  7078.  
  7079.  Ironic NSA considers Israel an “insider
  7080. threat” - meanwhile we provide them with
  7081. plenty of inside information.
  7082.  
  7083.  However the NSA used cryptanalysis and
  7084. exploitation against Brazil leadership
  7085. and Brazil was never a “key target.”
  7086.  
  7087. This reminds of a quote ;
  7088.  
  7089.  “What if all secret agencies were of one
  7090. accord spiritually, like in the paintings
  7091. of dogs playing poker, just using humanity
  7092. to play out one big game of destruction
  7093. and domination with humans as the visible
  7094. and spiritual puppets?”
  7095. _______________________________________
  7096. ¤ DNI Releases Phone Metadata Spying Docs ::
  7097.  
  7098. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-13-0910.pdf
  7099. _______________________________________
  7100. ¤ Smartphones Are Gold Mines to NSA ::
  7101.  
  7102. (EN)
  7103. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones-en.pdf
  7104.  
  7105. (DE)
  7106. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones.pdf
  7107.  
  7108. ¤ NSA Presentation You Won’t Believe ::
  7109.  
  7110.  Referring to customers as “zombies” is
  7111. the sort of thing you’d expect from
  7112. neckbearded hipsters and other self-
  7113. proclaimed individualists who tend to
  7114. take a dim view of any popular activity.
  7115. It’s rather jarring to hear the lingo
  7116. deployed in a government intelligence
  7117. agency presentation.
  7118.  
  7119. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones-en.pdf
  7120. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130909/08582024452/steve-jobs-is-big-brother-smartphone-users-are-zombies-according-to-nsa-cell-phone-tapping-presentation.shtml
  7121. http://www.infowars.com/steve-jobs-is-big-brother-and-smartphone-users-are-zombies-according-to-nsa-cell-phone-tapping-presentation/
  7122. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  7123. ¤ DNI and NSA Blame Obama to Cover Up
  7124. Violations Against a 2011 Court Order ::
  7125.  
  7126.  The Obama regime secretly won permission
  7127. from a surveillance court in 2011 to
  7128. reverse restrictions on the National
  7129. Security Agency’s use of intercepted
  7130. phone calls and e-mails, permitting
  7131. the agency to search deliberately for
  7132. Americans’ communications in its massive
  7133. databases, ACCORDING TO INTERVIEWS WITH
  7134. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS and recently
  7135. “declassified material” - (which, by
  7136. the way, had NO classification, NO date,
  7137. NO stamp, NO names, NO identification
  7138. of which agency it came from and most
  7139. shocking of all NO blackouts, odd.)
  7140.  
  7141. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/DNI%20Clapper%20Section%20702%20Declassification%20Cover%20Letter.pdf
  7142.  
  7143.  In addition, the court extended the
  7144. length of time that the NSA is allowed
  7145. to retain intercepted US communications
  7146. from five years to six years — and more
  7147. under special circumstances, according
  7148. to the documents, which include a
  7149. recently released 2011 opinion by US
  7150. District Judge John D. Bates, then
  7151. chief judge of the Foreign Intelligence
  7152. Surveillance Court.
  7153.  
  7154. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-administration-had-restrictions-on-nsa-reversed-in-2011/2013/09/07/c26ef658-0fe5-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html
  7155.  
  7156. NOBODY comments
  7157.  
  7158.  The document which was declassified by
  7159. US intelligence officials explains the
  7160. chief judge of the Foreign Intelligence
  7161. Surveillance Court ruled the FAA 702
  7162. upstream collection unconstitutional.
  7163.  
  7164. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-shut-nsa-phone-records.pdf
  7165. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/fisa-court-documents-on-illegal-nsa-e-mail-collection-program/409/
  7166. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-gathered-thousands-of-americans-e-mails-before-court-struck-down-program/2013/08/21/146ba4b6-0a90-11e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html
  7167.  
  7168.  National Security Agency analysts
  7169. deliberately ignored restrictions on
  7170. their authority to spy on Americans.
  7171.  
  7172. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-23/nsa-analysts-intentionally-abused-spying-powers-multiple-times.html
  7173.  
  7174.  NSA analysts admitted to abuse after
  7175. the 2012 FISA Court audit was released.
  7176.  
  7177. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  7178.  
  7179. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  7180.  
  7181.  And this is not the first attempt to
  7182. try to cover up their FISA violations.
  7183.  
  7184. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit-note.pdf
  7185.  
  7186. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/what-to-say-and-not-to-say-to-our-overseers/390/
  7187.  
  7188.  The new Washington Post report has
  7189. linked to disinformation from a DNI
  7190. (press) release exposing yet another
  7191. attempt to dodge any criminal charges
  7192. or take responsibility for the abuses
  7193. exposed from the FISA Court audit.
  7194.  
  7195. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-administration-had-restrictions-on-nsa-reversed-in-2011/2013/09/07/c26ef658-0fe5-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html
  7196.  
  7197.  I suspect another attempt by the DNI
  7198. and NSA to cover up FISA violations.
  7199.  
  7200.  Just blame the puppet-in-charge, Obama,
  7201. to use as a scapegoat - go figure.
  7202.  
  7203.  All of this information is backed up
  7204. and will be mirrored soon. Meanwhile,
  7205. here is the leaked 2012 audit exposing
  7206. 2,776 violations one year after the
  7207. FISA Court order.
  7208.  
  7209. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  7210.  
  7211.  As for Congress they will lay down like
  7212. a bunch of leashed dogs who are getting
  7213. kickbacks for doing nothing to prevent
  7214. this abuse nor fix any problems. I will not
  7215. link to their PR circus stunts anymore and
  7216. I encourage voters to throw a majority of
  7217. them out of office come next election.
  7218. _______________________________________
  7219. ¤ Snowden, NSA, and Counterintelligence? ::
  7220.  
  7221. http://20committee.com/2013/09/04/snowden-nsa-and-counterintelligence/
  7222. _______________________________________
  7223. ¤ NSA SATC Slide [Images] Leak ::
  7224.  
  7225. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XlkHBB3-DhY
  7226.  
  7227.  Screen shots of Brazilian Fanstastico
  7228. TV show on NSA spying Brazil and Mexico
  7229. presidents, aired 1 September 2013. ▼
  7230.  
  7231. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/09/nsa-br-mx/nsa-br-mx.htm
  7232.  
  7233. ¤ NSA Spying Brazil, Mexico Presidents ::
  7234.  
  7235. Translation by Google, tidied by Cryptome.
  7236.  
  7237. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-spying-brazil.htm
  7238.  
  7239. ¤ NSA SATC Eavesdropping Case Study ::
  7240.  
  7241. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/09/an-nsa-eavesdropping-case-study.html
  7242.  
  7243. ▲ All 14 SATC Slides Released (Mirrored) ::
  7244.  
  7245. http://up.inet.ge/download.php?file=eb9465849119fa5efe4256304d2c5630
  7246. http://filebeam.com/eb9465849119fa5efe4256304d2c5630
  7247. http://tishare.com/y7ldwxx397kl.htm
  7248. http://f.lui.li/get_822_b946.html
  7249.  
  7250. ¤ Brazil Senate Committee to Probe Espionage ::
  7251.  
  7252.  Brazil’s senate has formed an Investigative
  7253. Parliamentary Commission to follow up on
  7254. reports that the US National Security Agency
  7255. (NSA) spied on Brazilian Prez Dilma Rousseff.
  7256.  
  7257.  “We intend to protect national sovereignty,”
  7258. Xinhua quoted Senator Vanessa Graziotin of
  7259. the Communist Party of Brazil as saying
  7260. Tuesday.
  7261.  
  7262.  The committee, comprising 11 main members
  7263. and seven substitutes, initially has 180
  7264. days to investigate claims that the NSA
  7265. monitored emails between Rousseff and
  7266. several of her top aides, and tapped
  7267. her phone.
  7268.  
  7269. http://news.yahoo.com/brazil-senate-committee-probe-us-spying-032012289.html
  7270.  
  7271. ¤ BLOWBACK ; US/Brazil Bilateral Relation
  7272. Impacted ::
  7273.  
  7274.  Revelations of a US spy program that
  7275. allegedly allows digital surveillance
  7276. of the presidents of Brazil and Mexico
  7277. have drawn cries of indignation and anger
  7278. in both nations, but the fallout may be
  7279. strongest for US-Brazil relations.
  7280.  
  7281.  At stake is whether Brazilian Prez Dilma
  7282. Rousseff will cancel a planned state
  7283. visit to Washington in October, the
  7284. first offered by Prez Barack Obama this
  7285. year, or will take action on digital
  7286. security that may affect US companies
  7287. such as Google, Facebook and Yahoo.
  7288.  
  7289.  Rousseff is reported to be considering
  7290. a proposal that would suspend operations
  7291. of companies that cooperate with the
  7292. NSA or US intelligence agencies.
  7293.  
  7294. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/09/03/201125/nsa-leak-might-lead-to-cancellation.html
  7295. _______________________________________
  7296. ¤ ACLU Sues the NSA Update 02 ::
  7297.  
  7298. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/320357-nra-claims-nsa-illegally-created-a-gun-database
  7299.  
  7300. ¤ ACLU Sues the NSA Update 01 ::
  7301.  
  7302. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/27/nsa-surveillance-program-illegal-aclu-lawsuit
  7303. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  7304. ¤ Top Secret US Spy Budget FY 2013 Vol 1 ::
  7305.  
  7306.  “We are bolstering our support for
  7307. clandestine SIGINT capabilities to
  7308. collect against high priority targets,
  7309. including foreign leadership targets.
  7310. Also, we are investing in groundbreaking
  7311. cryptanalytic capabilities to defeat
  7312. adversarial cryptography and exploit
  7313. internet traffic.”
  7314.  
  7315. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  7316.  
  7317. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  7318.  
  7319. ▲ Snapshots of Budget Exhibit ::
  7320.  
  7321. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-exhibit-13.pdf
  7322.  
  7323. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-tidbits.pdf
  7324.  
  7325. ▼ US Spy Budget FY 2013 - Spoon Fed ::
  7326.  
  7327.  “The Post is withholding some information
  7328. after consultation with US officials who
  7329. expressed concerns about the risk to
  7330. intelligence sources and methods.
  7331. Sensitive details are so pervasive in
  7332. the documents that The Post is publishing
  7333. only summary tables and charts online.”
  7334.  
  7335. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/black-budget-summary-details-us-spy-networks-successes-failures-and-objectives/2013/08/29/7e57bb78-10ab-11e3-8cdd-bcdc09410972_story.html
  7336.  
  7337. ▲ Declassified, Censored US Spy Budget
  7338. FY 2013 Vol 4 ::
  7339.  
  7340. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-v4.pdf
  7341.  
  7342. http://www.fas.org/irp/nro/fy2013cbjb.pdf
  7343.  
  7344. ▲ Declassified, Censored US Spy Budget
  7345. FY 2013 Vol 12 ::
  7346.  
  7347. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-v12.pdf
  7348.  
  7349. http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/cbjb-2013.pdf
  7350.  
  7351. ¤ Intelligence vs Intelligence ::
  7352.  
  7353.  The Obama regime views Israel as one
  7354. of the top spying threats facing it’s
  7355. intelligence services, leaked documents
  7356. reveal.
  7357.  
  7358.  “Israel should be assumed to continue
  7359. to have an aggressive intelligence
  7360. collection operations against the
  7361. United States,” Pillar said. While
  7362. much information is collected through
  7363. traditional political contacts, “I
  7364. would personally have no doubt that
  7365. that is supplemented by whatever means
  7366. they can use to find out as much as
  7367. they can about what we’re doing,
  7368. thinking, deciding on anything of
  7369. interest to Israel, which would include
  7370. just about any Middle Eastern topic.”
  7371.  
  7372. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/middle-east-north-africa/319513-leaked-documents-reveal-us-sees-israel-as-a-major-spying-threat
  7373.  
  7374. From US Spy Budget FY 2013 Vol 1 ...
  7375.  
  7376.  “To further safeguard our classified
  7377. networks, we continue to strengthen
  7378. insider threat detection capabilities
  7379. across the Community. In addition, we
  7380. are investing in target surveillance
  7381. and offensive CI against key targets,
  7382. such as China, Russia, Iran, Israel,
  7383. Pakistan, and Cuba.”
  7384. _______________________________________
  7385. ¤ NSA Exploit Isn’t Crypto, It’s SMTP ::
  7386.  
  7387.  “The crypto is the easy part. The hard
  7388. part is the traffic analysis, of which
  7389. the worst part is the Received headers.
  7390. Everyone should look at their own headers
  7391. -- especially people on this list and
  7392. at least comprehend that your email
  7393. geotracks you forever, as it’s all in
  7394. the Mailman archive.
  7395.  
  7396.  There are plenty of other leaks like
  7397. Message-ID, Mime-Version, X-Mailer,
  7398. the actual separators in MIME part
  7399. breaks, and so on.
  7400.  
  7401.  It’s absolutely correct that some
  7402. combination of VPNs, Tor, remailers of
  7403. whatever stripe, and so on can help
  7404. with this, but we’re all lazy and we
  7405. don’t do it all the time.
  7406.  
  7407.  What we’re learning from Snowden is
  7408. that they’re doing traffic analysis --
  7409. analyzing movements, social graphs,
  7410. and so on and so forth. The irony here
  7411. is that this tells us that the crypto
  7412. works. That’s where I’ve been thinking
  7413. for quite some time.
  7414.  
  7415.  Imagine that you’re a SIGINT group trying
  7416. to deal with the inevitability of crypto
  7417. that works being deployed everywhere.
  7418. What do you do? You just be patient and
  7419. start filling in scatter plots of traffic
  7420. analysis.
  7421.  
  7422. The problem isn’t the crypto, it’s SMTP.”
  7423.  
  7424. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/callas-nsa-smtp.htm
  7425.  
  7426. ¤ NSA Trying to Break Encryption ::
  7427.  
  7428.  Among the NSA’s annual budget of $52.6
  7429. billion are requests to bankroll ground-
  7430. breaking cryptanalytic capabilities that
  7431. can beat cryptography and mine regular
  7432. Internet traffic, new documents leaked
  7433. by Edward Snowden to the Washington Post
  7434. reveal.
  7435.  
  7436. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57600647-38/nsa-seeks-groundbreaking-spying-powers-new-leak-reveals/
  7437.  
  7438.  “We are bolstering our support for
  7439. clandestine SIGINT capabilities to
  7440. collect against high priority targets,
  7441. including foreign leadership targets.
  7442. Also, we are investing in groundbreaking
  7443. cryptanalytic capabilities to defeat
  7444. adversarial cryptography and exploit
  7445. internet traffic.” ... ...
  7446.  
  7447. Processing & Exploitation 15% of budget.
  7448.  
  7449.  Cryptanalysis & Exploitation Services ;
  7450. Analysis of Target Systems, Cryptanalytic
  7451. IT Systems, Cyber Cryptanalysis, Exploitation
  7452. Solutions, Microelectronics, PEO Program,
  7453. PEO Program B, PEO Program C, Target Pursuit,
  7454. Target Reconnaissance & Survey.
  7455.  
  7456.  SIGINT Stations ; Cryptologic Centers,
  7457. Field Sites, OCMC, SIGINT Ground Operations.
  7458.  
  7459. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  7460.  
  7461. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  7462.  
  7463. ¤ NSA Rigging the Crypto Market Repost ::
  7464.  
  7465. http://cryptome.org/jya/nsa-sun.htm
  7466.  
  7467. ▲ NSA May Have SSL Encryption Keys ::
  7468.  
  7469.  The US government has attempted to
  7470. obtain the master encryption keys that
  7471. Internet companies use to shield millions
  7472. of users’ private web communications
  7473. from eavesdropping.
  7474.  
  7475.  These demands for master encryption keys,
  7476. which have not been disclosed previously,
  7477. represent a technological escalation in
  7478. the clandestine methods that the FBI and
  7479. the National Security Agency employ when
  7480. conducting electronic surveillance against
  7481. Internet users. ... ...
  7482.  
  7483.  Leaked NSA surveillance procedures,
  7484. authorized by Attorney General Eric
  7485. Holder, suggest that intercepted domestic
  7486. communications are typically destroyed
  7487. -- unless they’re encrypted. If that’s
  7488. the case, the procedures say, “retention
  7489. of all communications that are enciphered”
  7490. is permissible.
  7491.  
  7492. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57595202-38/feds-put-heat-on-web-firms-for-master-encryption-keys/
  7493. _______________________________________
  7494. ¤ NSA Arrangements with Foreign Internet
  7495. Providers and Foreign Intelligence ::
  7496.  
  7497.  “The NSA started setting up Internet
  7498. intercepts well before 2001, former
  7499. intelligence officials say. Run by NSA’s
  7500. secretive Special Services Office,
  7501. these types of programs were at first
  7502. designed to intercept communications
  7503. overseas through arrangements with
  7504. foreign Internet providers, the former
  7505. officials say. NSA still has such
  7506. arrangements in many countries,
  7507. particularly in the Middle East and
  7508. Europe, the former officials say.”
  7509.  
  7510. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/08/nsa-has-also-arrangements-with-foreign.html
  7511.  
  7512. ¤ NSA’s Global Surveillance ::
  7513.  
  7514. http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/WSJ-NSAB08202013.jpg
  7515. http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/08/21/319731/nsa-surveillance-new-detail/
  7516. http://www.dailypaul.com/296515/wsj-new-details-show-broader-nsa-surveillance-reach-programs-cover-seventy-five-of-nations-traffic
  7517. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  7518. ¤ Another Loophole Around FISA Laws for
  7519. the NSA - Postpone Timestamp Process ::
  7520.  
  7521.  A common hacking technique can be used
  7522. to make emails look as if they came from
  7523. outside the United States.
  7524.  
  7525. http://paste.servut.us/wsiq
  7526. _______________________________________
  7527. ¤ Google and the NSA ; Who’s Holding the
  7528. Shit-Bag Now? ::
  7529.  
  7530. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/assange-google-nsa.htm
  7531.  
  7532. http://thestringer.com.au/google-and-the-nsa-whos-holding-the-shit-bag-now
  7533.  
  7534. ▲ Related ; Surveillance Industry Profit ::
  7535.  
  7536. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-payed-internet-companies-911/
  7537. http://www.infowars.com/leaked-document-reveals-government-paid-millions-to-prism-participants/
  7538. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/23/nsa-prism-costs-tech-companies-paid
  7539. http://www.informationweek.com/security/government/nsa-paid-tech-companies-millions-for-pri/240160383
  7540. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  7541. ¤ Judge Walton FISA Letter to Senator
  7542. Patrick Leahy ::
  7543.  
  7544. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/walton-leahy-13-0729.pdf
  7545.  
  7546. ¤ USA to Provide Declassified FISA Documents ::
  7547.  
  7548. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/usa-fisa-13-0729.pdf
  7549. _______________________________________
  7550. ¤ NSA Analysts Admit Deliberate Abuse ::
  7551.  
  7552.  Some National Security Agency analysts
  7553. deliberately ignored restrictions on
  7554. their authority to spy on Americans
  7555. multiple times in the past decade,
  7556. contradicting Obama regime officials’
  7557. and lawmakers’ statements that no
  7558. willful violations occurred. ...
  7559.  
  7560.  Legal opinions declassified on Aug. 21
  7561. revealed that the NSA intercepted as
  7562. many as 56,000 electronic communications
  7563. a year of Americans who weren’t suspected
  7564. of having links to terrorism, before a
  7565. secret court that oversees surveillance
  7566. found the operation unconstitutional
  7567. in 2011.
  7568.  
  7569. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-23/nsa-analysts-intentionally-abused-spying-powers-multiple-times.html
  7570.  
  7571. ¤ FISA Court Shut Down NSA’s Authority to
  7572. Collect Domestic Calls (FAA 702 Upstream)
  7573. in 2011 but the NSA Kept Collecting ::
  7574.  
  7575.  The 86-page document, which was declassified
  7576. by US intelligence officials Wednesday,
  7577. explains why the chief judge of the Foreign
  7578. Intelligence Surveillance Court ruled the
  7579. collection method unconstitutional. ...
  7580.  
  7581.  The documents were released in response
  7582. to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit
  7583. filed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
  7584.  
  7585.  “It’s unfortunate it took a year of
  7586. litigation and the most significant leak
  7587. in American history to finally get them
  7588. to release this opinion,” EFF staff
  7589. attorney Mark Rumold said Wednesday,
  7590. “but I’m happy that the administration
  7591. is beginning to take this debate seriously.”
  7592.  
  7593. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-shut-nsa-phone-records.pdf
  7594. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/fisa-court-documents-on-illegal-nsa-e-mail-collection-program/409/
  7595. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-gathered-thousands-of-americans-e-mails-before-court-struck-down-program/2013/08/21/146ba4b6-0a90-11e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html
  7596.  
  7597. ¤ NSA Audit of 2,776 FISA Violations ::
  7598.  
  7599. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  7600.  
  7601. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  7602.  
  7603. ¤ NSA Fudging FISA Violations ::
  7604.  
  7605. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit-note.pdf
  7606.  
  7607. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/what-to-say-and-not-to-say-to-our-overseers/390/
  7608.  
  7609. ¤ Leaked NSA Audit Found Agency Broke
  7610. Privacy Rules Thousands of Times ::
  7611.  
  7612. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  7613. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-per-year-audit-finds/2013/08/15/3310e554-05ca-11e3-a07f-49ddc7417125_story_1.html
  7614. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/leaked-nsa-audit-found-agency-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times/
  7615. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/wapo-nsa-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-harms-uncertain/
  7616. http://www.infowars.com/uncontrolled-by-fisa-court-nsa-commits-thousands-of-privacy-violations-per-year/
  7617. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/16/nsa-violated-privacy-rules-audit
  7618.  
  7619.  The account is based on top-secret
  7620. documents and a May 2012 internal NSA
  7621. audit that found 2,776 infractions –
  7622. including unauthorized collection,
  7623. storage, access to or distribution of
  7624. legally protected communications – in
  7625. the preceding 12 months alone. The audit,
  7626. originally only meant to be seen by top
  7627. NSA leaders, only accounted for violations
  7628. at NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, Virginia,
  7629. and other locations in the Washington DC
  7630. region.
  7631.  
  7632. ▲ NSA Claims to Have Zero Tolerance Policy ::
  7633.  
  7634.  “I do think in a lot of the headlines
  7635. and other things, there’s people talking
  7636. about privacy violations or abuses or
  7637. willful or violations, right, it is
  7638. important for people to understand,
  7639. NSA has a zero tolerance policy for
  7640. willful misconduct. Zero. That’s our
  7641. tolerance, it’s very simple.
  7642.  
  7643.  Right, we do realize mistakes do occur.
  7644. We detect them, as early as we can.
  7645. We correct them, right. None of the
  7646. mistakes, the incidents that were in
  7647. the document released were willful.
  7648. Right, it doesn’t mean that we have
  7649. any desire to have any mistakes; it
  7650. doesn’t mean we think a mistake is okay.”
  7651.  
  7652. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0816.pdf
  7653.  
  7654. ¤ NSA Reveals That It Does 20,000,000
  7655. Database Queries Per Month ::
  7656.  
  7657. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130819/02153624228/nsa-reveals-that-it-does-20-million-database-queries-per-month.shtml
  7658.  
  7659. ¤ Breaking Down Mass NSA Spying & Lies ::
  7660.  
  7661. http://www.infowars.com/you-wont-believe-whats-going-on-with-government-spying-on-americans/
  7662. _______________________________________
  7663. ¤ UK GCHQ Bude and NSA Exchange Data ::
  7664.  
  7665.  Britain runs a secret internet-monitoring
  7666. station in the Middle East to intercept
  7667. and process vast quantities of emails,
  7668. telephone calls and web traffic on behalf
  7669. of Western intelligence agencies, The
  7670. Independent has learnt. ... ...
  7671.  
  7672.  The information is then processed for
  7673. intelligence and passed to GCHQ in
  7674. Cheltenham and shared with the National
  7675. Security Agency (NSA) in the United States.
  7676. The Government claims the station is a
  7677. key element in the West’s “war on terror”
  7678. and provides a vital “early warning”
  7679. system for potential attacks around
  7680. the world.
  7681.  
  7682.  The Independent is not revealing the
  7683. precise location of the station but
  7684. information on its activities was
  7685. contained in the leaked documents
  7686. obtained from the NSA by Edward Snowden.
  7687. The Guardian newspaper’s reporting on
  7688. these documents in recent months has
  7689. sparked a dispute with the Government,
  7690. with GCHQ security experts overseeing
  7691. the destruction of hard drives containing
  7692. the data. ... ...
  7693.  
  7694.  The data-gathering operation is part of
  7695. a £1,000,000,000 internet project still
  7696. being assembled by GCHQ. It is part of
  7697. the surveillance and monitoring system,
  7698. code-named “Tempora”, whose wider aim is
  7699. the global interception of digital
  7700. communications, such as emails and text
  7701. messages.
  7702.  
  7703.  Across three sites, communications –
  7704. including telephone calls – are tracked
  7705. both by satellite dishes and by tapping
  7706. into underwater fibre-optic cables.
  7707.  
  7708. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/exclusive-uks-secret-mideast-internet-surveillance-base-is-revealed-in-edward-snowden-leaks-8781082.html
  7709. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  7710. ¤ Backbone Wiretaps to Backdoor Microcode ::
  7711.  
  7712. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/callas-snowden.htm
  7713. _______________________________________
  7714. ¤ FISA Reauthorization to John Boehner,
  7715. Harry Reid, Nancy Pelosi, Mitch McConnell,
  7716. Mike Rodgers, Dutch Ruppersberger, Lamar
  7717. Smith, John Conyers Jr, Dianne Feinstein,
  7718. Sexby Chambliss, Patrick J Leahy, Charles
  7719. E Grassley ::
  7720.  
  7721. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-dni-12-0326.pdf
  7722.  
  7723. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-dni-ag-12-0208.pdf
  7724.  
  7725. ¤ FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship March 2009 ::
  7726.  
  7727. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-march-2009.pdf
  7728.  
  7729. ¤ FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship May 2010 ::
  7730.  
  7731. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-may-2010.pdf
  7732.  
  7733. ¤ FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship December 2009 ::
  7734.  
  7735. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-december-2009.pdf
  7736.  
  7737. ¤ FISA Horse Droppings ::
  7738.  
  7739. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-droppings.htm
  7740.  
  7741. ¤ FISA Documents Withheld From Most of
  7742. Congress ::
  7743.  
  7744.  “I can now confirm that the House
  7745. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
  7746. did NOT, in fact, make the 2011 document
  7747. available to Representatives in Congress,
  7748. meaning that the large class of Representatives
  7749. elected in 2010 did not receive either of
  7750. the now declassified documents detailing
  7751. these programs.”  - Justin Amash
  7752.  
  7753. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/12/intelligence-committee-nsa-vote-justin-amash
  7754.  
  7755. http://www.infowars.com/amash-nsa-docs-were-withheld-from-congress-by-higher-ups/
  7756.  
  7757.  
  7758. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Sg4AtcW0LU
  7759.  
  7760.  Youtube video ; 27:18 “So on this program,
  7761. 100% audibility on every query that we make.
  7762. And that is overseen by our Inspector General,
  7763. our General Council. In 2009 in our
  7764. discussions with the president when he
  7765. first came on board we talked to him about
  7766. these programs and the issue was how do
  7767. we know the compliance is there and what
  7768. more could we do? We stood up working with
  7769. the COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS a directorate
  7770. of compliance. This directorate of
  7771. compliance is headed by legal professionals
  7772. and information specialists that can look
  7773. at everything that we do in these programs
  7774. and ensure they (comply ?) with the court
  7775. orders but we also have oversight from
  7776. the Director of National Intelligence,
  7777. General Council and IEG, from the Defense
  7778. Department, from the Department of Justice,
  7779. from the White House, FROM CONGRESS, the
  7780. Intel(ligence) committees and from the
  7781. courts.”  - Keith Alexander
  7782. _______________________________________
  7783. ¤ EU Privacy Watchdogs Seek PRISM Slides ::
  7784.  
  7785.  Only 9 out of 41 slides have become
  7786. public so far.
  7787.  
  7788. http://cnsnews.com/news/article/eu-privacy-watchdogs-seek-details-nsa-spying
  7789. _______________________________________
  7790. ¤ NEVER LET SURVEILLANCE SHUT YOU UP ::
  7791.  
  7792. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323639704579015101857760922.html
  7793. _______________________________________
  7794. ¤ NSA Funds New “Top Secret” $60,000,000
  7795. Data Lab ::
  7796.  
  7797. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-funds-new-top-secret-60-million-dollar-data-lab/
  7798.  
  7799. http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/08/15/3109412/nc-state-teams-up-with-nsa-on.html
  7800. _______________________________________
  7801. ¤ What the NSA’s Massive Org Chart
  7802. (Probably) Looks Like ::
  7803.  
  7804. http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2013/08/what-nsas-massive-org-chart-probably-looks/68642/
  7805. http://www.mindmeister.com/308518551/the-national-security-agency-operates-more-than-500-separate-signals-intelligence-platforms-employs-roughly-30-000-civilians-and-military-budget-10-billion
  7806. http://cdn.govexec.com/media/gbc/docs/pdfs_edit/d1nsaorgmapimg.jpg
  7807. _______________________________________
  7808. ¤ NSA Spying Under Fire in Latin America ::
  7809.  
  7810.  The massive NSA snooping revelations
  7811. have cast a shadow over John Kerry’s
  7812. trip to Latin America – his first visit
  7813. there since he assumed the position
  7814. of Secretary of State. He has already
  7815. received a chilly reception in Colombia
  7816. – where officials demanded an explanation
  7817. to reports that Washington had collected
  7818. vast amounts of internet data there.
  7819. The next stop on his trip is Brazil –
  7820. which allegedly was the top regional
  7821. target of the surveillance program.
  7822.  
  7823. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fpRPnc6Ucy8
  7824.  
  7825. http://sgtreport.com/2013/08/kerry-on-damage-control-nsa-spying-under-fire-in-latin-america/
  7826.  
  7827. ¤ Brazil Demands Clarifications on NSA
  7828. Surveillance ::
  7829.  
  7830. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=txCcJ0wqdFc
  7831.  
  7832. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cv1WjVI3lQA
  7833.  
  7834. http://news.yahoo.com/brazil-demands-clarifications-nsa-surveillance-200545031.html
  7835. _______________________________________
  7836. ¤ Ten Operational Directorates of NSA ::
  7837.  
  7838. http://williamaarkin.wordpress.com/2013/08/13/nsa-a-little-help-with-transparency/
  7839. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  7840. ¤ NSA Strategy and Core Values ::
  7841.  
  7842. http://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/nsacss_strategy.pdf
  7843.  
  7844. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-strategy-values.htm
  7845.  
  7846. ¤ NSA Deputy Director on NSA Core Values ::
  7847.  
  7848. http://www.nsa.gov/about/values/core_values.shtml
  7849.  
  7850. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-core-values-inglis.htm
  7851. _______________________________________
  7852. ¤ Edward Snowden Speaks to Peter Maass ::
  7853.  
  7854. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/magazine/snowden-maass-transcript.html
  7855.  
  7856. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/snowden-maass.htm
  7857. _______________________________________
  7858. ¤ Detail Into FAA Section 702 ::
  7859.  
  7860. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/09/nsa-loophole-warrantless-searches-email-calls
  7861.  
  7862.  “While the FAA 702 minimization procedures
  7863. approved on 3 October 2011 now allow for
  7864. use of certain United States person names
  7865. and identifiers as query terms when reviewing
  7866. collected FAA 702 data, analysts may NOT/NOT
  7867. implement any USP queries until an effective
  7868. oversight process has been developed by NSA
  7869. and agreed to by DOJ/ODNI. Until further
  7870. notice, collected FAA 702 data (702 data is
  7871. contained in MARINA, MAINWAY, NUCLEON, PINWALE
  7872. (Sweet* and Sour* partitions) and other
  7873. databases).”
  7874.  
  7875. http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2013/8/9/1376060880108/FAA-document-001.jpg
  7876.  
  7877. NOBODY comments
  7878.  
  7879. Refer to this leaked FISA document.
  7880.  
  7881. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  7882.  
  7883.  Under the FISA minimization, section 3
  7884. (b) (2)  “Monitoring, Recording, and
  7885. Processing (U)” the NSA can hold domestic
  7886. communications not related to foreign
  7887. information or foreign activity for up
  7888. to five years.
  7889.  
  7890.  Found in section 3 (1) “Such inadvertently
  7891. acquired communications of or concerning a
  7892. United States person may be retained no
  7893. longer than five years in any event.”
  7894.  
  7895.  Under the FISA minimization, section 5
  7896. “Domestic Communications (U)” there is
  7897. more than one loophole the NSA can use to
  7898. be granted authorization to snoop domestic
  7899. communications that have been stored.
  7900. Look into section 5, sub-sections (2) and
  7901. (3). ║ (2) refers to criminal activity and
  7902. *suspected* criminal activity. (3) refers
  7903. to “communications security vulnerability”
  7904. both being used as excuses to snoop.
  7905. _______________________________________
  7906. ¤ NSA ; Adobe Reader Very Vulnerable ::
  7907.  
  7908. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-adobe-reader-XI.pdf
  7909. _______________________________________
  7910. ¤ NSA ; Mobility Capability Package ::
  7911.  
  7912. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-mobility-capability.pdf
  7913. _______________________________________
  7914. ¤ Obama Meets With Third-Party Corporate
  7915. Executives Behind Closed Doors ::
  7916.  
  7917.  As the steady stream of revelations
  7918. continues, the White House has choosen
  7919. to meet quietly with tech executives and
  7920. consumer groups behind closed doors.
  7921.  
  7922. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/tim-cook-barack-obama-technology-95362.html
  7923. _______________________________________
  7924. ¤ Obama Press Conference on NSA Spying ::
  7925.  
  7926. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/obama-nsa-13-0809.htm
  7927.  
  7928. ¤ Luke Rudkowski Talks About Obama’s NSA
  7929. Spying Press Conference ::
  7930.  
  7931.  Luke Rudkowski breaks down today’s
  7932. Presidential press conference in which the
  7933. focus was predominantly on the NSA spying
  7934. program. Luke points out many of the lies
  7935. that Obama told today about the program
  7936. by citing multiple articles with information
  7937. that completely contradict what Obama said.
  7938.  
  7939. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=adZyfrcvtgg
  7940. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  7941. ¤ NSA  Missions, Authorities, Oversight,
  7942. Partners ::
  7943.  
  7944. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0809.pdf
  7945. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  7946. ¤ DoJ ; NSA Bulk Collection of Telephony
  7947. Metadata ::
  7948.  
  7949. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/doj-13-0809.pdf
  7950. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  7951. ¤ National Security Run Amok ::
  7952.  
  7953. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/9/paul-national-security-run-amok/
  7954. _______________________________________
  7955.  The Western Center for Journalism released
  7956. a video briefing over Russel Tice former
  7957. NSA whistleblower and his story about
  7958. blackmailing former senator Barack Obama.
  7959.  
  7960. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K31xCh6f_VY
  7961.  
  7962.  Abby Martin talks to Russell Tice, former
  7963. intelligence analyst and original NSA
  7964. whistleblower, about how the recent NSA
  7965. scandal is only scratches the surface of
  7966. a massive surveillance apparatus, citing
  7967. specific targets the he saw spying orders
  7968. for including former senators Hillary
  7969. Clinton and Barack Obama.
  7970.  
  7971. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d6m1XbWOfVk
  7972.  
  7973. ¤ Boiling Frogs Post Podcast Show of NSA
  7974. whistleblower Russell Tice ::
  7975.  
  7976. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2DmN80yi5mo
  7977.  
  7978. http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/podpress_trac/web/20927/0/BF.0112.Tice_20130617.mp3
  7979.  
  7980. ¤ Corbett Report ; NSA Wiretapped Obama,
  7981. Petraeus, Alito, and Others ::
  7982.  
  7983. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H1ZAzu_0YZU
  7984.  
  7985.  Ron Paul talks about NSA spying and
  7986. why they want to sweep it under the rug.
  7987.  
  7988. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0h4yOr-27mA
  7989. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  7990. ¤ NSA and Spying Nicknames and Codewords ::
  7991.  
  7992. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/p/nicknames-and-codewords.html
  7993.  
  7994. ¤ NSA’s Code Names Revealed (2012) ::
  7995.  
  7996. http://williamaarkin.wordpress.com/2012/03/13/nsa-code-names-revealed/
  7997.  
  7998. NOBODY comments
  7999.  
  8000. RAGTIME is the codename for Stellar Wind.
  8001.  
  8002.  This operation was debated years ago, yet
  8003. the document was still classified. It was
  8004. leaked to cryptome.org last month. ▼
  8005.  
  8006. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  8007.  
  8008.  OCELOT and STORMBREW are both managed
  8009. by Stu Bathurst - both telephony data
  8010. grabbing operations. RAGTIME sponsored
  8011. many of these operations being leaked.
  8012. _______________________________________
  8013. ¤ Uncensored NSA FAIRVIEW Slides Air
  8014. on Brazilian Television ::
  8015.  
  8016. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOAv7zbJkCk
  8017. http://www.dailydot.com/news/nsa-fairview-slides-brazil-spying/
  8018. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-codenames.htm
  8019.  
  8020. NOBODY comments
  8021.  
  8022.  Upstream collection via FAA 702 includes
  8023. FAIRVIEW, STORMBREW, BLARNEY and OAKSTAR.
  8024.  
  8025.  Original leaks of FAIRVIEW slides censored
  8026. program managers - for FAIRVIEW “Craig Hicks”
  8027. and for STORMBREW “Stu Bathurst.” ▼
  8028.  
  8029. http://postimg.org/image/9viuxblpd/
  8030. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  8031. ¤ Transfers From Germany Aid US Surveillance,
  8032. English Report ::
  8033.  
  8034.  German intelligence sends massive amounts
  8035. of intercepted data to the NSA, according
  8036. to documents from whistleblower Edward
  8037. Snowden, which SPIEGEL has seen. The
  8038. trans-Atlantic cooperation on technical
  8039. matters is also much closer than first
  8040. thought. ... ...
  8041.  
  8042.  Day after day and month after month,
  8043. the BND passes on to the NSA massive
  8044. amounts of connection data relating
  8045. to the communications it had placed
  8046. under surveillance. The so-called
  8047. metadata -- telephone numbers, email
  8048. addresses, IP connections -- then flow
  8049. into the Americans’ giant databases.
  8050.  
  8051. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-intelligence-sends-massive-amounts-of-data-to-the-nsa-a-914821.html
  8052.  
  8053. ¤ Transfers from Germany Aid US Surveillance,
  8054. Deutsch Report ::
  8055.  
  8056. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/der-spiegel-13-0804.pdf
  8057.  
  8058. ¤ Germany Nixes Spy Pact With US, UK (?) ::
  8059.  
  8060. http://bigstory.ap.org/article/germany-nixes-surveillance-pact-us-britain
  8061. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  8062. ¤ NSA XKEYSCORE Slides, 2008 ::
  8063.  
  8064. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-xkeyscore.pdf
  8065. http://www.slideshare.net/xkeyscore/xkeyscore-nsa-program-presentation
  8066. http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/743244-xkeyscore-slidedeck.html
  8067.  
  8068. ¤ XKEYSCORE God-terminal Into Internet ::
  8069.  
  8070. http://www.dw.de/xkeyscore-a-god-terminal-into-internet/a-16994780
  8071.  
  8072.  The latest revelations will add to the intense public
  8073. and congressional debate around the extent of NSA
  8074. surveillance programs. They come as senior intelligence
  8075. officials testify to the Senate judiciary committee on
  8076. Wednesday, releasing classified documents in response to
  8077. the Guardian’s earlier stories on bulk collection of
  8078. phone records and FISA surveillance court oversight.
  8079.  
  8080. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jul/31/nsa-xkeyscore-program-full-presentation
  8081. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data
  8082. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/31/us-usa-security-intelligence-idUSBRE96U03320130731
  8083. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/31/declassified-documents-show-nsa-snooping-had-compl/
  8084.  
  8085. ¤ NSA XKeyscore Produced by SAIC ::
  8086.  
  8087. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-xkeyscore-saic.htm
  8088.  
  8089. ¤ NSA Press Statement on XKEYSCORE ::
  8090.  
  8091. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-xkeystore.htm
  8092.  
  8093. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/press_room/2013/30_July_2013.shtml
  8094.  
  8095. ¤ NSA X-KEYSCORE Server Locations ::
  8096.  
  8097. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-x-keyscore-servers.htm
  8098.  
  8099. ¤ NSA X-KEYSCORE Global Cyber-espionage ::
  8100.  
  8101. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-x-keyscore-family.htm
  8102.  
  8103. ¤ Instrument of Mass Surveillance ::
  8104.  
  8105. http://www.infowars.com/xkeyscore-instrument-of-mass-surveillance/
  8106.  
  8107. ¤ NSA’s X-Keyscore One of Many More ::
  8108.  
  8109. http://www.infowars.com/nsas-x-keyscore-one-of-many-surveillance-programs-used-on-americans/
  8110.  
  8111. ¤ RAGTIME and X-KEYSCORE @ Fort Meade ::
  8112.  
  8113.  “At Fort Meade, a program called
  8114. XKEYSCORE processes all signals before
  8115. they are shunted off to various “production
  8116. lines” that deal with specific issues.
  8117. PINWALE is the main NSA database for
  8118. recorded signals intercepts. It is
  8119. compartmentalized by keywords (the NSA
  8120. calls them “selectors”). Metadata is
  8121. stored in a database called MARINA and
  8122. is generally retained for five years.
  8123.  
  8124. ... ...
  8125.  
  8126.  “Congress repeatedly resisted the
  8127. entreaties of the Bush Administration
  8128. to change the surveillance laws once the
  8129. RAGTIME program had been institutionalized.
  8130. This was for a simple reason: they did
  8131. not want to be responsible for a program
  8132. that was not legal.”
  8133.  
  8134. https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1718-ambinder10-things.pdf
  8135.  
  8136. NOBODY comments
  8137.  
  8138.  Under the FISA minimization, section 3
  8139. (b) (2)  “Monitoring, Recording, and
  8140. Processing (U)” the NSA can hold domestic
  8141. communications not related to foreign
  8142. information or foreign activity for up
  8143. to five years.
  8144.  
  8145.  This confirms an XKeyscore presentation
  8146. posted by the Guardian regarding the
  8147. metadata aggregation to PINWALE databank
  8148. seen in the DNI discovery options.
  8149. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  8150. ¤ NSA Pays £100,000,000 in Secret Funding
  8151. for GCHQ Bude ::
  8152.  
  8153. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/aug/01/nsa-paid-gchq-spying-edward-snowden
  8154. _______________________________________
  8155. ¤ Other Agencies Clamor for Data NSA
  8156. Compiles but Claim Rejections ::
  8157.  
  8158.  Agencies working to curb drug trafficking,
  8159. cyberattacks, money laundering,
  8160. counterfeiting and even copyright
  8161. infringement complain that their
  8162. attempts to exploit the security
  8163. agency’s vast resources have often
  8164. been turned down because their own
  8165. investigations are not considered a
  8166. high enough priority, current and
  8167. former government officials say.
  8168.  
  8169.  Intelligence officials say they have
  8170. been careful to limit the use of the
  8171. security agency’s troves of data and
  8172. eavesdropping spyware for fear they
  8173. could be misused in ways that violate
  8174. Americans’ privacy rights. ...
  8175.  
  8176.  “It’s a very common complaint about
  8177. NSA,” said Timothy H. Edgar, a former
  8178. senior intelligence official at the
  8179. White House and at the office of the
  8180. director of national intelligence.
  8181. “They collect all this information,
  8182. but it’s difficult for the other
  8183. agencies to get access to what
  8184. they want.”
  8185.  
  8186. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/04/us/other-agencies-clamor-for-data-nsa-compiles.html?hp&_r=0
  8187. _______________________________________
  8188. ¤ NSA’s Keith Alexander Remarks at Aspen
  8189. Security Forum ::
  8190.  
  8191. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-aspen.pdf
  8192.  
  8193. ¤ NSA’s Keith Alexander Remarks at AFCEA
  8194. Conference ::
  8195.  
  8196. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-afcea.pdf
  8197.  
  8198. ¤ NSA’s Keith Alexander Remarks at Blackhat
  8199. Conference ::
  8200.  
  8201. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Sg4AtcW0LU
  8202. https://soundcloud.com/larrymagid/nsa-director-general-keith
  8203. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0731.pdf
  8204.  
  8205.  Youtube video ; 27:18 “So on this program,
  8206. 100% audibility on every query that we make.
  8207. And that is overseen by our Inspector General,
  8208. our General Council. In 2009 in our
  8209. discussions with the president when he
  8210. first came on board we talked to him about
  8211. these programs and the issue was how do
  8212. we know the compliance is there and what
  8213. more could we do? We stood up working with
  8214. the committees in Congress a directorate
  8215. of compliance. This directorate of
  8216. compliance is headed by legal professionals
  8217. and information specialists that can look
  8218. at everything that we do in these programs
  8219. and ensure they (comply ?) with the court
  8220. orders but we also have oversight from
  8221. the Director of National Intelligence,
  8222. General Council and IEG, from the Defense
  8223. Department, from the Department of Justice,
  8224. from the White House, from Congress, the
  8225. Intel(ligence) committees and from the
  8226. courts.”  - Keith Alexander
  8227.  
  8228. ▲ NSA’s Keith Alexander Angers a Few at
  8229. Blackhat Conference ::
  8230.  
  8231. “Read the constitution” someone shouts.
  8232.  
  8233. “I did, you should too” replied Keith.
  8234.  
  8235. http://www.infowars.com/security-consultant-heckles-nsa-head-shouts-freedom-read-the-constitution/
  8236.  
  8237. http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/07/31/nsa-director-heckled-at-conference-as-he-asks-for-security-communitys-understanding/
  8238.  
  8239. ¤ NSA’s Keith Alexander Remarks to Workforce ::
  8240.  
  8241. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-workforce.htm
  8242.  
  8243. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/speeches_testimonies/25jun13_dir.shtml
  8244. _______________________________________
  8245. ¤ Obama Releases Three Patriot Act Docs ::
  8246.  
  8247. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/obama-releases-13-0731.pdf
  8248.  
  8249. ¤ US Outlines NSA Culling of Data for
  8250. All Domestic Calls ::
  8251.  
  8252.  On Wednesday, the Obama regime released
  8253. three documents related to the National
  8254. Security Agency’s collection of phone
  8255. records, including briefings to Congress
  8256. as the relevant provision of the Patriot
  8257. Act was up for renewal, and a ruling
  8258. from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  8259. Court that outlines rules that must be
  8260. followed when accessing data provided by
  8261. a Verizon subsidiary.
  8262.  
  8263. http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/08/01/us/01nsa-docs.html
  8264.  
  8265.  Before Mr. Snowden’s leaks made clear
  8266. what the government was doing with the
  8267. Patriot Act program, several senators
  8268. on the Intelligence Committee had made
  8269. cryptic warnings that it was interpreting
  8270. the law in a twisted way to do something
  8271. alarming and made reference to the 2011
  8272. briefing paper. The New York Times filed
  8273. a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information
  8274. Act to obtain that document.
  8275.  
  8276. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/743215-2011-coverletters-report-collection.html
  8277. _______________________________________
  8278. ¤ Senate FISA Spying Hearing Statements ::
  8279.  
  8280. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/fisa-hearing-13-0731.pdf
  8281.  
  8282. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/fisa-hearing-13-0731-2.pdf
  8283. _______________________________________
  8284. ¤ Monitoring Emails Purely “Accidental” ::
  8285.  
  8286.  Saxby Chambliss ; “no emails are monitored
  8287. now” ... “they used to be but that stopped
  8288. two or three years ago.”
  8289.  
  8290. http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/07/glenn-greenwald-low-level-nsa-analysts-have-powerful-and-invasive-search-tool/
  8291. _______________________________________
  8292. ▼ Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying
  8293. Received Dox ::
  8294.  
  8295. (1) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56175
  8296. (2) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56176
  8297. (3) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56177
  8298. (4) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56178
  8299. (5) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56179
  8300.  
  8301. ▼ Lawmakers Who Sold Out ::
  8302.  
  8303. http://pastebin.com/6fhaDJMp
  8304.  
  8305. ¤ Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying
  8306. Received Double Defense Campaign Funds ::
  8307.  
  8308.  The numbers tell the story — in votes
  8309. and dollars. On Wednesday, the house
  8310. voted 217 to 205 not to rein in the
  8311. NSA’s phone-spying dragnet. It turns
  8312. out that those 217 “no” voters received
  8313. twice as much campaign financing from
  8314. the defense and intelligence industry
  8315. as the 205 “yes” voters.
  8316.  
  8317. http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/07/money-nsa-vote/
  8318.  
  8319. ¤ These Are The 217 People Who Voted
  8320. To Preserve NSA Surveillance ::
  8321.  
  8322. http://www.infowars.com/these-are-the-217-people-who-voted-to-preserve-nsa-surveillance/
  8323. http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2013/roll412.xml
  8324. http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2013/07/NOES_0.jpg
  8325.  
  8326. ▲ US Congress Doxed, July 2013 ::
  8327.  
  8328. http://slexy.org/view/s2fZ764IzB
  8329.  
  8330. ¤ Justin Amash’s Amendment to Defund
  8331. the NSA Will Get a Vote [Failed] ::
  8332.  
  8333. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IUy3IT0A8hM
  8334. http://washingtonexaminer.com/defund-nsa-amendment-will-get-a-vote/article/2533380
  8335. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/07/23/197485/sen-wyden-says-he-tried-to-warn.html
  8336. http://www.infowars.com/house-fight-brews-over-nsa-stasi-state/
  8337.  
  8338. ¤ White House Responds to Amash’s
  8339. Amendment [Before It Failed] ::
  8340.  
  8341.  “In light of the recent unauthorized
  8342. disclosures, the President has said
  8343. that he welcomes a debate about how
  8344. best to simultaneously safeguard both
  8345. our national security and the privacy
  8346. of our citizens.  The Administration
  8347. has taken various proactive steps to
  8348. advance this debate including the
  8349. President’s meeting with the Privacy
  8350. and Civil Liberties Oversight Board,
  8351. his public statements on the disclosed
  8352. programs, the Office of the Director
  8353. of National Intelligence’s release of
  8354. its own public statements, ODNI General
  8355. Counsel Bob Litt’s speech at Brookings,
  8356. and ODNI’s decision to declassify and
  8357. disclose publicly that the Administration
  8358. filed an application with the Foreign
  8359. Intelligence Surveillance Court. We
  8360. look forward to continuing to discuss
  8361. these critical issues with the American
  8362. people and the Congress.
  8363.  
  8364.  However, we oppose the current effort
  8365. in the House to hastily dismantle one
  8366. of our Intelligence Community’s
  8367. counterterrorism tools. This blunt
  8368. approach is not the product of an
  8369. informed, open, or deliberative process.
  8370. We urge the House to reject the Amash
  8371. Amendment, and instead move forward
  8372. with an approach that appropriately
  8373. takes into account the need for a
  8374. reasoned review of what tools can
  8375. best secure the nation.” - WH Press
  8376.  
  8377. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/23/statement-press-secretary-amash-amendment
  8378.  
  8379. http://washingtonexaminer.com/white-house-scrambles-to-defeat-bill-to-defund-nsa-program/article/2533418
  8380.  
  8381. ▲ RELATED ; Privacy and Civil Liberties
  8382. Board Meets Behind Closed Doors ::
  8383.  
  8384. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/pclob-13-0617.htm
  8385.  
  8386. ¤ NSA Director Calls Emergency Meeting to
  8387. Lobby Against Justin Amash’s Amendment
  8388. to Defund NSA ::
  8389.  
  8390. http://washingtonexaminer.com/nsa-director-calls-emergency-meeting-to-lobby-against-rep.-justin-amashs-nsa-amendment/article/2533407
  8391. _______________________________________
  8392.  Yesterday, German media wrote about an
  8393. official letter from the NSA, which was
  8394. sent to the German government to clarify
  8395. some misconceptions about PRISM. This
  8396. because German media and politics were
  8397. heavily confused after it became clear
  8398. that there’s more than one program named
  8399. PRISM.
  8400.  
  8401.  The NSA letter explains what the PRISM
  8402. data collection program is about and
  8403. then confirms that this program is
  8404. different from a more common military
  8405. web tool called "Planning tool for
  8406. Resource Integration, Synchronization
  8407. and Management" (PRISM).
  8408.  
  8409.  Surprisingly, the NSA also reveals that
  8410. there’s even a third program called
  8411. PRISM. In this case the name stands
  8412. for “Portal for Real-time Information
  8413. Sharing and Management” and it’s
  8414. apparently an internal NSA information
  8415. sharing program. It was unknown until
  8416. now, probably because it’s used in the
  8417. NSA’s highly sensitive Information
  8418. Assurance Directorate (IAD). ... ...
  8419.  
  8420.  Here’s a short summary of all three
  8421. different PRISM programs:
  8422.  
  8423. 1. PRISM
  8424.  
  8425.  This is a codeword for an NSA project
  8426. of collecting information about foreign
  8427. targets from data of nine major US
  8428. internet companies. This program started
  8429. in 2007 and was unveiled by Edward Snowden
  8430. in June 2013.
  8431.  
  8432. 2. Planning tool for Resource Integration,
  8433. Synchronization and Management (PRISM)
  8434.  
  8435.  This is a web tool used by US military
  8436. intelligence to send tasking instructions
  8437. to data collection platforms deployed to
  8438. military operations. This program is
  8439. not very secret and was first mentioned
  8440. in 2002.
  8441.  
  8442. 3. Portal for Real-time Information
  8443. Sharing and Management (PRISM)
  8444.  
  8445.  This is an internal NSA program for
  8446. real-time sharing of information,
  8447. apparently in the NSA’s Information
  8448. Assurance Directorate. Its existance
  8449. was revealed by the NSA in July 2013.
  8450.  
  8451. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/nsa-says-there-are-three-different.html
  8452.  
  8453. ¤ Three Different PRISM Programs? German
  8454. Parliament Seeks Clarity in NSA Scandal ::
  8455.  
  8456.  A Thursday meeting in German parliament
  8457. was supposed to shed light on NSA
  8458. surveillance activities in Germany.
  8459. It only added to the mystery. A US
  8460. response to a Berlin inquiry claims
  8461. that there are actually three unrelated
  8462. Prism programs. ... ...
  8463.  
  8464.  In addition to testimony from Schindler
  8465. and Maassen, officials also read a
  8466. written statement from the NSA in
  8467. response to a query from the German
  8468. government. According to the statement,
  8469. there are three separate Prism programs,
  8470. all of them unconnected to each other.
  8471. Meeting participants say the NSA response
  8472. said that one of the Prism programs was
  8473. only used internally. That program had
  8474. thus far remained secret. Another of
  8475. the programs was used by the Pentagon
  8476. in Afghanistan. Yet another NSA tool
  8477. -- vaguely described in the statement
  8478. and allegedly “totally unrelated to the
  8479. first” -- carries the name PRISM and
  8480. “tracks and queries requests pertaining
  8481. to our Information Assurance Directorate.”
  8482.  
  8483. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/merkel-chief-of-staff-testifies-before-parliament-on-nsa-spying-a-913268.html
  8484.  
  8485. NOBODY comments
  8486.  
  8487.  The snapshot of the PRISM input tool
  8488. posted on electrospaces blogspot must
  8489. have been from the Pentagon’s PRISM.
  8490. _______________________________________
  8491. ¤ UPDATE ; NSA Utah Data Center Probe ::
  8492.  
  8493. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-utah-probe/nsa-utah-probe.htm
  8494.  
  8495. ¤ NSA Utah Data Center Construction ::
  8496.  
  8497. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/07/nsa-utah-dc/nsa-utah-dc.htm
  8498.  
  8499.  Description and drawings by US Army
  8500. Corps of Engineers.
  8501.  
  8502. http://cryptome.org/nsa-utah-data.zip
  8503. http://cryptome.org/dodi/nsa-utah-award.pdf
  8504. http://cryptome.org/dodi/nsa-utah-data-02.pdf
  8505. _______________________________________
  8506. ¤ Eyeballing the UK’s GCHQ Spy Policy ::
  8507.  
  8508. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uk-spy-commish-2012.pdf
  8509.  
  8510. ¤ Eyeballing the UK’s RIPA Spy Policy ::
  8511.  
  8512. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uk-cop-spy-2012-13.pdf
  8513. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  8514. ¤ NSA Organizational Chart 1950 ::
  8515.  
  8516. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-org-chart-1950.pdf
  8517.  
  8518. ¤ NSA Headquarters Plans/Drawings 1953 ::
  8519.  
  8520. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-hq-plans-1953.pdf
  8521.  
  8522. ¤ NSA Employee Conduct Guide 1955 ::
  8523.  
  8524. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-conduct-guide-1955.pdf
  8525. _______________________________________
  8526. ¤ DoJ Responds to Snowden Russia Asylum ::
  8527.  
  8528.  “First, the United States would not seek
  8529. death penalty for Mr. Snowden should he
  8530. return to the United States. The charges
  8531. he faces do not carry that possibility,
  8532. and the United States would not seek the
  8533. death penalty even if Mr. Snowden were
  8534. charged with additional, death penalty-
  8535. eligible crimes.”
  8536.  
  8537. “Second, Mr. Snowden will not be tortured.”
  8538.  
  8539. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/usdoj-rumoj-snowden.pdf
  8540. _______________________________________
  8541. ¤ Edward Snowden Nominated for Nobel
  8542. Peace Prize ::
  8543.  
  8544.  Edward Snowden, the National Security
  8545. Agency whistleblower who revealed the
  8546. agency’s data collection program, has
  8547. been nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize.
  8548.  
  8549.  “Edward Snowden has — in a heroic effort
  8550. at great personal cost — revealed the
  8551. existence and extent of the surveillance,
  8552. the US government devotes electronic
  8553. communications worldwide,” read the
  8554. nomination. “By putting light on this
  8555. monitoring program — conducted in
  8556. contravention of national laws and
  8557. international agreements — Edward Snowden
  8558. has helped to make the world a little
  8559. bit better and safer.” ...
  8560.  
  8561.  “The decision to award the 2013 prize
  8562. to Edward Snowden would — in addition
  8563. to being well justified in itself —
  8564. also help to save the Nobel Peace Prize
  8565. from the disrepute that incurred by the
  8566. hasty and ill-conceived decision to
  8567. award [war criminal] Barack Obama the 2009
  8568. award,” Svallfors wrote to the committee.
  8569.  
  8570. http://washingtonexaminer.com/edward-snowden-nominated-for-nobel-peace-prize/article/2533071
  8571. _______________________________________
  8572. ¤ Glenn Greenwald Interviewed Moskovsky
  8573. Komsomolets News ::
  8574.  
  8575. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/gg-snowden-leak-halt.htm
  8576. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  8577. ¤ Minute Details of How the NSA Installs
  8578. Their Surveillance Equipment ::
  8579.  
  8580.  Pete Ashdown, the CEO of XMission, detailed
  8581. his experience when he received a Foreign
  8582. Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrant
  8583. in 2010 which forced him to allow the
  8584. federal government to monitor a customer
  8585. of his.
  8586.  
  8587.  Of course, like all FISA orders, it also
  8588. contained a broad gag order, which still
  8589. prevents him from telling all the details.
  8590.  
  8591.  “The FISA request was a tricky one, because
  8592. it was a warrant through the FISA court —
  8593. whether you believe that is legitimate or
  8594. not,” Ashdown wrote.
  8595.  
  8596.  He had to help the agents “set up a
  8597. duplicate port to tap in to monitor that
  8598. customer’s traffic. It was a 2U (two-unit)
  8599. PC that we ran a mirrored ethernet port to.”
  8600.  
  8601.  Ashdown eventually had a box in his
  8602. facility that was capturing all of the
  8603. traffic sent to his customer. He did not
  8604. remember if it was connected to the internet,
  8605. but wrote that it was likely capturing
  8606. all data to a hard drive for later analysis.
  8607.  
  8608. http://endthelie.com/2013/07/21/owner-of-small-utah-isp-describes-how-the-nsa-attempted-to-get-him-to-install-surveillance-equipment/
  8609. _______________________________________
  8610. ¤ NSA Briefs a New Administration, 2004 ::
  8611.  
  8612. http://tinyurl.com/kqmpf4w
  8613. _______________________________________
  8614. ¤ New Slides About NSA Collection Programs ::
  8615.  
  8616. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/new-slides-about-nsa-collection-programs.html
  8617. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  8618. ¤ NSA Admits They Snoop Targets’ Contacts’
  8619. Contacts’ Contacts (3 Hops) ::
  8620.  
  8621.  As an aside during testimony on Capitol
  8622. Hill today, a National Security Agency
  8623. representative rather casually indicated
  8624. that the government looks at data from
  8625. a universe of far, far more people than
  8626. previously indicated.
  8627.  
  8628.  Chris Inglis, the agency’s deputy director,
  8629. was one of several government representatives
  8630. —including from the FBI and the office of
  8631. the Director of National Intelligence—
  8632. testifying before the House Judiciary
  8633. Committee this morning. Most of the testimony
  8634. largely echoed previous testimony by the
  8635. agencies on the topic of the government’s
  8636. surveillance, including a retread of the
  8637. same offered examples for how the Patriot
  8638. Act and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  8639. Act had stopped terror events.
  8640.  
  8641.  But Inglis’ statement was new. Analysts
  8642. look “two or three hops” from terror
  8643. suspects when evaluating terror activity,
  8644. Inglis revealed. Previously, the limit of
  8645. how surveillance was extended had been
  8646. described as two hops. This meant that
  8647. if the NSA were following a phone metadata
  8648. or web trail from a terror suspect, it
  8649. could also look at the calls from the
  8650. people that suspect has spoken with one
  8651. hop. And then, the calls that second person
  8652. had also spoken with two hops. Terror suspect
  8653. to person two to person three. Two hops.
  8654. And now: A third hop. ... ...
  8655.  
  8656. So all of your friends, that’s one hop.
  8657.  
  8658.  Your friends’ friends, whether you know
  8659. them or not - two hops.
  8660.  
  8661.  Your friends’ friends’ friends, whoever
  8662. they happen to be, are that third hop.
  8663.  
  8664. http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2013/07/nsa-admits-it-analyzes-more-peoples-data-previously-revealed/67287/
  8665. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  8666. ¤ The Private Global Information Grid ::
  8667.  
  8668.  It is a good thing that people are
  8669. becoming aware of the fact that they
  8670. are being monitored - it is not only
  8671. speculation anymore. We have seen PRISM,
  8672. FinSpy and ECHELON. These programs are
  8673. made to collect information and to store
  8674. them in a database. Now just imagine the
  8675. resources that PRISM used and how it
  8676. could combine these resources to multiple
  8677. databases. This is where GiG comes in.
  8678.  
  8679. http://cyberwarzone.com/government-spying-database-global-information-grid
  8680. _______________________________________
  8681. ¤ Edward Snowden Application for Asylum ::
  8682.  
  8683. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/snowden-ru-asylum.htm
  8684. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  8685. ¤ NSA Leaks Nothing Compared to Further
  8686. Leaks Not-Yet-Released-to-Public ::
  8687.  
  8688.  Fugitive NSA leaker Edward Snowden today
  8689. applied for asylum in Russia and, as a
  8690. condition, agreed to stop ‘harming’ the
  8691. US, according to a Russian lawyer who
  8692. is advising him, but that doesn’t
  8693. necessarily mean headline-grabbing
  8694. stories about the US government’s vast
  8695. foreign and domestic spying programs
  8696. will stop. ... ...
  8697.  
  8698.  Putin has said that Snowden can stay
  8699. in Russia, but only if he stops “harming”
  8700. the United States by releasing more
  8701. intelligence secrets. ... ...
  8702.  
  8703.  But while Snowden agreed to stop leaking
  8704. secrets, it could prove a technicality
  8705. since he has already said that he gave
  8706. all of his classified information --
  8707. thousands of documents -- to several
  8708. journalists. The most prominent of which,
  8709. The Guardian columnist Glenn Greenwald,
  8710. told ABC News Friday that he’s not even
  8711. half done with the stories he plans to
  8712. write based on the secret information.
  8713.  
  8714. http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/edward-snowden-legal-apply-russian-asylum/story?id=19678502
  8715. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  8716. ¤ Mirror of Removed NSA Recruitment Drive ::
  8717.  
  8718. http://cypherpoet.com/nsa/
  8719. _______________________________________
  8720. ¤ Snowden NSA Revelations Mirrored ::
  8721.  
  8722. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/cryptogram-13-0715.htm
  8723. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  8724. ¤ When You’re Online, You’re Hacked ::
  8725.  
  8726.  In Russia, Prez Putin’s office just
  8727. stopped using PC’s and switched to
  8728. typewriters. What do they know that
  8729. we don’t?
  8730.  
  8731. http://steveblank.com/2013/07/15/your-computer-may-already-be-hacked-nsa-inside/
  8732. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  8733. ¤ MITRE Corporation Outlined Collection
  8734. Management for PRISM and Other Spying ::
  8735.  
  8736.  Planning Tool for Resource Integration,
  8737. Synchronization, and Management aka PRISM
  8738. has existed since at least 2002. The
  8739. following document refers to it directly.
  8740. This demonstrates PRISM not only existed
  8741. in July 2002, but it had been undergoing
  8742. usage for some time, enough time to recognize
  8743. limitation of it and similar projects.
  8744.  
  8745. http://pastebin.com/h5a1c1Pd
  8746.  
  8747. http://www.mitre.org/work/tech_papers/tech_papers_02/kane_isrplatforms/isrinformationservices.pdf
  8748. _______________________________________
  8749. ¤ Brasil é alvo da Maciça Operação de
  8750. Espionagem da NSA  (TRANSLATED) ::
  8751.  
  8752. http://code.str0.be/view/raw/540c2ebf
  8753.  
  8754. ¤ Brazil is the Most Monitored Country
  8755. in Latin America ::
  8756.  
  8757. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-tracking/nsa-tracking.htm
  8758. http://oglobo.globo.com/infograficos/volume-rastreamento-governo-americano/
  8759. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/paper-reveals-nsa-ops-in-latin-america/2013/07/09/eff0cc7e-e8e3-11e2-818e-aa29e855f3ab_print.html
  8760. _______________________________________
  8761. ¤ US Dictatorship in Damage Control,
  8762. Hyper-paranoia Over Snowden’s Leaks ::
  8763.  
  8764. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/snowden-us-threat.htm
  8765.  
  8766. http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/07/13/usa-security-snowden-greenwald-idINDEE96C05520130713
  8767.  
  8768. ¤ Future PRISM Leaks May Be Used As An
  8769. Excuse for Global Internet Censorship ::
  8770.  
  8771. http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/07/15/usa-security-cybertruce-idINDEE96E0DQ20130715
  8772. _______________________________________
  8773. ¤ Intel in Bed with NSA ::
  8774.  
  8775. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/intel-bed-nsa.htm
  8776. _______________________________________
  8777. ¤ News Media Censoring or Editing PRISM
  8778. Slides / Slides Differ ::
  8779.  
  8780. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-upstream-differ.htm
  8781. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-upstream-differ.jpg
  8782. http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-nsa-slide-you-havent-seen/2013/07/10/32801426-e8e6-11e2-aa9f-c03a72e2d342_story.html
  8783. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  8784. ¤ NSA Policy on IP Encryptor ::
  8785.  
  8786. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/CNSSP-19.pdf
  8787.  
  8788. ¤ NSA Policy on Information Assurance ::
  8789.  
  8790. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/CNSSP-11.pdf
  8791. _______________________________________
  8792. ¤ PRISM Method of Storing and Transferring
  8793. Metadata ::
  8794.  
  8795. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/new-insights-into-prism-program.html
  8796. _______________________________________
  8797. ¤ NSA Rejecting Every FOIA Request Made
  8798. by US Citizens ::
  8799.  
  8800. http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/07/06/1221694/-NSA-Rejecting-Every-FOIA-Request-Made-by-U-S-Citizens
  8801. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  8802. ¤ National Security Agency DNS Tunnels ::
  8803.  
  8804. http://pastebin.com/TpGTHDSy
  8805.  
  8806.  “This may look like a small release, but
  8807. it's actually huge. See, we hacked the
  8808. NSA yet again because we just love doing
  8809. that. These are DNS tunnels that are
  8810. sending encrypted data to and from the
  8811. PRISM databases. We have the IP's of
  8812. those servers. If you crash these servers
  8813. with DDoS, you literally render PRISM
  8814. "broken". We are also planning to release
  8815. some of that data (which we have access
  8816. to) if we can decrypt it.”
  8817. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  8818. ¤ BEFORE PRISM ; Presidents Surveillance
  8819. Program 2001 - 2006 ::
  8820.  
  8821.  Contractors include Booze Allen Hamilton,
  8822. Snowden’s employer.
  8823.  
  8824. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/Presidents-Spy-Program-Sept14-2001.htm
  8825.  
  8826. ¤ History Behind Fiber-optic Wiretapping ::
  8827.  
  8828. http://pastebin.com/VzqpaF8y
  8829. _______________________________________
  8830. ¤ France Has Own PRISM Spy System ::
  8831.  
  8832. http://www.megapastebin.com.ar/DU5BPIIK
  8833. _______________________________________
  8834. ¤ Edward Snowden’s WikiLeaks Statement ::
  8835.  
  8836.  “One week ago I left Hong Kong after
  8837. it became clear that my freedom and
  8838. safety were under threat for revealing
  8839. the truth. My continued liberty has been
  8840. owed to the efforts of friends new and
  8841. old, family, and others who I have never
  8842. met and probably never will. I trusted
  8843. them with my life and they returned that
  8844. trust with a faith in me for which I will
  8845. always be thankful.
  8846.  
  8847.  On Thursday, President Obama declared
  8848. before the world that he would not permit
  8849. any diplomatic “wheeling and dealing” over
  8850. my case. Yet now it is being reported that
  8851. after promising not to do so, the President
  8852. ordered his Vice President to pressure the
  8853. leaders of nations from which I have
  8854. requested protection to deny my asylum
  8855. petitions.
  8856.  
  8857.  This kind of deception from a world leader
  8858. is not justice, and neither is the extralegal
  8859. penalty of exile. These are the old, bad
  8860. tools of political aggression. Their purpose
  8861. is to frighten, not me, but those who would
  8862. come after me.
  8863.  
  8864.  For decades the United States of America
  8865. have been one of the strongest defenders
  8866. of the human right to seek asylum. Sadly,
  8867. this right, laid out and voted for by the
  8868. US in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration
  8869. of Human Rights, is now being rejected by
  8870. the current government of my country. The
  8871. Obama administration has now adopted the
  8872. strategy of using citizenship as a weapon.
  8873. Although I am convicted of nothing, it has
  8874. unilaterally revoked my passport, leaving
  8875. me a stateless person. Without any judicial
  8876. order, the administration now seeks to stop
  8877. me exercising a basic right. A right that
  8878. belongs to everybody. The right to seek
  8879. asylum.
  8880.  
  8881.  In the end the Obama administration is
  8882. not afraid of whistleblowers like me,
  8883. Bradley Manning or Thomas Drake. We are
  8884. stateless, imprisoned, or powerless. No,
  8885. the Obama administration is afraid of you.
  8886. It is afraid of an informed, angry public
  8887. demanding the constitutional government
  8888. it was promised – and it should be.
  8889.  
  8890.  I am unbowed in my convictions and
  8891. impressed at the efforts taken by so
  8892. many.”
  8893.  
  8894. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/10154064/Edward-Snowdens-WikiLeaks-statement-in-full.html
  8895. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  8896. ¤ The Internet Counter-culture ::
  8897.  
  8898. http://media.risky.biz/RB284.mp3
  8899.  
  8900. ¤ Surveillance Scandals and Thought Crimes ::
  8901.  
  8902. http://media.risky.biz/RB283.mp3
  8903. _______________________________________
  8904. ¤ Cyber Command Suffers Second Defeat ::
  8905.  
  8906. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uscybercom-dump.htm
  8907. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  8908. ¤ Washington Post Publishes More PRISM ::
  8909.  
  8910. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prism-collection-documents/
  8911. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/30/washington-post-new-slides-prism
  8912. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/06/wapo-13-0629/prism-wapo-13-0629.htm
  8913. _______________________________________
  8914. ¤ US Army Blocked Access to The Guardian ::
  8915.  
  8916. http://www.infowars.com/u-s-army-now-censoring-the-guardian/
  8917. http://www.montereyherald.com/local/ci_23554739/restricted-web-access-guardian-is-army-wide-officials
  8918. http://endthelie.com/2013/06/28/u-s-army-restricting-access-to-the-guardian-across-all-of-their-networks-over-security-concerns/
  8919. _______________________________________
  8920. ¤ Mirror of Deleted Article by Guardian ::
  8921.  
  8922. http://pastebin.com/NTJvUZdJ
  8923.  
  8924.  Revealed: secret European deals to hand
  8925. over private data to America.
  8926.  
  8927.  Germany among countries offering intelligence
  8928. according to new claims by former US defence
  8929. analyst.
  8930.  
  8931.  At least six European Union countries in
  8932. addition to Britain have been colluding
  8933. with the US over the mass harvesting of
  8934. personal communications data, according
  8935. to a former contractor to America’s
  8936. National Security Agency, who said the
  8937. public should not be “kept in the dark.”
  8938.  
  8939.  Wayne Madsen, a former US navy lieutenant
  8940. who first worked for the NSA in 1985
  8941. and over the next 12 years held several
  8942. sensitive positions within the agency,
  8943. names Denmark, the Netherlands, France,
  8944. Germany, Spain and Italy as having secret
  8945. deals with the US.
  8946.  
  8947.  Madsen said the countries had “formal
  8948. second and third party status” under
  8949. signal intelligence (sigint) agreements
  8950. that compels them to hand over data,
  8951. including mobile phone and internet
  8952. information to the NSA if requested.
  8953.  
  8954.  Under international intelligence agreements,
  8955. confirmed by declassified documents,
  8956. nations are categorised by the US according
  8957. to their trust level. The US is first party
  8958. while the UK, Canada, Australia and New
  8959. Zealand enjoy second party relationships.
  8960. Germany and France have third party
  8961. relationships.
  8962.  
  8963.  In an interview published last night
  8964. on the PrivacySurgeon.org blog, Madsen,
  8965. who has been attacked for holding
  8966. controversial views on espionage issues,
  8967. said he had decided to speak out after
  8968. becoming concerned about the “half story”
  8969. told by EU politicians regarding the
  8970. extent of the NSA’s activities in Europe.
  8971.  
  8972.  He said that under the agreements,
  8973. which were drawn up after the second
  8974. world war, the “NSA gets the lion’s
  8975. share” of the sigint “take.” In return,
  8976. the third parties to the NSA agreements
  8977. received “highly sanitised intelligence.”
  8978.  
  8979.  Madsen said he was alarmed at the
  8980. “sanctimonious outcry” of political
  8981. leaders who were “feigning shock”
  8982. about the spying operations while staying
  8983. silent about their own arrangements
  8984. with the US, and was particularly
  8985. concerned that senior German politicians
  8986. had accused the UK of spying when their
  8987. country had a similar third-party deal
  8988. with the NSA.
  8989.  
  8990.  Although the level of co-operation provided
  8991. by other European countries to the NSA is
  8992. not on the same scale as that provided by
  8993. the UK, the allegations are potentially
  8994. embarrassing.
  8995.  
  8996.  “I can’t understand how Angela Merkel can
  8997. keep a straight face, demanding assurances
  8998. from [Barack] Obama and the UK while Germany
  8999. has entered into those exact relationships,”
  9000. Madsen said.
  9001.  
  9002.  The Liberal Democrat MEP Baroness Ludford,
  9003. a senior member of the European parliament’s
  9004. civil liberties, justice and home affairs
  9005. committee, said Madsen’s allegations
  9006. confirmed that the entire system for
  9007. monitoring data interception was a mess,
  9008. because the EU was unable to intervene
  9009. in intelligence matters, which remained
  9010. the exclusive concern of national
  9011. governments.
  9012.  
  9013.  “The intelligence agencies are exploiting
  9014. these contradictions and no one is really
  9015. holding them to account,” Ludford said.
  9016. “It’s terribly undermining to liberal
  9017. democracy.”
  9018.  
  9019.  Madsen’s disclosures have prompted calls
  9020. for European governments to come clean
  9021. on their arrangements with the NSA.
  9022. “There needs to be transparency as to
  9023. whether or not it is legal for the US
  9024. or any other security service to
  9025. interrogate private material,” said
  9026. John Cooper QC, a leading international
  9027. human rights lawyer. “The problem here
  9028. is that none of these arrangements has
  9029. been debated in any democratic arena.
  9030. I agree with William Hague that sometimes
  9031. things have to be done in secret, but you
  9032. don’t break the law in secret.”
  9033.  
  9034.  Madsen said all seven European countries
  9035. and the US have access to the Tat 14
  9036. fibre-optic cable network running between
  9037. Denmark and Germany, the Netherlands,
  9038. France, the UK and the US, allowing them
  9039. to intercept vast amounts of data,
  9040. including phone calls, emails and records
  9041. of users’ access to websites.
  9042.  
  9043.  He said the public needed to be made
  9044. aware of the full scale of the communication
  9045. -sharing arrangements between European
  9046. countries and the US, which predate the
  9047. internet and became of strategic importance
  9048. during the cold war.
  9049.  
  9050.  The covert relationship between the
  9051. countries was first outlined in a 2001
  9052. report by the European parliament, but
  9053. their explicit connection with the NSA
  9054. was not publicised until Madsen decided
  9055. to speak out.
  9056.  
  9057.  The European parliament’s report followed
  9058. revelations that the NSA was conducting a
  9059. global intelligence-gathering operation,
  9060. known as Echelon, which appears to have
  9061. established the framework for European
  9062. member states to collaborate with the US.
  9063.  
  9064.  “A lot of this information isn’t secret,
  9065. nor is it new,” Madsen said. “It’s just
  9066. that governments have chosen to keep the
  9067. public in the dark about it. The days
  9068. when they could get away with a conspiracy
  9069. of silence are over.”
  9070.  
  9071.  This month another former NSA contractor,
  9072. Edward Snowden, revealed to the Guardian
  9073. previously undisclosed US programmes to
  9074. monitor telephone and internet traffic.
  9075. The NSA is alleged to have shared some of
  9076. its data, gathered using a specialist tool
  9077. called Prism, with Britain’s GCHQ.
  9078. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  9079. ¤ Wayne Madsen, Former Contractor for NSA,
  9080. Talks About Global SIGINT Interception ::
  9081.  
  9082.  A former contractor to the US National
  9083. Security Agency (NSA) has told the
  9084. Privacy Surgeon that communications
  9085. intelligence arrangements between the
  9086. US and Europe are much more “complex,
  9087. murky and far reaching” than the public
  9088. has been led to believe. ...
  9089.  
  9090.  He was particularly concerned about the
  9091. “sanctimonious outcry” of political leaders
  9092. who were “feigning shock” about recently
  9093. disclosed spying operations such as PRISM
  9094. while staying silent about their own role
  9095. in global interception arrangements with
  9096. the United States. ...
  9097.  
  9098.  Madsen also expressed anger over the
  9099. NSA’s hypocrisy over Edward Snowden.
  9100.  
  9101.  “Snowden is being roundly condemned by
  9102. many who say he had no authority or right
  9103. to provide the public with details of
  9104. NSA snooping. But what right or authority
  9105. did NSA director, General Keith Alexander,
  9106. have to provide information on NSA
  9107. surveillance at five meetings of the
  9108. global Bilderberg Conference – two in
  9109. Virginia and one meeting each in Greece,
  9110. Spain and Switzerland?”
  9111.  
  9112.  “Alexander claims he is protecting the
  9113. American people from a constantly changing
  9114. number of terrorist attacks. In fact, he
  9115. is providing information to elites on
  9116. the methods NSA uses to spy on labor,
  9117. student, religious and progressive
  9118. organizations.”
  9119.  
  9120.  “When Alexander leaks to the elites,
  9121. he’s thanked. When Snowden does it,
  9122. he’s called a traitor and a coward.”
  9123.  
  9124. http://www.privacysurgeon.org/blog/incision/former-nsa-contractor-warns-of-murky-interception-arrangements/
  9125. _______________________________________
  9126. ¤ NSA Spying Pisses Off European Union ::
  9127.  
  9128. http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2013/06/30/new-nsa-leak-documents-show-how-the-us-is-bugging-its-european-allies/
  9129. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57591678/european-officials-lash-out-at-new-nsa-spying-report/
  9130. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/30/nsa-spying-europe-claims-us-eu-trade
  9131. http://www.infowars.com/report-nsa-joint-wiretapping-operations-with-foreign-nations/
  9132. http://www.waynemadsenreport.com/articles/20130630
  9133. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/secret-documents-nsa-targeted-germany-and-eu-buildings-a-908609.html
  9134. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/10152478/Francois-Hollande-tells-the-US-to-stop-eavesdropping-on-Europe-if-it-wants-progress-on-trade-deal.html
  9135.  
  9136. ¤ FLASHBACK ; Why We Spy on Our Allies ::
  9137.  
  9138. http://cryptome.org/echelon-cia2.htm
  9139. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  9140. ¤ NSA Stellar Wind Email Internet Data Collection ::
  9141.  
  9142. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  9143. _______________________________________
  9144. ¤ Two NSA IG Reports Differ ::
  9145.  
  9146. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-reports-differ.htm
  9147. _______________________________________
  9148. ¤ Congress Insisted They Be Kept in the Dark on NSA Spying ::
  9149.  
  9150. http://www.infowars.com/congress-insisted-they-be-kept-in-the-dark-on-nsa-spying/
  9151. _______________________________________
  9152. ¤ DoJ Memo on NSA Data Collection on Americans 2007 ::
  9153.  
  9154. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/doj-nsa-memo.pdf
  9155. _______________________________________
  9156. ¤ NSA FISA Surveillance Leaks ::
  9157.  
  9158. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-targeting.pdf
  9159. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  9160. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-certification.pdf
  9161.  
  9162. ¤ Mass Spying of All Telecommunication via FISA ::
  9163.  
  9164. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-prism-dk.pdf
  9165. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prism-collection-documents/
  9166. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/inner-workings-of-a-top-secret-spy-program/282/
  9167. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/20/fisa-court-nsa-without-warrant
  9168. http://techcrunch.com/2013/06/21/new-nsa-warrantless-tactics-reveal-little-room-for-presumption-of-innocence/
  9169. http://www.informationweek.com/global-cio/interviews/nsa-dragnet-debacle-what-it-means-to-it/240156243
  9170. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/inside-the-nsa-peeling-back-the-curtain-on-americas-intelligence-agency-8658016.html
  9171. http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2013/06/nsa-whistleblower-nsa-spying-on-and-blackmailing-high-level-government-officials-and-military-officers.html
  9172. http://boilingfrogspost.com/wp-content/uploads/BF.0112.Tice_20130617.mp3
  9173. http://boilingfrogspost.com/wp-content/uploads/BF.0111.Young_20130613.mp3
  9174. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-14/u-s-agencies-said-to-swap-data-with-thousands-of-firms.html
  9175. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-arch-spy.htm
  9176. http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/06/12/prism-class-action-lawsuit-filed-20b-injunction-sought-against-complicit-companies-and-officials
  9177. http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/06/11/nine-companies-tied-to-prism-obama-will-be-smacked-with-class-action-lawsuit-wednesday
  9178. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2013/06/13/former-justice-prosecutor-seeks-23-billion-in-damages-for-nsa-surveillance-programs/
  9179. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/06/09/rand-paul-planning-class-action-lawsuit-against-surveillance-programs/
  9180. http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-nsa-prism-scandal-20130609,0,432240.story
  9181. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/snowden-censored.htm
  9182. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57588385/nsa-seeks-criminal-probe-of-program-leaker/
  9183. http://theweek.com/article/index/245311/sources-nsa-sucks-in-data-from-50-companies
  9184. http://theweek.com/article/index/245360/solving-the-mystery-of-prism
  9185. http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/welcome-to-the-bush-obama-white-house-they-re-spying-on-us-20130606
  9186. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data
  9187. http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_print.html
  9188. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/obama-prism.pdf
  9189. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/tpm-palantir-prism.pdf
  9190. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/prism-spy-tools.htm
  9191. http://openchannel.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/07/18831985-officials-nsa-mistakenly-intercepted-emails-phone-calls-of-innocent-americans
  9192. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-payed-internet-companies-911/
  9193. http://www.infowars.com/leaked-document-reveals-government-paid-millions-to-prism-participants/
  9194. http://threatpost.com/fisc-no-phone-company-ever-challenged-metadata-collection-orders/102334
  9195. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  9196. http://www.infowars.com/new-nsa-revelations-another-limited-hangout-whitewash/
  9197. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  9198. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-c6ca94801fac_print.html
  9199. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/04/nsa-storing-cell-phone-records-daily-snowden
  9200. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/meet-executive-order-12333-the-reagan-rule-that-lets-the-nsa-spy-on-americans/2014/07/18/93d2ac22-0b93-11e4-b8e5-d0de80767fc2_story.html
  9201. _______________________________________
  9202. ¤ FLASHBACK ; Pentagon Wanted Searchable
  9203. Database of People’s Lives in 2003 ::
  9204.  
  9205. http://dailycaller.com/2013/07/01/pentagon-wanted-searchable-database-of-peoples-lives-in-2003/?print=1
  9206. _______________________________________
  9207. ¤ FLASHBACK ; NSA Undersea Fiber Cable Tapping 1 & 2 ::
  9208.  
  9209. http://cryptome.org/nsa-fibertap.htm
  9210.  
  9211. http://cryptome.org/telecomm-weak.htm
  9212.  
  9213. ¤ FLASHBACK ; NSA Undersea Fiber Optic Tapping ::
  9214.  
  9215. http://cryptome.org/nsa-seatap.htm
  9216. _______________________________________
  9217. ¤ RELATED ; All Online Spy Guides 7zip ::
  9218.  
  9219. http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/online-spying.htm
  9220.  
  9221. http://cryptome.org/online-spying-11-1206.7z
  9222. {[▓▒▒▒▓██▓░░▓██▓░░▓██▓░░▓██▓░░▓██▓▒▒▒▓]}
  9223. {[▓▒▒▒▓██▓░░▓██▓░░▓██▓░░▓██▓░░▓██▓▒▒▒▓]}
  9224.    

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